Winds of Change: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

Maastricht European Studies Papers 2007/01 Bennet Strang 

Winds of Change: The Europeanization of National 

Foreign Policy 

Maastricht European Studies Papers 2007/01 

Date of Publication: January 2007 

Email Author: b.strang@student.unimaas.nl 

Abstract: 

Bennet Strang 

This paper applies the multi-faceted theory of Europeanization to the domain of 

national foreign policy and traces the change the latter underwent in response to the 

impact of EU institutions, norms and policy-making styles. The analysis of both the 

characteristics of and interrelatedness between the notions of sovereignty and foreign 

policy will highlight their receptivity to change. As will become apparent, foreign 

policy is not an impermeable realm of state sovereignty. This insight provides the 

basis for an outline of the repercussions the European arena has on national foreign 

policy regimes and the conduct of foreign policy. Practical examples of this impact 

will draw on a definition of the Europeanization concept and an analysis of its 

characteristics. 

MESP is a peer-reviewed journal that publishes working papers from ‘European Studies’ students. 

MESP is a joint initiative of the European Studies Programme at the Faculty of Arts and Social 

Sciences, University of Maastricht, and the European Studies student association ‘Concordantia’.


Contents 

1. Introduction p. 1 

2. At the Heart of Foreign Policy – Sovereignty p. 2 

3. At the Heart of Sovereignty – Foreign Policy p. 4 

4. Foreign Policy goes Europe, or the other Way around? – p. 7 

The Europeanization of Foreign Policy 

4.1 Defining ‘Europeanization of Foreign Policy’ p. 8 

4.2 Delving further into a multi-faceted concept p. 10 

4.2.1 National Adaptation p. 11 

4.2.2 National Projection p. 13 

4.2.3 Elite Socialization p. 14 

4.2.4 Bureaucratic Re-organization p. 16 

4.3 Enabling and (Constraining) Conceptual Limits p. 17 

5. Conclusion p. 19 

6. References p. 21 

7. Appendix p. 24


1. Introduction 

It was a surprise that he went to Teheran, wasn’t it? When the five permanent members of the 

United Nations’ (UN) Security Council plus Germany met in order to discuss the further 

strategy of how to deal with Iran’s attempts to get its hands on the nuclear weapon, the 

European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 

was commissioned to deliver the group’s proposals to Teheran personally. The observer may 

have been struck by surprise that Mr Solana, embodying the EU’s ‘foreign policy’, conveyed 

the message and not one of the five (six) ministers of foreign affairs. As there has always been 

a lot of symbolism to the discipline of diplomacy, this journey can certainly be considered 

symbolic too. 

Since the times of the failed European Defence Community (EDC), European member 

states have increasingly come to devise common foreign policy positions. In this process, both 

globalization and European integration in ‘high politics’ have left their imprint on the 

traditional and modern, Westphalian, notions of both sovereignty and the (sovereign) state. 

However, in the post-modern context of the European integration project, these two concepts 

have undergone substantive change. This is likewise applicable to the concept and exercise of 

national foreign policy, which is not any longer directed against other European states, aiming 

to assert a state’s sovereignty but increasingly incorporated in and part of common European 

positions to external challenges. This re-orientation is exemplified by the emergence of 

concerted European foreign policy approaches, i.e. led by the EU-3 in the Iranian case, and 

the so-called phenomenon of Europeanization. 

The latter broadly speaking refers to both the impact of ‘the European’ on ‘the 

domestic’ and vice versa. Still being in its infancy, Europeanization has originally only been 

applied to first pillar developments but is increasingly used to account for occurrences which 

take place in the second one. In this context, it is an applicable explanatory tool to account for 

changes in the fields of both foreign policy and sovereignty, which will be also carried out in 

this paper. Being a fashionable term, it has a wide analytical scope, which in turn contains the 

risk of conceptual stretching. 

Firstly, the focus will be on the meanings and characteristics of two intimately 

interlinked concepts, i.e. foreign policy and sovereignty. The analysis will highlight that the 

Europeanization of foreign policy is a post-modern phenomenon occurring in a post-modern 

polity, which is made possible and builds upon the conceptual changes of both foreign policy 

and sovereignty. In an attempt to attach flesh to the characteristics and shortcomings of the 

multi-faceted Europeanization concept in the light of foreign policy, practical examples 

1


thereof will be provided. The reader, thus, gets an impression of the real-life repercussions 

Europeanization has on national foreign policy cultures, their ways of conduct and, finally, 

their transformation against the European backdrop. 

2. At the Heart of Foreign Policy – Sovereignty 

“One of the most important analytical challenges for scholars of international relations is to 

identify different meanings of state, sovereignty and territory, and to understand their origins, 

comprehend their changes of meaning, analyze their interrelationships, and characterize their 

transformations” 1 

In the undertaking of tracing the impact of Europeanization on foreign policy, the analytical 

emphasis must firstly be on the dynamic concept of sovereignty. Elaborating on its meaning, 

methodological linkages with foreign policy and the changes it underwent will provide the 

framework to position an analysis of the Europeanization of foreign policy. However, the very 

meaning of the concept of sovereignty has to be clarified first. 

Principally, the concept of sovereignty has been and still is a central and popular one 

in the international system, on top of which it is “…difficult to acquire – and to lose” (Hill, 

2003, p. 31). Connected to the notions of authority, identity and territory (Biersteker, 2002), 

“…sovereignty means that a state enjoys political independence from other states” (Jackson/ 

Sørensen, 2003, p. 280). Being the promising guiding light of all nations seeking to brake 

away from colonial rule or dominant oppressors and aiming to establish a sovereign, i.e. 

independent, nation-state, the possession of sovereignty is synonymous with having had the 

power to acquire and maintain it (Hill, 2003). Likewise, the mentioning of sovereignty in a 

Westphalian sense took and continues to take place in one stroke of breath with reference to a 

state, just as you have to say B after you have said A (Biersteker, 2002). 

The ‘state’, however, is essentially a socially constructed concept (ibid). This gives 

rise to the question of how the concept of sovereignty will adapt to possible changes in the 

definition of a ‘state’, in the context of European integration and the intrusive forces of 

globalization. Unquestioningly, “…the possibility of change in the operational meaning of 

sovereignty…” (p. 162) exists, which is underlined by the continuously evolving connotations 

of the dynamic concepts of both sovereignty and state (ibid.; Jackson/ Sørensen, 2003). The 

explanatory scope of traditional realist state-centric approaches, however, does not account 

for such transformations (ibid.; Biersteker, 2002). Nevertheless, the fact that the Westphalian 

concept of sovereignty has undergone considerable change and currently continues to do so 

1 (Biersteker, 2002, p. 157) 

2


under the impact of the supranational European integration process implies that theories on 

sovereignty should expand their focus and analytical scope. This would allow them to account 

for those forces which are at the heart of the change in the meanings of both state and 

sovereignty (ibid.). The latter has, anyways, never existed in a realist, ‘pure’ form, the reason 

for which is why some scholars refer to it as “…‘organized hypocrisy’…” (Krasner quoted in 

Biersteker, 2002, p. 161). States necessarily intervene in each other’s affairs in the process of 

mutual interaction, which in turn strictly speaking violates the key principle of sovereignty, 

i.e. the principle of non-intervention. Thus, it is interesting to see how the concept of 

sovereignty changes in the process of continuous interaction brought about by European 

integration. 

This idea of change has also been alluded to by the former UN Secretary General 

Ghali, who remarked that the “…‘the time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty…has 

passed’…” (quoted in Jackson/ Sørensen, 2003, p. 281). 2 Accordingly, the traditional state- 

centric conduct of foreign policy, which has always aimed at maintaining full state 

sovereignty, has increasingly acquired a European dimension. However, despite Kissinger’s 3 

warning not to abandon the sovereign nation-state as long as there is no proven alternative in 

place yet, the EU member states ceded substantial parts of their sovereignty and thereby 

increasingly transformed this concept into a “…bargaining resource for a politics 

characterized by complex transnational networks’” (Keohane quoted in ibid. p. 283). In this 

process of European integration, foreign policy, at whose heart sovereignty is, has been 

subjected to the impact of EU institutions, norms and policy-making styles. As a result, 

foreign policy itself underwent considerable change. 

“There is a lively debate on the impact of Europeanization” (Radaelli, 2000, p. 10). 

Departing from the assumption that sovereignty is essentially connected to a claim of 

authority 4 , the Europeanization challenge to foreign policy inherently represents such an 

issue-specific demand 5 (Biersteker, 2002). Considering that authority claims “…determine[] 

the change in the meaning of sovereignty…” (p. 168) and that states face other authority 

claims from (supranational) actors in the field of foreign policy, one has to ask further 

whether the Europeanization process gradually hollows out the sovereignty of EU member 

2 

Nevertheless, it is still the predominant principle of International Relations (IR) worldwide (Jackson/ 

Sørensen, 2003). 

3 

Henry A. Kissinger was National Security Advisor (1969-1975) and US Secretary of State (1973- 

1977). 

4 

‘Authority’ refers in this context to the institutionalized power of national foreign ministries in their 

conduct of foreign policy (Biersteker, 2002). 

5 

The impact of Europeanization on foreign policy will be elaborated upon in the following parts of the 

paper. 

3


states in foreign affairs. This might finally lead to the de-coupling of the concepts of state and 

sovereignty (ibid.). Likewise, as the traditional meaning of what a ‘state’ constitutes is 

increasingly being challenged in the process of European integration, so is the traditional 

notion of state-centric sovereignty. 

Nonetheless, an eventual change in the meaning of the latter does not necessarily 

amount to the generalizing equation ‘Europeanization of foreign policy=loss of sovereignty’ 

(ibid.). What it gives rise to, however, is the valid question of whether one can continue to 

apply and stick to the modern Westphalian conception of sovereignty, considering the 

contemporary foreign policy making style, which is increasingly rooted in inter-state 

cooperation and embedded in a European framework (ibid.). Moreover, it has to be asked 

whether we are currently witnessing a shift to a post-Westphalian notion of sovereignty, of 

which the increasingly Europeanized and post-modern conduct of foreign policy might be 

indicative. In order to prepare the basis for answering this question, light will be shed on the 

nature of the concept of foreign policy in the following section. 

3. At the Heart of Sovereignty – Foreign Policy 

The purpose of a nation’s foreign policy should be power, strength and influence in 

furtherance of its interests and beliefs. That purpose never changes. But the context in which 

it is pursued does. 6 

Indeed, the context has changed, as outlined with regard to the supposed transformations of 

the sovereignty concept. Before focusing on the changed environment in which foreign policy 

is contemporarily conducted, the very concept must be addressed first. The reader will notice 

that the concepts of sovereignty and foreign policy are both intimately intertwined and 

complementary. However, what is ‘foreign policy’? 

There is no fast answer to this question, as there are multiple definitions, giving rise to 

a certain conceptual ambiguity (Carlsnaes, 2002). Choosing a definition, however, is 

“…crucial in circumscribing the field of investigation” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 2). On 

the one hand, it must be narrow enough in order to be workable, while it should also not be 

too narrow on the other hand (ibid.). In its simplest form, foreign policy refers to the external 

activities and relations of a sovereign state with other states in pursuance of its objectives in 

the international community (Manners/ Whitman, 2000; Mahncke, 2004; Bátora, 2005). 

Opting for a more sophisticated definition of the concept, one could say that 

6 (Blair quoted in Haugevik, 2005, p. 7) 

4


“foreign policies consist of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly 

stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental 

representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward 

objectives, conditions and actors- both governmental and non-governmental – which 

they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy [own emphasis]” 7 

The mentioning of ‘sovereign communities’ in one stroke of breath with foreign policy points 

to the intimate linkage between both concepts, over which one will come across more often in 

this paper. Additionally, reference to a community reveals another aspect of foreign policy, 

which is related to the notion of identity each of the former has (Aggestam, 1999). Foreign 

policy, accordingly, “…plays a significant role in the socio-political imagination of a 

collective identity” (ibid.; Torreblanca, 2001). Put differently by applying Rousseau’s volonté 

générale concept, foreign policy can be seen as the expression of the sovereign people’s will. 

This reading even more emphasizes its status as the key sovereignty domain of nation-states 

(Hill, 2003). In the course of ‘expressing’ the popular will, policy-makers draw on the so- 

called politics of identity in order to “…mobilise a sense of cohesion and solidarity to 

legitimate the general thrust of foreign policy” (Aggestam, 1999). Following this line of 

thought, the so-called concept of national responsibility, which holds that statesmen are 

exclusively responsible for the well-being of their people 8 , would be applicable here (Jackson/ 

Sørensen, 2003). 

The definition, furthermore, contains a state-centred bias, which is typical for modern 

Westphalian conceptualizations of foreign policy. However, it is problematic if one wants to 

account for the increasingly consensual and cross-national style of contemporary post-modern 

foreign policy-making (Wong, 2005). According to this reasoning, the exercise of foreign 

policy is considered to be “…the domaine réservé of sovereign governments and therefore 

exclusive to states” (p. 140) 9 . This implies that foreign policy is an impermeable realm, 

7 (Carlsnaes, 2002, p. 335). Additionally, one could conceptualize foreign policy as being made up of 

“…‘ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the 

policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in nonstate actors, in the international economy, 

or in the physical environment of the world’” (Wong, 2005, p. 140). The main instrument of foreign is 

diplomacy, which in turn can be characterized as “‘the process of dialogue and negotiation by which 

states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war’” (Watson 

quoted in Bátora, 2005, p. 46). 

8 In order to live up to this (realist) obligation, statesmen are expected to have nothing else in mind but 

national self-interest, the protection of national security and, finally, the defence and advancement of 

their own people’s benefit, all of which they are morally obliged to (Jackson/ Sørensen, 2003). 

9 One has to be aware of the existence of so-called national ‘ring-fenced’ domains, which states do not 

want to see touched upon or affected by the characteristics of Europeanization (Manners/ Whitman, 

2000). 

5


forbidden to supranational influences (Sjursen, 2003). The associated state-centric school 10 , 

thus, favours the traditional realist and intergovernmental approach with states being 

sovereign key actors, putting a premium on self-interest and utility maximization (Wong, 

2005). The European idealist school 11 , in contrast, also allows for non-state actors to play a 

role in foreign policy. Nonetheless, it does not fail to acknowledge that states’ foreign policies 

are important though, allegedly, being gradually replaced by a common European approach 

(ibid.). 

The theoretical assumptions of the state-centric school appear to be outdated, against 

the background of the incrementally developing European venue of foreign policy making. As 

“…studying foreign policy in an EU context has its particular intricacies” (Mahncke, 2004, p. 

27), since multiple non-state actors are involved in a multilevel foreign policy game 12 

(Sjursen, 2003), one “…must at least reflect on the possibility that the very fundament of 

national foreign policy is changing” (Sjursen, 1999; Biersteker, 2002). Understandably, 

European states have jealously tried to maintain full foreign policy autonomy (Smith, 2003), 

although they could not forestall that 

“‘…the conduct of foreign policy [has been moved] away from the old nation-state 

sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high-level networking 

with transformationalist effects and even more potential’ [own emphasis]” 13 . 

The prospect of an increased foreign policy ‘potential’, i.e. greater impact, which derives from 

a concerted European position on foreign policy matters, is a key motivation to cooperate in 

this sensitive area in the first place 14 . 

10 In accordance with this school, traditional foreign policy analysis is applicable and maintains that 

the member states remain the key actors (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). 

11 To this school, transformational foreign policy analysis is attributable, which holds that the conduct 

of foreign policy gradually slips into the hands of supranational actors, who thereby increasingly play 

into this key sovereignty domain of the nation-state (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). 

12 In this context, “…EU membership involves asking some difficult questions of foreign policy 

practices…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 264), as for example the one about the influence of the 

European Commission on foreign policy-making under first pillar prerogatives, cross-pillar conflicts 

and delimitations of influence in external matters and eventual rival claims to external representation 

in Brussels by the German Länder. 

13 (Hill quoted in Wong, 2005, p. 138) 

14 This also relates to the motivation of small member states to amplify their voice by siding with 

bigger ones. Moreover, there is of course a certain conflict of interest observable, characterized on the 

one hand by the “…drive to act collectively on the world stage and the desire to retain national 

autonomy…” (Smith, 2003, p. 230), on the other. It seems appropriate to suggest that “…the Member 

States conduct all but the most limited foreign policies objectives inside an EU context” (Manners/ 

Whitman, 2000, p. 243). The “[t]he value of Political Cooperation to member governments has thus to 

be established and re-established as new issues and crises arise” (Wallace quoted in Hill, 1983, p. 8). 

6


4. Foreign Policy goes Europe, or the other Way around? – The 

Europeanization of Foreign Policy 

By having highlighted the conceptual characteristics of both foreign policy and sovereignty, it 

has become apparent that both interlinked concepts have been subjected to and underwent 

substantial change. Furthermore, a basis has been provided from which one can further 

elaborate on the concept of Europeanization, how it is defined, its theoretical components, the 

advantages and disadvantages of its use and its limits. In the following section, the strands 

previously analyzed will, thus, be put together and both enriched and complemented with the 

introduction of this new concept. Moreover, the relationship between both Europeanization 

and globalization will be dealt with. Finally, an outlook of the impact of the former will round 

off the picture of theoretical elaborations substantiated with practical examples. 

However, before the repercussions of Europeanization on foreign policy can take 

center stage, on overview of the different connotations and usages of the concept has to be 

given first. Olsen (2003) enumerates five different dimensions in this respect. It is, thus 

firstly, used in reference to denote European enlargement, secondly, it is synonymous with the 

development of European governance institutions, thirdly, Europeanization is relied upon to 

characterize the worldwide export of “…European forms of political organization and 

governance…” (p. 334), fourthly, it can be seen as a political concept aiming at deepening 

European integration and, fifthly and finally, Europeanization can refer to the domestic 

impact of European institutions on EU member states. The term’s usage in these multiple 

contexts highlights that it lacks a stable definition, which, according to Olsen (2003), brings 

with it the question of whether the concept is useful at all. 

Moreover, a question which has to be asked at this point is whether foreign policy is 

immune to Europeanization, as member states supposedly guard this key domain of national 

sovereignty jealously (Wong, 2005). If this were the case, there would be no sense in studying 

the Europeanization of foreign policy 15 . However, i Fanés (2001) affirms that “…there is a 

case for studying the Europeanisation of foreign policy, despite the fact that this policy 

remains, by and large, at the national governments’ hands”, indeed. It, thus, becomes apparent 

that “…foreign policy is not a special case immune to Europeanization pressures… [emphasis 

in original]” (Wong, 2005, p. 137). As a consequence, the traditional modern state-centric 

image of regarding foreign policy (and sovereignty) as an impermeable and exclusive domain 

of nation-states proves to be outdated once more. This becomes even further apparent by 

15 So far, “…relatively little research has been conducted on the Europeanization of national foreign 

policy…” (Osswald, 2005, p. 4; Smith, 2003). 

7


considering, firstly, “…competing centres of influence…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 244) 

in the European post-modern setting, which, secondly, are at the heart of and contribute to the 

increasing blurring of the previously clear demarcation of what constitutes the ‘domestic’ and 

the ‘foreign’ sphere 16 even in high politics, i.e. foreign policy 17 (Sjursen, 1999; Manners/ 

Whitman, 2000; Wong, 2005). Before elaborating upon the facets of the Europeanization of 

foreign policy in-depth, an attempt to define this phenomenon has to be made first. 

4.1 Defining ‘Europeanization of Foreign Policy’ 

“‘Europeanization’…can be a useful entry-point for greater understanding of important 

changes occurring in our politics and society. The obligation of the researcher is to give it a 

precise meaning” 18 

Attributing a ‘precise meaning’ to Europeanization of foreign policy is, indeed, not such an 

easy task as it appears to be at first sight, since there is no common definition (Smith, 2003). 

It is pivotal not to equate the perception of the Europeanization of ‘less sensitive’ policy areas 

with the degree and characteristics of the same phenomenon in the field (and special case) of 

foreign policy. Thus, member states will not readily agree to a transfer of competences and, 

thereby, sovereignty to Brussels in this prestigious domain (Sjursen, 2003), as they probably 

would and have more easily done in low politics areas 19 , such as environmental policy. 

Nonetheless, the features Europeanization processes of both low and high politics have in 

common are incrementalism, the concern about domestic adaptation to EU decision-making, 

norms and atmosphere 20 and “…the political and policy changes caused by the impact of 

16 This is to say that due to the Europeanization process, European policy is nowadays increasingly 

perceived of as being part of domestic policy, leading to a situation in which it “…is no longer 

possible to make a clear distinction between European foreign and domestic policy…” (Manners/ 

Whitman, 2000, p. 44). 

17 However, the Europeanization of foreign policy can at this point in the paper already be said to 

represent a special case, as it is “…not just another public policy” (Torreblanca, 2001) area in which 

Europeanization takes place. This view will further manifest itself in the course of the paper. 

18 (Featherstone, 2003, p. 3) 

19 Even in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which can be seen both as an 

expression of concerted action in the sensitive foreign policy domain and “…a process of 

‘Europeanisation’ of foreign policy…” (Sjursen, 2003, p. 15), member states still vigorously affirm 

their central decision-making prerogatives by having subjected CFSP decision-making to 

intergovernmental unanimity. Thus, the perception of Europeanization of foreign policy as being a 

vertical and hierarchical top-down process embedded in a principal-agent structure (de Flers, 2005) is 

considered by member states to be absolutely beyond the pale. This, in turn, does not neglect the 

CFSP’s transformative impact on their foreign policies, which is limited as far as the socialization of 

policy makers in a European sense is concerned, inter alia inhibiting “…the EU to act decisively” 

(Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 80; Sjursen, 2003; de Flers, 2005) 

20 One of the earliest definitions of Europeanization has been put forward by Ladrech, accounting for it 

as “…‘a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU political and 

8


membership in the European Union on the member states” (Wong, 2005, p. 135; Manners/ 

Whitman, 2000) 21 . This mix of adaptation, elite socialization and re-organization of foreign 

policy (structures) is, after reviewing alternative suggestions 22 , best captured by Tonra’s 

definition. Accordingly, Europeanization of foreign policy is characterized by 

“‘…a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed 

[following pressure for adaptation], in the ways in which professional roles are defined 

and pursued and in the consequent internationalisation of norms and expectations arising 

from a complex system of collective European policy making’” 23 . 

Taking this conceptualization as the paper’s underlying working definition and after having 

defined the concept, extensive light will subsequently be shed on the facets of 

Europeanization of foreign policy in general. 

4.2 Delving further into a multi-faceted 24 concept 

“…Europeanisation provides a fascinating perspective on how governance is changing” 25 . 

‘Change’ seems to be a good starting point for this section, as the very fact that 

Europeanization is being applied to foreign policy is already indicative of a certain change. 

economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’” 

(quoted in Featherstone, 2003, p. 12). He has, thus, very much emphasized the element of receptive 

adaptation (i Fanés, 2001). However, the implicit precondition for ‘reorienting the direction and shape 

of politics’ is that those actors deciding on politics have been affected, the process of which is 

accounted for by Radaelli. He, consequently, defines Europeanization as “‘…processes of (a) 

construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 

paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 

consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 

subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies’” (quoted in Featherstone, 2003, p. 17). 

21 The underlying assumption of debating the impact of ‘the EU’ on domestic structures of all sorts is 

of course that ‘the EU factor’ matters. This recognition is already an implicit acknowledgment of the 

EU’s importance. Furthermore, the very fact that the connection between both Europeanization and 

foreign policy domain is being made, hints at the increased importance of the European venue for the 

making of national foreign policy. Accordingly, “[t]he key proposition of Europeanization is that 

membership in the European Union has an important impact on each member state’s foreign policy 

and that this impact is increasing in salience” (Wong, 2005, p. 152). This impact, however, is 

inherently “…incremental, irregular, and uneven over time and between locations…” (Featherstone, 

2003, p. 4). 

22 i Fanés (2001) emphasizes the ‘adaptation dimension’ of Europeanization of foreign policy, defining 

it “…as the process of foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation 

pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European integration process” (White, 2001; 

Featherstone, 2003). 

23 (quoted in Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 245) 

24 This multi-faceted nature becomes clear from being able to think of ‘Europeanization’ broadly as 

(a) enlargement, (b) institutionalization at the European level, (c) export of European institutions, (d) 

European integration project and its strengthening and, (f) domestic impact of EU institutions’ output 

(Smith, 2003). 

25 (Radaelli, 2004, p. 16) 

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Originally being only confined to supranational first pillar developments, nobody would have 

imagined applying this ‘first pillar concept’ to the second, intergovernmental, pillar (Major/ 

Pomorska, 2005). Whereas one could also safely conceptualize the increasing 

communitarization of policy areas in the process of European integration by means of the 

neofunctionalist spillover idea, such thinking seemed to be likewise inconceivable with 

regards to second pillar (‘spillover’) developments 26 . 

Nonetheless, Mahncke (2004) makes the case for applying the spillover concept to 

developments in the intergovernmental domain 27 . The exception, however, is that states are 

not passively subjected to a ‘drive’ towards increasing integration in foreign policy issues 

(ibid.). Thus, there is no automatism, which is in turn suggested by neofunctionalism 28 . 

There is, however, a wasteful use of this fashionable term Europeanization has become 

(Torreblanca, 2001), leading to a situation in which the concept in general is expected to 

“…explain processes of cultural change, new identities formation, policy change, 

administrative innovation, and even modernization” (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4). It has to be 

inquired whether such a demand does not result in conceptual stretching, arbitrariness and 

shallowness. Due to its intergovernmental character, the foreign policy domain in particular 

has only seen a rare usage of the concept 29 (Featherstone, 2003). 

Despite its initially less frequent usage, the very invocation of Europeanization in 

relation with foreign policy “…has reflected the evolution of EU foreign policy coordination 

itself” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 10). This evolution can be accounted for by the already outlined 

neofunctionalist approach and both constructivist and realist theories, which will later be 

addressed (Osswald, 2005). There is, in fact, a certain evolutionary process, a ‘Brusselisation’ 

of foreign policy 30 going on. Even “…states jealous of their foreign policy sovereignty have 

not been immune to…” (Wong, 2005, p. 145) this development. Notwithstanding, it has to be 

26 

An example would be the development from European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the 

increasingly assertive European Foreign Policy (EFP). 

27 

One should, nevertheless, acknowledge and keep in mind the pitfalls associated with this 

application. 

28 

In matters of foreign policy cooperation, the member states have always chosen and “…choose 

which aspects of their foreign policy they share, and which they retain” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 

266), with the majority of foreign policy issues still being dealt with by them (Mahncke, 2004). As one 

might even observe a re-nationalization of foreign policy in crises (cf. Iraq War) (Mackenstein/ Marsh, 

2005), it becomes even more obvious that the “…EU is far from a single entity that dictates the actions 

of its member states” (p. 248). 

29 

As another consequence, “…cases related to EU foreign policy have not figured high in the research 

agenda of Europeanization” (Torreblanca, 2001; Osswald, 2005). 

30 

The impact of this ‘Brusselisation’ has uncovered that some Member States’ “…notions of 

specialness and…domain[es] privé[s] are more fluid concepts than was initially thought…” (Manners/ 

Whitman, 2000, p. 268). This very fact points at the indirect strength of Europeanization in foreign 

policy affairs. 

10


stressed again that there is no uncontrollable automatism in place 31 , i.e. “…‘Brusselisation’ of 

foreign policy does not mean the wholesale communitarization of foreign policy making and 

implementation…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 264). 

In the following, the analysis will turn towards and separately elaborate upon four 

central theoretical components of Europeanization of foreign policy. These are national 

adaptation (downloading), national projection (uploading), elite socialization and bureaucratic 

re-organization. In addition, horizontal learning and adaptation processes amongst the 

member states are taking place, the phenomenon of which is termed ‘crossloading’ 32 . These 

components can, nonetheless, not as neatly be separated from each other as this clear-cut 

enumeration suggests. It needs to be stressed that particularly the very vaguely defined term 

‘national adaptation’ might serve as a heading under which one could group both elite 

socialization and bureaucratic re-organization as sub-points. The corresponding reason is that 

changes in these intertwined areas also inherently contain a certain adaptation. This 

subsumption is made possible by the implicit broadness of the term ‘national adaptation’. 

Nevertheless, the paper will elaborate on each of those points separately for the following 

analysis, in order to pay tribute to their distinctiveness and individual importance. 

4.2.1 National Adaptation 

“…‘[T]he ability of a political actor to change its behaviour so as to meet challenges in the 

form of new demands by altering the means of action’…” 33 

Being this ‘political actor’, the focus is on states when talking about national adaptation 34 , 

which can be broadly characterized as those steps a state undertakes in adjustment to 

European influences. As the traces of national adaptation, i.e. down-loading, are very difficult 

to detect, the question is with which means and to what extent one could ‘measure’ it. Smith 

(2000) proposes, inter alia, both elite socialization and bureaucratic re-organization as 

indicators, on which the focus will be in this context (Smith, 2000; Featherstone, 2003). In 

these two, the feature of modernization is implied, which hints at the reform of national 

foreign policy standpoints in response to EU membership, i.e. to Europeanization. 

31 On the contrary, it is interesting to observe that states have used CFSP failures as a justification and 

pretext to ‘strike back’ by ‘renationalizing’ their foreign policy a bit more. 

32 See Appendix, Annex 2. See also footnote 39. 

33 (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 245) 

34 See Appendix, Annex 1. 

11


Thus, Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden can be taken as examples of states which all have 

adapted their foreign policy regimes in response and adaptation 35 to joining the EU 36 (Wong, 

2005). Accordingly, they moved from neutrality to post-neutrality. EU membership has, in a 

similar vein, Europeanized Spain’s foreign policy 37 . As a result, it acquired a distinctive EU 

profile (Torreblanca, 2001). Thinking further about the incremental top-down adaptation 

process in which states are reactive and muddle themselves through, one should not expect 

identical outcomes from adaptation. The reason is that the states’ different domestic 

‘seedbeds’ condition dissimilar national repercussions (Wong, 2005). This is the same in the 

foreign policy domain, where “…the pre-existing orientation of external relations which 

Member States...” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 262) have needs to be taken into 

consideration 38 . 

Those ‘orientations’ sometimes find their expression in a national foreign policy 

domaine privé, which no member state would accept to be affected by eventually conflictual 

EU positions (Hill, 1983). One can, thus, safely say that “…adaptation is more a function of 

attitude than time…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 248). Subsequently, the two forms of 

adaptation, i.e. both rationalist adaptation with preferences remaining stable and constructivist 

adaptation, where policy learning 39 results in a change of preferences, will be dealt with. 

Turning, as above-mentioned, to both constructivist and realist approaches, the 

rationalist perspective holds that adaptation takes place according to the logic of 

consequentiality. This means that egoistic actors take the self-interested and strategic decision 

to carry out adaptation only when it is in the state’s rational interest (de Flers, 2005). 

Nonetheless, this approach is not all-explanatory, as it only covers half of the picture. 

Therefore, it needs to be complemented by a social constructivist perspective, focusing on 

35 National adaptation refers in this context to the change in content of the countries’ foreign policies. 

36 Obviously, “EU adaptation appears to play an important role in the ‘modernisation’ of Member 

States’ [twenty-first century] foreign policies…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 246). 

37 After the country had emerged from Franco’s dictatorship, it needed to consolidate the young 

democracy and regain international esteem. For this purpose, an extensive foreign policy 

transformation set in, which was triggered by EU membership and in the course of which Spain 

abandoned its neutrality by achieving NATO membership (Torreblanca, 2001). 

38 Hence, “[i]f domestic modifications occur, their extent and their inherent mechanisms will depend 

not only upon the European input, but also upon the particular conditions of the national level on 

which they act…national opportunity structures…” (Major/ Pomorska, 2005). 

39 Policy learning can be defined as “‘…actors chang[ing] not only how they deal with particular 

problems but also their very concept of problem solving – resulting form the recognition that they and 

other actors face similar conditions, have mutual interests, and share aspirations’” (Ruggie quoted in 

Sjursen, 2003 p. 17). Having learned from the devastating disunity in the course of the Iraq crisis, the 

Member States devised the European Security Strategy (ESS), which is an example and outcome of 

policy learning (Mahncke, 2004; Lebl, 2004). 

12


rules, norms, identity, ideas and communicative action 40 (Sjursen, 1999; i Fanés, 2001). 

Those, undoubtedly, also play a role besides purely rational explanations. According to the 

constructivist logic of appropriateness 41 , actors adhere to social rules prevailing in 

institutional settings. Hence, Europeanization might change their preferences as they undergo 

learning and socialization processes. Those result from social interactions in the process of 

dealing with foreign affairs at a European level 42 (de Flers, 2005). 

4.2.2 National Projection 

“…[P]rojecting a particular set of [domestic] concerns...[into the international arena]” 43 

National projection 44 might be seen as complementing and mirroring adaptation. Whereas the 

latter is a top-down process impacting upon reactive states, the former represents a bottom-up 

procedure, with which states actively upload their national policy preferences onto the 

European level. They, thereby, reduce both the risk and costs associated with misfit and 

subsequent adaptation and increase their international influence (Wong, 2005). Both the 

Netherlands and Austria, for example, have managed to upload their positions on human 

rights (Manners/ Whitman, 2000), just as Spain has succeeded in selling its foreign policy 

prerogatives 45 to the EU. Those were, accordingly, Europeanized and the EU was driven to 

adopt a foreign policy stance to Spain’s liking in the latter’s areas of interest. 

In this uploading process, the EU is turned into and used as an extremely forceful 

amplifier of national interests 46 (Torreblanca, 2001). Although it might at first sight be 

40 This concept has been developed by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. 

41 Linked to this logic is a phenomenon called normative isomorphism, or socialization logic, which 

relates to a situation in which individuals with similar professional and educational backgrounds work 

together (e.g. in the Political and Security Committee (PSC)) and, thereby, start to perceive of things 

eventually in the same vein. The process conditioning this outcome is commonly referred to as crossloading, 

which is exactly defined as “the exchange of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing’ things between 

countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene” (Major/ Pomorska, 2005). In this regard, 

“…Europeanisation in foreign and security policy operates through a voluntary horizontal [learning] 

process…[in an EU forum]” (ibid.). 

42 Social constructivism, hence, emphasizes the force of ideas and their role in shaping policy actors’ 

behaviour, the deep impact of normative structures on both identity and interest formation, the 

possibility of soft power, identity production and the value of knowledge as an influential key factor 

(Katzenstein, 1997; Manners/ Whitman, 2000). 

43 (Hill, 2003, p. 31) 

44 See Appendix, Annex 1. 

45 Those include “…Latin America or the Mediterranean, in which the EU had minor or marginal 

interests…” (Torreblanca, 2001). 

46 Another example would be the Baltic States, which have sought and acquired the ‘European backup’ 

in their conflictual relationships with Russia through EU membership and, thereby, subsequently lent 

additional weight to their positions (Mahncke, 2004). 

13


supposed that projection is more successfully exercised by larger states due to their 

comparatively extensive administrative capabilities, the validity of this suggestion can be 

doubted. Both domestic pressures and the level of commitment to EU policy development is 

more decisive (Wong, 2005). What can be said, however, is that the more complex and large 

Europe becomes the harder it gets for (rivalling) states to project their national foreign policy 

objectives (Maull, 2006). 

4.2.3 Elite Socialization 

“European socialisation not necessarily concerns the adoption of supranational role 

conceptions at the expense of intergovernmental conceptions or the mere shift of one category 

to another; it might also imply a re-definition or a re-conceptualisation of existing 

intergovernmental conceptions” 47 . 

While tracing national adaptation has already proven to be a difficult undertaking, even more 

so is uncovering evidence for this ‘re-conceptualization’, i.e. the repercussions of elite 

socialization (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). It is easier to enumerate the conditions for it to 

happen in the first place. Those are secrecy, a communication reflex, consensus and mutual 

respect for and acceptance of domaines privés (Osswald, 2005). Proposing this definition 

according to which 

“[s]ocialization…means the process by which actors internalize the norms which then 

influence how they see themselves and what they perceive as their [potentially 

changing national] interests” 48 , 

the pivotal importance and centrality for the Europeanization of foreign policy becomes 

apparent. Assuming that the socialization of policy-makers into a European decision-making 

framework has an effect on their belief system 49 , the distinctive national orientation they have 

might be supplemented if not partly transformed by commonly accepted and legitimate 50 

European norms and social identities. Those transnational norms are subsequently adhered to, 

inter alia, in national day-to-day policy-making. This Europeanization of decision-makers 51 

47 (Beyers, 2002) 

48 (i Fanés, 2001) 

49 “The `belief system' of the practitioner is a deep-rooted legacy of experience and political culture, 

but it is also an organic set of attitudes which is capable, within limits, of self-transformation” (Hill 

quoted in Aggestam, 1999). 

50 Likewise, the increasing practice to take decisions in the EU arena is also considered to be 

legitimate, according to the so-called appropriateness logic (Smith, 2004). 

51 Some scholars suggest that larger member states experience a lower degree of elite socialization in 

the foreign policy domain, in contrast to smaller ones (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). However, despite 

the fact that “[e]ven for actors who are regularly involved in European policy-making, European 

experiences basically function as a secondary socialisation processes… [emphasis on original]” 

14


is, in turn, expected to result in more decisions having a European dimension (Sjursen, 2003). 

Elite socialization at the European level is, furthermore, made possible and enhanced by 

mutual trust and a club atmosphere, to whose informal norms and rules the participants adhere 

(Smith, 2000; Osswald, 2005). An increasing European orientation of foreign policy-making 

groups might, thus, “…lead to an actual ‘Europeanisation’ of foreign policy…” (Manners/ 

Whitman, 2000, p. 8) 52 . In this context, it can be imagined that the envisioned establishment 

of a European diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS) 53 , might 

eventually represent a socializing institution 54 and lead to an increased convergence in 

European foreign policy positions 55 (Mahncke, 2004). 

Case studies have highlighted that regular consultation, confidentiality and a 

consensual decision-making style, which are the characteristics of the European foreign 

policy-making 56 community, have already decisively impacted upon national foreign policy 

structures and belief systems and, thereby, led to a certain convergence in outcomes 57 

(Beyers, 2002), the question arises, firstly, of how to ‘measure’ socialization degrees in comparative 

terms and, secondly, of why smaller states allegedly experience a higher degree. One suggestion might 

be that as smaller states do not have as many alternative diplomatic venues as larger ones do, they 

concentrate all their efforts on the European venue to make their impact felt by engaging in national 

projection. Due to this intense exposition to and contact with European decision-making channels, 

they, consequently, become more Europeanized. 

52 Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the transformative impact of elite socialization of foreign 

policy-makers at the European level. Corresponding to Aggestam’s (1999) suggestion that e.g. 

“German foreign policy-makers…tend to avoid acknowledging potential role-conflicts in case that 

would involve privileging a particular institution or set of relationships in favour of another”, an 

interview with an high-ranking official of the Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of 

Germany neglected any loyalty or identity conflicts between both the national and European level. 

Thus, one ‘chooses not to choose’, in accordance with the German sowohl als auch approach. 

Nonetheless, the necessity to think transnationally, which comes with holding the EU presidency, and 

the frequent lending of national diplomats, formalized in the 1981 London Report, advance the 

European socialization of foreign policy actors (Osswald, 2005). 

53 However, with the negative referenda on the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands, this 

service has not come into existence for the time being. 

54 Smith (2003) defines socializing institutions as “…develop[ing], through education and 

socialization, a territorial identity and a cultural community with a sense of belonging, emotional 

attachment, and shared codes of meaning” (p. 338). 

55 One could argue that the EFP has to be build up from the micro level onwards by means of 

educating (socializing) diplomats in a European spirit. Common thinking and mutual understanding 

will, thus, result eventually in common European positions. In this context, Duke (2002) proposes the 

establishment of an educational institution in order to provide prospective diplomats with a 

distinctively European background. Since the member states will, however, not that easily give in on 

the possibility to send their nationally minded diplomats to Brussels, “…any diplomatic training at the 

European level must be careful not to present itself as an alternative to national diplomatic training 

schemes” (p. 865; Mahncke, 2004). 

56 This community provides “…a textured environment, a part in a process, a social sphere for 

continued and intensifying interaction” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 251). 

57 Convergence, yes or no; this question is disputed. Much depends on the terming of whether one can 

speak about convergence to have taken place. Osswald (2005) already considers the weakening of the 

Austrian and Irish neutrality status to be indicative of convergence. However, “…Europeanisation is 

15


(Torreblanca, 2001; Featherstone, 2003; Smith, 2004; Mahncke, 2004). The COREU telex 

system 58 , firstly, embodies this réflexe communautaire (Wong, 2005) and, secondly, serves as 

an enabling feature for coordination to take place. One might suggest that the very existence 

of this réflexe is indicative of a feedback process, characterized by “…national 

politicians…increasingly think[ing] in European terms…” (Mahncke, 2004, p. 372). 

4.2.4 Bureaucratic Re-organization 

This ‘thinking in European terms’ is also reflected in the extensive re-organization of national 

foreign service structures in response to improving participation in CFSP over the years 59 

(Sjursen, 2003). New national CFSP counsellors have been appointed, diplomatic services 

extended and departmental re-orientation towards Europe has taken place. In this process, 

smaller member states have been more willingly adjusted their comparatively limited 

administrative structures (Smith, 2000). It might be suggested that as the European venue is 

pivotal for smaller states in contrast to larger ones, which have more alternative diplomatic 

channels, the former ones have to concentrate all their efforts on the European venue to make 

their impact felt. Furthermore, whereas the UK, for instance, might consider the use of 

European channels to be a loss compared to its lost world power status, smaller states more 

likely regard this venue to be a gain for the conduct of their foreign policy and status upgrade. 

4.3 Enabling and (Constraining) Conceptual Limits 

After having elaborated on the theoretical components of the concept, the focus will shift to 

the debate as to whether Europeanization enables and/ or constrains national governments in 

their conduct of foreign policy. This will be followed by an outline of the concept’s limits. 

Turning to the enabling theory first, functional logic holds that the European venue can be 

not convergence” (Radaelli, 2004, p. 14; Radaelli, 2000). The member states are still in the driver’s 

seat when it comes to deciding on whether they converge on positions and act collectively or not 

(Smith, 2003). For the time being, the ‘cooperators’ prevail over the ‘integrators’, as “[c]oordination 

rather than integration…remains the guideline” (Mahncke, 2004, p. 32; Hill, 1983; Smith, 2003). 

58 This system, which enables European national foreign ministries to exchange information in a very 

short time and, eventually, coordinate action, is “…assumed to have a socializing character and to 

support the convergence among national foreign policy actors” (Osswald, 2005, p. 21). Accordingly, 

“Spanish participation in the EPC framework…proved decisive to socialize Spanish diplomats in the 

habits of coordination and consensus-seeking and to have Spanish policies gradually converge with 

those of the other member states” (Torreblanca, 2001). 

59 Thus, “there is substantial evidence to show that EU membership in general and CFSP membership 

in particular influence the way individual member states organize their pursuit of foreign policy” 

(Smith, 2000, p. 619; Smith, 2004). 

16


used in order to amplify national interests 60 , provided that their uploading took place. From a 

realist and rationalist intergovernmental/ consequentiality perspective, Europeanization is 

only likely to occur after a cost-benefit analysis has revealed that participation in European 

structures would be in one’s own national self-interest. Based on the “…‘politics of scale’…” 

(Smith, 2003, p. 242) reasoning, deliberate recourse to EU instruments will only be made if 

their application better meets the challenges at hand than the use of national devices would (i 

Fanés, 2001). 

Those considerations allude once more to the question of whether the member states 

are controlling the Europeanization process, i.e. are in the driver’s seat, or whether the process 

controls them (Manners/ Whitman, 2000). Apart from that, the question of who serves whom 

is difficult to answer; it has been shown that no automatism exists. What is indisputable, 

however, is that foreign policy cooperation contains the possibility for member states to 

supervise and influence each other’s positions 61 (Mahncke, 2004). Furthermore, European 

participation enabled Spain, inter alia, to regain its international status after the Franco 

dictatorship, acquire more political influence and modernize its foreign service 62 . There exist, 

however, “…‘tiers of exclusivity’…” (Manners/ Whitman, 2000, p. 10). They refer to the 

extent to which a member state is able to influence EU external affairs relatively to other 

states. Accordingly, Germany would have more influence than Malta. Speaking with one 

voice, on the other hand, bestows enormous influence on all member states 63 (Wong, 2005). 

In the course of coming to a common position, concessions have to be made and compromises 

struck, which might be perceived of as being constraining. 

Even more constraining for the concept itself are its own limits. Identifying them is 

vital “…in order to be able to distinguish those changes which are a result of Europeanisation 

60 Accordingly, the “…EU has provided an excellent opportunity to enhance the foreign policy 

capacity and the national goals of a country which had a large and problematic foreign policy agenda, 

scant economic resources to match ambitions with policies, little international prestige, and a weak 

foreign service” (Torreblanca, 2001). 

61 On top of that, foreign policy-making in a European environment indirectly provides for the 

possibility of a so-called smokescreen, i.e. empowers states by “…by giving them manoeuvring room 

to make politically difficult domestic reforms under the cover of the EU” (Wong, 2005, p. 135). This 

may justify (in)action, provide an alibi for foreign policy change and deflect external pressure (Hill, 

1983). 

62 Likewise, Tonra notes with reference to Ireland, Denmark and Holland that “‘political co-operation 

improved the effectiveness, broadened the range and increased the capabilities of foreign policy 

making’” (quoted in Sjursen, 1999). 

63 Here, the impact of globalization on the conduct of foreign policy has to be elaborated upon. As 

globalization entails both growing levels of interconnectedness and interdependence, diplomacy must, 

thus, be more characterized by adjustment processes (White, 2005). Globalization, furthermore, 

“…creates pressures on the EU to act collectively” (Smith, 2003, p. 242) by challenging traditional 

state-centric notions of sovereignty and foreign policy (White, 2005). It, thereby, indirectly adds to the 

development of an EFP. 

17


and those which are not” 64 (i Fanés, 2001). Europeanization must further not be thought of as 

and expected to be an all-explanatory concept. Other influences besides it have also to be 

accounted for (Major/ Pomorska, 2005). Particularly in foreign policy, the EU impact is very 

difficult to discern (ibid.), as national diplomats are not keen to admit to have been influenced 

by anything else than the national side. Another difficulty lies in the task to find indicators of 

change in foreign policy in the first place (Osswald, 2005). Thus, “…the study of the 

Europeanisation of a policy is probably the most difficult because of the complexity of 

isolating an ‘EU-effect’ [emphasis in original]” 65 (i Fanés, 2001). 

In the quest of identifying this ‘smoking gun’, the “…‘missing link’…” (Goetz quoted 

in Featherstone, 2003, p. 13) between both the effect and the supposed (European) cause, the 

attempt is made to uncover the existence of a causal chain connecting both (i Fanés, 2001). 

On top of that, the question of whether Europeanization is the cause (independent variable) or 

effect (dependent variable) has to be posed 66 . This would lead to a chicken and egg debate, 

though (ibid.). 

Besides this problem, a second challenge is to identify the “…relevance of change…” 

(i Fanés, 2001), i.e. the ‘deepness’ of adaptation and the transformation(s) it triggered. This is 

also easier said than done, as the act of attributing relevance is inherently a subjective 

undertaking, which can effortlessly be challenged. Adding to the collection of challenges is 

the third one to account for and separate endogenous and exogenous phenomena, which act in 

parallel to Europeanization, from the latter. Perceiving of Europeanization as an all-explaining 

causal factor is, thereby, to be forestalled (ibid.). Henceforth, 

“[t]he foreign policies of EU Member States are subject to a number of pressures and 

incentives for change which act at the same time as Europeanisation, sometimes in 

similar directions, sometimes in completely opposite…We should avoid attributing 

any detected policy change to a vague idea of ‘Europeanisation” (ibid.; Major/ 

Pomorska, 2005). 

64 There is, thus, the need for “…conceptual clarity…” (Smith, 2003, p. 333), in order to avoid the 

stretching of the Europeanization concept (Radaelli, 2000; Wong, 2005). This very fashionable 

concept must eventually be clearly defined so as to prevent it from being arbitrarily used for the 

description of anything. 

65 In foreign policy, no “…legal obligation or compliance-mechanism…” (Osswald, 2005, p. 2) exists, 

which adds to this problem. Thus, in order to discern the European impact on national foreign policy 

one has to ask what makes foreign policy distinctive compared to other policies (i Fanés, 2001). 

Provided this factor has been isolated, Wong (2005) proposes criteria with which the degree of a 

state’s foreign policy Europeanization could allegedly be measured. However, the extents of 

adaptation, projection and elite socialization are, firstly, very hard to detect and, secondly, even harder 

to ‘measure’. 

66 Notwithstanding, “[t]he boundaries between cause and effect, independent and dependent variables 

are blurred…” (Bulmer/ Radaelli, 2004, p. 3). 

18


Amongst those factors are things going on, firstly, in the domestic and, secondly, the 

international sphere. Referring to the first one, there might be national policy-making styles, 

administrative reforms, political transition processes and changes triggered by particularities 

of the party landscape, all of which have not been a result of Europeanization whatsoever (i 

Fanés, 2001). Concerning the second domain, global politics, changes caused by the end of 

the Cold War, the impact of non-EU institutions in the international system on the member 

states’ foreign policies and globalization effects 67 can be at the heart of policy changes (ibid.). 

5. Conclusion 

In general, change is the rule, not the exception. This is also very much valid for the evolving 

conceptual meanings of both sovereignty and foreign policy, which have been triggered by 

the post-modern European integration and globalization processes. Initially, the focus has 

been on the connotations of these two dynamic and intertwined concepts and the changes 

thereto. As the notion of sovereignty has become increasingly blurred, the traditional conduct 

of state-centric foreign policy, which has always striven to primarily preserve the state’s 

sovereignty, has increasingly acquired a European dimension. This, in turn, manifests itself 

nowadays in EU common positions and the EU-3 initiative. In this context, the suggestion of 

whether there is a shift from modern Westphalian to post-modern European notions of both 

sovereignty and foreign policy going on, upon which the Europeanization of foreign policy 

builds, has been put forward. 

Turning to the concept itself, the paper has shown that foreign policy, being the key 

sovereignty domain of nation-states, is not immune to the multi-faceted and imprecise concept 

of Europeanization. It has become apparent, though, that its application in the high politics 

field of foreign policy represents a special case, against the background of the other multiple 

usages of the term. However, the very fact that scholars talk about the Europeanization of 

foreign policy is already indicative of a certain intrusion ‘of Europe’ into this domain. Against 

the impact of both increasing European integration and global pressures for the EU to act 

67 Pirro and Zeff (2005) come up with the interesting question of how Europeanization and 

globalization fit together. Additionally, one has to draw the definitional boundaries between them, so 

as to be able to distinguish between them. They, thus, ask further: “…is Europeanization simply a 

regional variety of globalization?” (p. 211). On top of that, one has to think about whether 

Europeanization is part of, reaction to or bulwark against globalization (Bulmer/ Radaelli, 2004). Once 

more, the chicken and egg problem emerges, since “[t]o Wallace, the interaction of globalization and 

Europeanization is so close, it is hard to determine which is the leader and which the follower” (Pirro/ 

Zeff, 2005, p. 214). 

19


collectively, which would imply greater Europeanization of foreign policies, the following 

questions and suggestions will be proposed for further consideration. 

Firstly, is “…‘the determination to preserve national foreign policies…ultimately at 

odds with the ambition to create a European foreign policy [?]’…” (Allen quoted in White, 

2001, p. 37). Secondly, as all member states have to concert in the same European orchestra, 

who will be setting the tone, who will be deciding on the allocation of the roles to play and 

who will be the (indirect) maestro (Mahncke, 2004)? 68 It is, thirdly, suggested that increasing 

elite socialization and the eventual establishment of the EEAS will result both in long-term 

convergence in European foreign thinking and a more integrated and comprehensive EFP. 

This might currently be observed at the example of the EU’s role in the Iranian affair. 

Speaking with one voice, Europe has obviously learned from its mistakes in the run-up to the 

recent Iraq War. In this regard, it is not surprising anymore that Mr Solana went to Teheran, 

as initially suggested. Moreover, if Europeans get increasingly used to seeing EU 

representatives play a visible role in world affairs, this might be a first step in ‘socializing’ 

them in a European sense. 

68 The cacophony of uncoordinated national voices during the Iraq crisis has exemplarily highlighted 

how weak Europe is, if it does not speak with one voice. 

20


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Appendix 

Annex 1 

Source: de Flers, N.A. (2005). Theorising the effects of CFSP on national foreign policy and 

the concept of Europeanisation. CFSP Forum, Vol. 3, No. 5. Retrieved June 14, 2006, 

from the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP%20Forum%20vol%203%20no%205.pdf 

Annex 2 

Source: de Flers, N.A. (2005). Theorising the effects of CFSP on national foreign policy and 

the concept of Europeanisation. CFSP Forum, Vol. 3, No. 5. Retrieved June 14, 2006, 

from the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP%20Forum%20vol%203%20no%205.pdf 

24

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