Winds of Change: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

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Maastricht European Studies Papers 2007/01 Bennet Strang supposed that projection is more successfully exercised by larger states due to their comparatively extensive administrative capabilities, the validity of this suggestion can be doubted. Both domestic pressures and the level of commitment to EU policy development is more decisive (Wong, 2005). What can be said, however, is that the more complex and large Europe becomes the harder it gets for (rivalling) states to project their national foreign policy objectives (Maull, 2006). 4.2.3 Elite Socialization “European socialisation not necessarily concerns the adoption of supranational role conceptions at the expense of intergovernmental conceptions or the mere shift of one category to another; it might also imply a re-definition or a re-conceptualisation of existing intergovernmental conceptions” 47 . While tracing national adaptation has already proven to be a difficult undertaking, even more so is uncovering evidence for this ‘re-conceptualization’, i.e. the repercussions of elite socialization (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). It is easier to enumerate the conditions for it to happen in the first place. Those are secrecy, a communication reflex, consensus and mutual respect for and acceptance of domaines privés (Osswald, 2005). Proposing this definition according to which “[s]ocialization…means the process by which actors internalize the norms which then influence how they see themselves and what they perceive as their [potentially changing national] interests” 48 , the pivotal importance and centrality for the Europeanization of foreign policy becomes apparent. Assuming that the socialization of policy-makers into a European decision-making framework has an effect on their belief system 49 , the distinctive national orientation they have might be supplemented if not partly transformed by commonly accepted and legitimate 50 European norms and social identities. Those transnational norms are subsequently adhered to, inter alia, in national day-to-day policy-making. This Europeanization of decision-makers 51 47 (Beyers, 2002) 48 (i Fanés, 2001) 49 “The `belief system' of the practitioner is a deep-rooted legacy of experience and political culture, but it is also an organic set of attitudes which is capable, within limits, of self-transformation” (Hill quoted in Aggestam, 1999). 50 Likewise, the increasing practice to take decisions in the EU arena is also considered to be legitimate, according to the so-called appropriateness logic (Smith, 2004). 51 Some scholars suggest that larger member states experience a lower degree of elite socialization in the foreign policy domain, in contrast to smaller ones (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). However, despite the fact that “[e]ven for actors who are regularly involved in European policy-making, European experiences basically function as a secondary socialisation processes… [emphasis on original]” 14
Maastricht European Studies Papers 2007/01 Bennet Strang is, in turn, expected to result in more decisions having a European dimension (Sjursen, 2003). Elite socialization at the European level is, furthermore, made possible and enhanced by mutual trust and a club atmosphere, to whose informal norms and rules the participants adhere (Smith, 2000; Osswald, 2005). An increasing European orientation of foreign policy-making groups might, thus, “…lead to an actual ‘Europeanisation’ of foreign policy…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 8) 52 . In this context, it can be imagined that the envisioned establishment of a European diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS) 53 , might eventually represent a socializing institution 54 and lead to an increased convergence in European foreign policy positions 55 (Mahncke, 2004). Case studies have highlighted that regular consultation, confidentiality and a consensual decision-making style, which are the characteristics of the European foreign policy-making 56 community, have already decisively impacted upon national foreign policy structures and belief systems and, thereby, led to a certain convergence in outcomes 57 (Beyers, 2002), the question arises, firstly, of how to ‘measure’ socialization degrees in comparative terms and, secondly, of why smaller states allegedly experience a higher degree. One suggestion might be that as smaller states do not have as many alternative diplomatic venues as larger ones do, they concentrate all their efforts on the European venue to make their impact felt by engaging in national projection. Due to this intense exposition to and contact with European decision-making channels, they, consequently, become more Europeanized. 52 Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the transformative impact of elite socialization of foreign policy-makers at the European level. Corresponding to Aggestam’s (1999) suggestion that e.g. “German foreign policy-makers…tend to avoid acknowledging potential role-conflicts in case that would involve privileging a particular institution or set of relationships in favour of another”, an interview with an high-ranking official of the Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany neglected any loyalty or identity conflicts between both the national and European level. Thus, one ‘chooses not to choose’, in accordance with the German sowohl als auch approach. Nonetheless, the necessity to think transnationally, which comes with holding the EU presidency, and the frequent lending of national diplomats, formalized in the 1981 London Report, advance the European socialization of foreign policy actors (Osswald, 2005). 53 However, with the negative referenda on the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands, this service has not come into existence for the time being. 54 Smith (2003) defines socializing institutions as “…develop[ing], through education and socialization, a territorial identity and a cultural community with a sense of belonging, emotional attachment, and shared codes of meaning” (p. 338). 55 One could argue that the EFP has to be build up from the micro level onwards by means of educating (socializing) diplomats in a European spirit. Common thinking and mutual understanding will, thus, result eventually in common European positions. In this context, Duke (2002) proposes the establishment of an educational institution in order to provide prospective diplomats with a distinctively European background. Since the member states will, however, not that easily give in on the possibility to send their nationally minded diplomats to Brussels, “…any diplomatic training at the European level must be careful not to present itself as an alternative to national diplomatic training schemes” (p. 865; Mahncke, 2004). 56 This community provides “…a textured environment, a part in a process, a social sphere for continued and intensifying interaction” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 251). 57 Convergence, yes or no; this question is disputed. Much depends on the terming of whether one can speak about convergence to have taken place. Osswald (2005) already considers the weakening of the Austrian and Irish neutrality status to be indicative of convergence. However, “…Europeanisation is 15
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