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NZIER report on compensation for transmission infrastructure

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Figure 2 The effect of compulsory purchase <strong>on</strong><br />

negotiati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

$ Cumulative<br />

transacti<strong>on</strong><br />

cost<br />

Hold-out a d<br />

Price<br />

Backstop c<br />

Price<br />

Source: <str<strong>on</strong>g>NZIER</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

b<br />

0 Limit* Limit<br />

Time & transacti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

In Figure 2 the transacti<strong>on</strong> costs are depicted as a cumulative line (i.e. the critical<br />

issue is the vertical positi<strong>on</strong> of points <strong>on</strong> the line, not the area under the line). The<br />

mirror image of that cumulative transacti<strong>on</strong> cost line – ab – represents the value<br />

obtained from realising the hold-out price after increasingly protracted negotiati<strong>on</strong>s:<br />

at zero transacti<strong>on</strong> cost the full hold-out price is received, but the net return then<br />

diminishes as transacti<strong>on</strong> costs rise. In the presence of a back-stop price it is the<br />

difference in the net hold-out price and the back-stop that determines the limit to<br />

which it is worthwhile to pursue the hold-out price. In Figure 2 that limit is determined<br />

by point c when there is a back-stop price and by point d when there is no back-stop.<br />

So the threat of compulsory purchase can be expected to shorten landowners‟<br />

willingness to negotiate and result in them settling <strong>for</strong> less than they would prefer in a<br />

negotiati<strong>on</strong> unc<strong>on</strong>strained by compulsi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

How much that happens in practice is a moot point. Transpower depends <strong>on</strong> its<br />

relati<strong>on</strong>ships with the owners of lands it crosses over the l<strong>on</strong>g life of its <strong>infrastructure</strong>,<br />

and it is not in its interests to treat them badly in the negotiati<strong>on</strong>s: aggrieved<br />

landowners can be an irritant <strong>on</strong> the smooth running and maintenance of lines <strong>for</strong> a<br />

l<strong>on</strong>g time (e.g. by obstructing access with inadvertently locked gates or frisky bulls in<br />

paddocks that maintenance pers<strong>on</strong>nel must use). As Transpower can pass <strong>on</strong> the<br />

cost of its easements to its customers and still recover its Weighted Average Cost of<br />

Capital it has another incentive not to minimise easement payments.<br />

The possibility that Transpower may pay generously to secure easements, or<br />

purchase them earlier than would be required <strong>for</strong> an optimal acquisiti<strong>on</strong> programme,<br />

is recognised in recent rule changes. Now Transpower is required to obtain approval<br />

be<strong>for</strong>e an easement can be introduced in its capital base, from the Electricity<br />

Commissi<strong>on</strong> (<strong>on</strong> major new investments), the Commerce Commissi<strong>on</strong> (<strong>for</strong> minor<br />

investments) or a client (to pay the bill <strong>for</strong> an easement).<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>NZIER</str<strong>on</strong>g> – Compensati<strong>on</strong> <strong>for</strong> transmissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>infrastructure</strong> 15

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