Winds of Change: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

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Maastricht European Studies Papers 2007/01 Bennet Strang (Torreblanca, 2001; Featherstone, 2003; Smith, 2004; Mahncke, 2004). The COREU telex system 58 , firstly, embodies this réflexe communautaire (Wong, 2005) and, secondly, serves as an enabling feature for coordination to take place. One might suggest that the very existence of this réflexe is indicative of a feedback process, characterized by “…national politicians…increasingly think[ing] in European terms…” (Mahncke, 2004, p. 372). 4.2.4 Bureaucratic Re-organization This ‘thinking in European terms’ is also reflected in the extensive re-organization of national foreign service structures in response to improving participation in CFSP over the years 59 (Sjursen, 2003). New national CFSP counsellors have been appointed, diplomatic services extended and departmental re-orientation towards Europe has taken place. In this process, smaller member states have been more willingly adjusted their comparatively limited administrative structures (Smith, 2000). It might be suggested that as the European venue is pivotal for smaller states in contrast to larger ones, which have more alternative diplomatic channels, the former ones have to concentrate all their efforts on the European venue to make their impact felt. Furthermore, whereas the UK, for instance, might consider the use of European channels to be a loss compared to its lost world power status, smaller states more likely regard this venue to be a gain for the conduct of their foreign policy and status upgrade. 4.3 Enabling and (Constraining) Conceptual Limits After having elaborated on the theoretical components of the concept, the focus will shift to the debate as to whether Europeanization enables and/ or constrains national governments in their conduct of foreign policy. This will be followed by an outline of the concept’s limits. Turning to the enabling theory first, functional logic holds that the European venue can be not convergence” (Radaelli, 2004, p. 14; Radaelli, 2000). The member states are still in the driver’s seat when it comes to deciding on whether they converge on positions and act collectively or not (Smith, 2003). For the time being, the ‘cooperators’ prevail over the ‘integrators’, as “[c]oordination rather than integration…remains the guideline” (Mahncke, 2004, p. 32; Hill, 1983; Smith, 2003). 58 This system, which enables European national foreign ministries to exchange information in a very short time and, eventually, coordinate action, is “…assumed to have a socializing character and to support the convergence among national foreign policy actors” (Osswald, 2005, p. 21). Accordingly, “Spanish participation in the EPC framework…proved decisive to socialize Spanish diplomats in the habits of coordination and consensus-seeking and to have Spanish policies gradually converge with those of the other member states” (Torreblanca, 2001). 59 Thus, “there is substantial evidence to show that EU membership in general and CFSP membership in particular influence the way individual member states organize their pursuit of foreign policy” (Smith, 2000, p. 619; Smith, 2004). 16
Maastricht European Studies Papers 2007/01 Bennet Strang used in order to amplify national interests 60 , provided that their uploading took place. From a realist and rationalist intergovernmental/ consequentiality perspective, Europeanization is only likely to occur after a cost-benefit analysis has revealed that participation in European structures would be in one’s own national self-interest. Based on the “…‘politics of scale’…” (Smith, 2003, p. 242) reasoning, deliberate recourse to EU instruments will only be made if their application better meets the challenges at hand than the use of national devices would (i Fanés, 2001). Those considerations allude once more to the question of whether the member states are controlling the Europeanization process, i.e. are in the driver’s seat, or whether the process controls them (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). Apart from that, the question of who serves whom is difficult to answer; it has been shown that no automatism exists. What is indisputable, however, is that foreign policy cooperation contains the possibility for member states to supervise and influence each other’s positions 61 (Mahncke, 2004). Furthermore, European participation enabled Spain, inter alia, to regain its international status after the Franco dictatorship, acquire more political influence and modernize its foreign service 62 . There exist, however, “…‘tiers of exclusivity’…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 10). They refer to the extent to which a member state is able to influence EU external affairs relatively to other states. Accordingly, Germany would have more influence than Malta. Speaking with one voice, on the other hand, bestows enormous influence on all member states 63 (Wong, 2005). In the course of coming to a common position, concessions have to be made and compromises struck, which might be perceived of as being constraining. Even more constraining for the concept itself are its own limits. Identifying them is vital “…in order to be able to distinguish those changes which are a result of Europeanisation 60 Accordingly, the “…EU has provided an excellent opportunity to enhance the foreign policy capacity and the national goals of a country which had a large and problematic foreign policy agenda, scant economic resources to match ambitions with policies, little international prestige, and a weak foreign service” (Torreblanca, 2001). 61 On top of that, foreign policy-making in a European environment indirectly provides for the possibility of a so-called smokescreen, i.e. empowers states by “…by giving them manoeuvring room to make politically difficult domestic reforms under the cover of the EU” (Wong, 2005, p. 135). This may justify (in)action, provide an alibi for foreign policy change and deflect external pressure (Hill, 1983). 62 Likewise, Tonra notes with reference to Ireland, Denmark and Holland that “‘political co-operation improved the effectiveness, broadened the range and increased the capabilities of foreign policy making’” (quoted in Sjursen, 1999). 63 Here, the impact of globalization on the conduct of foreign policy has to be elaborated upon. As globalization entails both growing levels of interconnectedness and interdependence, diplomacy must, thus, be more characterized by adjustment processes (White, 2005). Globalization, furthermore, “…creates pressures on the EU to act collectively” (Smith, 2003, p. 242) by challenging traditional state-centric notions of sovereignty and foreign policy (White, 2005). It, thereby, indirectly adds to the development of an EFP. 17
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Winds of Change: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

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