Appendix to “Committed” Factual responses to PB advertisements ...

Appendix to “Committed”
Factual responses to PB advertisements by Ballengée et al.
(B. Ballengée with A. Ballengée, P. Henken, M. Madden, and G. Wilson)
Date: 20 April 2012
Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York, NY
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Response meta-categories
1. DWH, “MACONDO PROSPECT” DISASTER BACKGROUND………………...…………….3-6
2. HELPING COMMUNITIES..…...………………………………………………..………………..7-13
3. WILDLIFE…………..………………………………………………………………….………….14-27
4. CLEANUP…………………………………………………………………………………………28-39
5. ECONOMY………………………………………………………………………………………..40-41
6. SEAFOOD SAFETY……………………………………………………………….…………….42-45
7. CLEAN BEACHES…………………………………………………………….…………………46-50
8. THE FUTURE OF ENERGY…………………………………………………………………….51-52
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………………53-58
SELLECTED ARTICLES & REPORTS
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1- Deep Water Horizon, “Macondo Prospect” Disaster Background
“The amount of total oil spilled from the two events was approximately 750,000 barrels
for the EV and approximately 4,350,290 barrels for the DH spill. This means that the DH
oil spill was more than 6 times greater than the EV spill […]. Comparing the area covered
by the two spills, the DH spill was approximately 28,900 square miles or 2.5 times larger
in size than the EV spill, approximately 11,000 square miles […]” (Belanger et al., 2010)
“The clean-up operation will continue for months, but it's mostly PR — only a small
fraction of the oil will actually be removed.” (Goodell, 2010)
“According to the government’s estimates, by the time the well was sealed months later,
over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Long viewed strictly as environmental disasters, major oil spills can be hazardous to
human health, beyond direct fatalities or injuries. Many Gulf Coast residents have
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complained of respiratory problems and headaches, and depressive illness has
skyrocketed.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Offshore-rig accidents occur frequently (the British website ‘Oil Rig Disasters’ lists
more than 150 offshorerig mishaps, not all drilling-related, over the last fifty years), but
the blowout-prevention technologies that failed on the Deepwater Horizon have kept
most offshore oil rigs from releasing more than a trivial amount of oil.” (Green et al.,
2010)
“The Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, which prescribed protocols for responding to oil
spills, was written in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill and with the expectation
that tanker spills were the main risk to be managed.” (Green et al., 2010)
“Over the last sixty years, there have been ten offshore-drilling accidents that released
more than 5,000 tons of oil into ocean waters. During this same period, there have been
seventy-two oil spills from tanker accidents that released 5,000 tons of oil or more—
usually a lot more. In other words, for every offshore-drilling accident, there are seven
major tanker spills and numerous tanker accidents of smaller size. (Almost unnoticed by
the media, a tanker collision in the last week of May near Singapore released about 2,000
tons of oil.)” (Green et al., 2010)
“Although, as the NAS report states, ‘no spill is entirely benign,’ it adds that ‘there is no
correlation between the size of a release and its impact. Instead, as in the real estate
maxim, it’s all about ‘location, location, location.’ Sometimes small spills have large
effects on local wildlife, and large spills can have minor effects. […] ‘The actual impact
of the oil may be more complex than we realize if it interacts with spatially or temporally
constrained phenomena.’” (Green et al., 2010)
“From the Gulf floor to the interior marshes, BP’s oil remains. BP’s criminal negligence
has laid 2 inches of degraded oil on the seafloor for twenty six miles around the
Macondo wellhead, and decades will pass before we know the full impact of the loss of
these deepwater ecosystems upon our coastal waters. But the oil remains even on the
coast, and there are no easy methods for removing it.” (Gulf Restoration Network, 2010a)
“There is a law. In fact, there are three laws that, jointly and severally, should have
anticipated and provided measures to prevent and cope with the explosion of the drilling
rig Deepwater Horizon. Instead, we have 11 deaths, 17 serious injuries, the release of an
American record 2.6 million gallons of oil, an equivalent record for chemical dispersants,
months of Mutt ‘n’ Jeff responses, enormous corporate losses, and the ensuing pain of
the Gulf Coast region. Regulatory programs under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act (OCSLA) and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)
each require the consideration of worst-case situations. The latter two go further in
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equiring plans to minimize such possibilities and to respond effectively to them when
they occur.” (Houck 2010)
“To place this in perspective, the amount of oil released was roughly equivalent to the
total amount of the 1989 Exxon-Valdez oil spill occurring every 3–64 days (based upon
the largest to smallest Deepwater Horizon spill estimates, respectively)” (Kelley, 2010)
“Methane was the most abundant hydrocarbon released during the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Beyond relevancy to this anthropogenic event,
this methane release simulates a rapid and relatively short-term natural release from
hydrates into deep water. Based on methane and oxygen distributions measured at 207
stations throughout the affected region, we find that within ~120 days from the onset of
release ~3.0 Å~ 1010 to 3.9 Å~ 1010 moles of oxygen were respired, primarily by
methanotrophs, and left behind a residual microbial community containing
methanotrophic bacteria. We suggest that a vigorous deepwater bacterial bloom
respired nearly all the released methane within this time, and that by analogy, largescale
releases of methane from hydrate in the deep ocean are likely to be met by a
similarly rapid methanotrophic response.” (Kessler et al., 2011)
“Oceanic CH4 has been implicated in ancient climate change […] however, little is
known about potential future impacts. Importantly, for oceanic CH4 to directly impact
climate, CH4 must enter the atmosphere without first being consumed by microbes in
the ocean.” (Kessler et al., 2011)
“On 20 April 2010, a violent and tragic CH4 discharge severed the Deepwater Horizon rig
from its well. Two days later, the burning rig sank, and oil and gas began spewing into
the deep Gulf of Mexico at depths of ~1.5 km until 15 July, when the well was effectively
sealed. Estimates of the oil emitted during the 83 days of this disaster range from 4.1 Å~
106 to 4.4 Å~ 106 T 20% (uncertainty) barrels. The corresponding emission of methane
(CH4) could be as great as 1.25 Å~ 1010 moles or as low as 9.14 Å~ 109 moles […],
depending on uncertainties in the gas-to-oil ratio and net oil emission.” (Kessler et al.,
2011)
“Taken together, the tracking of a hydrocarbon intrusion layer throughout the northern
Gulf of Mexico, the paucity of CH4 in the affected waters a month or more after the
hydrocarbon emissions had ceased, the magnitude of the DO anomaly relative to
emitted hydrocarbons (Table 1), and the prevalence of a methylotrophic microbial
community […] suggest that CH4 emitted from the Deepwater Horizon event was
quantitatively consumed by August 2010. Given the slow rates of methanotrophy
observed near the wellhead in June 2010, we suggest that a bloom of methanotrophic
bacteria occurred in these waters sometime between the end of June and the beginning
of August 2010 and that it likely occurred after affected waters had flowed away from the
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wellhead. This assertion is supported by previous observations that rates of
methanotrophy increased as C2H6 was depleted in the hydrocarbon intrusions.”
(Kessler et al., 2011)
“It happens. It’s happened before. It will happen again. And it’s happening right now. So,
you know, and obviously they didn’t have any backup plan. It’s as if having poked 30,000
holes into the sea floor of the Gulf of Mexico and have 5,000 rigs operating, it never
occurred to them to say, ‘Oh, what if oil starts coming out of one of those holes, like it
has in other places at other times?’ They were completely unprepared. They don’t have
the equipment. They don’t have booms that can work in open water. And what the
obvious take-home message is, we don’t know how to do this. We can poke the hole. We
don’t know how to deal with some things that we know happen, because they’ve
happened. But people have not developed the technology or warehoused the tools or
created booms that work in ocean swell conditions or any of that stuff. We’re trying to
wring the last drops out of a depleting resource.” (Safina, 2010a)
"Between April 22 and July 15, 2010, it is estimated that 250 million gallons of crude oil
were discharged from the Deepwater Horizon well and 1.84 million gallons of Corexit
9500 and 9527, toxic oil dispersant products, were applied, making the largest
percentage of the oil unrecovered, with unknown long-term environmental impacts. "
(Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
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2- “Helping Communities”
“Revenue losses from fisheries in Louisiana alone are estimated to be between $100–
200 million (IEM, 2010). Tourism brings in an estimated $20 billion to the Gulf region
(EPA, 2011), and huge losses are expected in the foreseeable future due to avoidance of
areas impacted by the Deepwater Horizon disaster.” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“Though Gulf Coast providers would treat patients’ symptoms, they were unwilling to
draw any connection between the symptoms and the cause. In this atmosphere of
evasion, one doctor from coastal Alabama actually sought Sciencecorps out. “My
patients are getting really sick,” he said, and he felt sure it was linked to the oil and
dispersants. He was eager to work with Sciencecorps, but after a few weeks he suddenly
withdrew, saying he couldn’t be involved in the project.” (Alvar, 2011)
“What’s notable is the absence of doctors’ voices. The media quotes individuals, not
groups like the Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN), the Louisiana Bucket
Brigade, Boat People SOS and Guardians of the Gulf, all of whom are working to
organize the thousands of people who are sick along the coast. Unless they are placed
in context, individuals’ stories of persistent neurological, respiratory, and
gastrointestinal issues, while important to hear, only reinforce that these are ‘individual’
problems.” (Alvar, 2011)
“We see this in the behavior of the Coast Guard, the cozy relationship between the
regulators and the regulated (remember the Minerals Management Service cocaine
parties?), the slow reaction to the spill, the unwillingness to enforce regulation, and in
the National Institute of Environmental Health Services’ belated, cutesily-named “GuLF”
study of cleanup workers. By waiting six months to start the data collection NIEHS has
ensured the results will be flawed, something the study’s designers have already
admitted. The study was designed to be defective.” (Alvar, 2011)
"For decades, African American and Latino communities in the South became the
dumping grounds for all kind of wastes ― making them ‘sacrifice zones.’ Nowhere is this
scenario more apparent than in Louisiana’s ‘Cancer Alley,’ the 85-mile stretch along the
Mississippi from Baton Rough to New Orleans. Gulf Coast residents, who have for
decades lived on the fenceline with landfills and waste sites, are asking why their
communities are being asked again to shoulder the waste disposal burden for the giant
BP oil spill. They are demanding answers from BP and the EPA in Washington, DC and
the EPA Region 4 office in Atlanta and EPA Region 6 office in Dallas ― two EPA regions
that have a legacy of unequal protection, racial discrimination, and bad decisions that
have exacerbated environmental and health disparities." (Bullard, 2010)
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"Government officials estimate that the ruptured well leaked between 94 million and 184
million gallons of oil into the Gulf. However, not much attention has been given to which
communities were selected as the final resting place for BP’s oil-spill garbage." (Bullard,
2010)
“During the active cleanup phase, NIOSH conducted a series of Health Hazard
Evaluations, and a variety of symptoms in workers were reported [...] Chemical induced
symptoms in cleanup workers commonly include upper respiratory tract illnesses, throat
and eye irritation, headaches, dizziness, nausea, and vomiting.” (Goldstein et al., 2011)
“Calls to mental health and domestic violence hotlines in the Gulf area have increased
since the oil spill, in keeping with reports of increased domestic violence, mental illness,
and substance abuse after other disasters.” Goldstein et al., 2011)
“As BP and EPA implemented the waste directives, environmental justice activists
argued that BP was dumping the debris disproportionately in poor and non-white
communities. Residents of Harrison County, Mississippi fiercely opposed the disposal of
oiled waste in their Pecan Grove landfill, and BP agreed not to use it. Environmental
justice advocate and scholar Robert Bullard contended that the racial makeup of
Harrison County was a factor, and EPA objected to BP’s decision. The Federal On-Scene
Coordinator instructed BP to follow the approved waste plan, noting that “[a]llowing one
community to reject acceptance of waste… may complicate remaining waste disposal
efforts.” BP began to use the site for waste staging, though not for disposal.” (Graham et
al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Eventually, BP established a verification process that prioritized boats registered with
the state before March 2010 and that accepted only one boat per owner. The group that
may have lost out the most on the program was the large population of Vietnamese-
American fishermen. Many had arrived in the region as refugees and struggled with the
lack of Vietnamese-language training.” Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
2011)
“Almost three quarters of respondents who believed they were exposed to crude oil or
dispersant also reported experiencing symptoms. Nearly half of all respondents
reported an unusual increase in health symptoms – coughing, skin and eye irritation,
headaches – consistent with chemical exposure. Also consistent with exposure was the
sudden onset of these symptoms. Coastal residents reported sudden onset symptoms
that quickly subsided, consistent with chemical exposure. Anxiety and mental health
problems were associated with the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, and health care
providers might face a similar situation on the Gulf Coast.” (Louisiana Bucket Brigade,
2011a)
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“There are few treatment options. Almost a third (31.1%) of respondents used over-thecounter
medicine “more often than usual.” Medical treatment options are limited
because there are few known medical providers in the region trained to diagnose and
treat chemical exposure. More than half of the respondents had health insurance (54%),
yet relatively few sought treatment for symptoms (31%) or exposures (14.8%).”
(Louisiana Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
“Of those surveyed, 44% said that the livelihood of the primary provider in the home had
been impacted.” (Louisiana Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
“Many people in coastal parishes need economic assistance but are not receiving it.
Nearly a quarter reported needing but not receiving economic assistance due to lost
income.” (Louisiana Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
“The majority of respondents in the three communities surveyed between September 6
and October 1 – 64% – expressed concern about seafood contamination.” (Louisiana
Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
“In signing BP claims contracts, individuals have given up their rights to independently
or collectively pursue BP for potentially more money than they would receive through
the claims process. The claims process in many cases encourages residents to settle
claims payments because of the immediate necessity of financial support for job loss.
As Kenneth Feinberg is now required to state that he is a contractor of BP, it is urged
that there be an appeals process involving local Gulf Coast representation.” (Louisiana
Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
“In an under-the-radar release of new test results for its Gulf of Mexico oil spill workers,
BP PLC is reporting potentially hazardous exposures to a now-discontinued dispersant
chemical - a substance blamed for contributing to chronic health problems after the
Exxon Valdez clean up - among more than 20 percent of offshore responders.” (Schor,
2010 cited in Louisiana Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
“One of the chemicals of concern is 2-butoxyethanol, a chemical in dispersant. While BP
eventually phased out use of the chemical, clean-up workers were exposed. During the
clean up, BP offered consistent assurances of worker safety despite their internal
knowledge of use of 2-butoxyethanol. BP did conduct sampling during clean up to
determine if workers were exposed. ‘However, the company’s continued use of bar
graphs that encompass ranges of exposures - without including where and under what
conditions the Gulf tests are performed - left several occupational safety experts with
more questions than answers.’ ” (Schor, 2010 cited in Louisiana Bucket Brigade, 2011a)
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“Environmental groups and residents argue BP has yet to fulfill its financial and legal
obligations. More than 500,000 Gulf residents have claimed compensation from a $20
billion fund set up by BP. But a large number of the claims have not yet been settled.
Maritime life and communities in the area remain devastated.” (Safina, 2011b)
“Corexit Dispersant Ingredients Have Not Been Fully Disclosed.
On June 8th, US EPA provided a list of chemicals they stated were in the two Corexit
products used to date. Companies are not required to list all ingredients in their
products, or to provide detailed information on those that they do list. They can claim
ingredients are "proprietary" to avoid disclosure. Ingredients in a product may be listed
as a group rather than a single chemical.
For example, the group "petroleum distillates, hydrotreated light" is listed on the MSDS
for Corexit 9500. There are hundreds of chemicals within this group. Similarly, "organic
sulfonic acid salts" are listed as an ingredient, but these may include many potential
organic components. Without specific information, it isn't possible to fully assess short
or long-term human health hazards or ecological effects.” (Shaw, 2010)
“Residents who live and work on the water, particularly people in fishing communities
and the first responders to the BP oil disaster, are increasingly falling ill. They are being
ignored by the BP Victim’s Compensation Fund and denied health claims by Kenneth
Feinberg and the GCCF. These victims are being dismissed and told to seek help
elsewhere, without any referrals, suggestions, or support.” (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
“Hundreds of fishermen were hired to attach booms to their shrimp boats in place of
nets and then drive their boats directly through the BP Deepwater Horizon oil/dispersant
slicks to corral and collect the toxic substances. Some vessels worked the In-Situ Burns
and burned the oil, while others collected the absorbent boom, bagged it, loaded it on
their boats, and hauled it in. Fishing vessels were also used, after dispersant had been
sprayed, to “mix” it with the oil by running the vessel back and forth through the
oil/dispersant. During the heaviest flows of the disaster, many VOO workers anchored
their vessels each night and slept where they worked, often waking at night to the
spraying of Corexit and having their cabins filled with the smell of petroleum. Of all the
responders working the spill, these fisherman had the highest potential for exposure to
toxic air pollutants. In addition to the toxicity of crude oil, they were exposed to the
added danger posed by the application of dispersant chemicals.” (Waterkeeper Alliance,
2011)
"Even before oil began to wash ashore across the northern Gulf of Mexico, Save Our
Gulf Waterkeeper organizations began receiving calls from Gulf Coast residents with
health complaints. These residents were experiencing a wide range of symptoms and
were often unable to find relief with their local medical providers. In the early days of the
BP oil disaster the most commonly received health complaints were severe head- aches,
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nausea, vomiting, cough, sinusitis, and difficulty breathing. People with existing
breathing issues, such as asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
were having increased difficulty controlling their symptoms, required more medication,
and experienced an increased need for medical treatment.” (Waterkeeper Alliance,
2011)
"In the following weeks and months more and more cleanup workers, fishermen and
community members experienced health problems that they believed might be related to
the BP oil disaster. Symptoms commonly reported to Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers
expanded to include skin irritation and sores, irritation of the eyes, nose and throat,
nausea, diarrhea, numbness of the extremities, stomach cramps/abdominal pain,
dizziness, confusion, depression, coughing, shortness of breath/difficulty breathing, and
chest pains. These individuals also were often unable to get relief or satisfactory
diagnosis from their local health care providers. " (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
“In the wake of the BP oil disaster, thousands of Gulf cleanup workers and residents
have reportedillnesses, with symptoms as tame as headaches or as violent as bloody
stools and seizures.” (Woodward, 2011)
“From July to October 2010, LABB and Tulane University's Disaster Resiliency
Leadership Academy performed 934 health surveys of residents in Terrebonne,
Jefferson, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes at seven survey sites. The results
show three-quarters of respondents reported an increase in coughing, eye irritation,
headaches and sinus irritation. Grand Isle resident Betty Dowd, who suffers a persistent
cough, says its residents need blood work ‘to find out what exactly is causing these
problems — whether it's BP or not, we just need to know where it's coming from.’”
(Woodward, 2011)
“The National Institute of Health (NIH) began its ‘Gulf Long-Term Follow-Up Study for Oil
Spill Clean Up Workers and Volunteers’ (GuLF Study) to follow the health of 55,000
cleanup crew members over 10 years. It's the largest study to monitor the disaster, but it
won't be treating its participants. [...] GuLF Study leader Dr. Dale Sandler says the
illnesses ‘need to be taken seriously.’” (Woodward, 2011)
“Months later, Bayhi still hasn't been paid for his work as a Vessels of Opportunity
participant, a sum he says is $255,000. He's visited hospitals for severe abdominal pains,
but he doesn't have health insurance, and no insurance provider will take him on, he
says. He lost his home, and he and his family — his wife and his 2- and 3-year-old
daughters — now live with his wife's grandmother. The family visited Grand Isle beaches
in August, where his kids swam in the water and played in the sand. ‘My little girls now
have more toxins in their blood than I have. That hurts more. I blame myself,’ he says,
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fighting back tears. ‘I let them go and swim and play in the beach, but at the same time
those sons of bitches said it was safe.’” (Woodward, 2011)
“Matherne was an engineer on a support boat near the Deepwater rig when it exploded
and says crews sprayed dispersants directly on top of him. Matherne wasn't provided a
respirator. Since May 30, 2010, he's suffered paralysis, impaired vision, severe
headaches, and he frequently coughs up blood. ‘I don't know why things are happening
like this,’ he says through tears in a YouTube video dated March 25. ‘It seems to get
worse every day. ... It's driving me crazy. ... I prayed that God last night would let me die.
I'm tired of suffering, and tired of watching my family suffer.’” (Woodward, 2011)
“LEAN started receiving health complaints from Gulf workers and residents in the
explosion's aftermath. The group purchased $10,000 worth of respirators (about 200) and
protective gear for oil cleanup responders, but BP wouldn't allow the workers to use
them, she says. Stuart Smith, the group's attorney, argued that the Master Vessel
Charter Agreement, a contract to hire fishermen to perform cleanup operations for BP,
didn't account for the health and safety of the workers.” (Woodward, 2011)
“Others have come forward, like 22-year-old Paul Doom from Navarre, Fla., who says he
swam in the Gulf last summer and now experiences daily seizures and is in a wheelchair
following a stroke, yet the hundreds of doctors he has seen can't explain why, he says.”
(Woodward, 2011)
“Douglas Blanchard, a third-generation fisherman (‘I got my degree on the back deck of
a shrimp boat,’ he says), was hired to handle dispersants, but he says he wasn't allowed
to use a respirator. ‘They never gave us no nothing to breathe, no protection,’ he says. ‘It
was a bad smell — it'd burn your nose, your eyes, your throat, headaches. Take pills like
they're candy, all day.’ He was flown via helicopter to West Jefferson Medical Center in
Marrero where he says he was scrubbed with soap by workers clad in hazmat suits.
‘Afterward, they told us it's not harmful,’ he says. ‘We made good money, but the
money's not worth it.’” (Woodward, 2011)
“What puzzles Robichaux and others, however, is that many blood screenings show no
sign of chemicals despite the patients' illnesses. Commercial fisher and marine
toxicologist Riki Ott believes chemicals may have ‘parked’ in fatty tissue, and other tests
are necessary. ‘If you go get a blood test now, it might not show any oil in your blood,’
she says. ‘It's not a clear reflection of what's in your body.’” (Woodward, 2011)
“Science knows precious little about the human hazards of exposure to crude oil. oil.
Researchers have a better understanding of oil’s perils for pelicans and marshlands of
the Louisiana bayou.” (Woodward, 2010)
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“In the short term, the health effects have been most obvious among the thousands of
workers scrambling to contain and now clean up the spill. They’ve worked in brutal heat
for months, face to face with the primal sludge, in conditions too steamy for many to
wear full protective gear. They’ve experienced respiratory problems, skin irritation and
plenty of heat stress. Much less clear is the impact the chemical cocktail in Gulf crude
will have on the public in years to come.” (Woodward, 2010)
“At congressional hearings in Washington, DC, and an Institute of Medicine conference
convened in New Orleans, Louisiana, as the oil still flowed, experts expressed
frustration that they know little about the health risks of a substance that courses so
ubiquitously through daily life.” (Woodward, 2010)
“Much rides on what is found. Unlike in the Exxon Valdez aftermath, when recovery
payments stretched out over decades of litigation and awards ultimately were slashed
by the US Supreme Court, BP LLC agreed to set up a US$2-billion fund for Gulf
residents, businesses and the environment. Physical ailments now and in the future
qualify for compensation.” (Woodward, 2010)
“Mental health suffering, however, an inevitable consequence of the disaster, yet one
that is difficult to quantify, might be frozen out of the fund. Kenneth Feinberg, the blunt
independent arbiter of the fund, says mental health might be a step too far.” (Woodward,
2010)
“Grounded fishermen, owners and employees of shuttered businesses and other
residents close to the crisis have been exhibiting signs of acute anxiety, depression,
increased and excessive drinking, and suicidal ideation, Louisiana state counselling
teams reported.” (Woodward, 2010)
“Researchers at the New Orleans conference heard evidence that cleanup workers in
Spain’s far smaller 2002 spill, from the sinking of the tanker Prestige , suffered DNA
damage, although of a kind that reversed itself.” (Woodward, 2010)
“Still, uncertainties persist, from fumes in the air, tar balls on beaches, chemical
dispersants used on the slick, contaminants consumed by sedentary sea life that could
not get out of the way, and more.” (Woodward, 2010)
“We don’t have the world’s literature here that’s able to tell us what happens when
there’s this much oil around populated sites […] As we’ve said all this afternoon, we just
really do not know a lot of things here. And the only way to find out is to be able to
study.”(Howard cited by Woodward, 2010)
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3- “Wildlife”
“Like the phytoplankton, many zooplankton species are sensitive to the chemicals found
in the oil. Copepods in direct contact with the spill were likely to experience increased
mortality and decreased feeding and reproduction (Suchanek, 1993), potentially allowing
blooms of phytoplankton […]. Tolerance to oil varies by species, and a study of GoM
zooplankton communities found that mortality tended to be more dependent upon
exposure time than concentration of oil […], though the highest oil concentrations led to
the highest mortalities (50% after 50 hours; Lee and Nicol, 1977). Copepods may also be
able to sense and avoid oiled areas (Seuront, 2010), thus reducing their contact and
potential mortality […]. The same may not be true of Atlantic bluefin tuna larvae. PAHs
are known to be highly toxic to larval herring, topsmelt, minnow, and salmon (Petersen
and Kristensen, 1998; Heintz et al., 1999; Couillard et al., 2005). Toxic effects include
hemorrhages, spinal deformities, growth retardation, and death (Billiard et al., 1999;
Carls et al., 1999).” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“While larvae of different fish species exhibit variable sensitivities to PAHs, deformities
and/or death are probable for larvae that come into direct contact with the oil.” (Abbriano
et al., 2011)
“However, the literature is inconclusive as to the toxicological effects of dispersant on
bacteria, with studies showing both growth enhancement and retardation (Mulkins-
Philips and Stewart, 1974; Bruheim et al., 1999; Garcia et al., 2001). Still, key
investigations have cautiously concluded that chemical dispersants are appropriate for
enhancing microbial degradation (National Research Council, 2005).” (Abbriano et al.,
2011)
“By late May, SAH-degrading bacteria, particularly the order Oceanospirillales (Hazen et
al., 2010) had increased to the point that they represented over 90% of the bacteria
inside the plume compared to only 5% in samples acquired outside the plume […].
Following the bloom of Oceanospirillales, another γ-proteobacteria from the genus
Cycloclasticus known to degrade SAHs and PAHs bloomed in late June (Kasai et al.,
2002; Valentine et al., 2010). Respiration rates due to the degradation of SAHs were
measured to be ~ 1 μM O2 d–1 (Camilli et al. 2010), accounting for ~ 70% of the lowoxygen
anomaly associated with the main plume (Valentine et al., 2010). Models of
oxygen depletion due to bacterial respiration predicted hypoxia would occur within a few
hundred kilometer radius of the wellhead at depths greater than 1,000 m (Adcroft et al.,
2010). Though measurements showed oxygen drawdown, there was no evidence of
hypoxia (Kessler et al., 2011).” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“Biodegradation by bacteria can also incorporate chemically dispersed oil into the food
web. Graham et al. (2010) showed a decrease in the δ13C of the small suspended
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particles (including phytoplankton) and mesozooplankton after the spill toward the δ13C
value of the local crude oil. This decrease implies uptake and transfer of components of
the oil through the planktonic food web. Bioaccumulation of hydrocarbons at the base of
the food web could increase exposure of higher-trophic-level organisms, with potentially
delayed negative effects (Wolfe et al., 1998).” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“The mixture of crude oil and Corexit has been found to be more toxic to phytoplankton
and fish larvae than oil alone (Hsiao et al., 1978: a mixture of four different oils;
Middaugh and Whiting, 1995: WSF of No. 2 Fuel Oil). Acute toxicity tests on the larval
stages of several invertebrates indigenous to the GoM, such as shrimp, oysters, and
crabs, showed that mixtures of the GoM oil from different wells and Corexit were about
as toxic as the WSF of the oil alone (Fucik et al., 1994).” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“In some experiments, increases in toxicity could be attributed to the chemical
properties of dispersants, which can affect the cellular membranes of planktonic
organisms by increasing permeability to toxic chemicals, disrupting respiration, and
causing membrane lysis (Singer et al., 1991)” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“As the oil makes its way up the food chain, its effects on Atlantic bluefin tuna larvae
remain unclear. While contact with the oil probably resulted in larval mutation or death,
the boom-and-bust cycles in the microbial loop may have led to increases in the main
prey sources of these larvae, namely heterotrophic microplankton (Llopiz et al., 2010;
Nakagawa et al., 2007). Therefore, for the Atlantic bluefin tuna, being in the right place at
the right time may prove to be the deciding factor for the population.” (Abbriano et al.,
2011)
“Specialists within the diverse bacterial communities exhibited rapid boom-and-bust
cycles, showing signs of returning to background levels as early as 60 days after the
blowout. Although
individual phytoplankton species may have experienced relative mortality or enhanced
growth, the direct negative effects of oil were probably largely offset by a decrease in
predation. Dispersion and degradation of oil in surface seawater, high rates of
reproduction of marine planktonic organisms, and circulation and mixing in the ocean
may also have contributed to rapid recovery of phytoplankton populations within weeks
to months. […] Lastly, Atlantic bluefin tuna would likely suffer significant mortality with
direct oil contact, but secondary effects such as an increase in food supply are still to be
determined.” (Abbriano et al., 2011)
“The 2010 BP oil spill that spewed from a broken well on the Gulf of Mexico seafloor
damaged coral as far as seven miles (11 kilometers) away […] They found that coral
along the seafloor near the well was covered with some sort of brown material and
15

appeared to show signs of tissue damage. A survey of coral 12 miles (20 kilometers)
from the Macondo well showed no such damage.” (AFP, 2012)
“More study is needed to determine if the coral will recover, but the findings so far
suggest that there was a serious impact on deep sea animal life around the broken well,
said lead researcher Charles Fisher, a professor of biology at Penn State University.”
(AFP, 2012)
“Although not as clear as that observed for birds and turtles, the data obtained for
mammals suggest an exponential increase in mortality and an exponential daily
mortality rate” (Antonio et al., 2011)
“As a consequence of the oil spill, there was increasing mortality of vertebrates, whose
carcasses started to be reported after the 38th day (May 28). In our analysis we
considered the first 140 days reporting period. The highest impact during this period
was recorded for birds, with an exponential increase in the cumulative number of
carcasses […]. Consequently, the daily mortality rate (RB = dB/dt) was also an
exponential function.” (Antonio et al., 2011)
“The most visible and immediate impact of oil on wildlife is its adhesion to organisms,
especially after the sludge washes ashore. However, other dangerous impacts are
related to mutagenic and/or carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons present in
the oil […] and sub-lethal effects such as physiological or endocrine disruptions”
(Antonio et al., 2011)
“As an example, a regional abundance estimate shows a decrease in the number of
sperm whales at the site nearest to the DWH (9 mi away) which exceeds statistical
uncertainties and can be accepted as an existing trend. The use of acoustic data to
extract information about environ-
mental factors, such as anthropogenic noise level or food call densities, that may
contribute to the explanation of existing trends is also discussed.” (Sidorovskaia et al.,
cited in Baumann-Pickering, 2011)
“In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon (DH) oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico vented oil
uncontrollably for 90+ days. This ‘persistent’ spill resulted in oil washing up daily on the
shoreline of numerous Gulf of Mexico states, and created an oil spill lasting 30 times
longer and 5 times larger than the ‘rapid’ 1989 Exxon Valdez (EV) spill. There is ongoing
controversy regarding the effect of oil spills on seabird population, with few
opportunities to analyze its daily effect.” (Belanger et al., 2010)
“Analyzing daily seabird collection data between days 38-138 after the DH spill, the dead
bird collection average (48.2+35.5/day) was significantly (p

collection average (20.8+27.0/day). Data also shows a significant reduction in daily intake
of live seabirds after day 110, while the daily dead bird intake saw a significant
increase. Between days 110 to 138, live seabird collections only rose by 206 compared
to the dead bird collection of 1834. The EV spill yielded 600+ live birds and 35,000 dead
ones while the DH spill had 2053 live birds but only 7726 dead ones.” (Belanger et al.,
2010)
“The total number of live seabirds recovered from the EV spill was approximately 1,630
birds while 2,080 birds from the DH spill were captured (Table 1). The number of live
recovered seabirds from the DH spill was only approximately 22% more than the EV spill
despite the fact that the DH spill was 2.5 times bigger in area covered and had
approximately 6 times more oil spilled. There were 35,000 dead seabirds collected
during the EV spill but only 7,726 from the DH spill (Table 1). This demonstrates an
unexpected greater number of casualties (4.5 times) from the EV spill than the DH spill
despite more oil being spilled or covering a larger area in the Gulf of Mexico.” (Belanger
et al., 2010)
“In 2010, Tan et al published that there was a strong correlation between oil spill size
and number of sea bird casualties despite the DH spill being 5 times smaller in spill size.
This data reveals that after 110 days of a ‘persistent’ spill, collecting live birds
significantly decreases while the number of dead birds increases. Also, there were a
significantly lower number of dead birds collected during the ‘persistent’ DH spill than
the ‘rapid’ EV spill. This study reveals the first concrete evidence suggesting ‘persistent’
oil spills may have a greater environmental impact than ‘rapid’ spills, and immediate
reaction is required to lessen the number of seabird casualties.” (Belanger et al., 2010)
"For example, the BP spill may have had a substantial impact on Atlantic bluefin tuna
(Thunnus thynnus), because it occurred during spawning. The spill could have affected
20% of the 2010 bluefin larvae (2). But the impact of that loss is difficult to assess
because bluefin migration paths, reproductive habits, and early life history are
inadequately resolved (3). At the ecosystem level, long-term effects of food web
alteration by oil or dispersants could suppress wildlife populations." (Bjorndal et al.,
2011)
"Integrate demography with abundance trends for multiple life stages and determine
environmental effects on those parameters. Both demographic and abundance data are
essential to diagnose causes of population declines. Even for high-profile megafauna,
too little is known about abundance of different life stages and key demographic rates:
survival, breeding and recruitment probabilities; growth rates; and age at maturity.
17

These strongly influence how perturbations like the BP spill will affect population
growth” (Bjorndal et al., 2011)
“Most of these animals are long-lived and can move thousands of kilometers between
seasons and life stages. Often, there is only an estimate of abundance for one easily
observed life stage. This is analogous to estimating human population trends by
counting women in maternity wards. Useful data would emerge, but if the children were
decimated by disease, this mortality would not be detected in the maternity ward for
decades. Sea turtles provide a striking example of this problem […]" (Bjorndal et al.,
2011)
"Improve assessment tools for evaluation of anthropogenic impacts on populations by
fostering interdisciplinary research among fisheries science, marine ecology, and
conservation biology and by funding opportunities for student training and continuing
education for managers in the quantitative sciences. The Bering Sea Project is an
excellent" (Bjorndal et al., 2011)
"[…] species recovery plans often list many variables scientists could measure but do
not prioritize which variables to measure and with what precision. As in medicine, you
cannot efficiently produce a diagnosis and cure by measuring everything or ordering
every test. We must identify and measure the most predictive variables first." (Bjorndal
et al., 2011)
“The oil spill poses acute, immediate threats to marine life, while many climate change
impacts develop gradually over long periods of time. This difference can make
connections between the two difficult to see. Marine organisms and ecosystems are
already subject to multiple stresses, including climate-related changes in seawater
chemistry and temperatures, plus toxic pollution, overfishing, and habitat destruction.
These combined stresses can amplify the harmful effects of contact with oil. A great deal
is known about the impacts of oil and toxic chemical dispersants on marine life in
coastal and surface waters, but relatively little is known about the impact on ecosystems
at the depth of the leaking wellhead (roughly 5,000 feet).” (Bowman, 2010)
“Fossil fuel use is changing seawater chemistry, stratification, temperatures, and
oxygen supply at unprecedented rates. These changes suggest that the impacts on
biodiversity will probably be severe. But their potential impacts on marine life and
ecosystems continue to be assessed, and it is not clear how ecosystems are responding
thus far.” (Bowman, 2010)
“Oceanographer Jon Kessler of Texas A&M University has suggested that the crude
spilling from the well contains unusually high levels of methane; as much as 40 percent,
which compares to 5 percent in typical oil deposits. Kessler said, “This is the most
18

vigorous methane eruption in modern human history.” While the impact of high methane
levels is not fully known, there are concerns that the methane could potentially suffocate
marine life by creating low-oxygen dead zones.” (Bowman, 2010)
“Oil and dispersant chemicals can be harmful or lethal to marine organisms, depending
on many factors including the type of contact (inhalation, ingestion, or external contact),
duration and intensity of the contact, life stage and health of the organisms, and the
particular combination of oil and chemical dispersants. Toxic affects are often caused by
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in dispersants and dissolved oil. PAHs can kill
fish, mammals, and aquatic invertebrates directly through smothering and other physical
and chemical mechanisms. Even if they are not fatal, PAHs can damage DNA and cause
cancer; liver, kidney, and brain damage; reproductive and developmental problems; and
immune system impairment in fish and other organisms. PAHs that accumulate in
invertebrates can be passed to marine mammals and fish when they consume prey.
When sea turtles and marine mammals surface in or near an oil slick to breath, they can
inhale volatile petroleum compounds that can irritate or injure respiratory tracts and lead
to inflammation or pneumonia. Swallowing petroleum and dispersants in prey or
seawater can cause gastrointestinal inflammation, ulcers, bleeding, and diarrhea and
can impair the animal’s ability to digest and absorb food. External contact with oil and
dispersants can cause irritation, burns to mucous membranes of eyes and mouths, and
increased susceptibility to infection. Sea turtles are especially vulnerable to inhalation
and ingestion damage because they do not move away from oil slicks the way large
mammals and fish do, and turtles eat indiscriminately in the presence of oil. In fact,
turtles favor the highly productive surface convergence zones, where oil can also
accumulate, and this behavior puts them at risk. Four of the five sea turtle species in the
Gulf are already endangered, and the fifth is listed as threatened.” (Bowman, 2010)
“Chemical dispersants are applied directly to the oil slick, which cause tiny dispersantoil
droplets to separate from the slick and mix into the water column, where bacteria and
other microscopic organisms can degrade the oil more quickly. This process reduces
the size and volume of the surface slick because the tiny droplets are too small to refloat
to the surface. As of May 24, BP had applied between 800,000 and one million gallons of
the dispersant Corexit, including more than 50,000 directly at the wellhead on the
seafloor. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), this volume of
dispersant was approaching a world record. Additionally, the EPA has identified Corexit
as a causal agent in health problems experienced by cleanup workers following the
Exxon Valdez spill, and Corexit is banned as an oil spill dispersant in the United
Kingdom. The EPA considers Corexit an acute health hazard, and the manufacture states
that it is harmful to red blood cells, the kidneys, and liver and is irritating to the eyes and
skin. On June 29, the Louisiana state health department reported 162 illnesses believed
to be oil-dispersant related, 128 of them involving rig and clean-up workers. On May 7,
several Louisiana state agencies sent a letter to BP outlining concerns about the impact
19

of Corexit on fisheries, wildlife, and public health. On May 19, the EPA directed BP to
select less toxic alternatives to Corexit within twenty-four hours. BP refused to comply
with the EPA order, claiming that no EPA-approved dispersants meet the directive’s
criteria for effectiveness, availability, and lower toxicity. Controversy continues to
surround the potential environmental and public health impacts of Corexit and whether
alternative dispersants could be more effective, less toxic, and readily available.”
(Bowman, 2010)
“World-record amounts of chemical dispersants have been used on the sea surface and
at the wellhead. The dispersants are toxic, but the impact of their use in such large
quantities is unknown.” (Bowman, 2010)
“The Gulf of Mexico has exceptionally high marine biodiversity, with 15,419 recorded
species, of which 10% (1511) are endemic (Felder and Camp 2009). This diversity is
partly attributable to the Gulf ’s geographic position within the transition zone between
temperate and tropical waters. Some threatened species in the Gulf (e.g., whale shark,
Rhincodon typus ; loggerhead turtle, Caretta caretta ) occur globally but have significant
populations, spawning aggregations, or nesting sites in the Gulf region. Therefore,
greater threats in this region may have implications for the species’ global survival.
Other species (e.g., Kemp’s ridley turtle, Lepidochelys kempii ; the western Atlantic
population of bluefin tuna, Thunnus thynnus ) breed only in the Gulf, and oil spill
damage exacerbates previously existing threats to these species.” (Campagna et al.,
2011)
“Given the many threats facing the Florida Keys coral reef ecosystem in the 1980s, when
Congress established the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary in 1990, it explicitly
provided that ‘[n]o leasing, exploration, development or production of minerals or
hydrocarbons shall be permitted within the Sanctuary.’ Nevertheless, oil spills such as
the Deepwater Horizon threaten this intended legal protection by exposing the sanctuary
to oil-related damage, despite the prohibition on drilling within the sanctuary itself. As
the state of Florida more generally learned as a result of the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
prohibitions on oil and gas exploration and drilling provide rather flimsy ecological
protections when other political entities sharing the same waters make different
decisions regarding the desirability of offshore platforms.” (Craig, 2010)
“Unfortunately, comprehensive data on conditions before the spill—the natural “status
quo ante” from the shoreline to the deepwater Gulf—were generally lacking. Even now,
information on the nature of the damage associated with the released oil is being
realized in bits and pieces: reports of visibly oiled and dead wildlife, polluted marshes,
and lifeless deepwater corals. Moreover, scientific knowledge of deepwater marine
communities is limited, and it is there that a significant volume of oil was dispersed from
the wellhead, naturally and chemically, into small droplets. Scientists simply do not yet
20

know how to predict the ecological consequences and effects on key species that might
result from oil exposure in the water column, both far below and near the surface.”
(Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“The oil that made landfall was fairly “weathered,” consisting of emulsions of crude oil
and depleted of its more volatile components. More than 650 miles of Gulf coastal
habitats— salt marsh, mudflat, mangroves, and sand beaches— were oiled; more than
130 miles have been designated as moderately to heavily oiled. Louisiana’s fragile delta
habitats bore the brunt of the damage, with approximately 20 additional miles of
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida shorelines moderately to heavily oiled. Light oiling
and tar balls extended east to Panama City, Florida. Except for occasional tarballs,
Deepwater Horizon oil never reached Texas or the tourism centers along the southwest
Florida coast.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Few beachgoers realize that millions of microscopic organisms live in the Gulf’s soggy
sands between high and low tide. By comparing samples taken before and after beaches
were oiled, Holly Bik of the University of New Hampshire’s Hubbard Center for Genome
Studies, together with scientists at Auburn University and the University of Texas, hopes
to determine the impact on this understudied community of sediment-dwelling
microfauna.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Oyster mortality observed in the highly productive areas of Barataria Bay and Breton
Sound, estuaries that flank the lower Mississippi River, appear to be due, in large part, to
the flood of fresh water introduced through river diversions in what many believe was a
futile attempt to keep oil from entering the estuarine areas. Beyond their commercial
import, oysters are a keystone species—an organism that exerts a shaping,
disproportionate influence on its habitat and community. A single adult oyster can filter
more than one gallon of water per hour, effectively removing impurities— including oil—
from the water column. Oyster reefs established on an estuary’s muddy bottom can
increase the surface area fiftyfold, creating intricate habitats for crabs, small fish, and
other animals, which in turn sustain larger species.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, 2011)
“In September 28 testimony before the Commission, Jane Lyder, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Department of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, said that
‘With more than 60 percent of the data verified, the three most affected [bird] species
appear to be Brown Pelicans, Northern Gannets, and Laughing Gulls.’” (Graham et
al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“One hundred mammals were collected dead, though only four of those were visibly
oiled. Most of the marine mammal mortalities were bottlenose dolphins. Also among the
dead was one juvenile sperm whale; it was found floating more than 70 miles from the
21

source of the spill, reportedly unoiled. More than 600 dead sea turtles were collected.”
(Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Many large fish species are dependent on the health of the estuarine and marine
habitats and resources. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
noted that species with ‘essential fish habitat’ near the oil spill include scalloped
hammerhead, shortfin mako, silky, whale, bigeye thresher, longfin mako, and oceanic
whitetip sharks; and swordfish, white marlin, blue marlin, yellowfin tuna, bluefin tuna,
longbill spearfish, and sailfish. Other important Gulf fish include red snapper, gag
grouper, gray triggerfish, red drum, vermilion snapper, greater amberjack, black drum,
cobia and dolphin (mahimahi); coastal migratory open-water species, such as king and
Spanish mackerel; and open-water sharks.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
2011)
“Oil constituents can be transferred through the food chain: heavier hydrocarbons can
be passed from water to phytoplankton and then to zooplankton, or from sediments to
polychaete worms and eventually to fish. Because animals that are several steps up the
food chain, like small fish, have the capability to metabolize hydrocarbons fairly rapidly,
their predators will actually not accumulate much from eating them. Accordingly,
bioaccumulation of toxic oil components does occur in fish, but biomagnification, with
increasingly higher concentrations in animals at each level, does not occur.” (Graham et
al./ U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“It would be impossible to sample and assess each of the thousands of marine fish and
other species inhabiting the open-ocean water column.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 2011)
“In September 28 testimony before the Commission, Jane Lyder, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Department of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, said that
‘With more than 60 percent of the data verified, the three most affected [bird] species
appear to be Brown Pelicans, Northern Gannets, and Laughing Gulls.’ She added that
‘The fall migration is underway. Songbirds and shorebirds began their migration to the
Gulf coast in July. Waterfowl began arriving in late August and early September. We
know there are significant impacts to marsh and coastal wetland habitats along sections
of the Louisiana coast, particularly near Grand Isle, Louisiana. We are continuing to
monitor what the full impact will be to migratory birds and other wildlife.’ The potential
impact on marine mammals and sea turtles is harder to assess.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was unprecedented in total loading of petroleum
hydrocarbons accidentally released to a marine ecosystem. Controversial application of
chemical dispersants presumably accelerated microbial consumption of oil components,
22

especially in warm Gulf of Mexico surface waters. We employed δ13C as a tracer of oilderived
carbon to resolve two periods of isotopic carbon depletion in two plankton size
classes. Carbon depletion was coincident with the arrival of surface oil slicks in the far
northern Gulf, and demonstrated that subsurface oil carbon was incorporated into the
plankton food web.” (Graham et al., 2010)
“Carbon isotopic depletion in mesozooplankton and suspended particulate samples
throughout the water column […] indicates trophic transfer of oil carbon into the
planktonic food web. A similar response found in benthic communities around natural
seeps suggests that carbon isotopic shifts in the plankton fractions are likely due to the
duration and magnitude of depleted carbon released into the system. These data provide
strong evidence that labile fractions of the oil extended throughout the shallow water
column during northward slick transport and that this carbon was processed relatively
quickly at least two trophic levels beyond prokaryotic hydrocarbon consumers given our
understanding of microbial-zooplankton trophic linkages.” (Graham et al., 2010)
“The amount of Corexit 7664 used in the clean-up of spilled oil was “non-toxic to marine
fauna” in amounts below 10,000 p.p.m (parts per million). The manufacturer states that
the “marine fauna” tested were shrimps and fish, and that results on other marine life
(barnacles, limpets, periwinkles, and topshell) were unavailable.” (Griffith, 1969)
“The Irish Fisheries Leaflet no. 6 determined that the amount of Corexit exposure
necessary to debilitate these species (render them too weak to connect to surfaces or
reattach) was 8,000 p.p.m.” (Griffith, 1969)
“In July, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) released a new
water quality report, which includes the list of water bodies that the state considers
‘impaired.’ This list is important because it is the basis upon which LDEQ develops their
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) plans, which, as EPA is fond of saying, is basically a
pollution ‘diet’ that determines how much pollution must be removed from the water in
order for it to be considered not impaired. [...] the Dead Zone in the Gulf is a reoccurring
and urgent problem. Yet, in the recently released impaired waters list, LDEQ is
suggesting that the Gulf of Mexico and Mississippi River do not need to be put on one of
these “pollution diets” for Dead Zone-causing nitrogen and phosphorous.“ (Gulf
Restoration Network, 2010b)
“According to NOAA, between November, 2010 and May, 2011, there have been at least
238 cetacean strandings, of which 96% were dead. Samples and specimens are turned
over to the government under a controversial protocol that shuts out and angers many
marine experts.” (Gulf Restoration Network, 2011a)
23

“Although snail densities did not vary between oiled and control sites, crab burrows
were suppressed at oiled sites. Previous studies have shown that oil exposure
negatively affects intertidal crabs. In New England, exposure to oil led to shallower
burrows and, over time, to lower population densities of Uca fiddler crabs.” (McCall et
al., 2012)
“Mesozooplankton (>200 μm) collected in August and September of 2010 from the
northern Gulf of Mexico show evidence of exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs). Multivariate statistical analysis revealed that distributions of PAHs extracted
from mesozooplankton were related to the oil released from the ruptured British
Petroleum Macondo-1 (M-1) well associated with the R/V Deepwater Horizon blowout.
Mesozooplankton contained 0.03–97.9 ng g−1 of total PAHs and ratios of fluoranthene to
fluoranthene + pyrene less than 0.44, indicating a liquid fossil fuel source. The
distribution of PAHs isolated from mesozooplankton extracted in this study shows that
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill may have contributed to contamination in the northern
Gulf of Mexico ecosystem.” (Mitra et al., 2012)
“Oil spill resulted in dramatic effects on fish species in Louisiana marshes…Despite low
concentrations of oil constituents in Gulf of Mexico waters from the Deepwater Horizon
spill, fish were dramatically affected by toxic components of the oil. […] Gene
expression in tissues of the fish studied--in this case killifish--was predictive of oil spill
responses such as developmental abnormalities and death…It also indicated impairment
of fish reproduction…Fish gill tissues, important for maintaining critical fish body
functions, appeared damaged and had altered protein expression…These effects
persisted long after visible oil disappeared from a marsh's surface…Developing fish
embryos exposed to field-collected waters had similar cellular responses…A major
message of the previous Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska…is that sublethal biological
effects, especially those linked with reproduction, are most predictive of the long-term
effects of oil in many fish species” (National Science Foundation, 2011)
“Oil mitigation measures (release of Mississippi River water through diversions) likely
increased the noxious and harmful algal blooms, hypoxia, and fish kill problems to the
east of the Mississippi River delta where there was also visible oil.” (Rabalais, 2011)
“By the end of the year, some impacts had been noted such as the 1,500 km of oiled
shoreline habitats; the numbers of oiled or dead birds, sea turtles, and marine mammals;
days of lost income due to fishing closures; loss of rental income for beachside
property; or other visible and tangible signs. But considerable effort continues on the
assessment of damages, and relevant research programs are underway. It will be years
before the agreed-upon estimate of how much oil and gas spewed from the well is
established, a comprehensive picture of the fate of the oil is drawn, broader
24

environmental and social impacts are documented, and economic damages summed.”
(Rabalais, 2011)
"As bird protection they’re pointless, because birds fly, and the whole idea behind
booms―that oil floats―is defeated by dissolving the oil into the water with dispersants,
creating a toxic brew." (Safina, 2010c)
"While laboratory tests show dispersants, oil, and a mixture of the two kill fish, fish
larvae, and shrimp, sedentary creatures are perhaps most at risk from these substances.
Oysters and coral reefs―and the people and other wildlife that depend on them―are
essentially defenseless." (Safina, 2010c)
“Animals that breathe at the surface, like dolphins, whales, and sea turtles, are
especially vulnerable to oil in the water. Whale sharks, the world’s largest fish, often use
a mode of feeding that almost seems designed to skim floating oil from the surface. […]
During an aerial survey in June, Hurricane Creekkeeper John Wathen and author David
Helvarg photographed a sperm whale and dolphins swimming through long floating
streaks and dark, discolored slicks of oil, and another pod of dolphins in distress, with
several dead and dying members.” (Safina, 2010c)
“The Kemp’s ridley is the world’s most endangered sea turtle. In the 1980s its numbers
were so low that several experts feared it was doomed to extinction. Exhaustive
conservation efforts brought it back from the brink and put the species on firmer footing.
The number of nesting females, which lay eggs on only a few Gulf of Mexico beaches,
rose from fewer than 300 in 1985 to approximately 5,500 in 2009. Breeding adults,
juveniles, and hatchlings are highly vulnerable to oil slicks.” (Safina, 2010c)
“But the blowout is only the most acute threat to the people and wildlife who rely on the
Gulf’s seashore and seafood. The same fossil fuels are causing temperatures to rise,
melting Arctic ecosystems, and killing coral reefs. On top of that, they’re acidifying the
world ocean so rapidly that it is already affecting the growth of shellfish and corals.“
(Safina, 2010c)
“Kemp's Ridley turtle is the smallest marine turtle in the world, and endangered
throughout its range. It's only known breeding habitat is along the coasts of Texas and
Mexico; as the young leave the beach, however, they'll enter the loop current and be
carried out to the Atlantic, most likely through the oil slick, ‘potentially poisoning a
generation of those turtles,’ according to Douglas N. Rader, the chief ocean scientist for
Environmental Defense Fund.” (Shapley, 2010)
“Not only commercial species of fish, but other species are at risk from the BP Gulf Oil
Spill, including gulf sturgeon, a threatened species.” (Shapley, 2010)
25

“[…] the Gulf of Mexico is a tremendous engine of life and also a tremendous
concentration zone, where animals from the whole open Atlantic Ocean funnel into the
Gulf for breeding and millions of animals cross the Gulf and concentrate there on their
northward migration and then fan out to populate much of North America and the
Canadian Arctic, the East Coast, the Canadian Maritimes. So it’s a real hotspot, and it’s a
terrible place to foul.” (Safina, 2010a)
“The Gulf is the hourglass pinch-point for millions of migrating creatures that funnel
into, breed in, migrate through and then fan out of it to populate an enormous area of the
continents and coasts. Anything that affects living things inside the Gulf affects living
things far outside it.” (Safina, 2010b)
“BP had a federally approved Gulf of Mexico spill response plan that explained what it
would do for walruses and sea lions—creatures that don't live in the Gulf of Mexico.”
(Safina, 2011a)
“However, at one site 11 km southwest of the Macondo well, coral colonies presented
widespread signs of stress, including varying degrees of tissue loss, sclerite
enlargement, excess mucous production, bleached commensal ophiuroids, and
covering by brown flocculent material (floc). On the basis of these criteria the level of
impact to individual colonies was ranked from 0 (least impact) to 4 (greatest impact). Of
the 43 corals imaged at that site, 46% exhibited evidence of impact on more than half of
the colony, whereas nearly a quarter of all of the corals showed impact to >90% of the
colony. Additionally, 53% of these corals’ ophiuroid associates displayed abnormal color
and/or attachment posture.” (White et al.,2012)
“Observations of recently damaged corals and the presence of Macondo well oil on
corals indicates impact at a depth of 1,370 m, 11 km from the site of the blowout. This
finding provides insight into the extent of the impact of the spill, which is significantly
complicated by physical mixing processes and fractionation of the oil constituents.
Because deep-water corals are sessile and release mucous that may trap material from
the water column, these corals may provide a more sensitive indicator of the impact
from petroleum hydrocarbons than marine sediment cores and may record impacts from
water masses passing through a community, even if no deposition to the sediment
occurs.” (White et al., 2012)
“The data suggest the Deepwater Horizon oil spill impacted a community of deep-water
corals near the Macondo well. The numerous apparently healthy deep-water coral
communities in other parts of the GoM may indicate that the localized impact in MC 294
found to date, is not part of a much larger, acute, GoMwide event. However, life in deepwater
coral ecosystems is known to operate at a slow pace. Consequently it is too early
26

to fully evaluate the footprint and long-term effects of acute and subacute exposure to
potential waterborne contaminants resulting from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.”
(White et al., 2012)
“The biological consequences of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are unknown…Remote
sensing and analytical chemistry identified exposures, which were linked to effects in
fish characterized by genome expression and associated gill immunohistochemistry,
despite very low concentrations of hydrocarbons remaining in water and tissues.
Divergence in genome expression coincides with contaminating oil and is consistent
with genome responses that are predictive of exposure to hydrocarbon-like chemicals
and indicative of physiological and reproductive impairment. These data suggest that
heavily weathered crude oil from the spill imparts significant biological impacts in
sensitive Louisiana marshes.” (Whitehead et al., 2011)
.
“Coastal salt marsh habitats are dynamic and stressful, where changes in environmental
parameters, such as temperature, hypoxia, and salinity, can continuously challenge
resident wildlife. Although the physiological consequences of oil exposures are typically
studied in isolation, it is reasonable to predict that exposure to oil may compromise the
ability of resident organisms to adjust physiologically to natural stressors.” (Whitehead
et al., 2011)
“Our data reveal biologically relevant sublethal exposures causing alterations in
genome expression and tissue morphology suggestive of physiological impairment
persisting for over 2 mo after initial exposures. Sublethal effects were predictive of
deleterious population-level impacts that persisted over long periods of time in aquatic
species following the Exxon Valdez spill and must be a focus of long-term research in
the Gulf of Mexico, especially because high concentrations of hydrocarbons in
sediments may provide a persistent source of exposures to organisms resident in
Louisiana marshes.” (Whitehead et al., 2011)
27

4- “Cleanup”
“[…] analysis and testing of five of the post-landfall toxic samples utilizing Toxicity
Identification Evaluation techniques indicated that ammonia, and to a lesser extent
metals, contributed to most, if not all, of the observed toxicity in four of the five samples.
Results of one sample […] indicated evidence that ammonia, metals, and non-ionic
organics were contributing to the observed toxicity.” (Biedenbach 2011)
“Technical Group initially put the volume at 12,000 –19,000 barrels per day. Based on
additional
video evidence, however, this group revised its estimate on June 10 to 25,000 – 30,000
barrels (1.1– 1.3 million gallons) per day with a lower limit set at 20,000 barrels per day. .
At this rate, the Gulf spill would be releasing the equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill
every 8 –10 days. This quasi-official figure has been revised upward again to 35,000 –
60,000 barrels (1.5 – 2.5 million gallons) per day. On June 20, an internal BP document,
which was released by Congress, stated that the flow rate could be as high as 100,000
barrels (4.2 million gallons) per day.” (Bowman, 2010)
“The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) notes that a crude oil
slick “weathers” as volatile compounds evaporate and the remaining oil mixes with
seawater to form a sticky emulsion that can look like chocolate pudding. As waves tear
the slick into smaller patches The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) notes that a crude oil
slick “weathers” as volatile compounds evaporate and the remaining oil mixes with
seawater to form a sticky emulsion that can look like chocolate pudding. As waves tear
the slick into smaller patches they often form coin-sized tar balls that can become crusty
on the outside, but remain soft and sticky inside. The federal chemical hazard
assessment team for oil spills notes that the type of oil leaking from the Deepwater
Horizon well is a heavier blend than most of the oil drilled off Louisiana. The oil is rich in
asphalt-like substances and emulsifies easily into a sticky form that no longer
evaporates as quickly as regular oil, does not rinse off easily, cannot be eaten by
microbes easily, and does not burn as well as regular oil. This type of oil renders many
of the best response strategies less effective.” (Bowman, 2010)
“Material Safety Data Sheet for Low Sulfur Diesel
BP Oil Company
Date of issue 06/25/2004.
MSDS# 0000001799 (NAP)
Emergency overview: WARNING!
28

COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID AND VAPOR.
VAPOR MAY CAUSE FIRE.
ASPIRATION HAZARD.
Harmful or fatal if liquid is aspirated into lungs.
MAY CAUSE SKIN IRRITATION.
Do not ingest. If ingested do not induce vomiting. Avoid contact with skin and clothing.
Keep away from heat, sparks and flame. Keep container closed. Use only with
adequate ventilation. Wash thoroughly after handling. Prolonged or repeated contact
can defat the skin and lead to irritation and/or dermatitis.
Ecological information Ecotoxicity: No testing has been performed by the manufacturer.
Environmental precautions and clean-up methods: For large spills dike spilled material
or otherwise contain material to ensure runoff does not reach a waterway. Place spilled
material in an appropriate container for disposal. Minimize contact of spilled material
with soils to prevent runoff to surface waterways.”
(BP Oil Company, 2004)
“One major effect of oil is narcosis, a reversible anesthetic effect caused by the oil
partitioning into cell membrane and nervous tissue, causing central nervous system
dysfunction.” (Chen et al., 2011)
“As a result, oil that coated beaches on the Mexican and Texas coasts wiped out local
coastal fauna such as crabs and mollusks. Unusually large plankton blooms were
observed in oil-contaminated areas, which indicated possible eutrophication or a
decrease in zooplankton (their primary predator) caused by oil toxicity.” (Chen et al.,
2011)
“By early June, scientists working in the Gulf had detected two extensive plumes deep
under the surface of the Gulf, ‘most likely a haze of oil droplets, natural gas and the
dispersant chemical Corexit, 210,000 gallons of which had been mixed into the jet of oil
streaming from the sea floor. This oily haze could prove toxic to coral reefs.’ One of the
plumes was 200 cubic miles in size—one-half the size of Lake Erie—and extended for
about 22 miles from the Deepwater Horizon site. These plumes are highly unusual
compared to surface oil spills, and a great deal of uncertainty remains regarding how
they are currently behaving or will behave in the future. Nevertheless, the plumes
already threaten deepwater coral reefs lying outside the Flower Garden Banks National
Marine Sanctuary, some of which are just 20 miles northeast of the Deepwater Horizon
site.” (Craig, 2010)
“A full accounting of the oil released will be required in order to fully understand the
environmental and ecological impacts of this disaster. One method for determining this
29

volume is to measure the flow at the discharge sites and integrate these measurements
over time. We used optical plume velocimetry (OPV) to estimate the mean velocity of
fluids issuing from the well with videos from before and after the removal of the
collapsed riser pipe from the blowout preventer.” (Crone et al., 2010)
“In the study of fluid dynamics, spatial crosscorrelation methods (e.g., particle image
velocimetry) are often used to calculate the image velocity field. However, such methods
can yield velocities that are significantly lower than expected with this kind of flow. OPV
was developed for measuring flow rates in seafloor hydrothermal systems and uses
temporal instead of spatial cross-correlation.” (Crone et al., 2010)
“Assuming the fraction of liquid oil in this fluid was 0.4 (6), we estimated the average
flow rate after riser removal to be 9.3 × 103 and 5.8 × 104 barrels/day (1.7 × 10−2 and 1.1 ×
10−1 m3/s) for the lighter and darker flows, respectively, or 6.8 × 104 barrels/day (1.2 ×
10−1 m3/s) total. Our analysis frombefore riser removal yielded a flow rate of 5.6 × 104
barrels/day (1.0 × 10−1 m3/s). Because leaks at the kink above the blowout preventer
were not included, this total is likely an underestimate. Thus, we cannot say with
certainty that flow rates increased after riser removal.” (Crone et al., 2010)
“Assuming a constant flow rate and subtracting the 804,877 barrels of oil (127,965 m3)
collected at the seafloor (7), we estimated that the total oil released from the Deepwater
Horizon leak was 4.4 × 106 T 20% barrels (7.0 × 105 m3). This estimate may be refined if
additional video allows the temporal variability to be assessed or the flow from the
secondary leaks to be added. Despite the uncertainties, it is clear that this oil release
exceeds the Exxon Valdez spill by about an order of magnitude, with flow rates at least
one order of magnitude higher than initially reported.” (Crone et al., 2010)
“BP has aerially sprayed or otherwise released over two million gallons of COREXIT as
the primary dispersant in the spill’s cleanup. BP and contractors have reassured
cleanup crews that COREXIT is as safe as Dawn dishwasher soap. However, the
manufacturer’s Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) included in the manual indicate that
the dispersants utilized contain hazardous ingredients such as 2-butoxyethanol,
petroleum distillates, and sulfonic acids. The specific petroleum distillates and sulfonic
acids within COREXIT EC9257A and EC9500A have never been disclosed to the public.”
(GAP & LEAN, 2012)
“despite reassurances of the dispersant’s harmless nature, the manual lists the
following symptoms of exposure for COREXIT EC9527A and/or COREXIT EC9500A:
Injury to red blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or the liver; Irritate the upper respiratory
tract; Central nervous system effects; Nausea; Vomiting; Anesthetic or narcotic effects;
Defat and dry the skin, leading to discomfort and dermatitis; Chemical pneumonia if
aspirated into lungs following ingestion. The MSDSs for COREXIT indicate that no
30

toxicity studies have been conducted on this product. Further, the potential human
hazard is “High” for COREXIT EC9527A, and there is an “Immediate (Acute) Health
Hazard” for COREXIT EC9500A.” (GAP & LEAN, 2012)
“The oil spill dispersants, Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527 have low to moderate toxicity to
most aquatic species in laboratory tests. Toxicity estimates are significantly affected by
test variables such as species, lifestage, exposure duration, and temperature. Aquatic
toxicity data generated from spiked, declining exposures (107 min half-life) are more
reflective of actual dispersant use conditions. Decisions to use oil spill response
chemicals should not be based solely on aquatic toxicity. Factors to consider include
product effectiveness, toxicity of dispersed oil, species/habitats requiring priority
protection, and recovery potential of sensitive habitats and populations. An
environmental risk assessment approach is recommended where dispersant toxicity
data generated under environmentally relevant exposures are compared to estimated
environmental concentrations of dispersants.” (George-Ares et al., 2000)
“Acute aquatic toxicity is typically expressed by LC50 and EC50 endpoints. The LC50 is
the concentration causing mortality in 50% of test organisms in a specified time period
(typically 48 or 96 h). The EC50 is the concentration causing a specific effect (e.g.,
decreased algal growth or inhibition of animal mobility) in 50% of the test organisms at a
specified time period. Decreasing LC50 or EC50 values indicate increasing toxicity.
Corexit 9527 has low (LC50 or EC50 > 100 ppm) to moderate (LC50 or EC50 P 1 to 100
ppm) acute toxicity to most aquatic organisms in laboratory tests. The review of the
Corexit 9527 toxicity data covered 28 reports and 37 aquatic species. These data are
summarized in Table 1. Toxicity (24±96 h LC50 or EC50) values ranged from 1.6 to >1000
ppm. Lifestages investigated were zoospores, embryos, larvae, postlarvae, juveniles,
and adults.” (George-Ares et al., 2000)
‘Laboratory test methods are not harmonized among regulatory agencies of different
countries. Some countries compare aquatic toxicities of dispersant to that of oil and
dispersed oil (National Research Council, 1989). Other countries only evaluate
dispersant toxicity, because their regulators wish to compare toxicity among
commercially available dispersants. The acute toxicities of currently marketed
dispersants are typically lower than those of crude and refined oils (National Research
Council, 1989; Lewis and Aurand, 1997). In the field, the key concern is not the potential
for adverse effects of the dispersant, but effects of dispersed oil. These concerns must
be evaluated in light of a variety of considerations (Lewis and Aurand, 1997).” (George-
Ares et al., 2000)
“Much public attention has been focused on the fate and toxicity of the unprecedented
release of over a million gallons of dispersant. Dispersants are surfactants that help to
disperse the oil by lessening the tension of the oil–water interface. Information provided
31

on the manufacturer’s material safety data sheet for Corexit 9500, the major dispersant
used in the Gulf spill, states that the surfactant consists of 10 to 30% light-weight
petroleum distillate, 1 to 5% propylene glycol, and 10 to 30% proprietary organic sulfonic
acid salt. Some aquatic safety information about Corexit 9500 had been obtained
previously by the manufacturer. After the spill, additional studies were rapidly performed
by the EPA, which publicly identified the proprietary salt as dioctyl sodium
sulfosuccinate, a commonly used stool softener. Secrecy about this generic drug
appeared to contribute to public concern, despite the fact that the exposure of humans
through use of the dispersant was trivial as compared with the usual prescribed doses.”
(Goldstein et al., 2011)
“The Deepwater Horizon blowout produced the largest accidental marine oil spill in U.S.
history,2 an acute human and environmental tragedy. Worse still, […] it occurred in the
midst of environmental disasters related to land-based pollution and massive
destruction of coastal wetlands—chronic crises that proceed insidiously and will require
not months but decades of national effort to address and repair.” (Graham et al./U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“The highly visible damage to wildlife aside, public and scientific concern about the
Deepwater Horizon spill—at unprecedented water depths— has for some time focused
on the impacts of an invisible subsurface “plume,” or more accurately “clouds” of
minute oil droplets moving slowly over the seabed. As of November 2010, three
independent, peerreviewed studies confirmed the presence of a deepwater plume of
highly dispersed oil droplets and dissolved gases at between 3,200 and 4,200 feet deep
and extending for many miles, primarily to the southwest of the wellhead. How will such
substances affect the deepwater environment? One concern centered on decomposition
and the resulting depletion of the oxygen supply on which aquatic species depend. […]
The degradation rates are sufficient to reduce the dissolved oxygen concentrations in
the plume, but not to harmfully low levels associated with dead zones, where aquatic
species cannot survive. […] These findings do not rule out potential impacts of
deepwater oil and dispersant concentrations on individual species. Chemical analyses
of water samples taken from the established deepwater plume in May 2010 suggest that
hydrocarbon concentrations were high enough at the time to cause acute toxicity to
exposed organisms, although concentrations declined over several miles from the well
as the plume mixed with the surrounding water.” (Graham et al./ U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, 2011)
“Even before they were certain that oil was spilling into the Gulf, responders had readied
planes full of dispersants to use in a potential response. Dispersants include surfactants
that break down oil into smaller droplets, which are more likely to dissolve into the water
column.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
32

“Faced with what one Coast Guard captain called a ‘tradeoff of bad choices’ between
spraying chemicals on the water or watching more oil reach the shore, responders
would wield dispersants in the battle against oil for the next 12 weeks, using novel
methods and unprecedented volumes.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
2011)
“Using dispersants has several potential benefits. First, less oil will reach shorelines
and fragile environments such as marshes. Second, animals and birds that float on or
wade through the water surface may encounter less oil. Third, dispersants may
accelerate the rate at which oil biodegrades. Finally, responders to an oil spill can use
dispersants when bad weather prevents skimming or burning. But dispersants also pose
potential threats. Less oil on the surface means more in the water column, spread over a
wider area, potentially increasing exposure for marine life. Chemically dispersed oil can
be toxic in both the short and long term. Moreover, some studies have found that
dispersants do not increase biodegradation rates— or may even inhibit biodegradation.”
(Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Coordinator, BP and its contractors applied 14,654 gallons of the dispersant Corexit on
the surface during the week of April 20 to 26. […] From April 27 to May 3, responders
applied 141,358 gallons to the surface.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
2011)
“Moreover, the required testing is limited to acute (short-term) toxicity studies on one
fish species and one shrimp species; it does not consider issues such as persistence in
the environment and long-term effects.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
2011)
“Environmental groups pressured Nalco, the company that manufactures Corexit, to
disclose its formula. Although it had given the formula to EPA during the prelisting
process, Nalco declined to make the formula public, citing intellectual property
concerns. This decision did not reassure the citizens of the Gulf.” (Graham et al./U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“EPA expressed frustration that BP sought regular exemptions, and it repeatedly asked
for more robust explanations of why BP could not use mechanical recovery methods,
such as skimming and burning, instead of dispersants. Coast Guard responders, who
viewed dispersants as a powerful tool to protect the coastline, wondered why EPA
wanted to cast aside the advance planning that went into the preauthorization of surface
dispersant use.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“A year and a half into the BP oil drilling disaster, restoration seems to come too slow.
Even as we see oil uncovered by successive storms, the Coast Guard has declared the
33

Gulf coast ‘clean,’ Congress has yet to act to direct BP's fines to the Gulf, and we rely on
the laws written after Exxon-Valdez with Alaskans in mind to restore the Gulf of Mexico.”
(Gulf Restoration Network, 2011b)
“From British Petroleum to our federal, state and local government and on down, no one
seems to have made a plan for how to quickly plug a deepwater well, how to efficiently
capture the huge quantities of oil spewing into our Gulf, or how to protect and prevent
oil from reaching our coasts.” (Gulf Restoration Network, 2010a)
“During the height of the drilling disaster, the state of Louisiana received an emergency
permit to dredge up sand offshore and build 20-foot wide, 6-foot high sand barriers along
our coast outside of the barrier islands. The stated purpose of these berms is to stop the
oil from getting into the marshes, but little to no oil has washed up on them, several sea
turtles have been killed in the dredging process, and multiple coastal scientists have
spoken out against the project. Despite these concerns, the state is pushing to expand
the projects, and the construction would stretch well into next year!” (Gulf Restoration
Network, 2010b)
“A project that we have successfully avoided (twice!) in the past two months is what BP
calls ‘surf washing.’ This is where you push the “stained” oily sand back into the Gulf to
let the waves clean it up. Despite BP’s attempts to get two emergency permits (one for
Grand Terre and one for Grand Isle), both request were withdrawn due to concerns from
GRN, our conservation partners, and federal agencies.” (Gulf Restoration Network,
2010b)
“Back in August, the federal government released a very rosy report estimating that
three quarters of the oil from BP’s drilling disaster was gone due the federal response,
evaporation, natural degradation and other factors. This report immediately unleashed a
wave of criticism from independent scientists, and skeptical Gulf citizens who
contended that there was still a lot of oil out there threatening Gulf communities and
ecosystems. It’s hard not to be a little skeptical when two months since the well was
capped, scientists continue to discover significant amounts of oil in the ecosystem, and
oil and tar balls continue to wash-up on Gulf of Mexico shores.” (Gulf Restoration
Network, 2010b)
“The Deepwater Horizon oil spill has led to the use of >1 M gallons of oil spill
dispersants, which are mixtures of surfactants and solvents. Because of this large scale
use there is a critical need to understand the potential for toxicity of the currently used
dispersant and potential alternatives, especially given the limited toxicity testing
information that is available. In particular, some dispersants contain nonylphenol
ethoxylates (NPEs), which can degrade to nonylphenol (NP), a known endocrine
disruptor.” (Judson et al., 2010)
34

“The massive oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico has
led to the use of correspondingly large volumes of the oil spill dispersant Corexit 9500
(Nalco Energy Services, L.P., Sugar Land, TX). In excess of 1.5 M gallons of dispersant
have been released into the Gulf as of June 26, 2010. Oil spill dispersants are complex
mixtures of two basic components. The first is comprised of one or more surfactants
that can emulsify oil. The second is a hydrocarbon-based solvent mixture that helps
break up large clumps of high molecular weight, more viscous oil. There is limited
information on the potential of dispersants to cause acute or long term toxicity in
aquatic species or humans.” (Judson et al., 2010)
“This means that the Deepwater Horizon spill rivals the second-largest known
environmental oil release in global history (Camphese Exploratory Blowout, 1979), and
may perhaps be even larger than current estimates indicate.” (Kelley, 2010)
“NALCO MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET for COREXIT® EC9527 A
Prepared By : Nalco Energy Services, L.P., Product Safety Department
Date issued : 05/11/2010
Version Number : 2.0”
**EMERGENCY OVERVIEW** WARNING: Eye and skin irritant. Repeated or excessive
exposure to butoxyethanol may cause injury to red blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or
the liver. Combustible. Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing. Do not take internally.
Use with adequate ventilation. Wear suitable protective clothing . Keep container tightly
closed. Flush affected area with water. Keep away from heat. Keep away from sources of
ignition - No smoking. May evolve oxides of carbon (COx) under fire conditions.
SKIN CONTACT:
Can cause mild to moderate irritation.
INGESTION:
Not a likely route of exposure. Large quantities may cause kidney and liver damage.
INHALATION :
Not a likely route of exposure. Aerosols or product mist may irritate the upper
respiratory tract.
SYMPTOMSOFEXPOSURE:
Acute: Excessive exposure may cause central nervous system effects, nausea,
vomiting, anesthetic or narcotic effects.
Chronic : Repeated or excessive exposure to butoxyethanol may cause injury to red
blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or the liver.
35

AGGRAVATION OF EXISTING CONDITIONS:
Skin contact may aggravate an existing dermatitis condition.
HUMAN HAZARD CHARACTERIZATION:
Based on our hazard characterization, the potential human hazard is: High
ENVIRONMENTAL PRECAUTIONS: Do not contaminate surface water.”
ECOTOXICOLOGICAL EFFECTS :
No toxicity studies have been conducted on this product.”
(NALCO, 2010a)
“NALCO MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET for COREXIT® EC9500 A
Prepared By : Nalco Energy Services, L.P., Product Safety Department
Date issued : 05/11/2010
Version Number : 2.0
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS : Exposure guidelines have not been established
for this product.
TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION: No toxicity studies have been conducted on this
product.
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD AND EXPOSURE CHARACTERIZATION: Based on our hazard
characterization, the potential environmental hazard is: Moderate”
(NALCO, 2010b)
“Spills in enclosed spaces or within biologically complex or fragile ecosystems may
increase exposure to the toxic hydrocarbons in oil compared to spills in areas where
dispersion and weathering effects may reduce the amount of oil and lower toxicity
levels. There is no doubt, however, that the massive volume of oil released by the BP
Deepwater Horizon well increased the potential for large-scale impacts.” (Rabalais, 2011)
“[…] the dispersant is a toxic pollutant that has been applied in the volume of millions of
gallons and I think has greatly exacerbated the situation. I think the whole idea of using a
dispersant is wrong, and I think it’s part of the whole pattern of BP trying to cover up and
hide the body. They don’t want us to see how much oil, so they’ve taken this oil that was
concentrated at the surface and dissolved it. But when you dissolve it, it’s still there, and
it actually gets more toxic, because instead of being in big blobs, it’s now dissolved and
can get across the gills, get into the mouths of animals. The water below the floating oil
was water. Now it’s this toxic soup. So I think that in this whole pattern of BP trying to
36

not let people know what’s going on, the idea of disperse the oil is a way of just hiding
the body. But it actually makes the oil more toxic, and it adds this incredible amount of
toxic pollutant in the dispersant itself.” (Safina, 2010a)
“Dispersant, which is toxic by itself, also makes the petroleum more toxic. Instead of
remaining concentrated at the surface, dispersed oil pollutes the entire water column.
Instead of evaporating, the toxic components remain in the water. And because it's
dissolved, it passes more easily across gills and into digestive systems. Planktonic
animals become disoriented or die.” (Safina, 2010b)
“I was very critical of dispersants as a response, partly because they exemplified the
lack of real preparation, their chemical components were being kept secret, and they
served BP's interests in hampering understanding of the amount of oil leaking. Legal
liability is based on how much oil enters the environment. This gives an oil company
strong incentive to minimize or hide the amount of oil. Critics used the analogy of
putting the perpetrator in charge of securing and cleaning up a crime scene.” (Safina,
2011a)
“Oil spill impacts can occur by 1) physical contact (oiling), 2) toxicity, and 3) loss of food
web niches. Some of the effects of this spill are visible – 1866 dead oiled birds, 463 sea
turtles, 59 dolphins, one sperm whale (DH Response Report July 14). Many scientists
suspect that the worst of the impacts on the Gulf are yet to come and will not be
apparent without deliberate tracking and scientific assessment.” (Shaw, 2010)
“Since the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on April
20, 2010, BP has applied almost two million gallons of dispersants, both on the surface
and beneath Gulf waters. Government officials acknowledge that the quantity and
manner in which dispersants have been applied in the Gulf are unprecedented. The
application of dispersant at the source of the discharge, 5,000 feet under the surface of
the water, is also unprecedented. At a Senate hearing on June 15, 2010, EPA
Administrator, Lisa Jackson stated, “In the use of dispersants we are faced with
environmental tradeoffs.” In fact, the use of dispersants does not represent a sciencebased,
quantifiable “tradeoff” but rather amounts to a large-scale experiment on the Gulf
of Mexico ecosystem that runs contrary to a precautionary approach, an experiment
where the costs may ultimately outweigh the benefits.” (Shaw, 2010)
“Moreover, this ‘trade-off’ has been confounded by the lack of a vigorous,
technologically adequate effort to collect crude oil from the surface. Berms and booms
quickly proved to be ineffective in this deepwater system. As a result, crude oil has
penetrated 30 miles into the coastal wetlands of Louisiana and has reached the shores
of other Gulf states.” (Shaw, 2010)
37

“We believe that Corexit dispersants, in combination with crude oil, pose grave health
risks to marine life and human health, and threaten to deplete critical niches in the Gulf
food web that may never recover.” (Shaw, 2010)
“The rig’s Macando well spewed as much as 700 million litres before a temporary plug
finally worked in mid-July.” (Woodward, 2010)
“The oil is not gone, and long-term impacts are still unknown… three-fourths of the oil is
still lingering on the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, creating an unprecedented and
unknown new environmental reality for the Gulf Coast. Oil is also still along the coastal
areas in the form of tar balls, strings, and mats as well as in subsurface sandy beach
areas.” (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
“After the Macondo well was capped, many along the Gulf Coast asked the question,
“Where did the oil go?” In the report Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget
released in August 4, 2010, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) estimated that a large part of the oil discharged into the Gulf of Mexico by the
Deepwater Horizon spill was gone. However, just weeks later, a NOAA official conceded
that three-fourths of the oil discharged into the Gulf were still lingering in the
environment, either as hydrocarbons in dispersed form or possibly evaporated into the
atmosphere.” (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
“Those of us on the Gulf Coast who are monitoring the ongoing oil impacts know that
the oil is not gone. Yet BP is spending large amounts of money to convince the rest of
the nation that the oil is gone. Throughout most of 2010 and 2011, it has been evident
that BP is running a public relations campaign, more than a recovery effort. During the
height of the disaster, BP officials prevented journalists and residents from taking
photos and videos of oil washing ashore and prohibited cleanup workers from wearing
important protective gear. Meanwhile, between April 2010 and July 2010 BP more than
tripled the amount spent on public relations in the same period the previous year. There
is little question that the objective of this deluge of money was to combat growing public
image problems.” (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
"For instance, Dr. Samantha Joye, a University of Georgia researcher collecting data in
the area in September 2010 and again in February 2011, confirmed lingering plumes of
oil and methane, and also found patches of oil up to 2 inches thick on the Gulf floor that
stretched as far as 70 miles away from the wellhead. Other researchers, such as Dr.
Terry Hazen at Berkeley Lab, maintain that due to a significant bloom of a previously
unknown species of microbe in the area of the plume, a large portion of this oil had been
consumed by midsummer of 2010." (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
38

"The nearshore, ‘visible’ oil has largely been identified and remediated where this was
determined to be possible in the judgment of Unified Command. Residuals of oil remain,
especially in environmentally sensitive areas where cleanup is considered high risk in
terms of benefits versus impact. Far less is known about the ‘invisible’ oil. There are
almost no baseline data about life in the mid-depth and deep-water zones, where the
bulk of the Gulf’s food web resides, and where many commercially important species
spawn. This makes it difficult to draw conclusions with relatively limited sampling in a
body of water as vast as the Gulf.19 Reports have been conflicting. " (Waterkeeper
Alliance, 2011)
39

5- “Economy”
“Despite the closure of economically important fisheries and the potential public health
risks to coastal communities, many people in the Gulf States remain strongly committed
to deepwater oil exploration. This irony demonstrates how important fossil fuels are to
regional economies and how entrenched they are in American lifestyles.” (Bowman,
2010)
“With regard to NEPA specifically, some MMS managers reportedly ‘changed or
minimized the [MMS] scientists’ potential environmental impact findings in [NEPA]
documents to expedite plan approvals.’ According to several MMS environmental
scientists, ‘their managers believed the result of NEPA evaluations should always be a
‘green light’ to proceed.’ In some cases, there may also have been built-in employee
financial incentives that ‘distort[ed] balanced decision-making’ to the extent that
‘[e]mployee performance plans and monetary awards [were] . . . based on meeting
deadlines for leasing or development approvals.’” (Graham et al./ U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, 2011)
“That BP agreed to place in escrow a $20 billion fund to help address financial losses, at
President Obama’s urging, indicates the magnitude of the economic impact from the
loss of control of this one deepwater well. […] Coastal tourism and commercial fisheries
generate more than $40 billion of economic activity annually in the five Gulf States.”
(Graham et al./ U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“The Gulf of Mexico produces nearly three-quarters of all U.S. shrimp, valued at $366.6
million in 2008, or more than half the value of all Gulf of Mexico fisheries. It produces
more than two-thirds of all U.S. oysters, valued at more than $60 million. It produces
about 30% of all crabs, valued at nearly $40 million. Forty-two species of finfish (like red
snapper), as well as sharks, draw out 3.2 million anglers every year. This entire industry
is threatened, as the oil affects some species in spawning, some in juvenile stages ...
and some on the plate, as consumers shy away from Gulf species they fear could be
tainted.” (Shapley, 2010 )
“The present value of total revenues that would be lost in the commercial fishing sector
over the next 7 years, due to the DH well blowout, is estimated to be in the range of
US$0.5–2.7 billion..” (Sumaila et al., 2012)
“The present value of losses in the recreational fishing sector are estimated to be
US$1.4–2.4 billion in total revenues” (Sumaila et al., 2012)
“Overall, the present value of (midpoint) losses in total revenues, total profits, wages,
and economic impact from the three sectors considered here are about US$3.7 (Florida),
40

US$1.9 (Alabama), US$1.2 (Mississippi), and US$8.7 (Louisiana) billion over the next 7
years, respectively. The likely largest losses can be expected from the commercial
fisheries, while the recreational fishing sector may account for slightly more than a third
of such losses. Furthermore, the region may lose over 22 000 jobs in fisheries-related
sectors.” (Sumaila et al., 2012)
“Many local fishermen have tried to recoup their losses by lining up to sign contracts
with BP, who needs people with boats and knowledge of the area to help in the clean-up
effort […]” (Martin, 2010)
“[…] even though the current rate of Louisiana tourism seems relatively unaffected by
the spill, there does exist a perception among meeting and travel planners that this area
of the globe should be avoided for a few years to come. In response to this perception
Louisiana, along with the other affected states, have begun aggressive tourism
marketing campaigns funded by BP aimed at alleviating global tourist anxiety”
(Robinson, 2010)
“The one sector of Mississippi tourism that affected during this crisis has been the
charter boat fishing industry. This area of commerce has seen a drop in revenue of “over
90%” when compared to the 2009 statistics […]. This type of highly-stressed business
environment, where sales literally disappear overnight, is an unsustainable situation for
any business. Without significant financial support, by the government and BP, many of
these boat owners may be forced to scull their ships and seek other areas of
employment.” (Robinson, 2010)
“Hanks (2010) stated that a current report released by ‘Moody’s…recently warned of
strains on tax revenue for local governments across the Gulf if property values take a
dive because of oil contamination.’” (Robinson, 2010)
41

6- “Seafood Safety”
“NOAA notes, for example, that as white shrimp reach adulthood they begin migrating
out
of inshore waters in the early spring, while young brown shrimp migrate during the
summer and fall, when the oil slick might reach them. Blue crab, which are the region’s
most economically valuable crab species, reach peak spawning season in August and
September, and their eggs and larvae settle in estuaries, where they reach harvestable
size in the spring. Oiling of the estuaries could be lethal to these species. And juvenile
fish that rely on floating sargassum mats would be affected if the mats encounter the oil
slick.” (Bowman, 2010)
“The coating of marine rocks with oil interferes with arsenic absorption and may
increase
arsenic levels in seafood.” (Goldstein et al., 2011)
“By late September, when nearly 32,000 square miles of the Gulf were still closed to
fishing, government officials made strong statements about the safety of seafood caught
in reopened areas. ‘The shrimp, fish, and crabs are perfectly safe to eat,’ claimed Bob
Dickey, Director of Seafood Science and Technology at the FDA. Bill Walker, Executive
Director of the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, pronounced that ‘based on
credible scientific data collected using federally-approved sampling and analytical
techniques, Mississippi seafood has been safe and healthy to eat throughout the
entirety of this event.’ NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco stated, ‘I have confidence in
our protocols and have enjoyed Gulf seafood each trip I’ve made to the region.’”
(Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Most commercial Gulf seafood species seem to have emerged from the oil spill without
any clear evidence of taint or contamination. The real impact here is the reputational
damage to Gulf seafood as a safe brand. Continued government testing, improvements
in public outreach, and a coordinated marketing campaign may be needed to expedite
its recovery. After several requests over several months, BP relented in early November
and agreed to give Louisiana $48 million and Florida $20 million for seafood testing and
marketing. As of early December, BP is considering a similar request from Alabama.”
(Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“States on the Gulf Coast have closed many fishing areas because of the oil spill.”
(Shapley, 2010)
“Crude Oil & Corexit Combined Are More Toxic Than Either Alone. The combination of
Corexit and crude oil can be more toxic than either alone, since they contain many
ingredients that target the same organs in the body. In addition, Corexit dispersants
42

facilitate the entry of oil into the body, into cells, which can result in damage to every
organ system (Burns and Harbut, 2010).“(Shaw, 2010)
“Exposure to chemicals in crude oil and dispersants can occur through skin contact,
inhalation of contaminated air or soil/sand, and ingestion of contaminated water or food.
These can occur simultaneously.” (Shaw, 2010)
“Chemicals in crude oil and dispersants can cause a wide range of health effects in
people and wildlife. Crude oil has many highly toxic chemical ingredients, including
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), that can damage every system in the body.
These include: respiratory system, nervous system, including the brain, liver,
reproductive/urogenital system, kidneys, endocrine system, circulatory system,
gastrointestinal system, immune system, sensory systems, musculoskeletal system,
hematopoietic system (blood forming), skin and integumentary system, disruption of
normal metabolism.” (Shaw, 2010)
“Damage to these systems can cause a wide range of diseases and conditions. Some
may be immediately evident, and others can appear months or years later. The
chemicals can impair normal growth and development through a variety of mechanisms,
including endocrine disruption and direct fetal damage. Some of the chemicals, such as
the PAHs, cause mutations that may lead to cancer and multi-generational birth defects
(Burns and Harbut, 2010). Of note, benzene, a human carcinogen, is a VOC that is
released by crude oil (CDC, 1999). It is not known what additional VOCs (if any) are
added to the crude oil mix by dispersants, due to a lack of disclosure about dispersant
ingredients.” (Shaw, 2010)
“The properties that facilitate the movement of dispersants through oil also make it
easier for them to move through cell walls, skin barriers, and membranes that protect
vital organs, underlying layers of skin, the surfaces of eyes, mouths, and other
structures.” (Shaw, 2010)
Potential human health effects include burning skin, difficulty breathing, headaches,
heart palpitations, dizziness, confusion, and nausea — which have already been
reported by some workers — as well as chemical pneumonia and internal bleeding.
noticed than more serious effects that don't have obvious signs and symptoms - lung,
liver and kidney damage, infertility, immune system suppression, disruption of hormone
levels, blood disorders, mutations, and cancer. Coastal communities could also
experience more extreme health consequences, including long- term neurological
effects on children and developing fetuses, and hereditary mutations. As of June 21, the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals reported 143 cases of illness ‘believed to
be related to oil exposure’, including 108 response workers (mostly men) and 35 coastal
residents (two-thirds women) (http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/). The most common
43

symptoms were headache, nausea, throat irritation, vomiting, cough and difficulty
breathing.” (Shaw, 2010)
“Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers have collected and analyzed more than 100 samples of
aquatic organism tissue, soil, and water from Gulf of Mexico coastal areas from
Louisiana to Florida. We found petroleum hydrocarbon contamination in all of the areas
that were sampled and in the tissue of many of the seafood species. The data that we
collected also lead us to believe that Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH)
contamination in some seafood species may be increasing over time.” (Waterkeeper
Alliance, 2011)
“The BP oil spill of 2010 resulted in contamination of one of the most productive
fisheries in the United States by polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). PAHs, which
can accumulate in seafood, are known carcinogens and developmental toxicants. In
response to the oil spill, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) developed risk
criteria and established thresholds for allowable levels [levels of concern (LOCs)] of
PAH contaminants in Gulf Coast seafood. […] The FDA LOCs significantly underestimate
risk from seafood contaminants among sensitive Gulf Coast populations by failing to a)
account for the increased vulnerability of the developing fetus and child; b) use
appropriate seafood consumption rates; c) include all relevant health end points; and d)
incorporate health-protective estimates of exposure duration and acceptable risk. For
benzo[a]pyrene and naphthalene, revised LOCs are between two and four orders of
magnitude below the level set by the FDA. Comparison of measured levels of PAHs in
Gulf seafood with the revised LOCs revealed that up to 53% of Gulf shrimp samples were
above LOCs for pregnant women who are high-end seafood consumers.” (Rotkin-Ellman
et al., 2012)
"The FDA Gulf seafood risk assessment […] contains numerous assumptions that are
inconsistent with the FDA’s own prior practice and with risk assessment guidelines
produced by other authoritative entities, including the National Research Council (NRC),
the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and the California EPA. Each of these assumptions would tend to result in an
underestimate of risk for a significant fraction of the exposed population." (Rotkin-
Ellman et al., 2012)
"The FDA assumed that each consumer eats a daily average of 49, 12, or 13 g of fish,
oysters, or shrimp/crab, respectively. The FDA derived this consumption rate from the
90th percentile reported in the 2005–2006 National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) for nationwide seafood consumption […]. Populations living along the
Gulf Coast have a rate of seafood consumption higher than the rest of the nation […].
For example, surveys of New Orleans, Louisiana, residents and recreational anglers in
Louisiana found high-end consumers reporting shrimp intakes of 65.1 and 55.5 g/day,
44

espectively […], which is significantly higher than the FDA’s estimate of 13 g/day."
(Rotkin-Ellman et al., 2012)
"The FDA did not assess whether exposures in Gulf seafood could pose an increased
risk of cancer from naphthalene. Because PAHs are a mixture of multiple compounds,
small exposures to multiple PAHs can add up to significant cancer risks. By omitting
naphthalene from its cancer risk assessment, the FDA ignored the potential cumulative
effect of exposures to multiple carcinogens." (Rotkin-Ellman et al., 2012)
"The risk assessment methods used by the FDA to set safe exposure levels for Gulf
Coast seafood after the oil spill do not incorporate current best practices and do not
protect vulnerable populations." (Rotkin-Ellman et al., 2012)
"Health advisories targeted at high-end consumers would better protect vulnerable
populations such as pregnant women, women who may become pregnant, and children.
" (Rotkin-Ellman et al., 2012)
"These results call into question the efficacy of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s
seafood testing and their proclamation that Gulf seafood was and continues to be safe
for regular consumption. Based on our test results, we consider the “all clear” for
consumption of Gulf seafood to have been premature and based on flawed levels of
concern. It is imperative that in-depth independent scientific analysis of Gulf seafood
species and ecosystems be undertaken. Also, Gulf Coast commercial fishing families
must not bear the burden of this disaster." (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
“Working with LEAN and Smith is a team of researchers and scientists across the Gulf
Coast led by environmental scientists and toxicologists William Sawyer and Marco
Kaltofen. The team has collected seafood samples for safety tests and sent blood work
to Metametrix, a clinical laboratory in Duluth, Ga. Results from one patient's volatile
solvents blood screening show higher-than-average levels of ethylbenzene and xylene,
two compounds present in oil. According to Metametrix, adverse effects that can follow
exposure to the compounds include "brain fog," hearing loss, headache and fatigue;
continued exposure to xylene can affect kidneys, lungs, heart and the nervous system.
The patient's blood work also showed the presence of hexane, 2-Methylpentane and 3-
Methylpentane and isooctane — compounds present in oil and gas.” (Woodward, 2011)
45

7- “Clean Beaches”
“The Deepwater Horizon incident is the latest in a series of significant oil spills that has
plagued the Gulf of Mexico in the past three decades. In many of these cases, sensitive
areas, such as marshes, have not been cleaned due to concerns that clean-up efforts
would cause more damage than the spilled oil.” (Bowman, 2010)
“The Gulf of Mexico shoreline hosts more than half of the coastal wetlands in the lower
48 states, and Louisiana hosts 40 percent on its own. These wetlands and estuaries,
which alreadyreceive upstream pollution from a watershed encompassing most of the
central United States,provide erosion protection and vital habitats to many fish and
shellfish species at some point during their lifecycles. But the wetlands have been
disappearing at a very high rate for the past 50 years. More than one million acres of
wetlands were lost in the last century, and 90 percent of those losses occurred in
Louisiana. The impact of the oil spill on wetlands will depend on how much oil comes
ashore and how long it stays. If oil rests on vegetated coastal shorelines and kills roots,
for example, marsh soils will weaken and be susceptible to even faster erosion from
waves and storms.” (Bowman, 2010)
“The Gulf States supply one-third of the nation’s seafood harvest, and every habitat is
important to such a highly productive region. All coastal habitats are potentially
susceptible to oiling: from floating sargassum mats that provide nursery habitats to
deep and shallow coral nurseries to mangroves, sandy bottom, muddy bottom, marshes,
submerged vegetation, bays, lagoons, and sandy beaches where turtles lay their eggs.”
(Bowman, 2010)
“The Loop Current provides an extraordinary mechanism for distributing oil throughout
the Gulf of Mexico—to the eastern Gulf by the Loop Current, to the western Gulf by
eddies that spin off from the Loop Current, and to the Atlantic Coast as the Loop Current
feeds through the Florida Straits to the Gulf Stream” (Coleman et al., 2010)
“The combined effects of oil alone and oil in concert with dispersants (NRC 2005) has
the capacity to affect every life stage of the three fish species discussed here (Goliath
Grouper, Red Grouper, Tilefish)—either directly by distribution throughout their habitat
or indirectly through trophic interaction.” (Coleman et al., 2010)
“To date, tar balls have been found in the Florida Keys, but none have been linked to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster. Should BP-linked oil ever be found in either sanctuary,
however, BP faces liability under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act—a fact of which
federal government attorneys are well aware.” (Craig, 2010)
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“The Gulf ecosystem, a unique American asset, is likely to continue silently washing
away unless decisive action is taken to start the work of creating a sustainably healthy
and productive landscape. No one should be deluded that restoration on the scale
required will occur quickly or cheaply.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
2011)
“Evidence suggests that the effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill will be severe and
long lasting. A study in Science examining the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
showed ecosystem damages that persisted for fourteen years.The widespread use of
chemical dispersants and the large amount of oil apparently suspended below the ocean
surface are raising important questions that will take some time to study and answer.”
(Green et al., 2010)
“It has been over 14th months since the Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank in the
Gulf, yet much oil remains in coastal areas. As the temperature heats up along the coast,
once buried and submerged oil is resurfacing in impacted areas already declared “NFT”
or “No Further Treatment” by BP and the Unified Command. In other areas, BP
contractors are using controversial techniques such as marsh raking to remove huge
chunks or delicate marsh grass to get at the buried oil.” (Gulf Restoration Network,
2011a)
“A significant portion of oil from the recent Deepwater Horizon (DH) oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico was transported to the shoreline, where it may have severe ecological and
economic consequences.” (Kostka et al., 2011)
“Twenty-four bacterial strains from 14 genera were isolated from oiled beach sands and
confirmed as oil-degrading microorganisms. Isolated bacterial strains were primarily
Gammaproteobacteria, including representatives of genera with known oil-degraders
(Alcanivorax, Marinobacter, Pseudomonas, Acinetobacter). Sequence libraries
generated from oiled sands revealed phylotypes that showed high sequence identity (up
to 99%) to rRNA gene sequences from the oil-degrading bacterial isolates. The
abundance of bacterial SSU rRNA gene sequences was approximately 10 times higher in
oiled (0.44 – 10.2 x 107 copies g-1) vs. clean (.024 – 1.4 x 107 copies g-1) sand.” (Kostka
et al., 2011)
“Community analysis revealed a distinct response to oil contamination, and SSU rRNA
gene abundance derived from the genus Alcanivorax showed the largest increase in
relative abundance in contaminated samples. We conclude that oil contamination from
the DH spill has a profound impact on the abundance and community composition of
indigenous bacteria in Gulf beach sands, and our evidence points to members of the
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Gammaproteobacteria (Alcanivorax, Marinobacter) and Alphaproteobacteria
(Rhodobacteraceae) as key players in oil degradation there.” (Kostka et al., 2011)
“The blowout of the Deepwater Horizon (DH) drilling rig resulted in the world’s largest
accidental release of oil into the ocean in recorded history. The equivalent volume of
approximately 4.9 million barrels of light crude oil were discharged into the Gulf of
Mexico from April to July, 2010 […], and the total hydrocarbon discharge was 40 %
higher if gaseous hydrocarbons are included. A large amount of the discharged oil was
transported to the surface and reached the shoreline. Although cleanup efforts have
remained aggressive, a substantial portion of the oil remains trapped in coastal
ecosystems, especially in benthic areas.” (Kostka et al., 2011)
“Marine sands act as efficient biocatalytic filters that play an important role in the
biogeochemical cycles of carbon and nutrients in shallow Gulf waters. Marine sands in
the Gulf are covered with biofilms of highly diverse microbial communities, and bacterial
abundance in sands exceeds that of the overlying seawater by orders of magnitude.
Enhanced porewater exchange in highly permeable marine sands stimulates microbial
metabolism through the delivery of growth substrates and the removal of waste
products.” (Kostka et al., 2011)
“Similar to the microbially-mediated breakdown of natural organic matter,
biodegradation mediated by indigenous microbial communities is the ultimate fate of the
majority of oil hydrocarbon that enters the marine environment. Hydrocarbon-degrading
microorganisms are ubiquitous in the marine environment, and biodegradation was
shown to be successful in naturally remediating oil contamination associated with
several spills that impacted shorelines predominated by permeable marine sediments.
(Kostka et al., 2011)
“Contamination of beach ecosystems by oil has the potential to cause severe
environmental and economic consequences in the Gulf region. The risk of accidental oil
discharge to the marine environment will remain high for the foreseeable future as
increased economic pressure to access new oil reserves in deep marine waters will
require less tested technologies. Although technologies for oil drilling have advanced
rapidly in recent decades, strategies to respond to oil spills and to assess environmental
impacts of oil contamination have lagged behind.” (Kostka et al., 2011)
“Chemical analysis revealed petroleum hydrocarbon (C8-C40) concentrations ranging
from 3.1 to 4500 mg kg-1 in Pensacola Beach sands. All beach sand samples analyzed
contained detectable oil hydrocarbon concentrations. At the lower range of
contamination detected by chemical analysis (< 10 mg kg-1), oil was not observed
visually […].” (Kostka et al., 2011)
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“In oiled sands that were analyzed for hydrocarbon content, bacterial rRNA gene
abundance was approximately 10 times higher in oiled (0.44 – 14.2 x 107 copies g-1) vs.
clean (0.024 – 1.57 x 107 copies g-1) sand. Alcanivorax spp. were not detected with qPCR
methods in the clean sands used for MPN enumeration, but were detected in Pensacola
Beach sands without visible oil contamination. Alcanivorax were more abundant in sand
samples with visible oil contamination (0.27 – 2.77 107 copies g-1) than in sands without
visible oil contamination (0.12 – 8.9 x 105 copies g-1). Differences in total bacterial and
Alcanivorax gene abundances between oiled and non-oiled sands are both statistically
significant, as assessed by a t-test on log280
transformed data (P

“Dispersants applied by BP have resulted in widely disseminated undersea plumes of
oil, confirmed by NOAA on June 8.
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/06/government-confirms-undersea-oil-ingulf-
of-mexico.html). Samples were collected by scientists from University of South
Florida on the MV Weatherbird II and tested by NOAA's lab. Subsequently, the plumes
have migrated outward from the discharge source and over time are likely to travel with
prevailing currents to the Florida Keys, Cuba, Mexico, and the eastern seaboard of the
US. The vast quantities of dispersed oil in these plumes can enter the marine food chain
and bioaccumulate in animal tissue, potentially impacting marine ecosystems over many
years and over a broad geographical area.” (Shaw, 2010)
“BP’s Public Relations Machine: The great disappearing oil trick: now you see it now you
don’t! Through a strategic and very expensive public relations campaign, BP has
managed to magically convince much of the country into believing the oil is gone. The
reality is the oil is not gone, and the long-term impacts are still largely unknown. Leading
scientific studies demonstrate that three-fourths of the oil still lingers on the bottom of
the Gulf of Mexico, creating an unprecedented and unknown new environmental reality
for the Gulf Coast.” (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
50

8- “The Future of Fuel”
“Beyond liability, however, the oil spill’s threat to the Flower Garden Banks and Florida
Keys National Marine Sanctuaries highlights just how economically and ecologically
valuable the Gulf of Mexico’s marine resources actually are, despite the development
and commercial exploitation of the Gulf, and despite significant degradation in certain
areas. Indeed, the very existence of those sanctuaries and the multiple other MPAs in
the Gulf gives testament to both the truly destructive potential of oil spills in the Gulf
and the inherent dangers of deepwater drilling in ecologically productive marine
regions.” (Craig, 2010)
“The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is already
clear that the impacts on the region’s natural systems and people were enormous, and
that economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensitive environments in deep
Gulf waters, along the region’s coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for more drilling,
such as the Arctic, is inadequate. The same is true of the human and natural impacts of
oil spills.” (Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“More broadly, the disaster in the Gulf undermined public faith in the energy industry,
government regulators, and even our own capability as a nation to respond to crises.”
(Graham et al./U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011)
“Any attempt to estimate the total amount of human-caused oil pollution in the Gulf of
Mexico is hampered by three problems: 1) failure to report spills; 2) non-reporting of
spill amounts; and 3) underreporting of spill amounts […] In addition to the lack of
reporting, chronic underreporting of oil spills makes it impossible for the public and
decision makers to understand the true scope of pollution caused by oil and gas
exploration and production. NRC (National Response Center) reports lacking estimates
of the amount of oil spilled are common. Between October 1, 2010 and September 30,
2011 a total of 2903 oil or refined petroleum (e.g. diesel fuel) spills were reported in the
Gulf region. Seventy-seven percent (2221) of those reports did not include an estimate of
the quantity of oil spilled. Forty-five percent (1311) identify a suspected responsible
party – a strong indicator that those reports were submitted by the actual polluters – and
of those, nearly half (620) do not include any spill amount.” (Gulf Monitoring Consortium,
2011)
“The facts are that deepwater drilling is a new and inherently risky operation, pushing
the envelope of technology and engineering.9 Sea-floor responses, when things go
wrong, are described as “open heart surgery at 5,000 feet, in the dark.” The risks
51

magnify with ocean depth, some exceeding 10,000 feet, to environments that human
beings cannot even access to see, can manipulate only with probes and robots, and to
temperatures that freeze even gasses and render the management of fluids and
machinery an order of magnitude more challenging.” (Houck, 2010)
“On May 18, 2010, the CEQ announced a 30-day review of NEPA policies regarding OCS
drilling in the Gulf. The public comments were predictable, and, to some extent, a replay
of the l986 comments many years earlier. Industry claimed that the Deepwater Horizon
blowout was an anomaly, it had the situation in hand, it was already burdened with a
plethora of regulations, the only problem was implementation; environmental groups, of
course, urged opposite conclusions. The outcome of this inquiry is pending, but it is
also by its very nature quite limited. OCS drilling is the tip of the iceberg, a dangerous tip
to be sure, but much the same can be said for coal mining, oil shale, tar sands, natural
gas fracturing, renewed nuclear energy development, and similar ventures that ignore
worst cases at their (and our) peril. Nor is the worst-case doctrine limited in any logical
sense to energy development, with major decisions involving bioengineering,
genetically modified crops, endocrine disruptors, and ecosystem modifications ahead.
OCS is currently on the table, which is a good start. Worst case belongs back on the
table as well.” (Houck, 2010)
“Louisiana refineries have averaged more than one accident a day for the last six years.
We chose this focus because more than 90 schools and 200,000 people reside within
two miles of a refinery in Louisiana. Children, teachers, administrators and community
members are affected by accidents and toxic emissions on a daily basis.” (Louisiana
Bucket Brigade, 2011b)
“Planned maintenance resulted in the release of sulfur dioxide. The refinery report
states this release was al- lowed due to a negotiated consent decree with EPA. Total
emissions: 73.2 tons (146,565 pounds).” (Louisiana Bucket Brigade, 2011b)
“Where Do We Go from Here? Creating an Action Plan for Recovery & Preventing Future
Spills: After a short off-shore oil drilling moratorium, permits are being issued with no
significant technological procedures adopted to prevent future spills of this magnitude
from happening again. The BP oil disaster proved that the industry and the federal and
state government agencies regulating and monitoring these permits were not, and are
still NOT prepared for oil spills of National Significance. Lessons not learned are bound
to happen again. Save Our Gulf believes that comprehensive long-term environmental
monitoring will be essential to understanding, protecting, and restoring the Gulf Coast
ecosystem going forward.” (Waterkeeper Alliance, 2011)
52

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58

• The blowout killed 11 workers at sea; their families will never be the same.
• Approximately 170 million gallons of oil was spilled into the Gulf – fifteen times the
size of the Exxon-Valdez disaster (note: the total output of oil was estimated to
be 205.8 million gallons +/- 10%. However, because some of the oil was
siphoned to boats, only approximately 170 million gallons entered and
contaminated the environment).
• 650 miles of coastline were oiled (note: an estimated 126 miles were moderately to
heavily oiled).
• Oil settled into wetlands and estuaries around the Gulf Coast, some of the most
diverse and productive ecosystems anywhere, killing marsh grass, accelerating
erosion and damaging the cradle of the Gulf, the place young fish, shrimp and
crabs rely on in the earliest part of their lives.
• By the government's own reckoning, removal (i.e., burning and skimming) got rid of
just 8% of the oil from the BP blowout. That leaves approximately 92%
contaminating the environment, where it evaporated, dispersed or dissolved in
the water, floated to the surface, smothered coastal wetlands, beaches and
estuaries or sank to the bottom of the sea.
• 87,000 square miles – approximately 35% - of American Gulf waters had to be closed
to fishing – putting thousands of watermen out of work.
• Arguably a year’s worth of revenue was lost for many people in fisheries and tourism
industries (the oil spill overlapped with their main seasons).
• Residents along the coast - particularly fishermen who rely on the ocean for their
livelihoods - have also suffered severe anxiety and social stress. Experts have
observed that the social-fallout from man-made disasters is often more severe
and long-lasting than that of natural disasters (for numerous reasons man-made
disasters results in more social division).
• The oil killed wildlife - birds by the thousands, dolphins and whales, fish and hundreds
of endangered sea turtles. And that's just the acute impacts that officials were
able to observe.
◦ Approximately 6000 dead birds were collected in and around the spill this
spring and summer with the true death toll likely to be much higher (and
yet to be estimated). The cause of death is still being determined for
some fraction of these birds.
◦ Approximately 600 sea turtle carcasses were found, a spike in mortality many
times higher than usual. Approximately half of the deaths are believed to
be related to the oil spill. 278 loggerhead turtle nests were relocated.
◦ As many as 100 marine mammals were found dead. The cause of death is still
being investigated. However, many more are believed to have gone
uncounted as dead marine mammals sink out of sight quickly.
Lisa Suatoni, PhD
senior scientist
NRDC
phone (203) 777-8989/(212) 727-4549
cell 646-234-3036
fax (212) 727-1773

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Rabalais, N.N. 2011. Twelfth Annual Roger Revelle Commemorative Lecture: Troubled waters of
the Gulf of Mexico. Oceanography 24(2):200–211, doi:10.5670/oceanog.2011.44.
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TwelfTh ANNuAl RogeR ReVelle commemoRATiVe lecTuRe
Troubled waters
of the gulf of mexico
The Roger Revelle Commemorative Lecture Series was created by the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academies in honor of
Dr. Roger Revelle to highlight the important links between ocean sciences and public policy. Nancy Rabalais, the twelfth annual lecturer,
spoke on March 29, 2011, at the Baird Auditorium, Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of Natural History.
iNTRoDucTioN
The gusher has ended, but before it did,
an estimated 206 million gallons of crude
oil and methane gas escaped from the
Macondo well in lease block Mississippi
Canyon 252. We know it better as the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill that
resulted from a series of mechanical
and safety failures leading to an explosion,
the deaths of 11 workers, and the
largest accidental oil spill in history. The
well was in the northern Gulf of Mexico
in 1,500 m of water, not the deepest
in this petroleum production frontier,
but in an otherwise blue-water, pristine
ocean home to deepwater corals and
pods of sperm whales, and one of two
spawning areas for Atlantic bluefin tuna.
Satellite images of black oil at the surface
marred this picture as the oil continued
to spew from the ocean bottom and
spread into the northern Gulf of Mexico.
Innumerable lives were affected—from
microbes to humans—and the world
was transfixed by the continuous images
of oil and gas blowing from the Gulf
bottom while technology raced to catch
200
Oceanography | Vol.24, No.2
up with Mother Nature.
In addition to being the center for oil
and gas production in the United States,
the northern Gulf of Mexico provides
essential resources and services to the
region and the nation: transportation,
marine fisheries, tourism, recreation,
and shipping and navigation. But the
focused resource use by so many sectors
has not come without cost. Although the
region has been altered many times by
natural forces, in modern times, human
activities have reshaped the delta and
degraded water quality, causing major
losses of wetlands and creating the
largest hypoxic zone in the United States.
When the spill began in spring 2010,
water-quality problems from excess
nutrients already existed, triggering a
world-class “dead zone” that expanded
in size and severity throughout the
summer. The immediate and dramatic
insult inflicted by the spill’s intensity
garnered global attention, highlighting
not only the spill but the many existing
stressors that already threatened this
valuable ecosystem.
By NANcy N. RABAlAis
oilmAggeDoN
On April 20, 2010, something went
terribly wrong with the drilling of
the BP Macondo well by the drilling
platform Deepwater Horizon 80 km
southeast of the Mississippi River delta
in 1,500 m of water. The exact details are
still under investigation, but there were
several unexpected events, technological
and mechanical failures, failed safety
precautions, and human error in diagnosis
and action. There was an explosion,
the drilling rig caught fire, burned for
two days, and then sank into the depths
of the Gulf of Mexico, leaving an uncontrolled
gushing of oil from a broken
casing and several leaks in associated
underwater pipes.
By the time the broken well was
successfully capped on July 15 (about
three months later), it was estimated
that 206 x 106 gallons (780 x 106 liters)
Nancy N. Rabalais (nrabalais@lumcon.
edu) is Executive Director and Professor,
Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium,
Chauvin, LA, USA.

Millions of gallons
0 50 100 150 200
Deepwater Horizon
Ixtoc I
Amaco Cadiz
Torrey Canyon
Sea Star
Prestige
Metula
Exxon Valdez
H. Katrina & Rita
Argo Merchant
Ekosk oil eld
Santa Barbara
New Orleans
Buzzards Bay
North America seeps
Global seeps
NA exploration & production
Global exploration & production
NA transportation
Global transportation
NA consumption
Global Consumption
figure 1. Volume estimates for oil spills in millions of gallons per event
(above the dashed orange line; compiled from multiple sources) and
oil reaching the sea in millions of gallons per annum (below the dashed
orange line; compiled from National Research council, 2003). The National
Research council (2003) estimates are for: North American seeps, of which
two-thirds are in the gulf of mexico, followed by global seeps; global
exploration and production, which would include well blowouts such as
Deepwater horizon, ixtoc i, santa Barbara, and ekofisk; NA transportation,
which includes cargo losses through accidents in North America,
e.g., Exxon Valdez; similar losses in global transportation, e.g., Prestige; and
consumption losses in North America and global, which include atmospheric
deposition of fossil fuel burning, automobile exhaust onto roadways,
and oil and grease runoff into gutters. Based on data from National
Research Council, 2003; N.N. Rabalais, LUMCON
of oil and gas had escaped from the
ocean floor. This accidental oil spill
is the largest in history (Figure 1),
exceeded only by the amount of oil
released during the 1972 Gulf War,
estimated at 242–462 x 106 gallons
(916–1,749 x 106 liters). By comparison
(per event)
(per annum)
to Exxon Valdez, the BP Deepwater
Horizon spill is almost 20 times larger.
The volumes of oil released are headline
makers, but caution should be taken
in inferring impacts based on the spill
size alone (National Research Council,
2003). Spills in enclosed spaces or within
biologically complex or fragile ecosystems
may increase exposure to the toxic
hydrocarbons in oil compared to spills in
areas where dispersion and weathering
effects may reduce the amount of oil
and lower toxicity levels. There is no
doubt, however, that the massive volume
of oil released by the BP Deepwater
Horizon well increased the potential for
large-scale impacts.
The northern Gulf of Mexico is not
only a center of industrial extraction of
oil and gas but also the site of natural
hydrocarbon seeps, which occur along
the slope edge and escarpment and
account for two-thirds of the North
American seeps in Figure 1. Gulf seeps
amount to about 40 × 106 million gallons
(151 x 106 liters) per year (National
Research Council, 2003), which is a
substantial amount of oil released into
the environment. However, seeps occur
over a large area, are not continuous, and
the oil that reaches the surface or the
beaches is highly weathered. Seeps also
support a community of microorganisms
that live off the hydrocarbons, and these
microbes can help biodegrade oil from
accidental spills such as the Deepwater
Horizon. In contrast, a spill, or gusher,
is a finite input (volume) over a shorter
period (single event to months) of a
range of hydrocarbon components (not
weathered and inclusive of the more
toxic forms). The BP Deepwater Horizon
spill entered the open Gulf of Mexico
and began to move primarily northward,
threatening the eastern edge of the
Mississippi River Delta, Breton Sound,
and Chandeleur Sound by early May
2010. By early July, oil had spread across
the northern Gulf of Mexico coastline
from Galveston, TX, to Panama City, FL,
and across over 10,000 km2 in the open
Oceanography | June 2011 201

figure 2. The moderate Resolution imaging spectroradiometer
(moDis) on NAsA’s Terra satellite captured this image of
sunlight illuminating the lingering Deepwater horizon oil slick
off the mississippi Delta on may 24, 2010. Source: http://www.
flickr.com/photos/gsfc/4638932803/sizes/l/in/photostream;
NASA Goddard Center
northern Gulf of Mexico (Figure 2). In
2010, the Loop Current did not move as
far northward as possible, which resulted
in good news for the Gulf, as the oil was
not entrained and sent along the west
Florida shelf onto reef tracks or into
the Atlantic Ocean.
During the spill, people became aware
of the many oil and gas platforms in the
northern Gulf of Mexico; in fact, there is
a web of oilfield drilling and production
platforms that includes many deepwater
wells and pipelines connected to shore.
The infrastructure extends inshore as a
maze of pipeline canals, access canals,
and navigation channels that dice up the
fragile delta landscape.
The short-term and long-term impacts
of the oil gusher (not a leak, not a spill,
not an incident) are still unknown.
Immediate attention was focused on how
the oil spill was affecting oceanic ecosystems,
plankton communities, deep-sea
benthos, deepwater corals, mesopelagic
fishes, marine mammals and turtles, and
fishery resources. As the oil moved onto
202
Oceanography | Vol.24, No.2
the fragile, coastal wetlands (seagrass
and mangrove habitats), concern grew
for these biogenically structured systems
that provide so many ecosystem services,
such as nursery grounds for commercially
important fishes and crustaceans,
sediment stabilization, filtering of
contaminants and nutrients, and habitat
for recreational activities, such as fishing
and hunting. The more visible coastal
oiling in the form of black oil on sandy
beaches threatened the nearshore pelagic
and intertidal communities as well as
curtailed tourism. The environmental
and human impacts are being documented,
and these assessments will likely
continue for a decade or more.
The Big muDDy
The Mississippi River system has long
dominated the geological and biological
landscape of the northern Gulf of
Mexico. The watershed encompasses
41% of the lower 48 United States
(~ 3.2 x 106 km2 ), surpassed in size
only by the Amazon and Zaire Rivers
figure 3. intersection of sediment-laden
mississippi River plume with blue water of the
gulf of mexico. Petroleum production platform
seen in the distance (left). N.N. Rabalais, LUMCON
(Milliman and Meade, 1983; Meade,
1996). The river’s length and its freshwater
and sediment discharge rank
among the world’s top 10 rivers. The
annual average freshwater discharge
of 580 km3 enters the northern Gulf of
Mexico through two main distributaries:
the birdfoot delta southeast of the city of
New Orleans, Louisiana (Figure 3), and
the Atchafalaya River delta ~ 200 km
to the west on the central Louisiana
coast (Meade, 1995).
Sediment deposition and accumulation
are essential for maintaining the
delta to offset natural subsidence and
prevent drowning of wetlands. Over tens
of thousands of years, the flow of sediment-laden
freshwater created a series
of delta lobes that prograded, subsided,
and switched across the northern Gulf
coastal landscape, establishing a deltaic
plain that eventually formed the current
birdfoot delta about 1,000 years ago

(Penland et al., 1988). Substantial inputs
of river sediments sustained the wetlands
across the coast. Over two centuries,
transformation to a primarily agricultural
landscape, with water systems engineered
for drainage of agricultural lands,
navigation, and flood control, has altered
the river basin landscape, changed flow
regimes, and reduced the suspended
sediment load. The changes have lessened
the buffering capacity of the watershed
against pollutants and contributed
to the loss of landforms in the watershed
and at the coast (Boesch et al., 1994;
Turner and Rabalais, 2003). Watershed
manipulations along with natural deltaic
processes and intense human development
of the coastal zone have resulted in
over 5,000 km2 of coastal lands lost since
the 1930s (updated from Barras, 2006).
The “Big Muddy” is not as sedimentladen
as it was ca. 1700, according to
estimates of Meade (1995); presently, the
sediment load is roughly half its former
size. During the twentieth century, the
hydrology of the vast Mississippi River
system was greatly altered by locks,
dams, reservoirs, earthwork levees,
channel straightening, and spillways for
purposes of flood protection, navigation,
and water supply. The largest decrease
in suspended sediments occurred after
1950, when the natural sources of sediments
in the drainage basin were cut off
from the Mississippi River mainstem
by the construction of large reservoirs
on the Missouri and Arkansas Rivers
(Meade and Parker, 1985; National
Research Council, 2007).
In addition, landscape changes across
the middle of the country since the 1800s
have altered the ability of the Mississippi
River Basin to assimilate excess nutrients
(Turner and Rabalais, 2003). Vast areas
Roger Revelle
For almost half a century, Roger Revelle
was a leader in the field of oceanography.
Revelle trained as a geologist at Pomona
College and the University of California,
Berkeley. In 1936, he received his PhD
in oceanography from the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography. As a young
naval officer, he helped persuade the Navy to create the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) to support basic research in oceanography and was
the first head of ONR’s geophysics branch. Revelle served for 12 years
as the Director of Scripps (1950–1961, 1963–1964), where he built up a
fleet of research ships and initiated a decade of expeditions to the deep
Pacific that challenged existing geological theory.
Revelle’s early work on the carbon cycle suggested that the sea could
not absorb all the carbon dioxide released from burning fossil fuels.
He organized the first continual measurement of atmospheric carbon
dioxide, an effort led by Charles Keeling, resulting in a long-term
record that has been essential to current research on global climate
change. With Hans Suess, he published the seminal paper demonstrating
the connection between increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide
and burning of fossil fuels. Revelle kept the issue of increasing carbondioxide
levels before the public and spearheaded efforts to investigate
the mechanisms and consequences of climate change.
Revelle left Scripps for critical posts as Science Advisor to the
Department of the Interior (1961–1963) and as the first Director of
the Center for Population Studies at Harvard (1964–1976). Revelle
applied his knowledge of geophysics, ocean resources, and population
dynamics to the world’s most vexing problems: poverty, malnutrition,
security, and education.
In 1957, Revelle became a member of the National Academy
of Sciences to which he devoted many hours of volunteer service.
He served as a member of the Ocean Studies Board, the Board
on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, and many committees.
He also chaired a number of influential Academy studies on
subjects ranging from the environmental effects of radiation to
understanding sea level change.
Photo credit: SIO Archives, UCSD
Oceanography | June 2011 203

of the Mississippi River basin prairies
and forests were converted to cropland
and other agricultural uses as European
settlement expanded westward. By 1920,
large areas of virgin forests were reduced
to remnant forests (Greeley, 1925). The
river basin has also accommodated the
drainage and conversion of millions of
acres of wetlands, as over one half of the
original wetland ecosystems has been
converted to other land uses (Prince,
1997; Figure 4).
DeAD ZoNes
Since the middle of the twentieth
century, the Mississippi River has
transported anthropogenic nitrogen
and phosphorus in such quantities that
it now induces a zone of hypoxia (lowoxygen
water conditions) that is the
second largest human-caused coastal
hypoxic area in the world (Rabalais et al.,
204
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Remaining wetlands (millions of acres) 10
0
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Iowa
Oceanography | Vol.24, No.2
Illinois
WETLAND LOSS
42 46 89 85 87 81 72 59 59 46
Missouri
2007). This “poster child” for deteriorating
coastal water quality is popularly
referred to as the “dead zone,” a term
that originated with trawler fishermen
who would drag the bottom with their
nets and not capture any shrimp when
the oxygen was below 2 mg l –1 (Renaud,
1986). “Normal” oxygen levels are two to
three times greater.
Low-oxygen values are of concern
because of detrimental effects to marine
life, biodiversity, commercial and
recreational fisheries, trophic dynamics,
energy flow, and ecosystem functioning
(Rabalais and Turner, 2001; Díaz and
Rosenberg, 2008; Levin et al., 2009; Ekau
et al., 2010; Rabalais et al., 2010). Sharks
and rays will swim away from water
with dissolved oxygen less than 3 mg l –1 ;
demersal fishes, crabs, and shrimp will
attempt to move away from oxygen
concentrations less than 2 mg l−1 ; and
Kentucky
Arkansas
Tennessee
Mississippi
Louisiana
figure 4. wetland loss in the mississippi River mainstem states. Percent loss is shown
across the top of the histogram. Values are millions of acres of wetlands remaining,
ca. 1980s. Based on data from Dahl (1990)
few marine animals survive in prolonged
exposure to oxygen concentrations
below those levels.
The northern Gulf of Mexico hypoxic
area is large, at times extending from
the Mississippi River birdfoot delta
onto the upper Texas coast and into
the Mississippi Bight east of the delta
(Figure 5). The size has averaged
13,825 km2 in mid summer between
1985 and 2010 and has been as large as
22,000 km2 (updated from Rabalais et al.,
2007). Seasonal hypoxia arises from
the high productivity of surface waters
fueled by nutrients from the Mississippi
watershed, coupled with stratification,
in which the warm, less-saline surface
waters overlay the colder, saltier deep
waters with little mixing (Committee on
Environment and Natural Resources,
2000; Science Advisory Board, 2007;
Rabalais et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2007;
Kemp et al., 2010). Nutrients stimulate
the growth of phytoplankton, creating
large blooms in surface waters. The
excess organic matter from these blooms
rains down into deeper waters where
it is consumed (oxidized) by organisms,
thereby depleting the deep waters
of dissolved oxygen. These conditions
are found in many coastal areas where
hypoxia is getting worse or where
hypoxia has only recently been observed
(Díaz and Rosenberg, 1995, 2008).
The severity and extent of hypoxic
events are primarily influenced by
stream flows, nutrient runoff from agriculture
and urban centers, and precipitation.
Because the amount of freshwater
delivered to the northern Gulf of Mexico
affects both the nutrient loads and the
strength of stratification, variability
or long-term trends in river discharge
influence the extent and severity of

figure 5. Distribution of bottom-water dissolved oxygen content on the louisiana-Texas continental shelf in July 2006. This distribution is typical of years without
disruption of hypoxia by hurricanes or tropical storms or anomalous winds and currents. hypoxia also occurs intermittently east of the mississippi River but in
small areas (Rabalais et al., 2007). N.N. Rabalais, LUMCON; Funding: NOAA, CSCOR
hypoxia. On a multicentury time scale,
discharge has been relatively stable
from 1820–1992 (Turner and Rabalais,
2003; Turner et al., 2007). In contrast,
Mississippi River nutrients, especially
nitrate-nitrogen have changed dramatically
during the last century, with an
acceleration of these changes since the
1950s (Turner and Rabalais, 1991), due
primarily to an increase in concentration
coincident with the increase in application
of artificial fertilizers. Smaller
fractions arise from human sewage, nonagricultural
fertilizer use, and precipitation
(Goolsby et al., 1999; Alexander
et al., 2008). Changes in both nitrogen
and phosphorus lead to stimulation of
phytoplankton growth in the offshore
waters. While the overall change in the
development and extent of hypoxia is
due primarily to the nitrogen load of the
river, the Science Advisory Board (2007)
of the US Environmental Protection
Agency concluded that both nitrogen
and phosphorus reductions (about 45%)
were necessary to mitigate the occurrence
of hypoxia on the northern Gulf
shelf. The Science Advisory Board
(2007) further recommended that
nutrient reductions be targeted at those
areas in the watershed where the yields
of nitrogen and phosphorus were the
highest, corresponding to the Corn Belt
(Alexander et al., 2008).
All lines of evidence point to increased
nutrients, primarily in the last half of
the twentieth century, as the initiating
factor for hypoxia on the shelf and its
worsening since then. Alternative causal
hypotheses for the dead zone include
broad-scale landscape changes in the
watershed and hydrological changes
along the river. For the most part, these
alterations (Turner and Rabalais, 2003)
occurred well before the advent of
increased nutrient loads, and are not
coincident in time with the development
and worsening of hypoxia. The watershed
is less capable of removing nutrients, but
the consensus for mitigating excess nutrients
is to reduce them as close to their
sources as possible (Science Advisory
Board, 2007). However, actions taken
to manage the distribution of river flow
through the Mississippi-Atchafalaya
deltaic plain in the future, especially as a
mechanism for coastal restoration, could
be of major consequence to the development
and distribution of hypoxia on
the continental shelf and eutrophication
of ambient receiving waters (Ren et al.,
2009). Further, the inputs of terrestrial
carbon from the watershed or loss of
carbon from deteriorating wetlands along
the coast have been ruled out as contributors
to the carbon loading that leads to
hypoxia (Eadie et al., 1994; Turner and
Rabalais, 1994; Turner et al., 2007; Das
et al., 2010). Nutrient stimulation via
Oceanography | June 2011 205

upwelled waters, atmospheric deposition
onto the Gulf, and groundwater inputs is
unlikely or limited (Rabalais et al., 2007).
oilmAggeDoN AND
DeAD ZoNes
The northern Gulf of Mexico dead zone
received much media attention in 2010
for several reasons:
1. It was above average in size, severity,
and persistence (http://www.
gulfhypoxia.net), consistent with
higher-than-normal Mississippi
River flows in spring and summer
(→ stronger stratification → greater
nutrient loads → higher carbon fixation
and carbon flux)
2. There were areas of lower oxygen
associated with the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill at 1,100–1,200-m
depth where the subsurface oil
plume was observed (Joint Analysis
Group, 2010, but see Camilli et al.,
2010), but never near approaching
hypoxia or even the natural lowoxygen
area at 500–800-m depth
(Rabalais et al., 2002)
3. Oil mitigation measures (release of
Mississippi River water through diversions)
likely increased the noxious
and harmful algal blooms, hypoxia,
and fish kill problems to the east of
the Mississippi River delta where there
was also visible oil
4. Typical shelf hypoxia overlapped with
the distribution of emulsified oil on
the water surface during the three
months of oil gushing (recent work of
the author and colleagues)
5. The media really wanted to link the oil
spill to the formation of hypoxia on
the continental shelf
By many analyses too detailed to
outline here, there is little indication
206
Oceanography | Vol.24, No.2
that the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
contributed to shelf hypoxia in 2010.
Rather, the usual suites of conditions
that lead to hypoxia were in force. In
addition, the discharge of the Mississippi
River in 2010 was well above average,
with three peaks in spring and aboveaverage
flow from July to October,
extending the conditions of hypoxia
formation and maintenance much later
into the “hypoxia year” (recent work
of the author and colleagues). Still,
the media rightly focused attention
on the northern Gulf of Mexico dead
zone as an environmental problem
caused by humans over a half century
of willfully ignoring the downstream
fate of pollutants, especially nutrients
from excess fertilizer. The Oil Spill
Commission (2011) also recognized the
dead zone as an issue that needed to be
addressed by the Gulf Coast Ecosystem
Restoration Task Force (Presidential
Executive Order, 2010).
VANishiNg lANDs
Slow-moving, still waters meandering
in bayous through quiet swamps and
expansive wetlands teeming with fish
and wildlife is the often-conjured
landscape of coastal waters across the
northern Gulf of Mexico. The earliest
aerial photographs of coastal Louisiana
would support that vision and showed
vast expanses of wetlands (equal to
85% of the total land area; Baumann
and Turner, 1990) and an interwoven
network of natural channels. Eighteen
percent of the coastal land present
in the 1930s (3,954 km2 ) was lost by
1990 (Britsch and Dunbar, 1993), and
70% of this land loss occurred in the
deltaic plain. The coast-wide land-loss
rate peaked in the 1960s and 1970s
(104 km2 yr –1 ), slowed (62 km2 yr –1 )
between 1990 and 2000 (Barras, 2006),
and was on a trajectory to be only
10 km2 yr –1 at the turn of the century
(Turner, 2009) until Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita in 2005 converted 513 km2 of
land to open water (Barras, 2006).
Manipulation of the coastal landscape
began as soon as European settlers
arrived, with construction of levees
and draining of swamps to create land
for cities and agriculture, ditching
of wetlands for mosquito control,
cutting of cypress trees, dredging of
navigation routes, and dynamiting of
channels for fur trapping. By 1915,
agricultural impoundments across the
Louisiana coast captured 452 km2 of
former wetlands (Turner and Streever,
2002). Several large impoundments
(Delta Farms, The Pen, and Big Mar)
in the deltaic plain are now open water
following soil compaction and levee
failures. Since the late 1930s, the water
levels of 3,400 km2 of coastal wetlands
and open waters have been managed
by water-control structures and manmade
levees to control salinity, enhance
vegetation, mitigate land loss, or improve
wildlife habitat (Boyer, 1997). Rather
emergent plant cover was sometimes
reduced behind the weirs (Turner et al.,
1989), and the management practices
were causally related to increased land
loss or were of no benefit (Boyer, 1997).
Most wetland losses in Louisiana
have resulted from submergence, as
accretion of new soil and organic plant
material is unable to keep pace with the
relative sea level rise because of altered
hydrology, lack of mineral sediments,
and deteriorated landscapes that do not
support continued growth of marshes.
Dredging of canals for oil and gas

ecovery efforts began in the 1930s and
peaked in the 1960s. Direct removal of
sediments over that period is equivalent
to 1,017 km2 (Britsch and Dunbar, 1993)
and an equal area of spoil banks on the
adjacent wetlands (Figure 6; Baumann
and Turner, 1990). A much larger indirect
impact from canals and dredged
spoil deposits, demonstrable at several
temporal and spatial scales, is inferred
from close correspondence between
land-loss rates in the deltaic plain and
dredging (Turner, 2009). There are
plausible cause-and-effect explanations
for these relationships that are related to
the loss of accumulated organic matter
and plant stress that accompanies altered
hydrology (Swenson and Turner, 1987;
Turner, 1997, 2004).
Until completion of the levee system
along the lower Mississippi River,
seasonal overbank flooding provided
river sediment input to the coastal
landscape, but extensive river control
was completed before the dramatic land
losses began. The drop in suspended
sediment supply is consistent with the
completion of a series of dams and
reservoirs on the Missouri River in 1950
(Turner and Rabalais, 2003; Blum and
Roberts, 2010). As described below,
high rates of localized subsidence in
the deltaic plain can be attributed to
oil and gas extraction (Morton et al.,
2005). Except for the current birdfoot
and Atchafalaya-Wax Lake deltas, the
deltaic plain as a whole is in retreat
(Penland et al., 1988; Blum and Roberts,
2009). Although some of the causes are
natural factors, most of the deterioration
has been due to human activities,
which disrupted river flows and
altered hydrology. As with mitigation
of nutrients, the causes of ecosystem
figure 6. canals dredged for drilling platforms and access to well heads from a natural channel. more
dredged access canals can be seen in the background. N.N. Rabalais, LUMCON
change and the processes underlying it
are essential knowledge in restoring or
mitigating coastal land loss (National
Research Council, 2008).
PeTRoleum iNDusTRy
DeVeloPmeNT
The 1930s marked the birth of the petroleum
industry in the bays and wetlands
of Louisiana when drilling in the
wetlands began from submergible barges
(Priest, 2007). A free-standing structure
that produced oil in the open Gulf
was installed in 1938 a mile and a half
offshore of Cameron, LA. The first recognized
offshore platform was installed
in 1947 in Kerr-McGee’s Ship Shoal
Block 32 in 6 m of water. Afterward,
there was a wave of open-water developments,
with technological advances
moving wells beyond 20-m depth in
the 1960s (Priest, 2007). By 2007, there
were nearly 4,000 active platforms
servicing 35,000 wells and 29,000 miles
(46,671 km) of pipeline on the continental
shelf waters of Louisiana and
Texas (Priest, 2007), providing close to
one-third of the US oil and gas production.
Although reserves are becoming
depleted and redrilling wells is not
always profitable, work continues in the
nearshore and continental shelf waters of
the northern Gulf.
The flat coastal landscape, with its
many bayous and natural waterways,
coupled with advancing technology to
access reservoirs of oil and natural gas
along with onshore facilities that could
be built close to the sources helped
the initial expansion of the industry.
As oil was discovered and produced,
access canals were cut through marshes,
navigation channels were dredged,
thousands of miles of pipeline were laid
to consolidate and transport the oil and
natural gas inland, and seismic vehicles
crisscrossed the landscape looking for
more oil. Supportive and protective
Oceanography | June 2011 207

governments facilitated oil and gas
expansion in coastal Louisiana. Facilities
were built to separate the petroleum
or natural gas from highly saline and
contaminated waters that were brought
to the surface along with the oil and
gas from the deep geologic formations.
These waters were held in pits awaiting
evaporation of the water, which would be
followed by scooping out the remaining
contaminants for transfer elsewhere
inland, or the contaminated waters were
discharged into local waters. Discharge
of the contaminated waters is no longer
legal within the coastal zone (since
1999), but offshore production platforms
routinely separate waters from the petroleum
products and discharge them at sea
within regulatory limits.
Since the mid-1980s, exploration
for oil and gas has extended into everdeeper
waters of the Gulf of Mexico,
defined as 200 m or more by the
Deepwater Oil and Gas Royalty Relief
208
Oceanography | Vol.24, No.2
Act. Extraordinary technological developments
allowed the industry to drill
for oil at great depths, efforts that were
rewarded by yields that exceeded shelf
wells by an order of magnitude. There
are approximately 7,310 active leases
in the US Gulf of Mexico Exclusive
Economic Zone, and 58% of them are
in deep water (Nomack, 2010). The BP
Deepwater Horizon drilling platform
in 1,500 m of water was not the first
exploration and production venture into
the deep water of the Gulf of Mexico and
not the deepest. In 2007, the Minerals
Management Service (now Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement) reported 15 rigs
drilling for oil and gas in water depths of
1,500 m or more (Nomack, 2010).
Petroleum exploration and production
infrastructure (shipyards, tank
farms, fabrication yards, ports, transportation
centers, and related businesses)
dot the coast. Major industrial
figure 7. eroded wetlands surrounding pipeline canals and dredged access canals in the lafitte oil field
in the Barataria estuary, southeastern louisiana. N.N. Rabalais, LUMCON
installations were built to support the
discovery, extraction, production, transport,
and refining of petroleum products.
Economic benefits, employment opportunities,
and improved social support
systems were also generated in its wake.
The petroleum enterprise reshaped the
coastal landscape and altered the social
substance as well.
The maze of canals, channels, and
pipeline crossings have scarred the
coastal landscape and contributed,
among other factors, to massive erosion
and drowning of marshes (Figure 7).
The fractured coast is less able to protect
people and infrastructure, including
that of the petroleum industry, in the
face of severe hurricanes such as Ivan
in 2004, Katrina and Rita in 2005,
and Ike in 2008. Shrimp production
across the northern Gulf of Mexico is
intimately linked with the acreage of
coastal wetlands (Turner, 1977), and it
is clear that the bountiful fisheries of
the northern Gulf of Mexico depend
on coastal wetlands for survival. A fine
friction between the petroleum industry
and the fishing industry holds together
the economy and culture of the region.
Oil and gas coexist with crabbing and
recreational fishing, but the essence of
the landscape has changed, dramatically
endangering both.
ResToR ATioN of A
DAmAgeD ecosysTem
The oil from the BP Deepwater Horizon
spill stopped flowing on July 16, 2010,
after almost three months. By the end
of the year, some impacts had been
noted such as the 1,500 km of oiled
shoreline habitats; the numbers of oiled
or dead birds, sea turtles, and marine
mammals; days of lost income due to

fishing closures; loss of rental income
for beachside property; or other visible
and tangible signs. But considerable
effort continues on the assessment of
damages, and relevant research programs
are underway. It will be years before
the agreed-upon estimate of how much
oil and gas spewed from the well is
established, a comprehensive picture
of the fate of the oil is drawn, broader
environmental and social impacts are
documented, and economic damages
summed. It may be years—decades
or longer—before effects on fisheries
resources or sensitive populations are
fully determined. And, we must consider
that we may never know the levels of
exposure to oil or whether suspected
impacts are at all related to the spill.
The federal and state trustees
charged with assessing and restoring
oil-damaged natural resources issued
a Notice of Intent on September 29,
2010, to conduct restoration planning.
This action means the government
found evidence of oil damage to natural
resources that warrants a formal Natural
Resource Damage Assessment in which
the oil spill’s impact will be quantified.
This work, in turn, will form the basis
for a financial claim against the responsible
parties—BP and other companies—for
the cost of restoring natural
resources and lost uses to their pre-spill
conditions. In addition, President
Obama issued an Executive Order
(Presidential Executive Order, 2010)
for a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration
Task Force to develop a restoration
strategy that addresses environmental
degradation in the Gulf of Mexico before
the oil disaster. Thus, the ills suffered
by the coastal landscape and coastal
waters through decades of human
mismanagement become a broader
focus and an opportunity for restoration
of a deteriorating landscape. The Oil
Spill Commission (2011) recommended
that long-term restoration efforts have
the ability to set binding goals and
priorities, allocate funding in a way that
addresses the relative restoration needs
of individual states, balance the roles
and interests of state and federal governments,
ensure that decisions are made
efficiently and quickly, incorporate good
science without unduly slowing valuable
projects, and incorporate meaningful
public input. The Commission recommended
that Congress establish a joint
state-federal council similar to the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council
to ensure an effective restoration effort.
gRAND chAlleNge
AND oPPoRTuNiTies
With the creation of the Gulf Coast
Restoration Task Force, President
Obama committed to a vision of restoration
that reaches far beyond our usual
understanding. The vision encompasses
remediating the short- and long-term
impacts of the BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill on ecological and social systems
and strives to “right the wrongs” of
multidecadal mismanagement and
abuse by humans unwittingly, but also
willingly, destroying the environment
that provided them with their ecological
and economic support. Among the
“wrongs” to be addressed are the longterm
failures in water quality that lead
“The TRAgeDy of uNiNTeNDeD coNsequeNces
hAs DoNe much To DegRADe The gulf ecosysTem
oVeR The lAsT ceNTuRy, AND The chAlleNge of The
fuTuRe is To ANTiciPATe AND AVoiD AcTioNs ThAT
mAy Do moRe hARm ThAN gooD.
”
to and support the “dead zone” in the
Mississippi River-influenced Gulf of
Mexico (National Research Council,
2007) and the deteriorating wetlands and
altered landscapes of the coastal zone.
The challenge is daunting but accompanies
a rare opportunity to address
the long-standing and critical needs
of the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem in an
integrated manner. The idea is to form
partnerships among the federal government
agencies, states, communities,
academia, industry, and stakeholders
across the diverse, culturally rich region.
The plan should not only correct obvious
impacts (impaired habitat, fishery
resources, and community infrastructure)
but also support the restoration
of “resilient, healthy Gulf of Mexico
ecosystems that support diverse economies,
communities, and cultures of the
region” (Mabus, 2010).
Oceanography | June 2011 209

210
Habitat, resource, and social
goals include:
• Healthy and resilient coastal wetland
and barrier shoreline habitats
• Healthy, diverse, and sustainable
fisheries
• Adaptive and resilient coastal
communities, with more sustainable
storm buffers
• Healthy and well-managed
inland habitats, watersheds, and
offshore waters
These goals are “Grand Challenges” to
say the least. As we move forward, a few
guiding principles should be employed:
• Restoration should be ecosystembased.
The Gulf coast ecosystem does
not have state boundaries and is an
interconnected system.
• Maintain conceptual vision. What is a
healthy and resilient Gulf ecosystem
that supports living resources and
sustained human uses?
• Consider climate change. Recognition
that coastal lands and resources are
subject to the effects of changing
climate, particularly sea level rise.
• Take a tactical approach. With
large, but fixed, funding, address
areas and issues of systemic
environmental degradation.
• Practice adaptive management. Be
prepared to adapt restoration plans
in response to monitored results of
clearly stated project endpoints.
• Expect nonlinearity. Be prepared for
elusive, slow, or unexpected results.
And one last principle: Exercise caution.
The tragedy of unintended consequences
has done much to degrade the Gulf
ecosystem over the last century, and the
challenge of the future is to anticipate
and avoid actions that may do more
harm than good.
Oceanography | Vol.24, No.2
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Oceanography | June 2011 211

STATE OF THE GULF
A Status Report from the Save Our
Gulf Waterkeepers in the Wake of
the BP Oil Disaster
September 2011
Waterkeeper Alliance
Save Our Gulf
Apalachicola Riverkeeper
Atchafalaya Basinkeeper
Emerald Coastkeeper
Galveston Baykeeper
Louisiana Bayoukeeper
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper
Mobile Baykeeper

Thank you to everyone
who has stood by the
Gulf Coast Waterkeeper
organizations over the
past year.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to all the contributors to this publication:
Renee Blanchard
Justin Bloom
Casi Callaway
Tammy Herrington
Chasidy Hobbs
John Hoving
Tracy Kuhns
Marylee Orr
Designer: Thinka
Michael Orr
Paul Orr
Tom Quinn
Janelle Robbins
Mike Roberts
Jamie Rodgers
Nicole Spade
Wilma Subra
Dan Tonsmeier
Robin Rickell Vroelgop
John Wathen
Charlotte Wells
Dean Wilson
Marc Yaggi
State of the Gulf // September 2011 3
Contents
Introduction
Seven Key Findings
National Importance of the Gulf Coast
Timeline of the BP Oil Disaster and Community Response
The Ongoing BP Oil Disaster
Creating an Action Plan for Recovery
Offshore Drilling Moratorium
Where Did the Oil Go?
Growing Public Health Concerns
BP’s Public Relations Machine
Citizen Environmental Monitoring
Results of Save Our Gulf Sampling
Examination of Government Sampling
Where Do We Go from Here?
New Gulf of Mexico Oil Spills
The Importance of Citizen Involvement
Restoration and Holding BP Accountable
A Sustainable and Resilient Gulf Coast
Notes

4 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 5
Over a year later, our environment and
our communities continue to see impacts on
a daily basis. Across the Gulf Coast oil
continues to wash ashore along beaches
and wetlands. Local and state economies and
household budgets are still suffering, and
health impacts, potentially from exposure
to the mixture of crude oil and toxic
dispersant, are being reported.
Introduction
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon exploded and
the lives of eleven people were lost. Nine days later oil
began to hit the wetlands of coastal Louisiana. Between
April 22 and July15, 2010, it is estimated that 250 million
gallons of crude oil were discharged from the Deepwater
Horizon well and 1.84 million gallons of Corexit 9500 and
9527, toxic oil dispersant products, were applied, making
the largest percentage of the oil unrecovered, with
unknown long-term environmental impacts.
Our nation has never seen an environmental disaster of
this magnitude. Over a year later, our environment and
our communities continue to see impacts on a daily basis.
Across the Gulf Coast oil continues to wash ashore along
beaches and wetlands. Local and state economies and
household budgets are still suffering, and health impacts,
potentially from exposure to the mixture of crude oil and
toxic dispersant, are being reported.
This State of the Gulf report documents the current
conditions of the Gulf Coast from the perspective of seven
members of the Waterkeeper Alliance. The initiative Save
Our Gulf is made up of the seven Waterkeeper organizations
in the Gulf Coast region that continues to be directly
impacted by the BP oil disaster: from west to east they
are Galveston Baykeeper, Atchafalaya Basinkeeper,
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper, Louisiana Bayoukeeper,
Mobile Baykeeper, Emerald Coastkeeper and
Apalachicola Riverkeeper.
In addition to explaining the government’s response, BP’s
actions, and the continuing calls for help by communities
working to restore the Gulf Coast’s natural resources, the
report also discusses what still needs to be done, from
creating a Regional Citizens Advisory Council to securing
appropriate environmental restoration projects and
building more sustainable communities.
The main section of this report details the results of the
Save Our Gulf Environmental Monitoring Project, including
oyster tissue sampling from Louisiana to Florida. Save
Our Gulf Waterkeepers are committed to continuing its
Environmental Monitoring Project over the coming years.

6 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 7
Seven Key Findings
1
Long-term environmental monitoring is essential.
Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers have collected and analyzed more than 100 samples of aquatic organism tissue,
soil, and water from Gulf of Mexico coastal areas from Louisiana to Florida. We found petroleum hydrocarbon
contamination in all of the areas that were sampled and in the tissue of many of the seafood species. The
data that we collected also lead us to believe that Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) contamination in
some seafood species may be increasing over time. In light of these results we believe that comprehensive
long-term environmental monitoring is essential to understanding, protecting, and restoring the Gulf Coast
ecosystem in the wake of the BP oil disaster.
2
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil disaster is
an ongoing disaster.
The oil is not gone, and long-term impacts are still unknown.
If past oil spills are used as a barometer, we can fully
expect the Gulf Coast to suffer continued environmental
degradation for decades. Leading scientific studies are
showing that three-fourths of the oil is still lingering on the
bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, creating an unprecedented
and unknown new environmental reality for the Gulf Coast.
Oil is also still along the coastal areas in the form of tar
balls, strings, and mats as well as in subsurface sandy
beach areas. Our governmental and community leaders
must work in concert to find long-term, sustainable
solutions for recovery and restoration.
3
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil disaster
is a national disaster.
The Gulf Coast serves as a resource for the entire nation.
The Gulf of Mexico has one of the most productive fisheries
in the world, providing more than two-thirds of the nation’s
shrimp and oysters along with four of the top seven fishing
ports by weight. There are over 5 million acres of coastal
wetlands along the Gulf, which is about half of the coastal
wetlands in the United States. If the Gulf Coast collapses
and these resources are lost, it will have negative consequences
for the entire nation. 1
The BP oil disaster also proved that the industry and federal
and state governments and agencies are not prepared for
Oil Spills of National Significance. Deficiencies in regulations
and enforcement continue to threaten communities
and ecosystems across the nation. At a minimum, Oil Spill
Commission recommendations must be implemented in
order to ensure a higher level of safety in offshore drilling.
4
There are growing public health concerns on the Gulf Coast.
While setting up pathways toward ecosystem restoration,
the government continues to ignore citizens’ calls for
action on public health. Currently there is no government
forum for those suffering from and concerned about
short- and long-term health impacts. The impacts extend
along the entire Gulf of Mexico states and consist of
current and ex oil clean up workers and coastal communities.
The people of the Gulf Coast are still in need of
proper diagnosis, treatment, and medical monitoring. Our
health, economy, and environment are interconnected
and solutions must reflect this.
5
Citizens’ participation must be placed at the highest
priority for appropriate restoration.
To ensure responsible and adequate recovery and restoration
for sustainable and resilient communities, public
participation must be included in all decision making.
A Citizen Advisory Council has been added to provide input
to the federal restoration efforts, and now a Regional
Citizen Advisory Council (RCAC) must be established,
funded, and given decision-making authority for the Gulf
Coast. An RCAC should be charged to help monitor
industry compliance, governmental oversight, and scientific
research in the years following the nation’s largest
environmental disaster, thus protecting our environment,
communities and economies from additional oil pollution.
6
Dedicate Clean Water Act penalties to the Gulf Coast
for environmental restoration.
Impacted communities need leadership from their
congressional delegations to ensure that Clean Water
Act penalties resulting from the BP oil disaster are
dedicated to the Gulf Coast for environmental restoration.
The Gulf of Mexico is a major economic engine for the entire
country, and its restoration must be adequately funded.
7
The Gulf Coast must restore and rebuild sustainably.
The past seven years have been tumultuous for the Gulf
Coast. Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, Rita, Ike and Gustav and
now the BP oil disaster have devastated both important
natural resources and local economies. In our changing
times and climate, the Gulf Coast must show leadership
by rebuilding, recovering, and restoring sustainability.
Restoring wetlands, oyster reefs, and natural flow regimes
can build resiliency back into our coastal communities.
We have an opportunity to make fundamental changes to
the way we have cared for our environment and natural
resources, and we must not let the lessons of this disaster
or the gateway to change be lost.

8 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 9
National Importance of the Gulf Coast
While the BP oil disaster is no longer on the nightly news or making
national headlines, it continues to be an unfolding disaster that will
have significant national consequences for years to come. The health
of the Gulf of Mexico and its coastal areas is extremely important for
our nation’s economy and environmental well-being. The four largest
industries—oil, tourism, fishing and shipping—create economic
activity of nearly $156 billion on the Gulf Coast each year. 2 The Gulf
Coast boasts more than 50% of U.S. oil and gas reserves and has ten
of the nation’s fourteen largest ports; it is the largest supplier of the
nation’s seafood—40% of all seafood consumed in the lower 48 states
and 83% of the nation’s shrimp and oyster landings, providing 885,000
seafood-related jobs; and it has record population growth. 3 Tourism
represents a $33 billion industry along the Gulf Coast, providing more
than 620,000 jobs.
The national environmental significance of the Gulf Coast is hard to
deny. The Gulf of Mexico itself is 600,000 square miles and covers
1,631 miles of U.S. shoreline. The diversity and complexity of this
region make it one of the most productive bodies of water and
wetland systems in the nation. According to the Environmental
Protection Agency, “the Gulf of Mexico yields more finfish, shrimp,
and shellfish annually than the south and mid-Atlantic, Chesapeake,
and New England areas combined.” 4 The marshes, swamps, and
barrier islands that extend from Texas to Florida lend strategic
protection against severe storms while providing shelter and food
to a large cross-section of wildlife, including migratory birds. Those
coastal wetlands are needed to keep our nation and communities
environmentally sustainable.
In spite of these significant natural resources and their contribution
to the United States, Gulf Coast communities have suffered cumulative
impacts of an oil pollution legacy that has plagued the region for
nearly a century. Despite legislation, most oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico
go without penalty, financially incentivizing careless oil discharges
into our environment. In March 2011, Bloomberg Business and
Financial News published an investigation showing that only one in
a hundred oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico results in a penalty. 5 In a
similar CBS investigation it was found that in 2009 alone there were
6,500 leaks, spills, fires, and explosions at oil and gas facilities
nationwide, and more than 7,450,000 gallons of oil were discharged
in Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. 6 This lax governmental enforcement
puts communities across the nation in jeopardy of suffering additional
Spills of National Significance. Comprehensive industry reform
that prevents further oil pollution is desperately needed to protect
communities and the environment.
The lack of both national enforcement and resources dedicated
to environmental protection and restoration have led to additional
156
billion dollars is created by the
four largest industries—oil,
tourism, fishing and shipping–on
the Gulf Coast each year. 2
50%
of U.S. oil and gas reserves is from
the Gulf Coast
620
thousand jobs are provided by the
Gulf Coast tourism industry—a $33
billion industry.
significant detrimental impacts to the Gulf Coast
and its marine environment. Over the history
of the regional watershed programs, the Chesapeake
Bay Region has received over $480 million
and the Great Lakes region over $1 billion,
compared to the Gulf Region being funded at just
over $86 million. According to the Gulf of Mexico
Foundation, an estimated 50% of the Gulf Coast’s
inland and coastal wetlands have been lost, and
up to 80% of the Gulf’s sea grasses have been
lost in some areas.
The Gulf of Mexico is home to 24 endangered
and threatened species and critical habitats.
Relative sea level rise impacts along the Gulf
Coast have been higher than average due to local
land subsidence and an increasing amount of
water in the sea. Additionally, the Gulf of Mexico
serves as the drainage basin for more than two
thirds of the land area of the United States,
receiving all the pollution that flows downstream,
which results in the well-known dead zone.
Without the proper funding and protections in
place, we stand to lose the ecological diversity
and economic productivity that the Gulf provides
to the region and the nation.
Timeline of the BP Oil Disaster
and Community Response
March 31, 2010
President Obama
announces the
opening of the
eastern Gulf of
Mexico for offshore
drilling.
April 23, 2010
April 12, 2010
Halliburton runs
second set of
tests on a new
cement blend on
the Deepwater
Horizon rig, finding
it unstable.
U.S. Coast Guard makes the decision
to suspend the rescue effort for the
11 missing rig workers. White House
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs states,
“I doubt this is the first accident that
has happened and I doubt it will
be the last.” BP CEO Tony Hayward
arrives on the Gulf Coast, mobilizing
senior management in what is already
being called potentially the largest
crisis the company has seen since
a fire that killed 15 people in a Texas
refinery in 2005.
April 18, 2010
Halliburton runs
another test on
cement blend on
the Deepwater
Horizon rig but
does not send
results to BP
until 6 days after
blowout.
April 25, 2010!
U.S. Coast Guard,
based on underwater
camera
footage, reports
that 1,000 barrels
a day are being
discharged. An oil
sheen covering
600 square miles
lies about 70
miles south of
the Mississippi
and Alabama
shoreline.!
April 20, 2010
The first explosion
occurs at 9:49 pm at the
Deepwater Horizon rig,
also known as the
Macondo well, or MC252.
A short time later a second
explosion occurs;
11 people are reported
missing and 17 injured.
April 26, 2010
The Wall Street Journal states, “The
fallout for BP and the oil industry
could largely depend on the spill’s
severity and the extent of its ecological
impact. . . . The job of shutting off the
well is made all the more difficult
by its location. Much of the critical
equipment is under almost 5,000 feet
of water on the seafloor. A well in
such deep water was unthinkable in
prior decades, but the industry has
pushed the technological envelope
in recent years in its search for new
sources of oil and natural gas.”
April 22, 2010
The rig sinks
and reports of
a 5-mile-long
oil slick begin
reaching the U.S.
Coast Guard.
Coast Guard Petty
Officer Ashely
Butler estimates
the leak to be
8,000 barrels of
oil a day.

10 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 11
April 27, 2010
The oil is sighted
20 miles off
the coast of
Louisiana.
Mineral
Management
Service approves
two relief wells.
May 3
BP says
it will
pay
for all
cleanup
costs.
May 11, 2010
May 4, 2010
Transocean, BP,
and Halliburton
executives testify
before Congress
about the series
of events that led
to the two rig
explosions and
the discharging
oil. All three
executives pin
liability on one
another.
April 28, 2010
Waterkeeper
Alliance learns
the true scope of
the oil disaster as
an environmental
disaster unlike
any the nation
has ever seen.
Louisiana Environmental Action
Network (LEAN) and Lower
Mississippi Riverkeeper (LMRK)
received and began distributing
protective gear to the fishermen to
utilize during cleanup activities.
The protective gear consisted of
half face respirators with organic
cartridges, goggles, gloves and
sleeve protectors. LEAN and LMRK
have continued to provide protective
gear to fishermen and individuals
going into the polluted areas.
May 14, 2010
Tracy Kuhns and
Mike Roberts
from Louisiana
Bayoukeeper are
featured on Time.
com to tell the
story of Barataria
Bay during the
height of the BP
oil disaster.
May 14, 2010
April 28, 2010
Oil begins reaching Louisiana
marshes as governor declares
a state of emergency.
White House press briefing
includes all departments
charged with some portion of
the BP oil disaster. It is clearly
stated that BP is in charge of
the operation, will pay for all
clean up, and that discharge
amounts will change as the
days go by and more information
comes to light.
May 5, 2010
Waterkeeper
Alliance and
Gulf Coast
Waterkeepers
launch Save Our
Gulf Initiative
including website
to provide up to
date information
on the BP oil
disaster.
May 6, 2010
During a monitoring flight Atchafalaya
Basinkeeper, Dean Wilson, finds
subsurface oil going into Barataria
Bay for the first time. Also he finds
a line of surface oil about 2 miles
offshore along Grand Isle, Louisiana.
He immediately notifies Louisiana
Bayoukeeper and his native Louisiana
Atakapa-Ishak Tribe friends. The oil
is coming!
April 30, 2010
President Obama
suspends new
drilling offshore
until the cause
of the disaster
is known.
Galveston Baykeeper
partners
with Sierra Club
Lone Star to host
a press event at
the Reliant Center
in Houston to
demand a
moratorium on
offshore drilling.
May 19, 2010
May 10, 2010
Oil cleanup
workers demand
more protective
gear and express
concerns about
health problems.
May 1, 2010
Mobile Baykeeper’s
Casi Callaway,
appearing on
CNN, expresses
her community’s
concerns of the
serious potential
for destruction of
vital fisheries and
warning about the
dangerous impacts
associated with
use of chemical
dispersants.
A Temporary Restraining
Order, was brought by
a team of lawyers led by
attorney Stuart Smith on
behalf of LEAN and United
Commercial Fishermans
Association, requiring BP
to provide Vessel Of
Opportunity (VOO) clean up
workers with safety gear.
May 20, 2011
EPA demands that
BP use less toxic
dispersants to
break up oil in the
Gulf of Mexico.
May 23, 2010
Louisiana
Bayoukeeper,
Tracy Kuhns,
records oil
flowing into
Barataria
Bay, LA.
June 3, 2010
Kindra Arnesen of Venice,
Louisiana, wife of a
cleanup worker, tells
CNN reporter that Gulf
Coast residents are
scared to speak up about
the growing public
health concerns and the
rules against the use
of adequate protective
gear while working to
clean up the oil for BP.
June 30
BP CEO Tony
Hayward
relinquishes
oversight of
cleanup and oil
containment to
Robert Dudley.
May 28, 2010
President Obama
visits Louisiana
and states that if
the latest attempt
to cap the well
failed, experts will
intervene.
July 2, 2010
May 29
June 14, 2010
Oil
washes
ashore
on
Alabama’s
beaches.
President Obama
visits Alabama,
Mississippi and
Florida and calls
BP reckless in
White House
address.
Hurricane Creekkeeper John
Wathen and Waterkeeper
Alliance Founder and
President Robert F Kennedy
Jr. appear on MSNBC
Countdown with Keith
Olberman to speak the truth
about the continuing BP oil
disaster.
May 30
Latest
attempt
to cap
the well
fails.
June 14, 2010
May 31, 2010
A new attempt
to cap the well
begins, involving
slicing the top off
the leaking
pipe and siphoning
oil into a container
on the surface.
Apalachicola Riverkeeper
volunteers and Department
of Agriculture and
Consumer Services
employee collects seven
oyster samples from
summer and winter oyster
bars covering the breadth
of Apalachicola Bay’s
oyster harvesting areas.
July 3, 2010
Galveston
Baykeeper
responds to
reports of oil
washing ashore
on Bolivar P
eninsula.
July 10, 2010
June 1, 2010
Save Our Gulf
officially launched
by Waterkeeper
Alliance and seven
Gulf Coast
Waterkeeper
organizations.
June 15, 2010
Marylee Orr,
Executive Director
of Louisiana
Environmental
Action Network,
speaks to
MSNBC’s Keith
Olberman about
the emerging
public health crisis
on the Gulf Coast
resulting from the
BP oil disaster.
June 2, 2010
Florida officials
confirm oily sheen
within 10 miles of
Pensacola Beach.
June 17
BP CEO Tony
Hayward testifies
before Congress.
He apologizes for
the oil disaster.
Atchafalaya Basinkeeper, in partnership
with Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper,
goes into the Gulf with Drew Wheelan of
the American Birding Association
to monitor the effects of oil on colonies
of breeding seabirds. Government
creates rules with huge fines for getting
close to the boom around islands,
making it very difficult to document
oiled birds in breeding colonies. There
are no bird rescuers in the area. All
Royal Tern chicks in the colony on
Queen Bess appear to be dead.
July 16
BP CEO
Dean
Wilson,
AtchafalayaBasinkeeper,
becomes
a
certified
bird
rescuer.

12 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 13
July 15, 2010
Macondo
well is
finally
capped.
August 26, 2010
Lower Mississippi
Riverkeeper
makes a sampling
trip to the
southern Breton
Sound area in
Plaquemine
Parish, Louisiana.
Soil samples are
taken.
October 8, 2010
Atchafalaya
Basinkeeper
samples the
Atchafalaya River
Delta for blue
crab and snails
July 21, 2010
Community
outrage over
the use of toxic
dispersants
continues to
bubble over
within the Gulf
Coast.
Sept 19
The
government
states
the
Macondo
well has
been
permanently
sealed.
October 13, 2010
Earthjustice submits a letter of intent to
sue the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency on behalf of Alaska Community
Action on Toxics, Cook Inletkeeper, Florida
Wildlife Federation, Gulf Restoration
Network, Louisiana Shrimp Association,
Sierra Club, and Waterkeeper Alliance.
This is a result of EPA failing to publish a
schedule identifying the waters in which
dispersants, other chemicals, and other
spill mitigating devices and substances
may be used.
July 26, 2010
Galveston
Baykeeper hosts
the protest event
Hands Across the
Sand: Yes to
Clean Energy, No
to Offshore
Drilling
September 27, 2010
Navy Secretary Ray Mabus
releases restoration and
recovery report stating that
Clean Water Act monetary
penalties resulting from the
BP oil disaster should return
to Gulf Coast, and proposing
the formation of a Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Task
Force.
July 27, 2010
Robert Dudley is
announced as
replacing CEO BP
Tony Hayward as
of October 1.
Sept 30, 2010
Emerald
Coastkeeper
collects second
set of samples of
oysters in local
fishing and
swimming
locations.
October 26, 2010
Lower Mississippi
Riverkeeper
makes a sampling
trip to western
Breton Sound
area in St.
Bernard Parish,
Louisiana and
collects Redfish,
shrimp, crab and
oyster samples.
August 2, 2010
Lower Mississippi
Riverkeeper
makes its first
sampling trip.
Water, soil, crab
and oyster
samples are
taken from the
Big Oyster Bayou
area in Terrebonne
Parish,
Louisiana
October 1, 2010
Emerald
Coastkeeper
collects third
set of samples
of oysters in
local fishing
and swimming
locations.
Nov 10, 2010
Tar ball sample
collected by
Apalachicola
Riverkeeper
OSPREY project
volunteer on
Carrabelle Beach,
Florida.
August 9, 2010
Emerald
Coastkeeper
collects first
round of samples
of oysters in local
fishing and
swimming
locations.
October 5, 2010
President Obama
announces
formation of the
Gulf Coast
Ecosystem
Restoration Task
Force, with EPA
Administrator
Lisa Jackson as
chair.
Dec 21, 2010
Apalachicola
Riverkeeper
OSPREY project
volunteers return
to oyster bar
sampling sites
from June to
resample, and
include an
additional site
where local
oystermen had
reported seeing
suspected oil
product.
January 11, 2011
Oil Spill
Commission
Report is
released.
Timeline Sources
Jan 11, 2011 – Mar 3, 2011
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper
makes an on-thewater
patrol to the Breton
Island area in Plaquemines
Parish, Louisiana, in
response to reports of oil
sheen sightings in Breton
Sound. Long trails of heavily
oiled sand and scattered
tarballs are found spread
along the center of Breton
Island.
March 3, 2011
Mobile Baykeeper
collects water
samples at the
public beach in
Fort Morgan,
Alabama, and
water and
sediment samples
in Fairhope,
Alabama.
March 16, 17, and 18, 2011
Emerald Coastkeeper
collects fourth, fifth and
sixth sets of oyster samples
in local fishing and
swimming locations.
April 22, 2010: http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/22/coast-guard-oil-rig-that-exploded-has-sunk/
April 23, 2010: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704627704575204590586862162.html
April 26, 2010: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704627704575204590586862162.html
April 28, 2010: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/29/gulf-oil-spill-larger-estimated
April 29, 2010: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/press-briefing-bp-oil-spill-gulf-coast
April 30, 2010: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/apr/30/oil-spill-reaches-us-coastline
May 3, 2010: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704093204575215981090535738.html
May 6, 2010: http://www.39online.com/news/local/kiah-sierra-club-protests-oil-conference-story,0,882437.story
May 11, 2010: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704879704575236553480511416.html
May 14, 2010: http://saveourgulf.org/updates/louisiana-bayoukeeper-featured-time
May 19, 2010: http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rkistner/in_the_bayou_health_concerns_g.html
May 20, 2010: http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/epa_demands_bp_use_less_toxic.html
May 25, 2010: http://saveourgulf.org/updates/louisiana-bayoukeeper-finds-sludge-beach
June 3, 2010: http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/06/03/gulf.fishermans.wife/index.html
June 15, 2010: http://leanweb.org/our-work/water/bp-oil-spill/health-crisis-unfolding-in-the-gulf
March 24, 2011
Mobile Baykeeper
collects water
samples at Helen
Wood Park on the
western shore of
Mobile Bay near
the mouth of Dog
River as well as
sediment samples
at the public
beach on Dauphin
Island.

14 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 15
The Ongoing BP Oil Disaster
The BP oil disaster is considered the worst environmental disaster
our country has ever seen. Though none nearly as large, previous
oil spills in the U.S. provide us important lessons from which we
must learn, the most famous is the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska
in 1989. Unfortunately, the Valdez spill taught us that the Gulf
Coast stands at the very beginning of a developing disaster. For
instance, it was more than four years after the Alaska spill that the
salmon and herring stocks in the area crashed. It took ten years
for salmon stocks to recover, and herring stocks remain depleted
over twenty years later. We will not know for many years the true
cost to our Gulf communities, our economy, and our environment.
We must be vigilant in mitigating long-term impacts by dedicating
resources to environmental monitoring and management.
Creating an Action Plan for Recovery
In the wake of the disaster, President Obama appointed
Navy Secretary Ray Mabus to develop a long-term plan for
Gulf Coast restoration. After a series of public listening
sessions, Secretary Mabus released a report with recommendations
critical to the recovery of the Gulf Coast.
Mabus Report and National Commission on Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
The “Mabus Report” determined that in order to fund
needed restoration, a “significant amount” of all BP fine
dollars should be dedicated to Gulf Coast recovery efforts.
He urged Congress to pass legislation to this effect, placing
the funds in a Gulf Coast Recovery Fund managed by the
Gulf Coast Recovery Council. He determined that local
communities must lead their own recovery and suggested
citizen stakeholders play a critical role in the Gulf Coast
Recovery Council to ensure that local concerns were
addressed. On July 22, 2011, legislation was introduced
in the Senate requiring that 80% of the Clean Water Act
penalties return to the region. At the time of printing,
congressional negotiations were still under way to pass
a bill in both chambers.
The second finding in the Mabus Report was the need for
long-term ecosystem restoration. He recommended the
formation of a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force
(GCERTF), not only to address damage caused by the oil
disaster but also to address the longstanding ecological
decline of the region. On October 5, 2010, the GCERTF was
created by executive order.
In addition to these findings, the Mabus Report recommended
that federal efforts should address the needs
for monitoring of the presence of oil, dispersants, and
other toxic agents in seafood and to lead research on
the long-term effects of oil spills on the environment and
human health. These recommendations have yet to be fully
addressed. Legislation in the Senate would create, among
other things, a fisheries endowment and Centers of
Excellence in each of the five Gulf states to conduct longterm
research, but no mechanism is currently in place
to address the human health component.
Besides appointing Secretary Mabus to address the issue
of recovery and restoration, on May 21, 2010, President
Obama created by executive order the National Commission
on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
generally known as the Oil Spill Commission. Its charge
was to examine the “relevant facts and circumstances
concerning the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon
explosion, fire and oil spill and develop options to guard
against, and mitigate the impact of, any oil spills associated
with offshore drilling in the future.”
The Oil Spill Commission released its final report
on January 11, 2011, with seven categories of
recommendations:
1 Improving the safety of offshore operations
2 Safeguarding the environment
3 Strengthening oil spill response, planning, and capacity
4 Advancing well-containment capabilities
5 Overcoming the impacts of the Deepwater Horizon spill
and restoring the Gulf
6 Ensuring financial responsibility
7 Promoting congressional engagement to ensure responsible
offshore drilling.
The recommendations pointed to a lax regulatory and
enforcement atmosphere that eventually led to the nation’s
worst environmental disaster. Save Our Gulf believes that at
a minimum, recommendations by the Oil Spill Commission
be implemented.

16 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 17
“Despite the administration's never-again
rhetoric and avowed commitment to
reform, Interior continues to kowtow to
offshore drillers. Congress has been even
more derelict in its duty. The House
introduced eighty-four bills in response
to the BP spill. It passed just two of them.
They both died in the Senate. As a result,
America is not meaningfully safer from a
petro-catastrophe today than it was on the
eve of the BP blowout.” -Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national-affairs/bp-blowout-birthday-this-absolutely-could-happen-again-tomorrow-20110420]
Offshore Drilling Moratorium
In the aftermath of the 1969 blowout of the
offshore rig Platform Alpha, off the coast of Santa
Barbara, California, a moratorium on offshore
drilling was put into effect, but the majority of the
Gulf of Mexico region was exempted. That
exemption highlights how the oil and gas industry
wields more power over governmental regulations
and enforcement in the Gulf than elsewhere
in the country. On March 31, 2010, President
Obama stated he would end the moratorium still
in effect off America’s Atlantic coast and parts of
Alaska. He promised that this expansion of U.S.
offshore drilling would include ways to protect
our environment, stating, “Oil rigs generally don’t
cause oil spills.”
On May 11, 2010, just twenty days after the
Deepwater Horizon exploded and an estimated
250 million gallons of oil began discharging into
the Gulf of Mexico, the Obama Administration
issued a moratorium on all deepwater exploratory
activity. 7 The ban impacted 36 rigs exploring oil
and gas reservoirs in water deeper than 500 feet.
The vast majority of rigs extracting oil and gas
were not affected, but concerns about possible
economic ripples were heard throughout the
region. The temporary ban on deepwater exploratory
drilling was lifted a month early on October
13, 2010, before the 2010 midterm elections and
prior to the release of the Oil Spill Commission’s
report. Since the ban was lifted, permits are
being released at a much slower pace, with the
first post-disaster deepwater drilling permit
issued on February 28, 2011. 8
Discovered and then made painfully clear during the BP oil disaster
was the federal government’s inability to inspect sufficiently the
numerous wells under their jurisdiction for safety compliance. There
were complex failures in the lead-up to the BP oil disaster. Three
of the largest contributing factors are lack of government regulation,
inadequate safety requirements, and industry’s technological
advancements allowing deeper drilling without overhauling and
modernizing their protocols for spill response.
Having watched the permitting process for decades, many
environmental groups and community organizations consider
drilling permits to have been handed out too easily, leaving
many Gulf Coast communities referring to themselves as a “sacrifice
zone.” When pushed about too little oversight and too much oil
pollution, industry executives have repeatedly stated that environmental
degradation is nothing more than a justified impact relative
to the economic benefits the region enjoys.
In response to concerns over permitting, Mobile Baykeeper has
reviewed several oil drilling and exploration permit requests made
to the Board of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(BOEMRE) and the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management (ADEM) over the past year. Written comments were
submitted on three separate occasions requesting a public hearing
due to serious concerns about proposed projects’ potential for direct
and indirect impacts to water quality, wetlands, and wildlife habitat
in light of the BP/Deepwater Horizon oil disaster. On both Alabama
projects the request was denied and permits were approved. The
status of comments regarding drilling off the coast of Louisiana
is still pending.
In addition, Mobile Baykeeper has submitted written requests urging
the Branch of Environmental Assessment to analyze the long-term
impacts from the recent disaster thoroughly; to assess the real costs
to the public resulting from offshore drilling implementation of the
Oil Spill Commission’s recommendations; and to allow ample public
input in future drilling decisions.

18 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 19
Where Did the Oil Go?
After the Macondo well was capped, many along the Gulf Coast asked
the question, “Where did the oil go?” In the report Deepwater
Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget released in August 4, 2010,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
estimated that a large part of the oil discharged into the Gulf of Mexico
by the Deepwater Horizon spill was gone. 9 However, just weeks later,
a NOAA official conceded that three-fourths of the oil discharged into
the Gulf were still lingering in the environment, either as hydrocarbons
in dispersed form or possibly evaporated into the atmosphere. “The
spill is far from over,” admitted Bill Lehr, senior scientist with NOAA’s
Office of Restoration and Response, when questioned during testimony
before a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee. 10
Concerns linger over the unknowns about what has transpired on
the Gulf of Mexico bottom and in its depths due to the BP oil disaster.
Many along the Gulf Coast want to assume the substances will
continue to degrade as the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem physically,
chemically and biologically processes an unprecedented volume of
crude oil, the equivalent of 18 Exxon Valdez spills. The toxicity of the
mixture is particularly troubling because of the unprecedented use
of large quantities of dispersants, applied both at the wellhead and on
the surface. This discharge is a new concoction that was infused into
warm Gulf waters, under pressure, at depths of nearly a mile.
Over the past year, the oil tracking effort has been undertaken
primarily by three different groups of investigators, each with
their own strengths and approaches. The groups can be loosely
categorized as (1) officials under Unified Command—the rapid
response coordination of BP, plus the federal and state agencies,
(2) independent research scientists, and (3) non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and local citizens.
1
Unified Command – Operation Science Advisory Team (OSAT)
In early August of 2010, after the final dissipation of surface oil from
the capped well, the focus of Unified Command’s sampling turned
to cleanup and determining the locations where actionable oil
remained in the Gulf; where “oil removal actions are feasible and
consistent with net environment benefit.” 11 For the first time, the
sampling included analysis of water and sediment for the presence
of dispersant compounds as well as PAH compounds and metals. 12
OSAT surveys in the fall of 2010 obtained screening samples for
analysis of oil, dispersant, and metals in water
and sediments. 13 The findings discuss a significant
amount of remaining oil found in varying
states of weathering:
"The residual oil evaluated in this report
contained high molecular weight hydrocarbons
including the more toxic PAHs that are
recalcitrant to weathering and microbial
biodegradation.” 14
Report findings include 1,426 toxicity tests
performed on various water, sediment, and
marine species at 647 nearshore locations after
August 3; and they indicate that "significant
effects" were observed in samples from 18% of
the sediment test locations and in samples from
13% of the water sampling locations. These
post-August 3 results compared pre-impact
sampling from 104 locations with a post-impact
size of 137 tests. The graphics in OSAT’s follow-up
Ecotoxicity Report demonstrate an increase in
the amount of significant effects in toxicity tests
for "matched" locations. 15
2
Independent Research Scientists
The independent research scientists include
many individuals from research institutions,
including but not limited to:
University of South Florida
Mote Marine Lab
Florida State University
Berkeley Lab
University of Georgia
Texas A&M University
Louisiana State University
Georgia Institute of Technology
National Aquarium Conservation Center
Mississippi State University
There is some disagreement within the ranks of the independent
researchers as to the fate of the oil and methane
dispersed at the MC252 wellhead. 16 For instance, Dr.
Samantha Joye, a University of Georgia researcher
collecting data in the area in September 2010 and again
in February 2011, confirmed lingering plumes of oil and
methane, and also found patches of oil up to 2 inches thick
on the Gulf floor that stretched as far as 70 miles away
from the wellhead. Other researchers, such as Dr. Terry
Hazen at Berkeley Lab, maintain that due to a significant
bloom of a previously unknown species of microbe in the
area of the plume, a large portion of this oil had been
consumed by midsummer of 2010.
3
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and
Local Citizens
Due to the legal nature of the Natural Resources Damage
Assessment (NRDA) process, scientific data are being held
until the government is able to build a strong enough case
against BP to prove the true scope of environmental
damage. This will take several years. Meanwhile, while all
parties remain in a vacuum as regards to reliable data,
early restoration projects will be funded via a billion-dollar
agreement from BP to jumpstart the recovery of the
region’s economy and ecology. Over the past year, Save Our
Gulf Waterkeepers have conducted an environmental
monitoring project from Louisiana to Florida in an attempt
to address the information vacuum on the scope of
ecological impacts from the BP oil disaster. The results
of these tests are presented in the Citizen Environmental
Monitoring section of this report.
During the year following the BP oil spill, communities
along the Gulf Coast came to realize that each step of the
restoration process must be watched and thoroughly
vetted carefully. Waterkeeper Alliance has built relationships
with scientists and institutions as they also attempt to
understand better the long-term ecosystem consequences
of this disaster. The seven Gulf Coast Waterkeepers are
in accord that long-term environmental monitoring is
essential to understanding, protecting, and restoring the
Gulf Coast ecosystem.
Inconclusive Results
The information flow regarding the fate of the oil has
slowed considerably since January 2011, because the
pre-assessment phase of the Natural Resource Damage
Assessment process ended, and the damage assessment
phase began. In July 2010 Unified Command, in its
commitment to a Joint Assessment Team approach
to determining ecosystem damages, agreed to share
pre-assessment data collection duties and findings
with both the Responsible Party, BP, and the public.
However, in the damage assessment phase, any findings
that may be used “to build a legal case against BP” are
confidential and will not be shared. 17
Independent research scientists grew significantly more
guarded in interviews about their Gulf research work
beginning in February 2011. 18 Some of these researchers
are submitting research proposals through a new study
consortium, the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative. This
entity was set up to study and monitor the long-term
effects of the oil spill and its potential impacts on the
environment and human health. On August 31, 2011
$112.5 million of the pledged $500 million was awarded
to eight research consortia.
The nearshore, “visible” oil has largely been identified
and remediated where this was determined to be possible
in the judgment of Unified Command. Residuals of oil
remain, especially in environmentally sensitive areas
where cleanup is considered high risk in terms of benefits
versus impact. Far less is known about the “invisible”
oil. There are almost no baseline data about life in the
mid-depth and deep-water zones, where the bulk of the
Gulf’s food web resides, and where many commercially
important species spawn. This makes it difficult to draw
conclusions with relatively limited sampling in a body of
water as vast as the Gulf. 19 Reports have been conflicting.
Long-term studies are needed to understand fully the
toxicity effects in humans and wildlife, and whether overall
environmental background levels of PAHs have been
elevated by this spill event. If the fate of the Gulf is similar
to that of Prince William Sound, the site of the Exxon
Valdez spill, these residual impacts may be persistent;
time will tell. Long-term monitoring is the only way to
know the full impacts on the Gulf of Mexico and its
natural resources due to the large amounts of oil and
dispersants released through this event.

20 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 21
Growing Public Health Concerns
Even before oil began to wash ashore across the
northern Gulf of Mexico, Save Our Gulf Waterkeeper
organizations began receiving calls from
Gulf Coast residents with health complaints.
These residents were experiencing a wide range
of symptoms and were often unable to find relief
with their local medical providers. In the early
days of the BP oil disaster the most commonly
received health complaints were severe headaches,
nausea, vomiting, cough, sinusitis, and
difficulty breathing. People with existing breathing
issues, such as asthma and chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD), were having increased
difficulty controlling their symptoms, required
more medication, and experienced an increased
need for medical treatment. 20
Louisiana Bayoukeeper began receiving reports
from fishermen experiencing severe headaches,
nausea, vomiting, cough, sinusitis, difficulty
breathing and severe fatigue. In addition, some
reported flu-like symptoms so severe that they
had to throw their anchors and remain in a bunk
for days before recovering enough to come
home. They were strong, healthy men accustomed
to putting in long, laborious hours fishing. The
fishermen and other fishing community members
continue to suffer from these and many other
health problems. In mid-May officials in Louisiana
recognized that the BP oil/dispersant might
inundate inland fishing grounds. The Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries chose to
grant an emergency early opening of the brown
shrimp fishing season. Inland fishermen, whose
vessels were ready early, made the opening.
The In-Situ Burns were taking place in the Gulf.
Prevailing winds began blowing out of the
south-southeast. The air in the fishing grounds
and communities became thick with the smell
of petroleum.
Very early in the BP oil disaster, veterans of
the Exxon Valdez disaster reached out to the
communities of the Gulf Coast, warning
communities of the dangers they encountered
during cleanup; they hoped those impacted
could learn from their mistakes, and they implored Gulf Coast
cleanup workers to use all applicable safety gear.
The best information resource became the fishermen hired to work
on the “Vessels of Opportunity” or VOO program conducting oil
disaster response. By early May, those fisherman began learning
through BP's Master Vessel Charter Agreement that according to
their BP superiors, they would be fired if seen using a respirator or
any safety equipment not exclusively provided by BP.
Hundreds of fishermen were hired to attach booms to their shrimp
boats in place of nets and then drive their boats directly through the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil/dispersant slicks to corral and collect the
toxic substances. Some vessels worked the In-Situ Burns and
burned the oil, while others collected the absorbent boom, bagged it,
loaded it on their boats, and hauled it in. Fishing vessels were also
used, after dispersant had been sprayed, to “mix” it with the oil by
running the vessel back and forth through the oil/dispersant. During
the heaviest flows of the disaster, many VOO workers anchored their
vessels each night and slept where they worked, often waking at
night to the spraying of Corexit and having their cabins filled with the
smell of petroleum. Of all the responders working the spill, these
fisherman had the highest potential for exposure to toxic air pollutants.
In addition to the toxicity of crude oil, they were exposed to the
added danger posed by the application of dispersant chemicals. 21
Despite all the warnings and previous bad experiences, reports
of cleanup workers experiencing health problems emerged with
increasing frequency.
In the following weeks and months more and more cleanup workers,
fishermen and community members experienced health problems
that they believed might be related to the BP oil disaster. Symptoms
commonly reported to Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers expanded to
include skin irritation and sores, irritation of the eyes, nose and
throat, nausea, diarrhea, numbness of the extremities, stomach
cramps/abdominal pain, dizziness, confusion, depression, coughing,
shortness of breath/difficulty breathing, and chest pains. These
individuals also were often unable to get relief or satisfactory
diagnosis from their local health care providers.
Communities are finding that local health professionals lack training
and knowledge about the health impacts of exposure to both
dispersants and crude oil. 22 Similarly, there is a lack of information
on the long-term health consequences of these toxins, both
individually and in combination. Lack of adequate health insurance
and fears that private insurers and Medicaid will refuse to pay for
tests and visits to doctors contribute to the lack of even primary care.
Over the period since such problems arose, communities have
repeatedly asked state and federal decision makers to address their
health concerns appropriately. To date no public forum or task force
has been set up specifically to address the public health concerns
arising from the BP oil disaster. With no alternative, concerned
community members have been attending government ecosystem
restoration forums and BP claims meetings to express their anger
and frustration over the lack of government action.
In a report released on July 27, 2011, the environmental justice
advocacy group Advocates for Environmental Human Rights stated
that Kenneth Feinberg, government appointed administrator of BP
Victim Compensation Fund, has denied all health claims submitted
by Gulf Coast residents. Mr. Feinberg, who led claims for Vietnam
veterans over exposure to Agent Orange and also worked with 9/11
first responders, allowed health claims to be paid during those two
processes. 23 But over and over again during the BP oil disaster,
community members have been told to seek help elsewhere, without
any suggestion about where to go. This situation is leading to sustained
frustration at both the community and government levels. It is
also leading to significant fear, stress, and mental health problems
in communities throughout the Gulf Coast. 24
A Groundswell of Support for Public Health Help
In an effort to find some help, people with health
problems have been finding their way to community
groups and non-profit organizations. It
has been extremely difficult for organizations
that work primarily on environmental issues to
try to become a source of answers and advocacy
for those who have become ill and who have
nowhere else to turn.
While the exact short- and long-term impacts
of the BP oil disaster on Gulf Coast residents’
health are currently unclear, Save Our Gulf
Waterkeepers continue to receive health
complaints from Gulf Coast residents fourteen
months after the well was capped. Residents
who live and work on the water, particularly
people in fishing communities and first responders
to the BP oil disaster, are falling ill. At the
time of writing, Gulf Coast communities remain
without adequate diagnosis or treatment for
these health concerns.
On May 24, 2011, members of 154 environmental, fishing, chemical reform, and community groups sent
a letter to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Human and Health Services
demanding the following:
• Comprehensive restoration. Our health, economy, and environment are interconnected and solutions
must reflect this.
• A Gulf Coast Health Restoration Task Force that includes community members with decision-making
authority to address our long and short-term health needs.
• The implementation of the Oil Spill Commission Report Recommendations on health. The Oil Spill
Commission stated that EPA should develop distinct plans and procedures to address human health
impacts during a Spill of National Significance (See pages 38–39).
• The publication of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) type documents containing lists of potential
synergistic health effects of exposure to the combination of oil, dispersants, oil and dispersants combined,
any natural and/or bioengineered bacteria, and any other chemical or “natural” product used in response
to the BP spill.
EPA responded with a written letter on August 26, 2010 acknowledging the connection between public health
and the health of the ecosystem, but offering little in answers to the letter’s demands.

22 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 23

24 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 25
BP’s Public Relations Machine
"The single message that has been delivered, requested, begged from every type of community
leader, whether industry or environmentalist, health official or realtor, is tell us the truth
about what's happening. The one thing BP has fought from the beginning is letting the public
know the truth." —Casi Callaway, Mobile Baykeeper
Those of us on the Gulf Coast who are monitoring
the ongoing oil impacts know that the oil is not
gone. Yet BP is spending large amounts of money
to convince the rest of the nation that the oil is
gone. Throughout most of 2010 and 2011, it
has been evident that BP is running a public
relations campaign, more than a recovery effort.
During the height of the disaster, BP officials
prevented journalists and residents from taking
photos and videos of oil washing ashore and
prohibited cleanup workers from wearing important
protective gear. Meanwhile, between April
2010 and July 2010 BP more than tripled the
amount spent on public relations in the same
period the previous year. There is little question
that the objective of this deluge of money was
to combat growing public image problems.
The money spent was also a tactic to combat
its own glaring mistakes in its oil spill response
plan. BP received considerable criticism for
the details in this plan, and the federal government
in turn received considerable criticism
for approving it. Most famously, BP included the
walrus as a species that would potentially be
impacted in a Gulf spill, although the walrus of
course is an animal of the far northern seas and
does not occur in the Gulf region or anywhere
nearer than Alaska, Canada and Greenland.
Besides saturating traditional media sources,
the company was quick to leverage a sophisticated
social networking strategy. On popular
internet search engines, BP purchased search
terms related to the oil disaster. This resulted
in BP-sponsored websites rising to the top of
internet searches on sites like Google and Yahoo,
meaning that more legitimate news stories
were less likely to reach the public. This is an
effective tactic commonly used by corporations and non-profits alike,
but it comes with extra criticism when used in the midst of a disaster
felt by millions of people in need of quality and unbiased information.
Corporate public relations tactics such as those seen during the
height of the BP oil disaster serve the purpose of “re-creating” the
disaster narrative. The objective was to make the oil disaster “disappear”—to
make it seem smaller and less devastating than it was.
In effect, manipulating internet messages in this way was an attempt
to wipe from the minds of all those not actually on the front lines
the fact that a disaster even exists.
In early July 2011 the American Petroleum Institute released a report
detailing a decline in the number of offshore-related jobs since
the BP oil disaster and attacking the slower pace at which deepwater
drilling permits were being issued to energy companies. 25 The institute’s
push for business as usual is not surprising when one notes
that energy business analysts have forecast offshore operations and
maintenance expenditures of more than $330 billion over the next
five years. That is a large reason to scare people away from looking
at the very real problems connected to deepwater extraction.
Reports of this kind make headlines. They are part of an organized
effort to deflect the attention of elected officials and the public from
problems connected to deepwater extraction; systemic problems
that have not been rectified since the oil disaster began.
“The huge amount of BP money going to scientists all over the
Gulf of Mexico is not only a threat to independent research on the
effects of the oil spill, but also a threat to independent science
that is essential to stopping illegal activities that destroy wetlands
as well as the misspending of restoration funds.” —Dean A. Wilson,
Atchafalaya Basinkeeper
Citizen Environmental
Monitoring
On August 2, 2010, while Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper
Paul Orr was en route back from documenting oiled
shoreline on the western edge of Terrebonne Parish,
Louisiana, he was shown an oyster reef by a local fisherman
who from time to time gathered oysters from the
reef to bring back to his family as a treat. The oyster
reef was a mile and a half up Big Oyster Bayou, well away
from the Gulf shoreline and more than 170 miles from
the site of the Deepwater Horizon well. There was no sign
of oil anywhere in the area. The oysters looked perfect
and smelled perfect; to all intents and purposes they were
perfect oysters that any oyster lover would have been
excited to consume. Orr took a sample of the oysters.
The laboratory reported back that the oyster sample
contained 9,780 mg/kg of Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons
and 0.016 mg/kg of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
(PAHs). According to the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, PAHs may reasonably be considered
carcinogens. People who that have inhaled or touched
mixtures of PAHs and other chemicals over long periods
of time have developed cancer. 26 It was an eye-opening
experience for the Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper and
demonstrated that the information coming from the
government was inadequate and that additional independent
testing was greatly needed. This story would repeat
itself as the Save Our Gulf environmental monitoring
project tested seemingly perfect seafood organisms and
received lab reports of high levels of petroleum hydrocarbons
in the samples. In an effort to gain some concrete
data on what impacts the BP oil disaster has been having
on our Gulf Coast ecosystems and communities, the Save
Our Gulf Waterkeepers made it a priority to conduct
environmental testing.
Beginning in August 2010 Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers
launched an environmental sampling effort under the
supervision of Wilma Subra, a MacArthur Award-winning
chemist. One hundred samples of soil, water and seafood
organisms were collected along the northern Gulf shore,
from the central Louisiana coast to Apalachicola Bay,
Florida. It was decided early in the project to focus on the
testing of seafood organisms. This maximizes the expenditure
of resources, as these organisms tend to accumulate
materials from the environment and also have the
greatest potential to impact human populations directly
with contamination. Samples were collected using
best practice sampling methods and were analyzed by
EPA-certified laboratories for components of crude oil
and oil spill dispersants.
Significant levels of Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPHs)
and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) were found
in many of the samples taken during the Save Our Gulf
environmental monitoring project. TPH is defined as the
measurable amount of petroleum-based hydrocarbon
in an environmental media. PAHs are a specific kind of
hydrocarbons that occur in crude oil and can be dangerous
to human health.
These results call into question the efficacy of the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration’s seafood testing and their
proclamation that Gulf seafood was and continues to be
safe for regular consumption. Based on our test results,
we consider the “all clear” for consumption of Gulf
seafood to have been premature and based on flawed
levels of concern. It is imperative that in-depth independent
scientific analysis of Gulf seafood species and
ecosystems be undertaken. Also, Gulf Coast commercial
fishing families must not bear the burden of this disaster.
BP must compensate our Gulf Coast commercial fishing
families for all losses resulting from the BP oil disaster,
for as long as full recovery takes.

26 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 27
Results of Save Our Gulf Sampling
Hundreds of different PAHs commonly occur as mixtures in the environment, and toxicological
data available on these mixtures are limited. Most studies focus on individual PAHs, and
therefore assessing cumulative risks for more than one PAH is a challenge. However, based
on the available toxicological data, some PAHs have been classified as probable or possible
carcinogens. Naphthalene is not currently listed as a probable or possible carcinogenic PAH
(cPAH), although recent studies by the National Toxicology Program have concluded that there
is clear evidence of its carcinogenic effects in animals. 27
A summary of the tissue samples collected by Atchafalaya Basinkeeper, Lower Mississippi
Riverkeeper, Emerald Coastkeeper, and Apalachicola Riverkeeper are presented below.
For results from all samples taken by Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers, see associated document
“Save Our Gulf Environmental Monitoring Project Results June 2010 – August 2011”.
Summary of Results: Lower Mississippi
Riverkeeper Sampling
In response to the BP Oil Disaster, Lower Mississippi River
Keeper (LMRK), Louisiana Environmental Action Network
(LEAN), and Subra Company have performed monitoring,
sampling and analysis of the environment and seafood
organisms in the estuaries and wetlands of coastal Louisiana
from Atchafalaya Bay eastward to the Louisiana /
Mississippi state line. Soil samples and aquatic tissue
samples from all areas sampled contained Alkylated PAHs
and Oil Range Organic Petroleum Hydrocarbons.
Soil samples contained 6 to 89 individual Alkylated
Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) and Total
Petroleum Hydrocarbons up to 11,600 mg/kg (1.16%)
which corresponded to the fingerprint of the BP Louisiana
Sweet Crude. All of the areas sampled had soil/sediments
contaminated with Alkylated PAHs and Oil Range Organic
Petroleum Hydrocarbons.
Oyster samples have contained up to 8,815 to 12,500 mg/kg
Oil Range Organic Petroleum Hydrocarbons. The oyster
samples have also contained up the 4 Alkylated PAHs,
Fluoranthene, Naphthalene, Phenanthrene, and Pyrene
in concentrations of 1.4 to 63 ug/kg. Blue crab samples
have contained up to 2,230 to 3,583 mg/kg Total Petroleum
Hydrocarbons and up to 4 Alkylated PAHs, Fluoranthene,
Naphthalene, Phenanthrene and Pyrene in concentrations
from 84.6 to 162 ug/kg. Shrimp samples have contained
up to 8,356 mg/kg Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons and 5
Alkylated PAHs, Anthracene, Fluoranthene, Naphthalene,
Phenanthrene and Pyrene up to 69.4 ug/kg.
Summary of Results: Emerald Coastkeeper Sampling
Every six months Emerald Coastkeeper is collecting
oysters inland of Perdido and Pensacola, to monitor
whether these stationary species are accumulating the
most harmful components of dispersed oil, PAHs, along
with dispersant compounds. The goal of this study is
to have a long-term data set to determine whether these
species are accumulating toxins associated with hydrocarbon
contamination (not to determine whether these
species are safe to eat).
None of the four dispersant compounds tested was found
during the fall 2010 event. However, one of the compounds
tested for in spring 2011, 2-ethyl-1-hexanol, was found
in every sample. According to EPA, this chemical is a
common food and pesticide additive. However, also according
to the EPA, for marine/estuarine fish, the acute toxicity
estimates range from 6.5 to 19.5 parts per million; for
mysid shrimp, acute toxicity is estimated to be 3.4 ppm;
and for algae, 14.6 ppm. 28 Concentrations found during our
spring 2011 sampling event were much higher than these
toxicity estimates, ranging from 40.5 ppm to 69.0 ppm.
PAH concentrations in oysters increased from the fall
2010 sampling to the spring 2011 sampling inside Perdido,
Pensacola, and Destin passes (Figures 1–4). Anthracene,
chrysene (a cPAH), fluoranthene, fluorene, phenathrene
and pyrene increased at all three locations; naphthalene
(also a cPAH) and anthracene increased at Perdido and
Destin. Results are in fact magnitudes less than FDA levels
of concern and therefore are far below even the most
conservative risk assessments. However, despite the fact
that the increased concentrations are well below FDA
levels of concern, the fact that PAH concentrations have
increased is troubling.
Summary of Results: Apalachicola Riverkeeper Sampling
Apalachicola Riverkeeper obtained oyster samples from
a representative number of summer and winter harvesting
areas in June 2010 and repeated that sampling plan again
in December 2010. The purpose of this monitoring project
is to have a long-term data set to determine whether
these species are accumulating toxins associated with
hydrocarbon contamination. Samples were sent to Pace
laboratories for analysis to detect the presence and
amount of PAH, Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon and select
dispersant constituents.
Our results, obtained in mid-January, showed PAHs below
the FDA set Levels of Concern for both the June and
December sampling data sets. Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon
levels in the oyster tissue dropped between June and
December, with no dispersant compounds noted in either
analysis data set. Testing was conducted in seven locations
within Apalachicola Bay. Concentrations of PAHs found
during the June 2010 sampling event ranged from 1.36ppb
to 14.49ppb. Concentrations of PAHs found during the
December 2010 sampling event ranged from 0.54ppb
to 4.82ppb.

28 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 29
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Graph 1. Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon results from four samples collected by Atchafalaya Basinkeeper (10/8/10), Apalachicola Riverkeeper
(6/14/10), Emerald Coastkeeper (3/18/11), and Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper (10/26/10) respectively
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
TOTAL PETROLEUM HYDROCARBONS
LA Snail
10/8/2010
Napthalene
LA Shrimp
10/26/2010
POLYCYCLIC AROMATIC HYDROCARBONS
Fluorene
Anthracene/
Phenanthrene
Pyrene
FL Oyster
3/18/2010
Graph 2. Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons of four samples collected by Atachalfaya Basinkeeper (10/8/10), Apalachicola Riverkeeper
(6/14/10), Emerald Coastkeeper (3/18/11), and Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper (10/26/10)
Fluoranthene
Chrysene
FL Oyster
6/14/2010
Total PAH
TPH C10–C28
(ppm)
TPH C12–C36
(ppm)
LA Snail 10/8/10
LA Shrimp 10/26/10
FL Oyster 3/18/10
FL Oyster 6/14/10
Examination of Government Sampling
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) established levels of
concern specifically for the unprecedented Deepwater
Horizon disaster and will not necessarily be applicable after
all fisheries closed due to oil contamination are reopened
for safe harvest. In developing the parameters for levels of
concern (LOCs), adjustments for smaller individuals,
children, and pregnant women were not taken into account.
The seafood consumption rates of Gulf Coast communities
also were not taken into account. Residents of the Gulf
Coast tend to consume far more seafood than was taken
into consideration. In particular, many of the lower-income
coastal communities rely on subsistence fishing as a way
to supply a significant portion of their dietary requirements.
A study published by the journal Environmental Health
Perspectives took a close look at the testing done in
the Gulf and compared it to that in other oil spills and to
the science on oil-spill contamination. 29 Some of the
noteworthy findings include:
1 Gulf seafood should be tested for heavy metals.
2 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration allowed a higher
level of contamination to be considered “safe” after the
BP disaster than following other oil spills.
3 A long-term comprehensive testing plan is needed that
covers all types of seafood, includes an adequate number
of samples from all impacted areas, and measures all of
the relevant contaminants (PAHs, metals, and dispersant
chemicals).
4 Improvements are needed in community engagement
and communication.
5 Guidelines should be developed to standardize seafood
safety assessments and make them more protective
of health.
The graphs on the left show the four samples one from each program that took tissue sampling. These samples are representative of the
hydrocarbon contamination that was found by the Save Our Gulf monitoring project. These sample results are below current FDA levels of
concern. The Atchafalaya Basinkeeper snail sample "LASnail 10/8/2010" was taken on October 8, 2010 in Atchafalaya Bay. The Lower
Mississippi Riverkeeper shrimp sample "LAShrimp 10/26/2010" was taken October 26, 2010 in Breton Sound. The Emerald Coastkeeper
oyster sample "FLOyster 3/18/2011" was taken March 18, 2011 in Pensacola Bay. The Apalachicola Riverkeeper oyster sample "FLOyster
6/14/2010" was taken on June 14, 2010 in Apalachicola Bay. For a more detailed look at the Save Our Gulf monitoring project results see
document, "Save Our Gulf Environmental Monitoring Project Results June 2010 – August 2011"

30 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 31
Where do we go from here?
The BP oil disaster made it clear that restoring the Gulf Coast
region includes holding the oil and gas industry accountable for
environmental damages and creating a resilent Gulf Coast.
The people of the Gulf Coast find themselves at a crossroads;
continue with business as usual or make fundamental changes
to the way we care for our environment and natural resources.
New Gulf of Mexico Oil Spills
The BP oil disaster was not the first oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico
and it hasn’t been the last. In an effort to raise awareness of chronic
and new oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, Waterkeeper Alliance has
partnered with SouthWings and SkyTruth to form the Gulf Monitoring
Consortium. SkyTruth is a non-profit organization that reads satellite
images twice daily for oil pollution, and SouthWings is a non-profit
that provides skilled pilots and aerial education to promote conservation.
The Gulf Monitoring Consortium is a rapid response alliance
that collects information by space, air, and water, and analyzes and
publishes images and other data, in order to bring truth to oil pollution
incidents that occur in the Gulf of Mexico.
The initiative is solely a fact-finding mission, an innovative partnership
that is systematically monitoring oil pollution in the Gulf with
satellite images and mapping, aerial reconnaissance and photography,
and on-the-water observation and sampling. This unique effort led
by three non-profit organizations will collect and publish images,
observations, and sampling data from the Gulf so as to be able to
respond rapidly to reported and suspected oil pollution incidents.
The design of the Gulf Monitoring Consortium is such that SkyTruth
will monitor satellite imagery and National Response Center data to
identify possible spills. SouthWings will provide flyovers to confirm
and document the spills. And Waterkeeper organizations will visit the
sites by boat for on-the-water documentation and to take samples.
Instances of the discharge of oil into Gulf waters reported to the National Response Center
(NRC) from September 12, 2010, through September 12, 2011, are as follows:
Discharge Type
Minimum Estimated Volume
(gallons)*
The Gulf Monitoring Consortium has already put
its model into practice on two oil pollution incidents.
On June 8, 2011, SkyTruth noticed reports
of a sizeable oil slick near Venice, Louisiana, and
spread the word via its blog and to other members
of the consortium. On June 10, 2011, South-
Wings flew an air patrol to the area, discovered a
long oil slick coming from a well in Breton Sound,
and reported this to the authorities. On June 17,
2011, the Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper made an
on-the-water patrol to the well site to document
the status of the well, where the leak proved
to have been stopped. The other incident is an
ongoing discharge of crude oil at the site of an
oil rig that was damaged during Hurricane Ivan
in 2004. Due to the combined capabilities of the
three organizations, we have been able to gather
information consistently on this ongoing violation
of the Clean Water Act.
Oil pollution in the Gulf of Mexico is routine,
but the new attention is shining a light on the
impacts to this important natural resource.
This raised consciousness must result in
systemic changes that prevent future oil spills.
Total Incident Count
Total Count of Unknown
Volume Incidents**
Fuel 286,138.4407 218 63
Mechanical 1,583.290405 249 54
Oil 2,243,371.426 2096 1,060
* Many NRC reports only include an estimated sheen size of discharges. From these reports SkyTruth estimates the possible volume of discharge size.
SkyTruth also reads satellite images of the areas where oil discharges are reported and estimates the size of volume. These numbers represent
reported oil volumes as well as SkyTruth’s estimated volume size of sheen reports.
** Unfortunately, reports of discharges of an unknown volume are fairly common in NRC data. Reporting such as this leads to the inability to
understand the full scope of oil pollution in the Gulf of Mexico. This situation leaves environmental law enforcement officers without recourse
to assign appropriate accountability to responsible parties.

32 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 33
The Importance of Citizen Involvement
From the beginning of the BP oil spill disaster, BP has worked to exclude
community representatives from access to information and from involvement in
protection and cleanup, and the company has worked to separate the community
from the very waterways we know and love. Citizens could have been BP’s best
asset to protect and clean up waterways and shorelines, but instead we were
excluded from the process. Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers and other community
leaders are demanding citizen involvement at every stage of the process; from
restoration planning to oversight of drilling permits.
Citizens Advisory Council
After spending a year working to achieve citizen involvement,
coastal residents had their first victory. On May 6,
2011, at the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force
meeting in Mobile, Alabama, Gulf Coast communities were
informed that a Citizens Advisory Council would be added
to the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force. At
this time neither the charge of this council nor which
stakeholders will represent impacted communities has
been determined specifically, but the general responsibility
is to oversee implementation of restoration planning. Save
Our Gulf Waterkeepers’ names have been submitted for
seats at this table, and we look forward to reporting on
their involvement.
Regional Citizens Advisory Council
There is a critical need to establish a Gulf of Mexico Regional
Citizens Advisory Council that includes involvement of citizen
representatives from the most vulnerable and heavily
impacted communities. The formation of Regional Citizens
Advisory Council (RCAC) allows for citizens to have oversight
influence in areas heavily impacted by the oil industry.
The Alaska Oil Spill Commission stated that complacency
by the oil industry and federal and state of
ficials was the causal factor leading to the Exxon Valdez
oil disaster in 1989, according to a brief prepared for Louisiana
Bayoukeeper by Joseph Horton of Boston College Law
School, Land and Environmental Law Program. 30 The brief
recommends: “Representation of industry and agencies
on any RCAC should be avoided as breaching the separate
independent watchdog role of an RCAC, and representation
of municipalities directly dependent upon oil industry
payrolls should be limited to non-voting membership in
order to prevent undue political pressures from affecting
the actions of the council. RCACs should provide institutionalized
protection for members who publicly express
critical or dissenting views of the council, oil industry,
and/or government regulators.”
Dr. John Devens, executive director of the Prince William
Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council, stated in Community
Involvement versus Big Oil: A Case Study of the
Policy Process: “When the oil spill hit, there was a lack of
local involvement in decision making about the cleanup
and a general lack of good information about how events
were unfolding. Local individuals had to be hired and
trained before a sufficient cleanup effort could even begin,
and precious cleanup time was lost. It became painfully
Dr. Devens lists a number of lessons learned that should be noted by communities
looking to create their own RCAC. Several key points stand out:
Citizens are more effective if they have a formal relationship with those in
decision-making authority.
Citizen advisory groups should be mandated by a federal or state statute.
All affected stakeholder groups should be represented on the council.
Concerned citizens should have the opportunity to participate in
a meaningful way.
Sufficient funding is essential.
evident that the proper time for planning and training is not
after an oil spill has already occurred but before, and that
local people should be involved in that process.” 31
Too often, dedicated citizens are placed on Citizen Advisory
Committees to fulfill agency requirements, but representatives
are given little responsibility or ability to make real
contributions in the decision-making process. Practical,
local knowledge is discounted or ignored as anecdotal. Elected
officials, agency staff, scientists, academics and others
often feel they know what is best for impacted communities
and produce plans with little or overly controlled input from
vulnerable and impacted citizens. Relegating stakeholder
comment to an afterthought results in community opposition
to policy and slows the implementation process.
The key to seating a truly representative Gulf of Mexico
Regional Citizens Advisory Council is for it to be made up of
citizens from vulnerable and heavily impacted communities
across the Gulf of Mexico. The council must be composed
of voting and non-voting members and must include at
least one voting member who resides in each of the coastal
political subdivisions directly impacted by the Deepwater
Horizon disaster across the states of Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida.

34 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 35
Restoration and Holding BP Accountable
The federal government has taken steps to address future
restoration efforts along the Gulf Coast. The Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (GCERTF) was created
by Executive Order 13554 on October 5, 2010 to coordinate
intergovernmental implementation of restoration, support
the Natural Resource Damage Assessment process, present
to the President a Gulf of Mexico Regional Ecosystem
Restoration Strategy, engage local stakeholders to inform
the work of the Task Force, provide leadership and coordination
of research needs in support of restoration planning
and decision making, and prepare a biennial update
for the President on progress toward the goals of Gulf
Coast restoration.
Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force Starts Work
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson,
a Gulf Coast native, was named chair of the GCERTF.
Between November of 2010 and August of 2011, the task
force has had five meetings scheduled on the Gulf Coast
from Florida to Texas. These are working meetings open to
the public. They were set up for transparency and include
sessions to collect stakeholder input from a spectrum
of people from fishermen to hotel owners to members of
the regulated community.
The task force has used the listening sessions to enable
the community to answer the following main questions
about restoration:
Are these the right goals: Enhance Community Resilience,
Restore and Conserve Habitat, Restore Water Quality, Replenish
and Protect Living Coastal and Marine Resources?
What are the critical actions or major outcomes that need
to be accomplished as part of this strategy in order to
achieve the overarching goals?
What new programs and actions (state, federal and private)
are needed?
What key policy changes will improve the processes
necessary to support restoration?
What would "success" look like, and how should it be
measured and reported?
In coordination with partner organizations across the Gulf
Coast, members of Save Our Gulf have organized and
succeeded in pushing for a matrix that prioritizes how
restoration projects are defined and for creation of a Citizen
Advisory Council. Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers will continue
working to ensure that only the best environmental
projects rise through the process for both permitting
and funding.
Holding BP Accountable through the Natural Resources
Damage Assessment Process
In addition to presidential executive orders and immediate
action taken by the Environmental Protection Agency and
the U.S. Coast Guard in response to oil pollution, there
exists a legal process for the government to hold polluters
accountable for restoration of the ecosystem damaged by
the responsible parties.
Section 1006(e)(1) of the Oil Spill Pollution Act requires
a Natural Resources Damage Assessment in the case of
a discharge of oil. This is a legal process that holds an oil
polluter liable to fund ecosystem restoration. The process
has three phases: preliminary assessment, injury assessment/restoration
planning, and restoration implementation.
The NRDA public scoping period for the BP oil disaster
ended on May 18, 2011. The trustees are now compiling
comments and have begun drafting the Preliminary
Environmental Impact Statement, commonly referred to
as PEIS. A first draft is expected to be available for public
review and comment in early 2012. 32 Through the NRDA
process, NOAA, the Department of the Interior, and other
federal trustees as well as co-trustees established in each
state “conduct studies to identify the extent of resource
injuries, the best methods for restoring those resources,
and the type and amount of restoration required.” 33
Knowing the breadth and depth of the impacts to every
area is a key component to ensuring that the NRDA process
is complete. Mobile Baykeeper and the local organization
Alabama Coastal Foundation joined forces to create the
Volunteer Field Observer Program. Using the expertise at
Waterkeeper Alliance and the dedication of the Save Our
Gulf Waterkeepers, the two organizations researched the
NRDA processes and defined protocols for volunteers to
collect data in a proper manner that could be useful in the
NRDA process. Volunteers have collected data across the
Gulf Coast, ranging from location of pollution outfall lines
to recording of oil washing ashore. The ultimate goal of
the data collection is to create a pictorial review of the Gulf
Coast that can be compared over the duration of the oil
disaster and can show if problems are being properly recorded
and then addressed. SaveOurGulf.org/observations
is the website that houses the data collected. The challenges
with NRDA include ensuring that the best data are carefully
collected over a long period of time. While there is a critical
need for funding, we need to ensure we clearly understand
all the problems created by this oil disaster, and it
is imperative that federal and state agencies take the time
needed to understand all the impacts fully.
Once the data are collected and we move toward restoration,
the process becomes one of tracking to ensure that the best
projects receive top priority. NRDA funds can only be used
for ecosystem restoration of areas, species, and habitats
specifically impacted by the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
disaster. Because we cannot replace an oiled brown pelican,
alternatives must be found, such as creating new habitat,
or restoring marshland that fosters the growth or provides
healthy breeding grounds for pelicans. Essentially, our
federal agencies and the responsible parties negotiate the
price of the pelican and find ways to spend the money such
that it supports healthy pelicans in the future.
While studies are underway to understand the scope of
the damage done, communities are vigilantly holding the
government and industry accountable for all damages
done by this disaster. In July of 2011, as a result of outrage
by Gulf Coast shrimpers, NOAA was forced to retract

36 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 37
“When you cut your finger, the place to put the Band-aid is on your finger.
When an oil company damages the Gulf of Mexico with a major oil spill, the
place to put the ensuing Clean Water Act fine obviously is in the states along
the Gulf." –Charlotte Wells, Galveston Baykeeper
statements that a dramatic rise in sea turtle
deaths earlier in the year was a result of
fishermen not being in compliance with equipment
regulations. The sea turtle deaths spiked
prior to shrimping season, and NOAA’s own
figures confirm that large numbers of Gulf
shrimpers do comply with requirements for
turtle-protecting devices. As a result, the agency
has changed its position and decided not to
impose emergency measures on the shrimping
industry. Science has shown that petrochemical
compounds have neurological impacts on
marine animals even when no visible oil is
detected. 34 Full ecosystem restoration depends
on the follow-through of sound science and
a comprehensive NRDA process.
On April 21, 2011, in an unprecedented move
toward restoration, NRDA trustees and BP
announced $1 billion to fund early Gulf Coast
restoration projects. 35 It took NOAA and state
trustees three months to negotiate this early
settlement. The $1 billion paid by BP will be taken
out of the final amount owed by the company
at the end of the NRDA process. The distribution
breakdown was agreed as follows: (1) each of
the five states will select and implement $100
million worth of projects, (2) Federal Resource
Trustees, NOAA, and Department of Interior
will oversee $200 million worth of projects, and
(3) the remaining $300 million will be used for
projects selected by NOAA and the Department
of the Interior from proposals submitted by the
state trustees.
Early and emergency restoration is extremely important to the
long-term recovery of the Gulf Coast. BP and other companies being
held responsible for the oil disaster will owe billions of dollars for
restoration and punitive damages. The particulars of the settlement
will take years to negotiate. Having the opportunity to begin restoration
projects now will give coastal areas a better chance at full recovery.
As with all restoration projects, it is important that pet projects with
political ties are not shepherded in under the guise of early restoration.
Citizen oversight and submitting project comments during public
comment periods is extremely important in this process.
The Clean Water Act
The purpose of the Clean Water Act is to “prohibit the discharge
of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts, provide financial assistance for
public wastewater treatment, develop area wide waste treatment
management plans, invest in technology sufficiently to result in
elimination of discharges, and develop and implement programs for
the control of nonpoint sources of pollution in an expeditious manner.” 36
The more universal description of the Clean Water Act’s purpose is
to protect or restore America’s waterways to being fishable, swimmable
and drinkable. The BP oil disaster is clearly in violation of
this critical law that protects our waterways.
The Clean Water Act has been an important tool for defending local
watersheds across the country since its inception almost forty years
ago, but what it does not ensure is that the penalties resulting from
pollution be returned to the area that suffered the pollution. Organizations
across the Gulf Coast are mobilizing their families, neighbors
and supporters to contact their congressional delegation to pass
comprehensive legislation dedicating the penalties from the BP oil
disaster to the Gulf Coast for restoration. It is currently estimated that
the fines will run between $5 billion and $22 billion. Those funds
would not make a dent in the federal treasury, but an investment of
that size in the natural resources of our coastal communities could
make an immense difference for our families, our finances and our
quality of life.
On May 12, 2011, Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers sent a letter to the entire Gulf
Coast congressional delegation. Our letter asked for leadership in ensuring that
Clean Water Act penalties resulting from the BP oil disaster return to the Gulf
Coast. Our letter asked that any legislation passed include the following:
1 Dedicate Clean Water Act penalties resulting from the BP oil disaster to Gulf Coast
ecosystem recovery.
2 A matrix or prioritization tool must be developed to ensure that funds are spent on
the best projects and that projects with long-term sustainability and resilience as
their basis will rise to the top.
3 An equitable distribution of funds must go to Gulf Coast states based on
environmental and economic impact and with strict oversight by the Gulf Coast
Eco-system Restoration Task Force.
4 A Regional Citizens Advisory Council must be created and included in decision
making to guide the restoration of the Gulf Coast and future oil and gas activity.
5 Legislation must ensure that local communities are able to compete for jobs
and contract opportunities by giving preference to the utilization of local workers,
small businesses and institutions while providing funding for training and
workforce development, especially for vulnerable coastal communities and
workers impacted by the oil disaster.
The Senate has put forward a bill, SB 1400, that answers only a portion of our
requests. At the time of printing this report, neither the U.S. House of
Representatives nor the U.S. Senate had voted on a bill to dedicate these
Clean Water Act penalties to the Gulf Coast.

38 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 39
A Sustainable and Resilient Gulf Coast
Hurricanes Ivan, Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Gustav in
2004–2008 destroyed communities and displaced residents,
forcing many along the Gulf Coast to make a difficult choice:
to rebuild from the ground up or not to return home. Juxtaposed
with these natural disasters are the human-induced
ones. A decades-long legacy of oil pollution can be seen in
the unnatural canals of the Atchafalaya Basin, in the high
asthma rates of communities like Houston, Texas, and the
constant stream of oil leaks and spills in the Gulf of Mexico.
The economic, environmental, and social impacts of these
storms and oil pollution are the reason many consider the
Gulf Coast a sacrifice zone. The BP oil disaster is the latest
in a string of devastating events to hit the Gulf Coast in
the past six years. As has been reiterated throughout this
report, the opportunity to learn the lessons of sustainability
and resiliency cannot be lost in the aftermath of
the BP oil disaster.
The Gulf Coast must show leadership in sustainability in
order to thrive as a region in the wake of these events. The
green economy is a growing economic sector nationally.
By investing in a green economy on the Gulf Coast, the
region has a chance to lead the nation in innovation while
mitigating climate change impacts to the area’s already
vulnerable geographic position.
Gulf Coast states can learn lessons from states that are
prioritizing the development of the green-collar sector.
For instance, according to the recent report “Many Shades
of Green: Diversity and Distribution of California’s Green
Sector,” by the non-profit Next 10, green collar jobs in
California grew three times faster than total employment
from January 2008 to 2009. 37 The report also highlights
that manufacturing jobs represent only 11% of the state’s
employment, while representing more than 26% of green
economy employment. Globally between 2007 and 2009,
$1 trillion was invested in green technology. This new level
of green investment proves that early adopting investors
and entrepreneurs are leading governments in investments
in solar, wind, geothermal, and ocean/hydro energy efficiency
and in agriculture related to the green economy. 38
It is estimated that in the BP oil disaster the cleanup
costs alone reached $5 million a day; investments in wind
energy at that rate would result in the ability to power
900 homes each day. 39
The Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers see the Gulf
Coast cities and towns as the future leaders
in sustainability for our country. The tragic
events that have hit our shores over and over
again must not defeat our communities; they
must instead help us reevaluate how we
design our cities, construct our buildings, build
our local economies, care for our wetlands,
and invest in a more sustainable future.

40 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 41
Notes
1. Environmental Protection Agency, Gulf of Mexico Program Resources, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/facts.html.
2. “Gulf Economy Worth Over $230 Billion,” CNN Money, May 30, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/30/news/economy/gulf_economy/index.htm.
3. U.S. Census, Census Bureau Report Documents Rapid Expansion of Gulf Coast Population in Recent Decades, May 26, 2010, http://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb10-76.html.
4. Environmental Protection Agency, Gulf of Mexico Facts, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/facts.html.
5. Ben Wells, Aaron Kuriloff, and Charles Babcock, “Built to Spill,” Bloomberg.com, http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/built-to-spill/
Content?oid=1608991.
6. Armen Keteylan, CBS News, April 12, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20054042-10391695.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody
7. Greenwire: “Obama to Extend Deepwater Drilling Moratorium,” New York Times, May 5, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/05/27/27greenwire-obama-to-extend-deepwater-drilling-moratorium-8011.html?pagewanted=all.
8. “U.S. Approves First Deepwater Permit Since BP Spill,” Times Picayune, February 28, 2011, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.
ssf/2011/02/us_approves_first_deepwater_oi.html.
9. NOAA, U.S. Geological Survey, , Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, August 4, 2010, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/04/federal-science-report-details-fate-oil-bp-spill.
10. “BP Oil Spill: Scientist Retracts Assurances of Successful Clean Up,” Guardian, August 19, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/
aug/19/bp-oil-spill-scientist-retracts-assurances.
11. Cover letter to OSAT-1 report, p. 2, points B and C, ,December 17, 2010, signed by RADM P. F. Zukunft, U.S. Coast Guard (emphasis added).
12. OSAT-1, Appendix: OSAT Team Memorandum #3, p. xxxviii.
13. Operation Science Advisory Team (OSAT-1) Unified Area Command, Summary Report of Sub-Sea and Sub-Surface Oil and Dispersant Detection:
Sampling and Monitoring, December 17, 2010.
14. Operation Science Advisory Team (OSAT-2) Gulf Incident Management Team, Summary for Fate and Effects of Remnant Oil in the Beach Environment,
February 10, 2011, p. 19.
15. OSAT Ecotoxicity Addendum, July 7, 2011, pp. 18–20.
16. American Association for the Advancement of Science Lecture, February 19, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?
17. Jane Lubchenco, NOAA Administrator, “Lessons Learned from the Gulf,” Conference of the Society of Environmental Journalists, October 2010,
http://www.sej.org/sites/default/files/webform/conf10/FriAftPlenary.mp3.
18. Dr. Ian MacDonald and Dr. Jim Gelsleichter, FSU Coastal and Marine Lab, May 12, 2011, conversations with Apalachicola Riverkeeper.
19. Dr. Felicia Coleman, “Deepwater Horizon Spill and the Future of Oil Development in Florida,” FSU Coastal and Marine Lab Lecture, September 9,
2010.
20. Mayo Clinic, COPD, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/copd/DS00916.
21. Unified Command Center Meeting between U.S. Coast Guard and Louisiana Shrimp Association, reporting dispersant spraying in areas of VOO
cleanup workers, July 3, 2010.
22. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Greenwire: “Questions Longer about Effects of Oil Spill, Chemicals on Gulf Coast Residents,” New York Times, April 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/21/21greenwire-questions-linger-about-effects-of-oil-spill-ch-46883.html?pagewanted=all.
23. Advocates for Environmental Human Rights, “The Human Right to Health Denied: Fineberg’s Rejection of BP Illness Claims Breaks with Past Practices,”
July 27, 2011, p. 3.
24. WWLTV (New Orleans), Oil Spill Brings Spike in Depression across Gulf Coast, Says Survey, September 28, 2010, http://www.wwltv.com/news/Oilspill-brings-spike-in-depression-across-Gulf-Coast-says-survey-103920274.html.
25. “Restoring Gulf Drilling to Pre-spill Levels Could Create 190,000 jobs,” Houston Chronicle, July 2011, http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2011/07/
study-restoring-gulf-drilling-to-pre-spill-levels-could-create-190000-jobs/.
26. Agency of Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/TF.asp?id=121&tid=25.
27. Http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/risk/guidance/pahmemo.html.
28. Http://www.epa.gov/opprd001/inerts/hexanol.pdf.
29. Julia M. Gohlke, Dzigbodi Doke, Meghan Tipre, Mark Leader, and Timothy Fitzgerald, “A Review of Seafood Safety After Deepwater Horizon,” Environmental
Health Perspectives, February 2011, http://ehp03.niehs.nih.gov/article/fetchArticle.action?articleURI=info%3Adoi%2F10.1289%2Fehp.1103507.
30. Joseph Horton, Citizen Watchdogs: Insulating Regional Citizen Advisory Councils, Boston College Law School, Land and Environmental Law Program,
November 2010.
31. John Devens, PWS-RCAC, Community Involvement versus Big Oil: A Case Study of the Policy Process, PWS-RCAC 11-15, October 26, 2000, http://
www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0027400.pdf.
32. Http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Public-DWH-PEIS-Scoping-Review-Document1.pdf.
33. Natural Resource Damage Assessment Process, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/about/nrda.html.
34. Waterkeeper Alliance Press Release, August 22, 2011, http://saveourgulf.org/updates/gulf-coast-waterkeepers-praise-noaa-decision-favor-shrimpers-t.
35. Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force Press Release, April 21, 2011, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2011/04/21/nrda-trustees-announce-1-billion-agreement-fund-early-gulf-coast-restoration-proj.
36. Gayle Killiam, “The Clean Water Act Owner’s Manual,” River Network, 2005, p. 13.
37. Next 10, Many Shades of Green: Diversity and Distribution of California’s Green Sector, http://www.next10.org/next10/publications/green_jobs/2011.
html.
38. Tracy de Morseela, “Over $1 Trillion Invested in Green Since 2007,” Green Economy Post, http://greeneconomypost.com/over-1-trillion-invested-ingreen-since-2007-6922.htm.
39. Greenpeace, Offshore Disaster: Economic Costs of the BP Deepwater Horizon (fact sheet), 2011, http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/offshore-disaster-economic-impacts-of-the-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill.
40. Environmental Protection Agency, Gulf of Mexico Program Resources, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/facts.html.

42 Waterkeeper Alliance // Save Our Gulf
State of the Gulf // September 2011 43
Save Our Gulf Waterkeepers
Save Our Gulf is a coalition of Waterkeepers brought together in the wake of the BP oil disaster to
lead the fight to restore and protect local watersheds, coastal communities and the Gulf of Mexico.
We hold polluters and decision makers accountable and promote the sustainability of our communities.
Our vision is for all communities to have waterways that are swimmable, drinkable and fishable.
Save Our Gulf is made up of the following seven Waterkeepers located on the Gulf Coast coordinated
by one Waterkeeper Alliance staff member based in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Apalachicola Riverkeeper Dan Tonsmeire is based in Apalachicola, Florida. The Apalachicola
Riverkeeper monitors the Apalachicola from the Florida/Georgia line downstream 108 miles
to the estuary and bay on the Gulf. Particular attention is paid to reductions in life-sustaining
fresh water, loss of floodplain habitat, point and non-point source pollution,
and explosive growth and development in this region.
Atchafalaya Basinkeeper Captain Dean A. Wilson is based in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The Atchafalaya Basinkeeper works to protect deep swamps, wetlands and cypress forests in
southern portions of the state.
Emerald Coastkeeper Jamie Rodgers is based in Pensacola, Florida. The Emerald
Coastkeeper serves the watershed in northwest Florida, working to respond to citizen
reports of pollution and adverse environmental impacts from the Alabama/Florida
state line to Perdido Bay and from Panama City to West Bay.
Galveston Baykeeper Charlotte Wells is based in Seabrook, Texas. The Galveston Baykeeper
keeps the bay vital and vibrant for all who enjoy it and make their livelihoods through it.
Louisiana Bayoukeeper is based in Barataria, Louisiana, where Tracy Kuhns and Mike Roberts
work closely with coastal communities in coastal Louisiana's bayou country to promote sustainable
management of its local waterways and natural resources.
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper Paul Orr is based in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper works to preserve and restore the ecological integrity
of the Mississippi River Basin and the surrounding waterways in Louisiana.
Mobile Baykeeper, Casi Callaway is based in Mobile, Alabama. Mobile Baykeeper provides
citizens a means to protect the beauty, health and heritage of the Mobile Bay watershed and
Alabama's waterways and coastal communities. Priorities of the organization are clean water,
clean air and healthy people along with responsible government and a healthy economy.
Waterkeeper Alliance is a global environmental movement uniting more
than 190 Waterkeepers around the world and focusing citizen advocacy
on the issues that affect our waterways, from pollution to climate change.
Waterkeeper Alliance is the voice for the world’s waters.

44
17 Battery Place Suite 1329
New York, NY 10004
212.747.0622
(main) www.waterkeeper.org
www.saveourgulf.org

HISTORY:
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The Macondo prospect is located on Mississippi Canyon Block 252 in the Gulf of Mexico in a water depth of
4,993 feet.
BP submitted Application for Permit to drill on February 23, 2009. MMS approved BP exploration Plan on April
16, 2009.
09/29/2009 BP contracted with Schlumberger to perform logging while drilling, measuring while
drilling, and directional drilling services on the Transocean Marianas semisub.
10/07/2009 ‐10/31/2009 Schlumberger crew performs logging, measuring, and drilling services for BP.
ENI hired the Marianas from Transocean at USD 565,000/day and rehired to BP at USD 446,000/day at a net
loss of USD 120,000/day. Did ENI know the rig was going to blow to have this crazy deal?
ENI's Mission: We are a major integrated energy company, committed to growth in the activities of finding,
producing, transporting, transforming and marketing oil and gas.
Tony Hayward sold his 220,000 BP shares on October 28, 2009. On November 27, 2009, Byron E Grote another
BP Director sold 150,000 of his BP share holding.
10/31/2009 ‐11/02/2009 Schlumberger crew departs Transocean Marianas in advance of approaching
Hurricane Ida. Several days later drilling commenced, but was halted on November 8, 2009, when the
Marianas semisub sustained damage from Hurricane Ida.
11/26/2009 Transocean tows Transocean Marianas to shipyard for repairs. Transocean Marianas does
not return to MC252.
BP leased another rig, the Deepwater Horizon semisub to complete drilling operations on the well. The
Deepwater Horizon semisub commenced operations on February 2, 2010 and then terminated drilling at a
depth of just over 18,000 feet. BP contracted with Halliburton to perform logging while drilling, measuring
while drilling, directional drilling services and cementing on the Transocean Deepwater Horizon. BP contracted
with Schlumberger to provide wireline open and cased hole services.
03/10/2010 Schlumberger crew arrives on Transocean Deepwater Horizon to perform a wire line cased
hole service for BP. Specifically, the drilling pipe in the wellbore stuck during drilling. BP requests
Schlumberger to try to determine where the drilling pipe was stuck in the well bore so the drilling pipe
above that point could be removed. And then Schlumberger crew performs wireline cased hole logging
service to identify free drilling pipe for pipe retrieval. During the performance of this service, the tool
used by Schlumberger becomes lodged and is abandoned. BP reimburses Schlumberger for the cost of
the tool.
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03/13/2010 Schlumberger crew departs Transocean Deepwater Horizon.
04/05/2010 Schlumberger crew arrives on Transocean Deepwater Horizon to perform wire line open
hole logging and testing services for BP. BP informs Schlumberger crew that drilling activities are not
yet completed and sends crew home. Schlumberger leaves the next day.
04/08/2010 Schlumberger crew returns to Transocean Deepwater Horizon to perform wire line open
hole logging and testing services for BP. Specifically, BP contracted with Schlumberger to perform an
evaluation of the formation characteristics for porosity and permeability, and to gather fluid pressures
and samples.
04/10/2010‐04/15/2010 Schlumberger crew performs wire line open hole logging and testing services
for BP. Schlumberger crew deports Transocean Deepwater Horizon.
04/18/2010‐04/19/2010 Schlumberger wire line cased hole crew arrives on Transocean Deepwater
Horizon. Specifically, BP contracted with Schlumberger to be available to perform a cement bond log
and set a bridge plug and/or cement retainer, should BP request those services. Schlumberger is an
extremely highly regarded (and incredibly expensive) service company. They place a high standard on
safety and train their workers to shut down unsafe operations.
04/20/2010 Halliburton was informed at 7:00 AM that their CBL (Cement Bond Log) was not needed
while the report said they had a meeting at 7:30 AM for discussion and only after the discussion, they
decided the CBL was not needed. At 7 AM Schlumberger gets out to the Deepwater Horizon to run the
CBL, and they find the well still kicking heavily, which it should not be that late in the operation.
Schlumberger orders the "company man" (BP's man on the scene that runs the operation) to dump kill
fluid down the well and shut‐in the well. If the CBL was run, they could not have proceeded with
replacing the heavier drilling mud with lighter seawater. The company man refuses. Schlumberger in
the very next sentence asks for a helo to take all Schlumberger personnel back to shore. The company
man says there are no more helos scheduled for the rest of the week (translation: you're here to do a
job, now do it). Schlumberger gets on the horn to shore, calls Schlumberger's corporate HQ, and gets a
helo flown out there at Schlumberger's expense and takes all Schlumberger personnel to shore at 11
AM.
TRANSOCEAN TURNOVER:
2004 version of the Floating Operations Manual, Transocean outlines specific policies for taking over drilling
operations from another rig. The manual states:
The purpose of this document is to give the Rig Manager and Offshore Personnel guidance for
information gathering and documentation needed prior to moving onto an existing wellhead. This is of
2

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particular importance when moving onto a wellhead that the rig did not set, or has been away from for
an extended period of time.
Increasingly, our rigs are being called on to perform operations on wells that were drilled by other rigs
or operators, or wells that we have not been on for some time. This experience has highlighted the
importance of evaluating what condition the wellhead and well below it are in, prior to commencing
operations.
04/21/2010 21:21 DWH reported listing. Salvage & Emergency Response Team engaged.
04/22/2010 10:22 BP reported DWH sank ‐ There is a time discrepancy when matched up with
time‐stamped photos showing DWH sinking at approximately 5:30 PM
07/09/2010 Email to Thomas Jefferson at NOAA.
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Bk Lim will be publishing his latest article soon regarding the Wells, Seafloor condition and DWH. Please go to
his website at: http://bklim.newsvine.com/
INSURANCE
BP P.L.C. can look to its captive insurer, Jupiter Insurance Ltd., for up to $700 million in coverage of losses from
the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. BP is self‐insured.
4

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUEL SPENDING, SUPPLY, ACQUISITION, AND POLICY
ANTHONY ANDREWS
Specialist in Energy and Energy Infrastructure Policy, September 22, 2009
This report summarizes DOD’s fuel purchases over the current decade (FY2000 through FY2008);
Table 5. Top U.S. Fuel Suppliers to DOD FY 2003 ‐ FY2008
Supplier $ million % Supplier $ million %
FY2003 FY2006
Exxon Mobil 729 13.6 BP 1,190 9.2
Shell 538 10.0 Exxon Mobil 1,178 9.1
BP 442 8.2 Shell 1,151 8.9
Valero 314 5.8 Valero 661 5.1
2,023 37.6 Refinery Associates 576 4.4
4,756 36.7
FY2004 FY2007
Shell 1,068 17.2 Shell 2,108 17.2
BP 602 10.0 Valero 1,027 8.4
Valero 334 5.5 Exxon Mobil 1,019 8.3
Exxon Mobil 275 4.5 BP Corp 961 7.8
2,279 37.2 5,115 41.7
FY2005 FY2008
BP 1,604 14.9 Shell 1,715 12.1
Exxon Mobil 1,024 9.5 BP 1,523 10.7
Shell 1,004 9.3 Valero 1,044 7.4
Valero 564 5.2 Exxon Mobil 836 5.9
4,196 38.9 5,118 36.1
Source: DESC Fact Book (2003 – 2008).
Exxon Mobil $ 5,061,000
Shell $ 7,584,000
BP $ 6,322,000
Valero $ 3,944,000
Refinery Associates $ 576,000
Total $23,487,000
5

NECROPSIES
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The Guardian ‐ Deepwater Horizon oil spill: turtle deaths soar amid fight to save wildlife May 3, 2010
Dr Moby Solangi, the institute's director, said necropsies would be carried out to see whether the turtles'
deaths had anything to do with the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon rig and the 220,000 gallons of oil
that are still being spewed into the Gulf each day. A team of vets would be looking to see if the animals had
respiratory problems associated with inhaling oil fumes, or had consumed fish contaminated with oil.
Solangi said that until the results of the necropsies were known it would be impossible to tell whether the
turtles had been killed by oil. He pointed out, however, that the number of deaths was much greater than
normal, even at a time of year when sea turtles tend to come in closer to shore and are sometimes found
washed up dead on the beach.
Pre‐DWH Strandings
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Why is there such a big secret to the public to know what these numbers are? Obviously the reports are available.
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8

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9

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10

NOAA DWH Turtle Data
April 26, 2010 through October 31, 2010
Louisiana = 143
Mississippi = 322
Alabama = 133
Florida = 89
Offshore = 1
688
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11

NECROPSIES ‐ FAST FORWARD
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Dead dolphin found on Deer Island
01/09/2012 8:27 AM CST By Meggan Gray
GULFPORT, MS (WLOX) ‐
Another dead dolphin has been spotted in South Mississippi. A WLOX viewer sent us pictures of the animal
Monday morning.
Jon Higginbotham said he and a friend came across the dolphin Sunday evening on Deer Island while out on
the water. Higginbotham reported it to the Institute for Marine Mammal Studies in Gulfport. Executive
Director for IMMS, Dr. Moby Solangi tells WLOX News they did receive that report. He said IMMS plans to
send a crew out Monday afternoon to collect samples from the dolphin.
01/11/2012 Dead Dolphin Panama City, Florida
01/11/2012 Dauphin Island fish show up with lesions, BP spill link questioned
More than half the fish caught Monday by Press‐Register reporters in the surf off Dauphin Island had bloody
red lesions on their bodies. Fishing along an uninhabited portion of the barrier island during a trip to survey
beaches for tarballs, the newspaper caught 21 fish, 14 of them with lesions. Of those fish, eight had lesions a
quarter of an inch across or smaller, while 6 had much larger blemishes. Most of the fish were whiting, a small
species common to the surf zone throughout the Gulf of Mexico. Whiting grow to about 2 pounds and are
ubiquitous in the surf year round, commonly found inside the first sand bar near breaking waves.
A 12‐pound black drum also exhibited lesions. Scientists contacted by the newspaper noted that whiting
spend their lives close to shore in the area most affected by the Gulf oil spill. Buried mats of oil persist in the
surf zone along the Mississippi and Alabama coasts and tarballs remain common on the beach. BP crews
working at the water’s edge on Mississippi’s Petit Bois Island — adjacent to Dauphin Island — collect about
250 pounds of tarballs per day, company officials said Tuesday.
01/12/2012 Charles Taylor from Bay St Louis, MS. Another dead dolphin surrounded by IMMS checking it out.
Loggerheads and Kemp Ridleys are washing up in South Wales; these are warm water turtles. This started right
after Christmas 2011 and the second one was found on January 3, 2012. People don't know what to do with
them. They are either dead or suffering from the cold water.
USF study finds more sick fish in oil spill area than rest of Gulf of Mexico
01/14/2012 Craig Pittman
A government‐funded survey of the entire Gulf of Mexico last summer found more sick fish in the area of the
2010 oil spill than anywhere else, according to the top University of South Florida scientist in charge of the
project.
12

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"The area that has the highest frequency of fish diseases is the area where the oil spill was," said Steve
Murawski, an oceanographer who previously served as the chief fisheries scientist of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.
That doesn't necessarily mean the red snapper and other fish with nasty skin lesions were victims of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster, he said. That same area has lots of oil rigs, leaky pipelines and even natural oil
vents in the sea floor that could be the source of any contamination that has affected the fish.
"Even if the disease is from oil," he said, "it's another step to show it's from the oil spill."
But the USF findings, announced at a scientific conference this month, have been hailed as a big step forward
by researchers from other institutions pursuing similar studies.
"We still are seeing sick fish offshore and the USF survey confirmed our findings of 2 to 5 percent of red
snapper being affected," James Cowan, an oceanography professor at Louisiana State University, said in an
email to the Tampa Bay Times.
In addition, Cowan said, laboratory studies of those sick fish "are beginning to trickle out that show that
chronic exposure to oil and dispersant causes everything from impacts to the genome to compromised
immune systems. Similar findings … are being found in shrimps and crabs in the same locations."
While Murawski is cautious about saying there's a connection, Cowan, who has been studying fish in the gulf
for 25 years, said, "I absolutely believe these things are connected to the spill."
There are signs the lesions may be spreading. According to Will Patterson of the University of South Alabama,
"they're now showing up in fish being caught in the surf here in Alabama." Patterson said he plans to do some
scientific sampling of the surf fish this coming week.
The USF scientists plan a second survey of the gulf next month, and also plan to check whether the sick fish
they have caught suffer from immune system and fertility problems. Their goal, according to Ernst Peebles,
another USF scientist working on the study, is to be able to report something definite by April 20, the second
anniversary of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion.
One problem with the USF study, though, is that nobody made a similar gulf‐wide survey of fish health prior to
the disaster, Peebles and Murawski said. Without a baseline study, it's hard to say what's normal.
They have found more sick fish than what they would expect based on previous studies, Peebles said, but the
earlier studies took place in colder waters.
However, what started the investigation were reports from longtime commercial fishermen that they were
pulling in fish with skin problems like they'd never seen before.
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The Deepwater Horizon rig explosion killed 11 workers. Two days later oil began spewing from a pipe a mile
beneath the surface, and BP and its partners were not able to stop it until July.
Before BP could cap the well, 5 million barrels of oil gushed into the gulf. The company sprayed 1.8 million
gallons of chemical dispersant to prevent it from reaching shore, but 2.5 million pounds of it washed up on
Florida's beaches and in its marshes. Cleanup crews are still picking up tar balls from the beaches of Alabama
and Mississippi.
In late 2010 and early 2011, fishermen working the area the spill had reported finding red snapper and
sheepshead with lesions, fin rot and parasite infections. On some of them, the lesions had eaten a hole
straight through to the muscle tissue.
A few fishermen brought their suspect catch to scientists. When the scientists cut them open, they found the
fish also had enlarged livers, gallbladders, and bile ducts — indications their immune systems may have been
compromised by oil.
So last summer, with funding from NOAA and cooperation from the state's marine science laboratory in St.
Petersburg, the USF scientists chartered fishing boats from Madeira Beach and Panama City and set out to
cover the entire gulf. They dropped their lines about 600 feet deep — the spill began at 5,400 feet — and
caught about 4,000 fish.
Southern Offshore Fisheries Association president Bob Spaeth helped set up the voyage, and wasn't surprised
by its results.
His big worry is not that a percentage of the fish got sick, he said, but that the size of the fish population may
have been reduced. That could lead federal regulators to reduce how many fish they're allowed to catch. "If
you reduce our quota," he said, "we'll be out of business."
In the meantime, there have been other signs something unusual might be going on in the northern part of
the gulf. More than 600 dolphins have stranded along the gulf beaches over the past two years, which in some
areas is 10 times more than normal, according to NOAA scientist Erin Fougeres. So far 10 have tested positive
for a bacterial infection called Brucella, which the scientists believe may be a sign that the oil spill harmed the
dolphins' immune system.
The USF survey included some disquieting results for Florida anglers who think they don't have to worry about
the northern gulf where the spill occurred. Peebles' lab examined the ear bones of the fish caught in the gulf,
because those bones contain clues to the fish's life.
"I see fish caught off this coast," Peebles said, "who spent the early part of their lives up there."
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Stranded dolphin found dead days after rejoining pod
01/16/2012 Wendy Victora / Daily News
A spotted dolphin that beached itself at Grayton Beach on January 7 washed up dead less than a week after
being released by bystanders who tried to care for it.
Two local men spotted the dolphin, which makes it home in offshore waters, floating upside down in shallow
waters. They righted it, called for help and tried to keep it calm until a marine mammal stranding team could
arrive.
But when the dolphin seemed to recover and began struggling with the men, they guided it back out into the
Gulf of Mexico and watched it rejoin its pod and swim away.
On Friday, it washed up in a state of advanced decomposition, according to a press release from Steve
Shippee, Marine Mammal Stranding Team Coordinator for the Emerald Coast Wildlife Refuge.
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Where is the dolphin on FL FWC?
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NOAA WEBSITE
Total in 2010 = 260
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Total strandings for 2011 = 490
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12/09/2011 BAY ST. LOUIS — MS Business Journal
The Hancock County Port and Harbor Commission has received a $509,000 settlement with BP. Port and
harbor director Jack Zink says the commission has agreed not to sue BP over the 2010 oil spill. Zink tells the
Sea Coast Echo the damage did not come from the oil, but rather from activity at the Stennis Airport. The
commission runs the airport. In the weeks and months following the oil spill, Zink says planes carrying disperse
materials to the site flew in and out of the airport.
He says the planes caused damage to the runway and taxi areas of the airport. Zink says the money will be
used to repair the damage at the airport.
DISPERSANT PROGRAM
Sept 01, 2011 Second Amended Cross‐Claims of Defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
Item 19 Cross Defendant Marine Spill Response Corporation ‐ MSRC
Item 22 Cross Defendant Lynden, Inc. ‐ Lynden Air Cargo, Inc. (leased aircraft to Clean Caribbean Americas)
Item 23 Cross Defendant Dynamic Aviation Group
Item 24 Cross Defendant International Air Response, Inc.
CCA ‐ Clean Caribbean Americas (Ft. Lauderdale, FL)
Sprayed 360,000 gallons of Corexit EC9500A dispersant at a calibrated dosage. This accounted for more than
one third of the total dispersant sprayed by all aircraft during the entire incident.
The Spanish oil company Repsol plans to drill an exploratory well in 5,600 feet of water about 22 miles
north of Havana.
http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/water/coast-guard-plans-to-use-dispersants-if-cuban-drilling-producesoil-spill/1207054
Coast Guard plans to use dispersants if Cuban drilling produces oil spill
Craig Pittman, Tampa Bay Times
December 21, 2011
As Cuba prepares to begin allowing a Spanish company to drill for oil less than 100 miles from the Florida Keys
next year, U.S. Coast Guard officials say they have learned from the Deepwater Horizon disaster and will be
prepared should a spill occur.
"We will attack it quickly, aggressively and as far from our shores as we can," Rear Adm. William Baumgartner
told reporters during a news conference Tuesday.
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Attacking an offshore spill from Cuba would include flying out to the scene and spraying dispersants such as
Corexit on any oil slick, to break it up and make it degrade more quickly, Baumgartner said.
"We will use every tool at our disposal," said the admiral who commands the 7th Coast Guard District,
headquartered in Miami. "Aerial dispersants are going to be an effective tool. Undispersed oil is more
damaging to natural resources than dispersed oil."
The use of Corexit during last year's Deepwater Horizon cleanup — sprayed from above as well as underwater
— proved to be controversial, especially after scientists from the University of South Florida and other
institutions reported finding underwater plumes of dissolved oil droplets they feared would affect marine life.
Environmental activists are already questioning whether using such dispersants would be a good idea. They
noted the proximity of sensitive areas such as the Dry Tortugas National Park, the Florida Keys National
Marine Sanctuary, the National Key Deer Refuge and John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park.
"Just because it disappears doesn't mean it's not there," said Jonathan Ullman of the Sierra Club's South
Florida office.
David Guggenheim of the Ocean Foundation, a marine scientist who has explored Cuba's undersea world,
warned that dispersants should not be used lightly because there are still questions about the health effects
from spraying Corexit during Deepwater Horizon.
Baumgartner said his goal in blocking the spread of a spill is not to protect Florida tourist‐attracting beaches so
much as it is to protect natural areas that are important to marine life, particularly coral reefs, mangroves and
sea grass beds.
He said he expects the currents that flow through and near the Keys — the gulf's Loop Current, the Florida
Current and the Gulfstream — will help buffer Florida from contact with most of any oil that might be spilled
in Cuban waters.
But he conceded eddies are likely to break off and carry some of the oil close enough to taint the shore. That's
why he wants to attack it before it ever arrives.
In addition to dispersants, Baumgartner said he would use skimmer boats, booms and controlled burns to stop
the spill. However, a report on the Deepwater Horizon cleanup found that those tools did little to stop BP's
spill, with only five percent of the oil burned and three percent skimmed off the surface.
Cuban officials are just as concerned over a potential spill, the admiral said. Two weeks ago, he sat down with
officials from Cuba, Jamaica, the Bahamas and Mexico to run an exercise in what to do should there be a spill.
Jamaica and the Bahamas are also looking into allowing exploratory drilling.
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"Everyone is planning for the worst case, but hoping for the best," said Henry "Skip" Przelomski, vice president
of Clean Caribbean & Americas, a Fort Lauderdale‐based cooperative run by nine oil companies that is licensed
to help clean up any spill in Cuban waters.
Przelomski said one option being considered is to spray dispersant underwater, just as in Deepwater Horizon.
But at this point no company is licensed to take that action in Cuba, he said.
Cuba has agreed to let a Spanish company, Repsol, drill exploratory wells about 22 miles north of Havana,
which means they will be 70 miles south of the Keys. Repsol's safety record is spotty. In 2008, its operation in
Ecuador experienced a crude oil spill near the Yasuni National Park in a rainforest area. In 2009, another spill
occurred in Ecuador's Amazon region after a rupture in a pipeline.
Repsol is bringing in an Italian‐owned, Chinese‐made drilling rig, the Scarabeo‐9, which U.S. officials are
scheduled to inspect next week. It is expected to start drilling in January.
Currently, Cuba gets its oil from Venezuela and relies on sugar, nickel mining and tourism for its economic
wellbeing. But sugar production and the price of nickel have fallen. Meanwhile, its tourism industry has been
sputtering — so now the Cubans are ready to consider drilling.
The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated Cuba's offshore fields hold 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas and said the area has "significant potential.'' The first block Repsol is expected to
explore lies under 5,600 feet of water — 600 feet deeper than where BP's Deepwater Horizon well exploded in
April 2010.
Baumgartner and Capt. John Slaughter, his head of planning, said the main lesson they learned from
Deepwater Horizon was to do a better job of coordinating with state and county emergency officials, who
complained repeatedly about being ignored during last year's cleanup.
The admiral said he has personally briefed Gov. Rick Scott and talked with state and county officials about his
contingency plans for any Cuban incident.
MSRC ‐ N117TG (International Air Response owner) Foreign Non‐Profit established in MS in 1993 with
headquarters in Washington, DC
801,575 gallons of dispersant applied
Reconfigured Aircraft in Coolidge, AZ with STC SA5088NM and STC SA4850NM (Supplemental Type Certificate)
N7199S ‐ Beechcraft King Air 90 (twin turbo‐prop)
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US Pollution: MSRC – Agreement Concerning Use of Dispersants
August 2011
Dear Sirs,
Members will be aware that United States Coast Guard regulations now require vessel response plans for tank
vessels to include an oil spill response organization (“OSRO”) capable of applying dispersants by air as part of a
clean up operation. Pending finalization of the fine detail of the regulations and their implementation however
both main OSRO’s – NRC and MSRC – received permission to have their customers’ plans continue without a
dispersant capability for a period of six months. That period expires on 22 August 2011 and from which date
operators of tank vessels must include a dispersant capability in their plans.
On 10 August 2011 and unfortunately without prior notice to the International Group, MSRC issued notice to
its customers that they are amending their service agreement to include a “dispersant addendum”. They have
requested that the addendum be signed forthwith by all tank vessel operators who cite MSRC as OSRO in their
plans and also cautioned that the addendum would need to be signed by operators of other vessel types on an
ad hoc basis if and when the Federal authorities require the application of dispersants in a spill from a non‐
tank vessel. This action is said to have been taken in reaction to law suits issued against MSRC and others in
the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon event, where claimants are alleging adverse health effects of
exposure to dispersant chemicals. The defendants are seeking shelter under the “responder immunity”
principles of OPA ‘90 but have yet to perfect such defenses and hence the new addendum.
The Managers are concerned however that the terms of the Addendum are widely drafted and include a full
indemnity in favor of MSRC for injury and illness claims arising out of an oil spill event after a dispersant has
been used. These terms would fall outside of Club cover.
The International Group is in urgent discussion with MSRC in an effort to have the addendum changed. A
further Notice will be issued as soon as possible to update Members on the outcome of those discussions and
the position on Club cover. In the interim, and as recently confirmed by MSRC in their message of 15 August
2011, Members are strongly advised not to sign the addendum – it is reiterated that doing so may give rise to
liabilities that fall outside of Club cover. The Managers are not presently aware of any such issues with NRC.
Yours faithfully
For: West of England Insurance Services (Luxembourg) S.A.
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PRESENTATION: Sept 14, 2011, MSRC Aerial Dispersant Program Update – Tim Spoerl, MSRC
Mr. Spoerl provided the membership with an overview of the MSRC dispersant program as it was applied
during the Deepwater Horizon response from April 22, 2010 to September 9, 2010. (And we were told they
quit spraying in July 2010!)
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&sqi=2&ved=0CCkQFjAB&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.nrt.org%2Fproduction%2FNRT%2FRRT3.nsf%2FResources%2FSep2011ppt%2F%24File%2F2011
‐09‐
14_TS_Presentation.ppt&ei=BE0nT4zhG5G4twfE1pmFAg&usg=AFQjCNHytbXC8zGE7pd8_LHvnzHPPb9LLw&sig
2=CxSB4l30MFv7AiHPgwh1fw
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Why would the MSRC aircraft have spray wands? Certainly not to put out fires. They have been stock piling the
corexit at Stennis in one month from 11,000 gallons to 16,009 gallons. Their total (MSRC) is now 104,659.
These hangars are leased at Stennis and these companies pay for each cycle (touch and go). It is their private
property. The hangar is their private property. The runways are used and paid by them for each takeoff and
landing.
MSRC paid a hefty dollar to be on that block list, even though the FAA dismantled the program in November.
The FAA has Aircraft N117TG on their block list and flights cannot be followed on Flightaware.
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December 5, 2011 ‐ Aviation Week FAA Reverses Course On BARR Program
FAA has rescinded its controversial policy that essentially dismantled the Block Aircraft Registration Request
(BARR) program. In a statement released Dec. 2, FAA says that, effective immediately, general aviation and
charter operators will be able to request that their aircraft registration numbers be withheld from near real‐
time flight tracking programs without submitting a certified security concern.
“Owners and operators seeking to have their aircraft tail number blocked from these data feeds can now
submit a blocking request directly to the FAA without stating a reason for the request,” the agency says. “The
FAA has already begun receiving requests under the new appropriations language and is processing them.”
FAA had restricted use of BARR at the behest of the Department of Transportation, saying the move was part
of a government transparency effort. AOPA and NBAA, which had administered the program on behalf of FAA
for about 3,000 operators, had argued that the restrictions jeopardized the security and privacy of general
aviation operations.
WATER SAMPLES
An analyte is a chemical substance that is the subject of chemical analysis. MDL is Method Detection Limit.
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Offshore ‐ Deepwater Sediment Sampling 10‐9‐2010 through 10‐23‐2010 ‐ Examples
PCBs ‐ 65 detections which are above ug/kg limits on 4 different vessels, all at different coordinates of
longitude/latitude.
Arsenic ‐ 133 detections which are above ug/kg limits on 4 different vessels, all at different coordinates of
longitude/latitude.
Barium ‐ 286 detections which are above ug/kg limits on 4 different vessels, all at different coordinates of
longitude/latitude.
Total PAH ‐ 116 detections which are above ug/kg limits on 4 different vessels, all at different coordinates of
longitude/latitude.
The highest detection was the vessel Gyre at lat 28.7423, long ‐88.36221 on October 17, 2010. The MDL is
0.080 and the result was 47,558.760.
40,825 Analytes were shown as detected and above the MDL limit.
Thank you to Emerald Coast Surfrider for their continued monitoring and testing of our beaches !
Oil is still being seen.
Tar balls are still washing up on our beaches, tar mats are along the shorelines.
Susan B. Forsyth ‐ Real problem is, how can we be assessing for damages when there is still oil washing ashore,
and like here in Walton County, we have buried oil along the beach and new tar balls hitting the beaches too.
No one is studying the long‐term, chronic effects this is having day after day, week after week, month after
month.
RADIOACTIVITY
New Orleans attorney Stuart Smith has practiced law for nearly 25 years, litigating against oil companies and
other energy‐related corporations for damages associated with radioactive oilfield waste, referred to within
the oil and gas industry as technologically enhanced radioactive material (TERM). The waste product is also
known as naturally occurring radioactive material, or NORM. The two acronyms TERM and NORM describe a
substance that exists naturally in trace amounts – in soil and rocks, for example – and as such poses little
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health risk to humans. However, when the substance – primarily made up of radium‐226 and radium‐228 –
becomes concentrated through industrial processes, like oil production, it takes on toxic qualities. Exposure to
radium is known to cause a variety of illnesses, including cancer. Radium exposure can have significant impact
on the human body, and the damage can be particularly acute because radium is chemically similar to calcium
‐ and as such is frequently absorbed by bones after entering the body.
Smith has had many cases for damages tied to NORM contamination, some of which include Chevron, Ashland
Oil, ExxonMobile (which resulted in a verdict of $1.056 Billion. Smith is currently representing the Louisiana
Environmental Action Network (LEAN) as well as commercial fisherman and charter boat captains, whose
livelihoods have been damaged by the DWH oil spill.
I highly recommend our listeners to visit LEAN's website at LEANWEB.ORG. Marylee Orr is the executive
director.
HEALTH OF THE GULF COAST
Science of the Spill: Presentations on Emerging Impacts of the BP Oil Disaster
On December 5th, 2011, The Sierra Club, Louisiana Environmental Action Network, the Steps Coalition and
Mississippi Coalition for Vietnamese‐American Fisher Folk and Families sponsored an educational forum to
discuss the BP Oil Disaster and its impacts to our environment and communities, and how Gulf Coast
researchers are addressing these concerns.
Science of the Spill highlighted three Gulf Coast‐based researchers, Dr. Scott Milroy, Wilma Subra and Dr. Ed
Cake, who are tracking impacts of the BP oil disaster on blue water, fisheries, coastal wetlands and public
health. The forum provided citizens the opportunity to ask the scientists questions related to their research
and the ongoing impacts related to the oil disaster.
Held at the Biloxi Civic Center, 580 Howard Ave (Bellman and Howard) Biloxi, Mississippi
http://leanweb.org/our‐work/water/bp‐oil‐spill/science‐of‐the‐spill‐presentations‐on‐emerging‐impacts‐of‐
the‐bp‐oil‐disaster
SEAFOOD SAFETY
Heather Reed of Ecological Consulting Services is testing for 60 chemical compounds, the state only asks for 13. This is
the crux of this entire disaster. The state of FL is not testing to standards which you would need for finding Crude Oil
Compounds. This has been our dilemma‐and why we finally are using forensics testing models.
Florida Dept of Agriculture and Consumer Services Bureau ‐ Summary of FL PAH Analyses ‐ If the level of concern is
below the ppm, the spreadsheet shows

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31

BIOREMEDIATION
OSE II (Oil Spill Eater II) http://osei.us/
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This product has not been preapproved by the EPA; they made their first request in February 1990 and their
latest request in July 2011. Because of this no contractor would buy or stage the product. So if no one stages
OSE II then it is not readily available for spills. Consequently, when an emergency spill occurred there was
never enough OSE II on hand to address the spill, until recently. OSE II is now stocked in their Dallas
warehouse to address approximately 1 million gallons of spilled oil.
BIOREMEDIATION, INC. http://www.bioremediationinc.com/store/cleaning/maintenance/cat_33.html
An Environmental Solution to Pollution!
Bioremediation products have been successfully used in Plants, Refineries, Decontamination and Cleaning,
Line Cleaning, Emergency Spill Response, Wastewater Treatment, Marine Barges, Water and Soil Remediation,
Machine Shop Parts Washers, and in Fuel Service Areas and Equipment Wash Areas.
Bioremediation Products have been successfully used to clean Gasoline, Diesel, Crude Oils, Creosote, PCP,
Chlorinated Hydrocarbons, Fats, Grease, Glycols, PNA, Phenols, Benzene and Benzene Compounds (BTEX),
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Sulphur Containing Compounds, Solvents, Amines, MTBE, Acetone and Paint Sludge, Pipeline Condensation,
DMF (dimethylformanide), Polyurethane Resin Wastes, AN (acrylonitrile), and many other complex organic
compounds.
OPFLEX ‐ Scott Smith http://opflex.com/site
Opflex booms, mops, sweeps, pads, mitts and environmental indicators were tested in the real world, not in a
lab, on the oil sheen subsurface plumes and affected wildlife on the gulf coast POST BP oil spill. Opflex proved
so effective that BP purchased 2 million square feet of Opflex material for use in the clean up. Opflex also
cleans up PCBs.
Recently I had a gentlemen personally contact me regarding his product. It contains 11 essential oils and the
cost is $20 a gallon. The key to this product is the benzene test. There are 7 rings that bind everything
together. Once an incorrect product is used, the bind is broken and sets the PCBs free.
Explanation of PCB "Descriptors"
Congener descriptors give a shorthand notation for geometry and substituent positions. The twelve congeners
that display all four of the descriptors are referred to as being "dioxin‐like", referring both to their toxicity and
structural features which make them similar to 2,3,7,8‐tetrachlorodibenzo‐p‐dioxin (2378‐TCDD)[1]. Individual
congeners are identified by the number and position of the chlorine atoms around the biphenyl rings.[2]
CP0 / CP1
These 68 coplanar congeners fall into one of two groups. The first group of 20 congeners consists of those
with chlorine substitution at none of the ortho positions on the biphenyl backbone and are referred to as CP0
or non‐ortho congeners. The second group of 48 congeners includes those with chlorine substitution at only
one of the ortho positions and are referred to as CP1 or mono‐ortho congeners.
4CL
These 169 congeners have a total of four or more chlorine substituents, regardless of position.
PP
These 54 congeners have both para positions chlorinated.
2M
These 140 congeners have two or more of the meta positions chlorinated.
SUMMARY ON BIOREMEDIATION
Testing needs to include the PCB bind so that the rings are not broken and released via aerosol or in the water.
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http://osei.us/tech‐library‐pdfs/2011/OSEI%20Manual_FINAL‐2011.pdf Page 96
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NASA Data Strengthens Reports of Toxic Rain on the Gulf Coast From BP Spill
March 7, 2011
The Chief Mission Coordinating Scientist on the NASA remote sensing mission to the BP oil spill in the Gulf Of
Mexico was Ira Leifer, Ph.D from University of California Santa Barbara. Dr. Leifer has been working with
natural oil spills and natural methane bubble flows for the last decade. He is in the process of publishing
analysis of some of the government data collected during the spill. The analysis is based on openly‐available
airborne and satellite NASA data, recently published NOAA airborne data, and airborne and boat‐based data
collected over the Gulf and analyzed by Dr. Leifer's team. Other official air quality data, has been unavailable
to scientists, the media, or the general public until recently.
The data being released, which was collected by the NASA missions to the Gulf, shows that the toxic
compounds released from the BP spill became airborne, and significant quantities were brought onshore by
precipitation, thereby exposing coastal populations to chemical poisoning. This represents something new and
unique not observed in previous oil spills. It helps explain why there were numerous reports by people living
along the Gulf Coast that it was raining oil and dispersant during the summer months.
I think it is important to establish for the record that the unique aspect of this [BP blowout] is that the volatiles
were continuous, it was not a one‐day exposure. The chronic nature of the spill and the therefore chronic
nature of its health impact is a pretty unique aspect of this event. The reason I think it's important to call it
unique is that it gives a way to explain why various government agencies using protocols developed for a
single coast spill didn't get it right because it's not the same. I think it's important to give the people we really
want to take responsibility a way of saying ah, yes, you're right and jump on the bandwagon with us. We need
NIH to fund a 50 to 60 million dollar study because this is something that had never happened before.
The data we collected in the atmosphere shows a very high hydrocarbon load and we were able to identify
more than 100 compounds in it. Many of them have health implications. There were large amounts of them
and they have similarities to gasoline. In that regard the modeling I did seems to suggest that there are
reasons for concern. There are reasons to do additional research.
Considering toxic compounds ‐ realistically they are probably all toxic to some extent. But for so many
compounds I do not think the studies have been done to say what precisely the threats are ‐ it's a mixture. The
way we did the measurements we had evacuated stainless steel 1 liter cylinders opened up to very gradually
and gently allow air to enter into the container and then sealed. These were collected on a boat and also in
NOAA airplanes and then analyze by a scientist Don Blake at his laboratory at UC Irvine. The concentrations of
any one compound were very low in the parts per billion (PPB) or even less. But many of these concentrations
were at sea and this is a good comparison, higher.
This is what is being experienced or observed and breathed by people on site. The response workers were not
wearing a mask [respirator].
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People in the Gulf of Mexico were not warned that the air was going to be bad and they had clean air in much
of the area right before the spill. It is a very different kind of situation than people who chose to go and try to
make money in Mexico City. A lot of people in the Gulf live there because they enjoy the Gulf and they didn't
want to move Los Angeles or New York City or the big American polluted environments ‐‐ they chose to stay
where the environment is pretty clean.
In terms of the health implications for coastal communities I think there are two things. I have classified there
being three different approaches by which atmospheric phenomenon related to the oil spill can cause health
effects. One is the volatiles just breathing the stuff a long way from the incident site. A second one is aerosol,
so when oil comes up on the beaches as the wave breaks there is aerosol generated in the air, and that can be
breathed by people. The last one which we discovered is the rain. I will add a fourth one which is dispersants.
Clearly, spraying dispersants near populated areas is a bad idea. If dispersants are aerosolized that is a bad
thing as well. With regards to the volatiles there are two things the main thing is that volatiles can go a long
way on the wind. I did some simple calculations of quantities and exposures in coastal communities. What I
saw according to OSHA rules absolutely no problem. If one assumes the volatiles can be health effect modeled
as gasoline exposure there is a potential ‐ the dosage rates were high enough for there to be problems. When
I did it for healthy adults it seemed worth looking at, but who knows. The big worry is pregnant women and
the elderly ‐‐ at risk populations. In that regard, at‐risk populations, the levels seem to suggest there could be
really severe concern for the health‐related impacts. What that implies is that it really needs to be studied and
looked at. The [published] literature is for people exposed long term to gasoline.
The other way is the aerosols. The aerosolization are really tiny droplets smaller than a hair but still pretty
large, and they cannot stay airborne for very long before they will fall back down to the ground. Maybe a
couple of miles inshore. So you would expect people right near the beach would be at risk from aerosol
related problems. But once you got 5 to 10 miles onshore it would go back to people just breathing and
smelling fumes rather than the aerosol component. Aerosols and their effects are a little uncertain, exactly
what it is going to do. We know that aerosolization in past spills always cause a lot of people to get sick. In this
spill, probably the same. They are droplets that are large enough that if they get into your lungs your body can
potentially remove them, or maybe not because they are tar so it may get stuck in there. I do not know of
literature in detail on this in the U.S., there may be overseas. If you breathe in aerosols of oil do you cough
them out and get rid of them within a month or do they stay in your body for years? That is a very important
distinction.
What you would expect to see is that people within close proximity to the beach ‐‐ with a mile or two ‐‐ would
have symptoms different from people ten miles from the beach. And when I say beach it is also shoreline.
The last one is the rain. That is a completely new phenomenon that has not been reported. People at
California Oil Spill who have done testing on burning have never seen anything like that. But you don't have
102% humidity in California. There is no precedent in past oil spills to consider to know that this is a problem
and what its effects are.
I know there were clouds filled with hydrocarbons. This is from the remote sensing data showing that a cloud ‐
‐ maybe it is 1/2 mile thick ‐‐ had about .1 or .2mm of oil equivalent in it spread out through the whole thing.
36

RADIO SHOW TRANSCRIPT
TRISHA JAMES AND PROOF NEGATIVE ON FREEDOMIZER RADIO
JANUARY 18, 2012
When it rains, whatever is in it is going to come down, that is just how clouds work. I don't have
documentation on the rain. On the other hand there are quite a few anecdotal reports of people saying it's
raining oil. What was missing was any explanation of how that could be happening, a scientific mechanism.
What my data does is that it elucidates the mechanism scientifically so we can explain exactly how this could
happen. It goes from speculation that just have been a water spout and it pushed the oil up into the
atmosphere and then somehow it came down in Alabama to actually a very clear connection that can both be
studied from the remote sensing data we have and also from people's observations. This would be a cause for
concern in the future and burning oil from spills as to whether or not it's a good idea.
For myself there are two. To improve the atmospheric model. But more to the point the most important link
that needs to be made at this point is that chronic gasoline exposure is a good health model of exposure to the
BP oil spill fumes. Secondly to try and get a better understanding ‐‐ which seems to be impossible ‐‐ what is
known about the airborne impacts of the oil spills in the last 10 years around the world. We live in a global
world and society, it is silly for us not to learn from the experiences of our friends in Europe who have also
experienced oil spills in recent years and documented widespread health impacts. As Americans, if we can
learn from them we can avoid the mysterious Gulf Coast Health Syndrome appearing five years from now that
nobody figures out what it is until 10 years from now with a lot of people getting sick and very ill in the
interim.
CURRENT HEALTH ISSUES ON THE GULF COAST
Women are unable to conceive, women are having miscarriages
People are sick with numerous symptoms associated with a toxic environment
People are dying from cancer
Doctors are not able to help; they can only treat the symptoms
Detox clinics are not readily available
VOC Testing is expensive and many cannot afford it
CDC ‐ No current database
Florida Dept. of Health ‐ No current database
37

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Feature:
FISHERIES RESEARCH
Potential Impact of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Commercial
Fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico
A. McCrea-Strub
Postdoctoral Fellow, Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
E-mail: a.strub@fisheries.ubc.ca
K. Kleisner
Postdoctoral Fellow, Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
U. R. Sumaila
Associate Professor, Director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit,
Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, BC, Canada
W. Swartz
Ph.D. Student, Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre, University of
British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
R. Watson
Senior Research Fellow, Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
D. Zeller
Senior Research Fellow, Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
D. Pauly
Professor, Principal Investigator, Sea Around Us Project, Fisheries Centre,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
ABSTRACT: Given the economic and social importance of fisheries
in the Gulf of Mexico large marine ecosystem (LME), it is imperative
to quantify the potential impacts of the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill. To provide a preliminary perspective of the consequences of
this disaster, spatial databases of annual reported commercial catch
and landed value prior to the spill were investigated relative to the
location of the fisheries closures during July 2010. Recent trends
illustrated by this study suggest that more than 20% of the average
annual U.S. commercial catch in the Gulf has been affected by
postspill fisheries closures, indicating a potential minimum loss in annual
landed value of US$247 million. Lucrative shrimp, blue crab,
menhaden, and oyster fisheries may be at greatest risk of economic
losses. Overall, it is evident that the oil spill has impacted a highly
productive area of crucial economic significance within the Gulf of
Mexico LME. This study draws attention to the need for ongoing
and thorough investigations into the economic impacts of the oil spill
on Gulf fisheries.
Introduction
The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling
rig on April 20, 2010, initiated the world’s largest known
332
Fisheries • vol 36 no 7 • july 2011 • www.fisheries.org
Impacto potencial del derrame
petrolero Deepwater Horizon en las
pesquerías comerciales del Golfo de
México
RESUMEN: En virtud de la gran importancia económica
y social que tiene la actividad pesquera en el gran
ecosistema marino (GEM) del Golfo de México, es indispensable
cuantificar los potenciales impactos del derrame
petrolero Deepwater Horizon. Con la finalidad de
tener una perspectiva preliminar de las consecuencias de
este siniestro, se investigaron datos espaciales anualizados
de la captura comercial y valor desembarcado antes
del derrame en relación a la localización de las vedas
espaciales durante julio de 2010. Las tendencias actuales
que se ilustran en este trabajo sugieren que más del
20% de la captura comercial anual promedio en la parte
del golfo correspondiente a los EEUU, ha sido afectada
por vedas establecidas después del derrame, lo que indica
una pérdida mínima en valor de desembarque de
$247 millones de dólares. Las pesquerías más rentables
como el camarón, cangrejo, sábalo y ostión pueden estar
en riesgo de sufrir pérdidas económicas. En general, se
vuelve evidente que el derrame ha impactado un área altamente
productiva de primera importancia económica
dentro del GEM del Golfo de México. La presente contribución
llama la atención en la necesidad de desarrollar
investigaciones vigentes y profundas sobre los impactos
económicos del derrame petrolero en las pesquerías
del golfo.
accidental oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico Large Marine Ecosystem
(LME), a region valued for its high productivity and
lucrative fisheries (Adams et al. 2004; Sherman and Hempel
2008). Estimates of the quantity of oil, natural gas and associated
methane, and chemical dispersants released as a result of
this calamity have been plagued by uncertainty. The U.S. Government–appointed
team of scientists—the Flow Rate Technical
Group—estimated that a total of 4.9 million barrels of oil
was released from the Macondo well, 1 though an independent
study suggested that the amount was between 4.16 and 6.24
million barrels (Crone and Tolstoy 2010). According to British
Petroleum’s (BP) records, approximately 1.8 million gallons 2
1 “U.S. Scientific Teams Refine Estimates of Oil Flow from BPs Well Prior to
Capping”, August 2, 2010, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/02/
us-scientific-teamsrefine-estimates-oil-flow-bps-well-prior-capping
2 “One Year Later Press Pack”, April 4, 2011,
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2011/04/10/one-year-later-press-pack

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of dispersant was applied at the site of the leak, as well as the
sea surface, though the validity of this amount has been questioned.
Complex oceanographic processes have made it difficult
to determine the current and future distribution of these
substances from the surface to the sea floor and the duration
of their persistence in the marine environment. With no clear
picture yet, there is no immediate answer to questions concerning
short- and long-term impacts on habitats and marine organisms
in the path of this disaster.
Uncertainty regarding the extent of damage to the Gulf
of Mexico and the capacity for species and associated markets
to recover is particularly troubling for commercial fisheries.
Though it is difficult to predict the impacts of an oil spill of this
magnitude on the future of fisheries in the region, we can infer
possible effects by investigating broader patterns. This study
presents an analysis of the prespill spatial distribution of commercial
fisheries catch and landed value in the Gulf of Mexico
LME relative to the postspill fisheries closure in an effort to
evaluate potential economic losses.
Methods
To understand the ecological and economic implications
of fisheries on a global scale, the Sea Around Us Project in
the Fisheries Centre at the University of British Columbia has
developed and maintains databases of spatially allocated fisheries
data (Watson et al. 2004; Pauly 2007; Sumaila et al. 2007).
These global databases of catch and corresponding landed value
were utilized in this study. Commercial landings statistics,
reported to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) by national (e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration [NOAA]) fisheries management entities,
include the taxonomic identity of the catch, the reporting
year, the country reporting the catch, as well as the FAO statistical
area from which the catch was taken. Compiled catch
data extending from 1950 to 2005 have been allocated by the
Sea Around Us Project to a system of rectangular spatial cells
measuring 0.5° latitude by 0.5° longitude according to a rulebased
procedure. Information regarding the biological distribution
of the reported taxa (including depth and latitudinal
limits, proximity to critical habitat, and primary productivity),
as well as fishing patterns and access agreements of the reporting
country were used to restrict and prioritize those cells from
which the catch was most likely to have originated. This process
enables the production of maps illustrating the catch rate
(tons per square kilometer per year) by taxonomic group and
region (e.g., exclusive economic zone [EEZ], LME, high seas
area) from 1950 to 2005.
Ex-vessel price information (i.e., the price that fishers receive
when they sell their catch) has been compiled according
to taxa, year, and country and assigned to all landings records
in the global catch database. To allow comparisons across
countries, prices were converted to U.S. dollars for all years
using official currency exchange rates and converted to real
values using consumer price index (CPI) data. Prices were then
multiplied by spatially allocated landings data to facilitate the
visualization of spatial and temporal trends in landed value.
For the purpose of this study, the catch and landed value
databases were queried to investigate recent patterns in the
Gulf of Mexico LME. For each of the 606 spatial cells within
this LME, average annual taxon-specific total catch and landed
value was computed for the period extending from 2000 to
2005. The location of the fisheries closure (as of July 22, 2010)
in relation to georeferenced average annual catch and landed
value was investigated to provide clues regarding potential economic
losses to commercial fisheries in the region (Figure 1).
Spatial cells were proportionally allocated to six zones (i.e., the
commercial fisheries closure within the United States EEZ, the
remaining portion of the U.S. EEZ open to commercial fishing,
the Mexican EEZ, the Cuban EEZ, and two high seas areas),
and total catch and landed value statistics were computed
for each. Additionally, the average annual catch and landed
value of the five most valuable species in the U.S. EEZ during
2000–2005 (i.e., brown shrimp [Farfantepenaeus aztecus],
white shrimp [Litopenaeus setiferus], blue crab [Callinectes sapidus],
Gulf menhaden [Brevoortia patronus], and Eastern oyster
[Crassostrea virginica]) were calculated for each zone (Table 1).
Detailed data for each spatial cell used in this analysis are available
on the Sea Around Us Project website. 3 Discrepancies between
annual catch and landed value statistics reported here
and those reported by national fisheries management entities
likely result from over- or underallocation to spatial cells as
well as differences in pricing methodologies.
Results and Discussion
Over 100 species of fish, crustaceans, molluscs, and other
invertebrates, primarily inhabiting the highly productive
continental shelf area, are commercially fished in the Gulf of
Mexico. During 2000 to 2005, total annual reported commercial
landings within the entire LME averaged approximately
850,000 tons, producing approximately US$1.38 billion in
annual landed value (Table 1). The largest proportion of this
catch and landed value (77% and 74%, respectively) originated
within the 200 nautical mile limit of the U.S. EEZ, followed
by landings and associated landed value within Mexican waters
(22% and 26%, respectively; Figure 1). The composition
of the total annual catch within the LME was dominated by
Gulf menhaden (52%), and the remaining annual catch came
from Eastern oysters (13%), brown shrimp (5%), white shrimp
(4%), and blue crab (4%). Due to high consumer demand and
associated prices, landings of brown and white shrimp generated
the greatest landed value (17% and 16% of the annual total
within the LME, respectively), followed by blue crab (15%),
Gulf menhaden (12%), and Eastern oysters (8%; Table 1).
3 http://www.seaaroundus.org
Fisheries • vol 36 no 7 • july 2011 • www.fisheries.org 333

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On May 2, 2010, twelve days following the explosion of
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as well as the states of
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, began to declare
portions of federal and state waters closed to commercial fishing
in an effort to protect seafood safety and ensure consumer
confidence. 4 As of July 22, 2010, over 10% of the total surface
area of the Gulf of Mexico LME and approximately 24% of
the U.S. Gulf EEZ and territorial state waters were closed to
commercial fishing operations. During 2000 to 2005, habitats
located within the boundaries of the closed area yielded commercial
catches comprising approximately 17% of the total annual
tonnage and 18% of the total annual value of reported
landings within the Gulf of Mexico LME (Figure 1).
The visible extent of the oil spill and resultant closures
indicates that consequences will be greatest for U.S. fisheries.
On average, 22% of the annual U.S. commercial catch in the
4 http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon_oil_spill.htm
334
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of the average (2000–2005) annual landed value of reported commercial fisheries catches in the
Gulf of Mexico LME. The area closed to commercial fishing (including both federal and state within the U.S. EEZ as of July 22,
2010) accounts for approximately 18% of the total value of landings within the LME. The remainder of the U.S. EEZ still open
to fishing accounts for 56%, and Mexican waters account for 26% of total landed value. Less than 0.1% of the annual landed
value is derived from the two high seas areas and Cuban waters.
Fisheries • vol 36 no 7 • july 2011 • www.fisheries.org
Gulf and 24% of the corresponding annual landed value were
derived from the area closed to fishing, representing a potential
minimum annual loss of $247 million. Though the majority
of U.S. catch within the boundaries of the fisheries closure
was composed of Gulf menhaden, landings of brown and white
shrimp generated the greatest value (12% of the annual U.S.
total in the Gulf), followed by blue crabs (4%), Gulf menhaden
(3%), and eastern oysters (1%; Table 1). Economically
valuable invertebrate fisheries may be most at risk due to the
fact that relatively sessile, benthic organisms are likely to suffer
higher initial rates of mortality and exhibit long recovery times
as a result of exposure to oil-saturated habitats compared to
more mobile fish species (Teal and Howarth 1984; Carls et al.
2001; Culbertson et al. 2007, 2008a).
This study does not pretend to address the full range of
biological and economic consequences of the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill on fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. It is assumed
here that the effects of the spill will be confined spatially to

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TABLE 1. Average (2000–2005) annual commercial fisheries catch and landed value by zone within the Gulf of
Mexico LME, including total and taxa-specific estimates (BS = brown shrimp, WS = white shrimp, BC = blue crab,
GM = Gulf menhaden, EC = Eastern oyster).
the extent of the fisheries closures within U.S. waters and will
only last one year. However, the Gulf of Mexico LME is a hydrographically
dynamic system, and the existence of a large
subsurface oil plume provides evidence that impacts are likely
to extend beyond the visible surface boundaries (Camilli et al.
2010). Most marine organisms, including those mentioned here,
exhibit daily and seasonal, small- and large-scale migrations
both laterally and vertically. Species may be directly impacted
by physical contact with contaminants, as well as indirectly affected
via the fouling of important nursery and spawning habitats
and trophic interactions (Jackson et al. 1989; Peterson et
al. 2003). The ability of critical coastal habitats, including salt
marshes and mangroves, to act as long-term reservoirs of oil due
to buried hydrocarbon deposits can extend exposure and subsequent
biological recovery times by up to 40 years (Culbertson
et al. 2007, 2008a, 2008b). The capacity of habitats and species
to recover from the effects of oil, methane, and dispersants may
have already been compromised due to preexisting sources of
stress, including nutrient-laden freshwater discharge from the
Mississippi River resulting in periodic oxygen-depleted “dead
zones” (O’Connor and Whitall 2007; Rabalais et al. 2007), as
well as bycatch and habitat destruction due to extensive trawling
(Vidal-Hernandez and Pauly 2004; Wells et al. 2004). Additionally,
impacts on ecosystems and reductions in the quantity
and quality of fisheries resources translate to a variety of economic
impacts, including losses in revenue, profit, wages, and
jobs. Therefore, the possible future loss to commercial fisheries
in the United States is suggested as a minimum estimate and
provides a preliminary perspective given pre–oil spill trends.
This analysis includes only reported commercial landings; illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing as well as lucrative
recreational fishing is not considered.
Catch (1,000 tons) Landed value (US$1,000,000)
Zone Area
(1,000
km2 )
Total BS WS BC GM EO Total BS WS BC GM EO
U.S.,
open
550 513 29 25 20 343 51 767 175 152 134 126 47
U.S.,
closed
167 147 10 10 6 93 16 247 57 64 39 34 15
Mexico 741 191 1 1 6 9 45 358 5 3 29 3 45
Cuba 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
High
Seas
Total
LME
36 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1,550 852 40 35 32 445 111 1,376 219 219 202 163 106
Despite limitations associated with the spatial resolution
of the databases, this study indicates that the oil spill is clearly
impacting an area of crucial economic importance within the
Gulf of Mexico. Continued analyses such as those presented
here should shed light on an uncertain future.
Acknowledgements
This contribution is part of the Sea Around Us Project, a collaboration
between the Pew Environmental Group and the University of
British Columbia.
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Jackson, J. B. C., J. D. Cubit, B. D. Keller, V. Batista, K. Burns, H. M.
Caffey, R. L. Caldwell, S. D. Garrity, C. D. Getter, C. Gonzalez,
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J. Marshall, R. Steger, R. C. Thompson, and E. Weil. 1989. Ecological
effects of a major oil spill on Panamanian coastal marine
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Pauly, D. 2007. The Sea Around Us Project: Documenting and communicating
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Peterson, C. H., S. D. Rice, J. W. Short, D. Esler, J. L. Bodkin, B. E.
Ballachey, and D. B. Irons. 2003. Long-term ecosystem response
to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Science 302:2082–2086.
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Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Downloaded from www.nrcresearchpress.com by 121.223.166.191 on 02/26/12
For personal use only.
Introduction
Impact of the Deepwater Horizon well blowout on
the economics of US Gulf fisheries
U. Rashid Sumaila, Andrés M. Cisneros-Montemayor, Andrew Dyck, Ling Huang,
William Cheung, Jennifer Jacquet, Kristin Kleisner, Vicky Lam,
Ashley McCrea-Strub, Wilf Swartz, Reg Watson, Dirk Zeller, and Daniel Pauly
Abstract: Marine oil spills usually harm organisms at two interfaces: near the water surface and on shore. However, because
of the depth of the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon well blowout, deeper parts of the Gulf of Mexico are likely impacted.
We estimate the potential negative economic effects of this blowout and oil spill on commercial and recreational fishing, as
well as mariculture (marine aquaculture) in the US Gulf area, by computing potential losses throughout the fish value chain.
We find that the spill could, in the next 7 years, result in (midpoint) present value losses of total revenues, total profits,
wages, and economic impact of US$3.7, US$1.9, US$1.2, and US$8.7 billion, respectively. Commercial and recreational
fisheries would likely suffer the most losses, with a respective estimated US$1.6 and US$1.9 billion of total revenue losses,
US$0.8 and US$1.1 billion in total profit losses, and US$4.9 and US$3.5 billion of total economic losses.
Résumé : Les déversements de pétrole en mer nuisent généralement aux organismes à deux interfaces, soit près de la surface
de l'eau et sur la côte. Cependant, à cause de la profondeur à laquelle s'est produite l'éruption de Deepwater Horizon
en avril 2010, les zones plus profondes du golfe sont vraisemblablement affectées. Nous estimons les effets économiques négatifs
potentiels de cette éruption et du déversement de pétrole sur les pêches commerciales et sportives, ainsi que sur la mariculture
(aquaculture marine) dans la région du golfe aux É.-U., en calculant les pertes potentielles dans l'ensemble de la
chaîne de valeur des poissons. Nous trouvons que le déversement pourrait, dans les 7 prochaines années, entraîner des pertes
en valeur actuelle (point milieu) de revenus totaux, de profits totaux et de salaires et un impact économique de respectivement
3,7, 1,9, 1,2 et 8,7 milliards de $US. Les pêches commerciales et sportives subiraient vraisemblablement les pertes les
plus élevées, avec des pertes totales de revenu respectives de 1,6 et 1,9 milliards $US, des pertes de profit total de 0,8 et de
1,1 milliards $US et un impact économique total de 4,9 et de 3,5 milliards $US.
[Traduit par la Rédaction]
On 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon (DH), an oil rig
leased by British Petroleum (BP), exploded in the Gulf of
Mexico (GOM) and began leaking oil from the seabed at a
depth of over 1500 m. On Monday, 1 August 2010, the US
government stated that BP’s ruptured well had gushed an estimated
4.9 million barrels of oil (780 million L), making it
the largest accidental marine oil spill in US waters (Levy
and Gopalakrishnan 2010; Urriza and Duran 2010). In contrast,
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, a major disaster in US
history, amounted to less than 0.5 million barrels (80 million
L). Given the likely economic and legal repercussions
of this major pollution event, a rapid first-order estimation of
Pagination not final/Pagination non finale
the likely economic losses due to the oil leaks is required.
Here, we present such a preliminary estimate using a topdown
approach to set a baseline for future, hopefully more
detailed, comprehensive economic assessments.
Besides obvious environmental effects, oil spills can have
extensive socio-economic, psychological, and even cultural
impacts, including effects on marine resource use and livelihoods
(e.g., fisheries) and public health (Anonymous 1989;
1990a; Palinkas et al. 1993). Impacts on marine ecosystems
can persist for extended periods and stem directly from the
destruction of habitats, death and pollution of plants and animals,
and changes to food web structure and function. For
example, the environmental and economic effects of the
1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
Received 24 November 2010. Accepted 7 October 2011. Published at www.nrcresearchpress.com/cjfas on xx February 2012.
J2011-0046
Paper handled by Associate Editor Terrance Quinn III.
U.R. Sumaila, A.M. Cisneros-Montemayor, A. Dyck, L. Huang,* J. Jacquet, K. Kleisner, V. Lam, A. McCrea-Strub, W. Swartz,
R. Watson, D. Zeller, and D. Pauly. Fisheries Centre, The University of British Columbia, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4,
Canada.
W. Cheung. † School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom.
Corresponding author: U. Rashid Sumaila (e-mail: r.sumaila@fisheries.ubc.ca).
*Present address: Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063, Monteith Room 345, Storrs, CT
06269-1063, USA.
† Present address: Fisheries Centre, The University of British Columbia, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada.
Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 69: 1–12 (2012) doi:10.1139/F2011-171 Published by NRC Research Press
1

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were still being felt in the early 2000s (Graham 2003). The
impacts on marine ecosystems translate into impacts on the
economy and livelihoods, including commercial fisheries,
recreation, mariculture (marine aquaculture), tourism, and energy
markets. Fish caught from contaminated areas or neighboring
locations will raise concerns about food safety. These
effects call for actions to mitigate, recover, and prevent the
incidence of oil spills, which are costly to society.
The coast of the GOM is made up largely of saltwater
marshes, mangroves, wetlands, and estuaries, which are important
nursery and foraging areas for many marine species.
Within these ecosystems, there are over 15 000 species of
fauna and flora (Felder and Camp 2009), including whales,
turtles, manatees, sharks and other fishes, shrimps, crabs,
mollusks, birds, seagrasses, and mangroves. Many of these
species are highly valued by commercial and recreational
fisheries, including brown shrimp (Farfantepenaeus aztecus),
blue crab (Callinectes sapidus), eastern oyster (Crassostrea
virginica), red snapper (Lutjanus campechanus), Gulf menhaden
(Brevoortia patronus), and bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus).
Additionally, one of only two existing Atlantic bluefin
tuna spawning grounds is located in the GOM. Large-scale
pollution events, such as the DH spill, can result in impacts
that are both direct (e.g., acute-phase mortality) and indirect
(e.g., bioaccumulation through the food web). Indirect effects
have been shown to persist for decades (Graham 2003).
Long-term studies on salt marsh habitat following the
Florida barge spill in Wild Harbor, Massachusetts, USA, in
1969 demonstrate the persistence and impacts of oil within
sediments (Culbertson et al. 2007, 2008a, 2008b). Buried hydrocarbons
result in the destruction of seagrass root structure
and subsequent losses of grass cover and increased erosion
even 40 years later (Culbertson et al. 2008a).
Within tropical ecosystems, mangroves are considered to
be among the most susceptible to impacts from oil spills
(Shigenaka 2002). Studies of mangrove habitats after the
1986 spill of 50 000 barrels from the Galeta near the Panama
Canal demonstrate the influence of sediments acting as longterm
reservoirs of oil (Burns et al. 1993). The persistence of
the oil was unexpected because of relatively warm tropical
waters, which were thought to increase the rate of breakdown
of the hydrocarbons. Short-term effects included dead mangroves
along 27 km of coastline even 1½ years after the spill
(Jackson et al. 1989) and the deterioration of surviving mangroves
up to 6 years after the spill (Burns et al. 1993). Longterm
effects were not only apparent in the mangroves themselves,
but also detected in the species found associated with
the root structure (i.e., bivalves).
Coral reefs are one of the most diverse marine ecosystems
and host highly complex communities (Haapkyla et al. 2007).
Besides obvious lethal effects of oil, sublethal effects such as
reduced reproductive efficiency have also been demonstrated
(Loya and Rinkevich 1980). Haapkyla et al. (2007) reviewed
the impacts of oil and oil spills on corals and found that corals
were negatively impacted, leading to decreases in coral
cover, growth, reproductive output, and species diversity.
Only in two cases were no or only minor effects found, these
being the Arabian Gulf field experiment in 1989 (LeGore et
al. 1989) and oil spills in the Arabian Gulf related to the Gulf
War in 1991 (Downing and Roberts 1993; Price 1998).
Unlike the visually obvious and immediate effects on birds
Pagination not final/Pagination non finale
2 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Vol. 69, 2012
and mammals, the effects of oil on fisheries can be more difficult
to detect, though they are no less devastating. Oil
spreads through the marine ecosystem and damages coastal
areas important as nurseries for juvenile fish and shrimp. Oil
and hydrocarbons are taken up by plankton and other
surface-dwelling species that link to aquatic food chains.
Thus, oil moves through the food web and accumulates in
food fishes, posing serious health concerns for consumers.
Almost immediately following the DH spill, the region’s key
shrimp and oyster fishing areas were officially closed. According
to the US National Marine Fisheries Service, 70% of
the commercially caught shrimp and oysters in the US come
from the GOM (National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration 2010).
Several studies have examined the effects of oil on fish and
invertebrate species. The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in
1989 had notable effects on important fish species, such as
Pacific herring (Clupea pallasii) and pink salmon (Oncorhynchus
gorbuscha), including premature hatching, reduced
growth rates, morphological and genetic abnormalities, and
increased mortality (Bue et al. 1998; Rice et al. 2001). Adult
Pacific herring showed evidence of liver lesions and increased
disease due to depressed immune function (Moles et
al. 1993; Carls et al. 2001). These effects contributed to increased
natural mortality in adult Pacific herring over a 5year
period (Thorne and Thomas 2007). Research on biomarkers
of hydrocarbon exposure in nine species of pelagic
and demersal fish showed that 10 years after the Exxon Valdez
spill, signs of exposure were still present (Jewett et al.
2002). Consequences have been shown to be more severe for
invertebrates because of their sessile nature and close association
with contaminated habitats, including declines in abundance,
growth rate, and condition (Culbertson et al. 2007,
2008a). Sediments and intertidal mussel beds (Mytilus trossulus)
showed evidence of contamination 6 years after the Exxon
Valdez oil spill and were a source of chronic
contamination for predatory species (Carls et al. 2001).
In addition to direct effects on individual species, food
web interactions allow for the propagation of negative impacts
to higher trophic levels. The impact of the Tsesis oil
spill on benthic organisms in the Baltic Sea in 1977 resulted
in food chain transfer of oil to flounder (Platichthys flesus;
Elmgren et al. 1983).
The magnitude and duration of impacts will depend on the
scale of the spill, the type of hydrocarbon, and the characteristics
of the marine environment. Benthic and relatively sessile
organisms (e.g., crabs, clams, mussels, and shrimps)
suffer high initial mortalities, displacement, or contamination
(becoming unmarketable) of up to 100% (Teal and Howarth
1984). Mobile fish species are generally subject to lower initial
mortality rates, although those can quickly rise in large
spills. For example, the 1979 Ixtoc I blowout, previously the
largest accidental oil spill in history, is estimated to have
caused 50%–70% fish mortality in adjacent coastal regions
(Jernelov and Linden 1981).
There are many studies that examine the initial impacts of
oil spills on species, yet few consider the time scale for marine
organisms to recover from exposure. Recovery time is
dependent on the length of exposure, water temperature,
oceanographic features of the region, mobility, and ontogenetic
stage of the species, as well as species-specific life his-
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tory traits (e.g., feeding and reproductive patterns). The ability
of critical habitats to act as long-term reservoirs of oil can
extend exposure and subsequent recovery times. While habitat
recolonization can begin within 3 to 6 months, it generally
takes at least 1 year for pollutant concentrations in marine organisms
to return to prespill conditions (Teal and Howarth
1984). This assumes that the spill has ended and most oil
cleaned up, so the minimum duration of impacts can be well
over 1 year. In fact, oil concentrations in sediment, where it
is most persistent, have been detected up to 40 years after a
spill (Culbertson et al. 2008a). All of these effects depend to
a great extent on the type of ecosystem affected. In tropical
systems like the GOM, impacts can be exacerbated by a
high proportion of mangroves and marshes, which capture
and retain oil for prolonged periods, affecting organisms that
depend on these habitats for food, reproduction, and shelter
(Jackson et al. 1989).
There are numerous economic assessments of oil spills,
which can be adapted for the current assessment. Cohen
(1995) estimated the social costs (i.e., cost to society as opposed
to private cost to a firm or an individual) of the 1989
Exxon Valdez spill for the years 1990 and 1991 by examining
the revenue difference between actual fisheries catches with
and without the spill. García-Negro et al. (2009) studied the
economic impact of the 2002 Prestige oil spill on the affected
coastline in Spain, investigating the fisheries landings before
and after the accident. The McDowe Group used business
surveys to determine the economic effect of the Exxon Valdez
spill on Alaska’s tourism industry (Anonymous 1990b). A
study by Advanced Resources International provided estimates
of economic impacts for many oil spill accidents by dividing
spills into three types: tanker, pipeline, and offshore
platform, and determined the cost for clean-up, oil losses, environmental
and resource damage per gallon (1 gallon =
3.785 L) of oil spilled to be US$260, US$1.71 and
US$9.91–19.81, respectively (Anonymous 1993). Clean-up
costs and environmental damage from tanker spills are highly
variable, but can be particularly high if the spill occurs in remote
and environmentally sensitive areas, as has occurred in
the past. Offshore facilities have a relatively good safety record,
so spill effects are more poorly defined. However, large
blowouts close to sensitive coastal areas such as marshland or
reefs can lead to substantial ecological and economic damages
(e.g., Ixtoc I, 1979; Union Platform A, 1969); the DH
blowout is unfortunately one such case.
An important consideration in this study is the potential
market recovery times (i.e., the time required for market conditions
for the affected fish species to return to prespill levels)
of commercially important species in the GOM. There is
a distinct difference between ecological and market recovery
times. As mentioned above, ecological recovery can take decades,
especially for organisms associated with sediments such
as crustaceans and mollusks. Market recovery time, on the
other hand, depends on the length of fisheries closures after
a spill, public perceptions of seafood safety, and the degree
of tainting (both visible and with respect to taste and smell
of seafood; Moller et al. 1999).
The oil industry typically touts the quick recovery of organisms
to an “untainted state” as evidence of the safety of
seafood after an oil spill (e.g., Moller et al. 1999). However,
after the Exxon Valdez spill, fisheries for salmon, herring,
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Sumaila et al. 3
crab, shrimp, rockfish, and sablefish were closed, with some
commercial fisheries remaining closed through 1990. Herring
and salmon species in the region have never fully recovered
ecologically or economically. One of the main reasons for
this is the public perception of contamination from seafood
(see http://useconomy.about.com/od/suppl1/p/Exxon_Valdez_
Oil_Spill_Economic_Impact.htm).
Materials and methods
The GOM ecosystem supports considerable commercial
and recreational fisheries, as well as mariculture, all of which
are affected by spilled oil. To provide a broad picture of the
economic effects of the spill on these three sectors, we estimate
the potential losses in (i) total revenues; (ii) total profit
(payment to capital plus resource rent); (iii) wages (payments
to labor); (iv) number of jobs; and (v) economic impact
throughout the wider economy. To provide conservative estimates
of the economic effects of the oil spill, we use estimates
of market recovery time rather than longer ecological
recovery time horizons.
Total revenue is the product of ex-vessel price and catch in
the case of commercial fisheries; the total expenditure in the
case of recreational fisheries; and the product of ex-farm
price and production quantity in the case of mariculture. Total
profit is the sum of normal profit and resource rent. Normal
profit (payment to capital) is the opportunity cost of the
capital invested to run fisheries or mariculture. Resource rent
is payment to the “owners” of marine resources (i.e., the
American people in the case of commercial and recreational
fisheries). Wages (payments to labor) are the amounts earned
by people who expend their labor, skills, and expertise in the
sector. The added value or impact through the fish value
chain is the indirect economic effects of fisheries and mariculture
because of their impact on activities such as boat
building or maintenance, equipment supply, and the restaurant
sector (Pontecorvo et al. 1980).
We assume that each economic indicator is related to landings
(L) in the following manner:
ð1Þ total revenue ¼ L p
ð2Þ normal profit ¼ L p
ð3Þ wages ¼ L w
ð4Þ rent ¼ L p L c
ð5Þ impact ¼ L p M
where p, p, w, and c represent price, profit, wages, and costs,
respectively, per tonne. The parameter M represents the economic
impact multiplier for fisheries of the US as estimated
by Dyck and Sumaila (2010).
The present value of each indicator i over time t is expressed
as
ð6Þ PVi ¼ XT
d
t¼0
t iXi;t where X i,t represents economic indicator i at time t =0… T,
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Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of the annual average landed value of the total commercial fisheries catch in the US Exclusive Economic Zone in
the Gulf of Mexico (averaged for the 2000–2005 period). The area closed to commercial fishing (as of 22 July 2010) includes both federal
waters and portions of western Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana state waters.
and the parameter d is the discount factor determined using
the appropriate rate of discount applicable to the US. The discount
factor is calculated using a real discount rate of 3.0%.
Modeling oil spill impacts
We use the Sea Around Us Project (http://www.seaaroundus.
org) global grid-map system of half degree latitude by half
degree longitude cells of spatially assigned annual commercial
catch (Watson et al. 2004) and landed values of catch
(http://feru.org; Sumaila et al. 2007) taken by US fisheries in
the US Gulf Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). We then overlay
on this landed value map the area of the GOM that was
closed to fishing at its largest extent (as of 22 July 2010), including
federal and state waters (Fig. 1). Using this combination
of spatial data, we calculate the likely proportion of
landed value that is immediately unavailable to the fishing
sector. This approach has also been applied in McCrea-Strub
et al. (2011).
As foreign fishing vessels have been prohibited from operating
within the US EEZ since 1991, fisheries closures are
also assumed only to impact US fisheries. However, the
GOM is a dynamic system, and oil and dispersants have not
Pagination not final/Pagination non finale
4 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Vol. 69, 2012
been confined to the sea surface, with subsurface plumes
(50–1200 m) having been documented (Camilli et al. 2010).
Most marine organisms, including those mentioned here, exhibit
daily and seasonal, small- and large-scale migrations
both laterally and vertically. Marine organisms may be directly
impacted by physical contact with contaminants as
well as indirectly affected via the fouling of important nursery
and spawning habitats as well as food chain interactions.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the effects of the spill will be
spatially and temporally restricted to closed area boundaries
and closure duration.
Estimates of loss in commercial, recreational, and mariculture
fisheries are dependent on the combination of initial
mortality of fish species due to the oil spill as well as the
continued economic unmarketability that can result when
consumers believe marine products from the GOM are less
desirable because of real or perceived pollutants. In the case
of the Exxon Valdez spill, full market recovery of the tourism
and sport fishing sector in Alaska is reported to have occurred
within 2 years after cleanup (Anonymous 1993); in
the case of the Amoco Cadiz spill in Brittany, tourism activities
returned to prespill levels 1 year after cleanup (Grigalu-
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Table 1. Assumed impact gradient (%) for species group – state combinations
in the area open to fishing (Area B) in the Gulf of Mexico.
Group
Florida
(west) Alabama Mississippi Louisiana Texas
Mollusks 30 45 50 50 0
Crustaceans 30 45 50 50 0
Benthic fishes 15 23 25 25 0
Pelagic fishes 6 9 10 10 0
Table 2. Estimated annual catch and catch values before the Gulf of Mexico oil
spill in the areas closed and open to fishing as of 22 July 2010.
nas et al. 1986). The market “recovery” times used for recreational
fisheries are shorter than for commercial fisheries
because of the inherent differences between recreational and
commercial fishing, with the latter catching fish for consumption,
while recreational fishers are not motivated by this
factor alone and are likely to return to fishing sooner (Arlinghaus
2006; Fedler and Ditton 1986). Finally, we assume impact
gradients in the currently closed area for the second and
third years to be 50% and 25%, respectively, because we expect
the impact of the spill to fade away with time (Table 1).
Commercial fishing
Using the spatial catch and value data displayed (Fig. 1),
we estimate the average annual catch and landed values taken
before the oil spill (2000–2005) within areas closed to fishing
(Area A) and open to fishing (Area B; Table 2) by major
species groups (see below for details on species groups). We
Closed area (A) Open area (B)
Value
Value
Group Catch (t) (million US$) Catch (t) (million US$)
Mollusks 13 357 13.4 52 219 53.3
Crustaceans 21 938 99.3 73 608 334.2
Benthic fish 2 648 7.8 10 825 30.7
Pelagic fish 79 869 22.8 331 405 94.7
Total 117 813 143.3 468 058 513.0
Table 3. Assumed initial unmarketability and market recovery time for key marine taxonomic
groups targeted by commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico.
Group Includes
Initial
unmarketability (%)
Market recovery
time (years)
Mollusks Clams, mussels, oysters 100 1–6 a,b
Crustaceans Shrimp, crabs, lobsters 100 1–7 b,c
Benthic fish Soles, flounders, rockfish 50 1–2 b,d,e,f
Pelagic fish Tunas, sharks, jacks, mullets 10–30 0.16–1 b,g,h
Note: Initial mortality also includes displacement or contamination to unmarketable levels. Recovery time
refers to a return to prespill biomass and begins once all visible oil has been cleaned or dissipated.
a Jackson et al. 1989.
b Teal and Howarth 1984.
c Teal et al. 1992.
d Jernelov and Linden 1981.
e Elmgren et al. 1983.
f Lee and Page 1997.
g Grigalunas et al. 1986.
h Cedre 2008.
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Sumaila et al. 5
assume that the economic indicators are affected differently
in open versus closed areas as described below.
We use the equation below to estimate the loss in landings
arising from areas closed (C closed ) and open (C open ) to fishing:
ð7Þ lossg;s ¼ C closed
g;s þ Mg;s Ag;s C open
g;s
where the indices g and s refer to species groups and states,
respectively. The matrix M represents the initial mortality of
marine species groups due to the oil spill, and A denotes the
proportion of landings for a given species group – state combination
affected by the oil. For simplicity, the loss is assumed
to be experienced throughout the length of the market
recovery time, t ∈ [1, T], for a given species group. A range
of estimated recovery times (Table 3) are used to compute a
range of estimates of the present value of each economic indicator
calculated by substituting the loss in landings, loss g,s,
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Table 4. Preoil spill mariculture production in the Gulf of Mexico.
Production value Employment
State Product Production (t) (million US$) (jobs)
Alabama Shrimps 100 0.7 10
Florida Clams 7 030 10.3 210
Louisiana Oysters 51 400 41.5 250
into eqs. 1–5, summing across species groups and states, and
using eq. 6 to compute the present value of economic effects.
Employment data for commercial fisheries in the Gulf are
from National Marine Fisheries Service (2010). We collect
direct, indirect, and induced employment data by state. By
considering indirect and induced employment, we include
jobs that are supported by marine fisheries throughout the region’s
economy. We estimate potential employment loss by
assuming that a reduction in the value of marine landings
will be followed by a proportional change in the number of
workers employed.
Recreational fisheries
To estimate the economic indicators for recreational fisheries,
we rely on surveys undertaken by the US Fish and
Wildlife Service (Anonymous 2006b), which reports the
number of recreational fishers (resident and nonresident) by
state, as well as the expenditures by anglers. Under the assumption
that the percentage of resident anglers has remained
constant since 2006, we calculate the total number of resident
anglers based on 2009 population projections (http://www.
census.gov). We use the ratio of resident to nonresident anglers
to estimate the total number of anglers per state and
the total number of fishing trips. With regard to Florida’s
west coast, we use the proportion of recreational fishing that
takes place along the west coast (Steinback et al. 2004).
To estimate the total expenditure (or total revenues generated
by the sector) and the economic impact, we use reported
expenditures (Steinback et al. 2004) converted to 2010 dollars
based on the US consumer price index (http://www.bls.
gov/CPI). These expenditures include payments for fishingrelated
items (gear, tackle, etc.) and travel costs to the fishing
locations, including private, guided, and charter fishing trips.
We exclude expenditure on durable items (i.e., second
homes), assuming that these will not be substantially affected.
We make the strong assumption that recreational fishing
will continue in the area open to fishing (Area B) at the
prespill level. For the closed area (Area A), first year economic
effects of the spill are based on the spatial extent of
the fishing closures (Fig. 1). The resource rent and profit
share of total revenue is estimated by summarizing the literature
on the topic (Carter 2003; Marshall and Lucy 1981; Galeano
et al. 2004).
Losses due to the oil spill are then calculated using the following
equation:
ð8Þ losss;t ¼ 1 P closed
t Xs
where losss,t is the change in an economic indicator, Xs,for state s at time t. The parameter Pclosed t represents the percen-
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6 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Vol. 69, 2012
Total 58 530 52.5 470
Note: Production values adjusted to 2010 US$.
tage of waters in the GOM closed to fishing at time t. At the
time of writing, 24% of American waters in the GOM are
closed to recreational fishing. We assume that the percentage
of waters unavailable to recreational fisheries will decrease to
zero after 3 years, with their share in the second and third
years being 12% and 6%, respectively. Present values of loss
for each of the economic indicators (except for employment)
are estimated using eq. 6.
The economic impact of changes in total revenue due to
the oil spill is estimated using eq. 9 (see Appendix A for
more on impact multipliers):
ð9Þ impact ¼ X
s PVs Ms
where PV s is the present value of total revenue in a given
state s, and M s is the state-specific economic multiplier as reported
by Steinback et al. (2004). Employment is calculated
based on information from Steinback et al. (2004), and it is
assumed to change in proportion to changes in losses associated
with the oil spill.
Mariculture
Mariculture in the GOM is focused on invertebrate species,
particularly oysters. According to the 2005 US Census of
Aquaculture (Anonymous 2006a), Louisiana accounts for the
largest share in mariculture production (51 400 tonnes of oysters
worth US$37 million in 2005) in the US, with further
contributions from Florida (7000 tonnes of clams worth
US$9 million) and Alabama (100 tonnes of shrimp worth
US$630 000; Table 4). No mariculture has been reported for
Texas.
Owing to the fact that mariculture in Florida, Louisiana,
and Alabama is primarily for crustaceans and mollusks, we
assume that the impacts of the spill on mariculture will be
similar to those on commercial fisheries for crustaceans and
molluscs, namely that the contamination will result in zero
market recovery.
Based on the location of the current closure, we assume
that 100% of mariculture operations in Louisiana and Alabama
and 10% of operations in west Florida are affected.
Moreover, since oyster mariculture occurs in 2-year cycles
from seeding to harvesting, we assume that the exposure to
the spill will result in 3 years of lost oyster harvest (2010,
2011, and 2012). However, assuming that sufficient oyster
larvae can be recruited from uncontaminated broodstocks in
2011, we expect the industry to recover in early 2013. Here,
we focus solely on the impact due to loss of harvest and
ignore the potential long-term losses from a decrease in demand
due to consumer fears over residual contamination
risks.
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From our estimates of lost revenue, we compute the profit
and wages lost. The cost structure of mariculture operations
in the GOM region was not available to us; we therefore use
information from oyster farming in Virginia (Lipton et al.
2006) to estimate the potential loss in profit (∼47%) and
wages (∼20%) from total revenue. Because of the nature of
mariculture (i.e., requiring input by operators to generate harvest),
we assume that all of the profit is return to capital with
no resource rent. As in commercial fisheries, the present
value of the lost revenue, profit, and wages are calculated using
eq. 1.
We assume the current level of output from mariculture to
be similar to that reported in the 2005 US Census of Aquaculture
(Anonymous 2006a), converted to 2010 US$ equivalent
(Table 4). The employment figures are estimated from
the state total using the ratio of mariculture farms to total
number of aquaculture farms in each state (Anonymous
2006a).
The economic impact of losses in total mariculture revenue
is estimated by adapting eq. 5 to mariculture production,
changing it to
ð10Þ impact ¼ PVrevenue M
where PV revenue is the present value of loss due to the oil
spill, and M is the economic input–output multiplier from
Dyck and Sumaila (2010).
Results
Table 5. Predicted present value losses in economic indicators for commercial fisheries over the next 7 years in
the US Gulf of Mexico area due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Revenues Total profits
Group
(million US$)
a Wages Economic impact Employment
(million US$) (million US$) (million US$) (jobs)
Crustaceans 360–2307 155–987 79–507 1114–7151 —
Mollusks 53–297 67–369 53–297 165–920 —
Benthic Fish 22–43 18–35 2–4 68–133 —
Pelagic fish 35–58 26–43 8–14 106–176 —
Total 470–2705 266–1434 142–822 1453–8380 5250–8758 b
a This is the sum of normal profits (payment to capital) and resource rent (payment to resource owners).
b Employment data are available only by state, not species. This number represents total employment loss for all of the US
Gulf states. To produce a range, we calculate 7000 (±25%).
Table 6. Predicted present value loss in economic indicators for US Gulf states’ recreational fisheries.
Commercial fisheries
The present value of total revenues that would be lost in
the commercial fishing sector over the next 7 years, due to
the DH well blowout, is estimated to be in the range of
US$0.5–2.7 billion (Table 5). The equivalent losses in total
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Sumaila et al. 7
Total revenues Total profits Wages
Economic impact Employment
State
(million US$) (million US$) (million US$) (million US$) (jobs)
Florida 994–1 656 542–903 378–630 1 772–2 953 7 650–12 750
Alabama 111–185 60–100 38–64 195–325 900–1 500
Mississippi 59–98 32–53 17–28 119–198 375–625
Louisiana 278–464 152–253 95–159 473–788 2 025–3 375
All states 1 442–2 404 786–1 310 528–881 2 558–4 264 10 950–18 250
profits, wages, and total economic impact are estimated at
US$0.3–1.4, US$0.1–0.8, and US$1.5–8.4 billion, respectively.
By far the largest losses are incurred among fishers
targeting crustaceans such as shrimps, who would experience
nearly 85% of the total estimated economic impact (Table 5).
In addition, between 5000 and 9000 jobs may be lost by
commercial fisheries in the US Gulf region (Table 5).
Recreational fisheries
The present value of losses in the recreational fishing sector
are estimated to be US$1.4–2.4 billion in total revenues,
US$0.7–1.3 billion in total profits, US$0.5–0.8 billion in
wages, and US$2.5–4.2 billion in economic impact (Table 6).
The recreational fishing sectors in Florida and Louisiana are
predicted to suffer the largest impacts, with Florida accounting
for most of the expected losses (Table 6). Between
11 000 and 18 000 jobs may also be lost in this sector (Table
6). Note that no losses have been predicted for Texas.
Mariculture
For the three mariculture states, Florida, Alabama, and
Louisiana, the total loss in revenue is estimated to be
US$94–157 million, with an economic impact of about
US$293–488 million (Table 7). We estimate a loss of
US$44–73 million in total profit and US$19–31 million in
wages. The sector may lose well over 210 jobs, both fulland
part-time (Table 7). Overall, the majority of economic
losses will occur in oyster mariculture (Table 7).
Overall, the present value of (midpoint) losses in total revenues,
total profits, wages, and economic impact from the
three sectors considered here are about US$3.7, US$1.9,
US$1.2, and US$8.7 billion over the next 7 years, respectively
(Table 8). The likely largest losses can be expected
from the commercial fisheries, while the recreational fishing
sector may account for slightly more than a third of such
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8 Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. Vol. 69, 2012
Table 7. Predicted present value losses in economic indicators for US Gulf mariculture.
Revenues Normal profits Wages
Economic impact Employment
Group (million US$) (million US$) (million US$) (million US$)
a
(jobs)
Crustaceans 1.5–2.5 0.7–1.2 0.3–0.5 4.7–7.8 8–13
Mollusks 92–154 43–72 18.5–30 287.8–479.8 203–338
All species 94–157 44–73 19–31 293–488 211–351
a 25% error ranges on the median assumed.
Table 8. Predicted (midpoint) present value losses in economic indicators for all affected US Gulf states for commercial
and recreational fisheries and mariculture sectors combined.
Total revenues Total profits Wages Economic impact Employment
Sector
(million US$) (million US$) (million US$) (million US$) (jobs)
Commercial fisheries 1 577 823 469 4 888 7 000
Recreational fisheries 1 949 1 062 715 3 457 14 900
Mariculture 129 61 26 399 280
Total 3 655 1 946 1 210 8 744 22 180
losses. Furthermore, the region may lose over 22 000 jobs in
fisheries-related sectors (Table 8).
Discussion
We focus exclusively on the potential economic impacts of
the DH well blowout on commercial and recreational fisheries,
as well as mariculture in US Gulf waters, and find that
the impacts are quite significant. The blowout could, over the
next 7 years, result in (midpoint) lost revenue, profit, wages,
and total economic impact with a present value of US$3.7,
US$1.9, US$1.2, and US$8.7 billion, respectively. We also
find that over 22 000 jobs in the GOM economy may be
lost. Therefore, our analysis suggests that the spill will result
in considerable loss of income to households and businesses
in the Gulf states because of losses in wages and profits, respectively.
Our estimates include downstream and upstream
indirect and induced economic impact to industries such as
boat building, the restaurant sector, and fuel suppliers.
However, there are other potential economic impacts not
covered here (see e.g., Boyd 2010), including (i) clean-up
cost; (ii) value of lost oil; (iii) natural and environmental
damage beyond fisheries impacts; (iv) other direct use impacts
such as bird watching and other non-fish tourism (Oxford
Economics (2010) suggests a potential loss in US
tourism revenues at over US$22 billion); and (iv) non-use existence
and option values. Additionally, 11 people died in the
explosion and 17 were injured. These are unrecoverable
losses to affected families and the US at large.
Even for the sectors we study, our estimates are not complete.
For instance, we do not consider consumer impacts
through increases in fish prices due to reduced supply caused
by the spill. Also, we focus on the short-term (up to 7 years)
impacts and losses, thereby ignoring long-term effects. Some
unintended consequences of the spill may also exist (e.g., the
potential benefits of a forced fishing moratorium may help
rebuild some stocks in the medium to long term). Furthermore,
a potential spill injury to the Gulf fisheries can arise
in response not to actual contamination by oil but over public
perception of potentially contaminated fish that can lead to
closures so that demand remains high for other fishes or the
same fishes from other areas, thereby affecting the economics
of Gulf states fisheries. For instance, US demand for shrimp
from Thailand increased right after the oil spill. Having said
the above, it is worth noting that one consequence of the reduction
in shrimping effort due to the oil spill is reduction in
bycatch of groundfish species, which is a positive for fisheries
targeting these species, and could mitigate the losses
calculated in this contribution.
It is important for the reader to note that we used a number
of models, each with underlying assumptions, which may affect
the accuracy of our results, and this is the reason why our
estimates have ranges. For example, the input–output analysis
applied in this paper is not without criticism (e.g., Christ
1955; de Mesnard 2002); it is well known that input–output
analyses rely on the stability of technical coefficients, which
may not hold when used in forecasting situations that are
greatly different than those described by the respective input–
output table used. Furthermore, input–output analysis is fairly
data intensive — a factor that can be problematic when studying
regions with scattered high-quality data sources. These
caveats notwithstanding, we believe that our findings, which
are different from those presented by the Feinberg Commission,
are likely more accurate because of the passage of time
and the thoroughness of the review process.
Acknowledgements
Support for this study was provided by the Global Ocean
Economics Project at the Fisheries Economic Research Unit,
funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts of Philadelphia, USA,
as well as the Sea Around Us Project, collaboration between
The University of British Columbia and the Pew Environment
Group.
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Appendix A. More on input–output models
As a primary industry (i.e., activities focusing on extracting
or processing natural resources, such as energy, minerals,
and in this case food, for use elsewhere in the economy),
fishing is the beginning of a productive value chain in an
economy. The economic multiplier is used in fisheries research
to emphasize that the industry has many linkages
throughout the economy. Such multipliers are a factor by
which we can multiply the value of final demand for an economic
activity’s output to obtain its total contribution to economic
output, including activities directly and indirectly
dependent on it.
More specifically, the multipliers used in this study are
taken from Dyck and Sumaila (2010). The model configurations,
presented in this reference, are briefly described below.
The method developed by Nobel laureate, Wassily Leontief,
known as input–output analysis, is a tried and tested approach
to analyzing the structure of the economy. Beginning
as early as the late 1940s, Leontief used his method in a
number of applications, including the well-known analyses
of the potential economic impact of disarmament for the
United States of America and tests of the Heckscher–Ohlin
theory now known as the “Leontief Paradox” (Leontief
1953; Leontief et al. 1965). The definitive source on input–
output methodology, his book on the subject is a collection
of his earlier works and serves as an excellent foundation for
using input–output analysis (Leontief 1966). There are, how-
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ever, several additional sources for readers who are interested
in the methodology as applied to fisheries (Heen 1989;
Hoagland et al. 2005; Jin et al. 2003; Leung and Pooley
2001; Roy et al. 2009).
Input–output analysis uses interindustry transaction data to
compute a technical coefficient matrix, A, which is composed
of entries ai,j summarizing the output from industry i
required to produce a unit of output for industry j. We compute
this technical coefficient matrix for every maritime
country of the world, expressing the economy of each country
as a system of linear equations summarized by the following
equation:
ðA:1Þ Ax þ d ¼ x
where A is the matrix of technical coefficients describing input
requirements for each sector, x is a vector of sector inputs,
and d is a vector of final demand. The above equation
then simply states that the sum of intermediate demand (Ax)
and final demand (d) is equal to supply (x). It is then a simple
problem of linear algebra to solve for the vector of inputs
(x) required to satisfy a given final demand vector (d) using I
as the identity matrix. This solution is expressed as
ðA:2Þ x ¼½I AŠ 1 d
We note that the vector x represents total output supported
by the demand vector d. It is important to keep this measure
of economic activity separate from other measures such as
value-added, which subtracts the value of inputs from the
value of output. It is worth noting that it is not appropriate
to make comparisons between estimates using input–output
analysis and measures of value-added such as gross domestic
product (GDP).
Type I & II output multipliers
Given the solution in eq. A.2 above, we calculate the
change in output with respect to final demand. To do this,
we take a partial derivative of eq. A.2 with respect to final
demand (d):
ðA:3Þ
dx
1
¼½I AŠ
dd
Equation A.3 describes a new relationship that proves to be
very useful in macro-economic analysis. The right-hand side
of this equation, [I – A] –1 , is also denoted as L –1 ,asitis
commonly called the Leontief inverse or multiplier matrix.
This square matrix is of such interest because each entry (denoted
l i,j) describes the marginal inputs required from sector i
when the output of sector j increases by one unit.
We calculate industry multipliers by computing the column
sum of the Leontief inverse matrix L –1 as M ¼ X N
j¼1 Li;j
where M is a row vector of Type I industry output multipliers.
Each entry, M j, in this row vector is an output multiplier
that allows us to compute the direct and indirect output
required to support a unit of output for industry j. For example,
in a sector with a multiplier of 1.5, we would estimate
that US$100 in final demand from this sector supports US
$150 of activity throughout the economy.
As we have shown, for a given economy with n industries,
one calculates the Leontief inverse using a n × n technical
Pagination not final/Pagination non finale
Sumaila et al. 11
coefficients matrix as described above. Multipliers calculated
in this way account for the direct and indirect output supported
by a given industry. In addition to these multipliers,
often called Type I, a second set of multipliers, called Type II,
may also be calculated. The advantage to using Type II multipliers
is that they account for indirect as well as induced effects
that occur, for example, when additional demand for a
given sector increases household incomes that induce demand
for additional output. With Type I multipliers, household
consumption is part of the final demand sector and
therefore assumed to be exogenous; with Type II multipliers,
we treat household consumption as endogenous by adding it
as an additional intermediate sector in the technical coefficients
matrix A. When computing Type II output multipliers,
a technical coefficients matrix with endogenous households
will be (n +1)×(n + 1) in dimension. Summing the multiplier
matrix L –1 over n output sectors will produce Type II
output multipliers that include the induced effect of endogenizing
households without confusing output and income,
which would occur if we added the last row of the multiplier
matrix — also known as the income effect.
Researchers have adopted approaches to account for direct
and indirect effects of fisheries in literature. A considerable
amount of this previous work using economic impact methodology
has been done for the USA (e.g., Seung and Waters
2006). Several methods used in such studies to analyze the
economic impacts of fishing including input–output modeling,
social accounting matrix (SAM) modeling, econometric
input–output (EC-IO) modeling, fisheries economic assessment
models (FEAM), and computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models. Each of these techniques has its merits and
demerits, which have been discussed in the literature at
length (Loveridge 2004; Radtke et al. 2004).
Of these models, the input–output technique is well used
in the study of fisheries, likely because of the relative ease
of computation and accessibility of results (Bhat and Bhatta
2006; Hoagland et al. 2005; Leung and Pooley 2001). Results
from an input–output study can be used to predict the
outcome of a marginal change in demand for a particular
good, and they can easily be interpreted and used in a practical
manner.
For further reading on input–output tables, refer to references
listed below.
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Environmental Health Perspectives: Seafood Contamination after the BP …Risks to Vulnerable Populations: A Critique of the FDA Risk Assessment
COMMENTARY
Seafood Contamination after the BP Gulf Oil Spill and Risks to
Vulnerable Populations: A Critique of the FDA Risk Assessment
Miriam Rotkin-Ellman 1 , Karen K. Wong 2 , Gina M. Solomon 1,2
http://ehp03.niehs.nih.gov/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1289%2Fehp.1103695
3/15/12 8:46 AM
1 Natural Resources Defense Council, San Francisco, California, USA, 2 Department of Medicine, University
of California San Francisco, San Francisco, California, USA
Abstract
Background: The BP oil spill of 2010 resulted in contamination of one of the most productive fisheries in
the United States by polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). PAHs, which can accumulate in seafood,
are known carcinogens and developmental toxicants. In response to the oil spill, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) developed risk criteria and established thresholds for allowable levels [levels of
concern (LOCs)] of PAH contaminants in Gulf Coast seafood.
Objectives: We evaluated the degree to which the FDA’s risk criteria adequately protect vulnerable Gulf
Coast populations from cancer risk associated with PAHs in seafood.
Discussion: The FDA LOCs significantly underestimate risk from seafood contaminants among sensitive
Gulf Coast populations by failing to a) account for the increased vulnerability of the developing fetus and
child; b) use appropriate seafood consumption rates; c) include all relevant health end points; and d)
incorporate health-protective estimates of exposure duration and acceptable risk. For benzo[a]pyrene
and naphthalene, revised LOCs are between two and four orders of magnitude below the level set by the
FDA. Comparison of measured levels of PAHs in Gulf seafood with the revised LOCs revealed that up to
53% of Gulf shrimp samples were above LOCs for pregnant women who are high-end seafood
consumers.
Conclusions: FDA risk assessment methods should be updated to better reflect current risk assessment
practices and to protect vulnerable populations such as pregnant women and children.
Keywords: BP oil spill, children’s health, Deepwater Horizon, Food and Drug Administration, Gulf of Mexico, PAHs, polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons, risk assessment, seafood.
Citation: Rotkin-Ellman M, Wong KK, Solomon GM 2012. Seafood Contamination after the BP Gulf Oil Spill and Risks to
Vulnerable Populations: A Critique of the FDA Risk Assessment. Environ Health Perspect 120:157-161.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1103695
Received: 18 March 2011; Accepted: 03 October 2011; Online: 12 October 2011
Address correspondence to M. Rotkin-Ellman, 111 Sutter St., 20th Floor, San Francisco, CA 94104 USA. Telephone: (415)
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875-6100. Fax: (415) 875-6161. E-mail: mrotkinellman@nrdc.org
http://ehp03.niehs.nih.gov/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1289%2Fehp.1103695
3/15/12 8:46 AM
M.R.E. and G.M.S. are employed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, a nonprofit environmental advocacy group. The
authors declare they have no actual or potential competing financial interests.
The Gulf of Mexico is a very productive fishery, comprising the majority of domestic shrimp (60%) and oyster
(70%) production (Louisiana Seafood Promotion & Marketing Board 2010). During the BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill, > 200 million gallons of oil poured into the Gulf of Mexico, followed by 1.8 million gallons of
dispersants intended to break down the oil into droplets (Repanich 2010).
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the agency responsible for determining seafood safety. In
response to the oil spill, the FDA, working with the states and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), initially closed approximately 37% of the Gulf of Mexico (225,290 km 2 ) to
commercial and recreational fishing (NOAA 2010). Reopening of these areas was conducted on a rolling
basis, using a two-phase testing regime consisting of organoleptic testing, in which experts sniff pieces of
seafood for oil taint, and chemical analysis for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) (FDA 2010a). PAHs
are found in crude oil and have the potential to accumulate in aquatic organisms, presenting a health risk via
ingestion of contaminated seafood (Yender et al. 2002). Crustaceans and mollusks, such as shrimp, crab,
and oysters, are especially likely to be contaminated because of reduced rates of biological clearance of PAHs
in these species (Law et al. 2002). The FDA tested for the presence of 13 PAHs selected on the basis of
known carcinogenicity or other health effects, including stunted growth, anemia, and kidney disease. The
FDA also calculated allowable thresholds [levels of concern (LOCs)] for PAHs in each specific type of Gulf
seafood.
The FDA allowed most Gulf fisheries to reopen during the summer and fall of 2010 based on measured PAHs
in seafood below the LOCs, although public confidence in Gulf seafood was slow to rebuild (Marcus 2011).
The adequacy of the policy decision to resume commercial fishing hinged on the accuracy of FDA’s
assumptions in calculating the LOCs and on the rigor of the seafood monitoring program. By critically
evaluating the FDA’s risk assessment and monitoring practices, we aimed to determine the adequacy of
public health protection in this particular case and to identify any broader improvements that may be needed
to risk assessment practices and food safety determinations at the FDA.
Objectives
We evaluated the degree to which the FDA’s procedures for determining the safety of Gulf seafood after the
BP oil spill (FDA 2010a) reflect current risk assessment practices and protect vulnerable populations. We
focused on cancer risk associated with shellfish consumption, calculated revised LOCs designed to be
protective of vulnerable populations, and compared them with the FDA LOCs as well as with measured
concentrations of PAHs in Gulf shellfish.
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Discussion
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The FDA Gulf seafood risk assessment (FDA 2010a) contains numerous assumptions that are inconsistent
with the FDA’s own prior practice and with risk assessment guidelines produced by other authoritative
entities, including the National Research Council (NRC), the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the California EPA. Each of these assumptions would tend to
result in an underestimate of risk for a significant fraction of the exposed population. The questionable
assumptions include six main issues: a) high consumer body weight, b) low estimates of seafood
consumption, c) failure to include a cancer risk assessment for naphthalene, d) failure to adjust for early-life
susceptibility to PAHs, e) short exposure duration, and f!) high cancer risk benchmarks. Taken together,
these flaws illustrate a failure to incorporate the substantial body of evidence on the increased vulnerability
of subpopulations to contaminants, such as PAHs, in seafood.
High consumer body weight. For derivation of all LOCs, the FDA assumed a body weight of 80 kg (176 lb).
Although the FDA’s body weight assumption is reasonable for some segments of the population, close to
75% of the female population in the United States weighs < 80 kg, and the average body weight of a 4- to
6-year-old child is 21.6 kg (McDowell et al. 2008). In a follow-up risk assessment conducted for an additional
oil spill–related contaminant, the FDA acknowledged that using a lower body weight (60 kg) offered greater
health protection (Bolger 2010). The U.S. EPA publishes age group–specific body weights for use in risk
assessments (U.S. EPA 2011), based on the broad scientific understanding that children have increased
susceptibility to ingested contaminants because of their high food intake in proportion of their body weight
(NRC 1993). Because acceptable intake of contaminants is calculated as a fraction of body weight, using an
inflated assumption in a risk assessment is systematically underprotective of the entire population that
weighs below the level used in the calculation.
Low estimate of seafood consumption. The FDA assumed that each consumer eats a daily average of 49, 12,
or 13 g of fish, oysters, or shrimp/crab, respectively. The FDA derived this consumption rate from the 90th
percentile reported in the 2005–2006 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) for
nationwide seafood consumption (FDA 2010a). Populations living along the Gulf Coast have a rate of seafood
consumption higher than the rest of the nation (Mahaffey et al. 2009). For example, surveys of New Orleans,
Louisiana, residents and recreational anglers in Louisiana found high-end consumers reporting shrimp intakes
of 65.1 and 55.5 g/day, respectively (Anderson and Rice 1993; Lincoln et al. 2011), which is significantly
higher than the FDA’s estimate of 13 g/day. Federal and international agencies, including the U.S. EPA and
the WHO, have identified the need to protect high-end and subsistence fishing communities from
contaminants in seafood by accounting for increased consumption rates. These agencies recommend using
local studies and/or the 95th–97th percentile of national consumption surveys (U.S. EPA 2000; WHO 2008),
in contrast to the 90th percentile used by the FDA. To protect subsistence adult consumers, the U.S. EPA
recommends fish consumption rates ranging from 142.4 g/day (general population) to 170 g/day (Native
Americans) (U.S. EPA 2000), which is 2.9–3.5 times higher than the FDA estimate of 49 g/day. Similarly, the
95th percentile fish consumption rate reported in Seafood Choices: Balancing Benefits and Risks (Institute of
Medicine 2007) is equal to 155 g/day—3.2 times higher than the FDA assumption. The FDA also failed to
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account for the possibility that consumers may eat a combination of various types of seafood when they
calculated consumption rates and LOCs for shrimp, oysters, crab, and fish separately.
Failure to consider the cancer risk from naphthalene. Naphthalene was one of the most frequently detected
PAHs in Gulf seafood tested after the spill and was the most prevalent PAH in the oil itself (FDA 2010a; FDA,
unpublished data). Despite the fact that naphthalene poses a health risk due to both carcinogenic and
noncarcinogenic health effects, the FDA established the LOC in Gulf seafood based solely on noncancer
effects (FDA 2010a). Naphthalene is listed in the 12th Report on Carcinogens [National Toxicology Program
(NTP) 2011] (which the FDA has endorsed) as reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen based on
dose-related rare nasal and respiratory neuroblastomas and adenomas in male and female rats, and on lung
tumors in female mice. Inhalation has been associated with cancer of the larynx in humans, and ingestion
was associated with human colorectal cancer in one study (NTP 2011). Naphthalene is also listed by the
State of California as known to cause cancer, with sufficient evidence to determine a cancer potency factor of
0.12 per mg/kg-day, which defines the relationship between exposures and cancer risk [Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) 2005].
The FDA did not assess whether exposures in Gulf seafood could pose an increased risk of cancer from
naphthalene. Because PAHs are a mixture of multiple compounds, small exposures to multiple PAHs can add
up to significant cancer risks. By omitting naphthalene from its cancer risk assessment, the FDA ignored the
potential cumulative effect of exposures to multiple carcinogens.
Failure to include early-life vulnerability. The FDA conducted a single risk assessment for adults and did not
evaluate potential increased risks to the developing fetus or child, yet exposure to PAHs during pregnancy
causes genetic damage to the developing fetus (Harper et al. 1989; Orjuela et al. 2010). Most PAHs are lipid
soluble and therefore cross the placenta (Calabrese 1978; Shendrikova and Aleksandrov 1974). PAHs have
also been observed in human breast milk (Del Bubba et al. 2005; Kim et al. 2008). Animal studies have
found that ingestion of PAHs during pregnancy results in much greater genetic damage in the fetus than in
the mother (Harper et al. 1989). Children exposed prenatally to PAHs have statistically significant increases
in DNA aberrations in specific chromosomes, low birth weight, and intrauterine growth restriction (Choi et al.
2006; Dejmek et al. 2000; Orjuela et al. 2010; Perera et al. 2003, 2005).
The increased vulnerability of the developing fetus and child to genotoxins and carcinogens has been widely
recognized. In March 2005, the U.S. EPA released the Supplemental Guidance for Assessing Susceptibility
from Early-Life Exposure to Carcinogens (U.S. EPA 2005), which presented age-dependent adjustment
factors (ADAFs). ADAFs adjust the slope factors to account for differences in carcinogen potency by age
groups, based on data from animal studies of cancer potency in early-life stages compared with adult
animals (U.S. EPA 2005). The U.S. EPA methods also use different rates of exposure according to age,
accounting for the relative difference in intake between children and adults. The U.S. EPA did not include
ADAFs for prenatal exposures, but did acknowledge that the available data support increased prenatal
susceptibility (U.S. EPA 2005). In California, the OEHHA, under the California EPA, accounts for childhood
exposures in its risk assessment methods and provides an adjustment factor [age sensitivity factor (ASF)]
for prenatal exposures (OEHHA 2009). The FDA did not incorporate any of this information into its calculation
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of the LOCs.
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Short exposure duration and less-protective cancer risk benchmarks. The FDA LOC incorporates a duration of
exposure of only 5 years and an acceptable rate of cancer of 1 cancer in 100,000 people. However, based on
prior experience from oil spills, PAHs are detectable in shellfish for up to 13 years after oil contamination,
and there is evidence of ongoing DNA damage from PAHs in marine life after that time (Bejarano and Michel
2010; Thomas et al. 2007). There is considerable variation in the half-life of PAHs, depending on the
structure of the compound and environmental conditions. However, using an average value recommended by
the California EPA for PAHs in soil (570 days), approximately 10% of the contamination would be expected to
remain after 5 years, and < 2% would remain after 10 years (OEHHA 2000). FDA risk assessments
conducted for prior oil spills, such as the Exxon Valdez, used more conservative and health-protective values
for these parameters: a 10-year exposure duration and an acceptable cancer risk level of 1 in 1 million
(Bolger and Carrington 1999).
Revised risk assessment and LOCs. We used published sources to estimate exposure scenarios for three
populations vulnerable to PAH contamination in Gulf Coast seafood: a woman (or small man), a pregnant
woman (prenatal exposure to < 10 years of age), and a child (2–12 years of age). See Table 1 and
Supplemental Material, pp. 2–3 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1103695) for a description and comparison
of the exposure and risk profiles. Using the vulnerable population risk profiles, the FDA LOC equation (adult
scenario), and the U.S. EPA/California EPA ADAFs/ASFs and risk calculation methods (child and pregnant
woman scenarios), we derived revised LOCs for benzo[a]pyrene (BaP), one of the most potent PAHs, and for
cancer risk from naphthalene in individual types of seafood and for a combined cumulative shellfish-rich diet.
Consistent with FDA methods, we used toxic equivalencies to translate the LOC for BaP to other (non-
naphthalene) carcinogenic PAHs detected in seafood (see Supplemental Material, Table 1).
Table 1.
Parameters to estimate cancer risk due to PAHs in Gulf seafood: FDA versus vulnerable-
populations method.
Recalculating LOCs, including the factors omitted by the FDA, resulted in significantly lower numbers (Table
2). Most notably, the revised LOCs for naphthalene in shellfish using the pregnant woman scenario are four
orders of magnitude smaller than the FDA values (FDA 2010a). At the LOCs set by the FDA, we calculated
cancer risks of 4,094 and 20,214 per million people for a combined high-shellfish diet for the woman and
pregnant woman scenarios, respectively (Table 3). Although the combined high-shellfish diet scenario
represents the sum of individual shellfish consumption rates, it is consistent with estimates of high-end
shellfish consumption [see Supplemental Material, p. 4 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1103695)]. These
risks greatly exceed the FDA risk threshold of 1 in 100,000 (or 10 in 1 million) and indicate that the FDA
LOCs are too high to be protective of vulnerable subpopulations.
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Table 2.
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Comparison of FDA published LOCs for PAHs in Gulf seafood and revised LOCs calculated for
vulnerable populations.
Table 3.
Cancer risks (excess risk per million people) calculated for vulnerable Gulf Coast populations
at the LOCs set by the FDA for the Gulf Coast after the BP oil spill.
Table 4.
Calculated cancer risks (excess risk per million people) based on mean (95% CI) detected PAH levelsa in
Gulf shellfish tested after the BP oil spill.
Health risks associated with Gulf Coast shellfish tested after the oil spill. Although the volume of testing was
low, government monitoring of PAH levels in Gulf seafood enables a rough calculation of the cancer risk
associated with measured levels of PAHs in Gulf shellfish for populations of concern. The FDA based the
reopening of coastal (state) waters to commercial shellfish harvesting on a total of 80, 37, and 92 samples of
shrimp, oysters, and crab, respectively (FDA 2011). The NOAA analyzed an additional 122 shrimp samples
before reopening offshore (federal) waters (NOAA 2011). Subsequently, both the FDA and NOAA have
conducted follow-up testing of seafood collected in reopened Gulf waters for shrimp (n = 155), crab (n =
34), and oysters (n = 3).
The NOAA initially used gas chromatography-mass spectrophotometry (GC/MS) with low detection limits, but
the alkyl naphthalenes were omitted, thereby underestimating total naphthalene concentrations. Subsequent
NOAA testing and all FDA testing used a more-rapid high-performance liquid chromatography method (HPLC)
with fluorescence detection, with a higher detection limit. We analyzed the data published on the FDA and
NOAA web sites as of 10 June 2011 (FDA 2011; NOAA 2011). In addition, the Natural Resources Defense
Council conducted a shrimp-sampling project in Barataria Bay, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Sound near
Pass Christian, Mississippi, in December 2010 using the GC/MS analytical method, but including alkyl
naphthalenes. Our project, although covering only two specific locations of concern, collected 4–9 samples
per 100-mile 2 sampling grid, greatly exceeding the sampling density the FDA reported for state waters.
We used the revised risk assessment methods to evaluate the levels of carcinogenic PAHs detected in
shellfish after the oil spill. For the seven PAHs with established toxicity equivalents, we calculated total BaP
equivalents to enable comparison with the LOC and to calculate total cancer risk. Detection frequencies and
concentrations of carcinogenic PAHs varied between the analytes, types of shellfish, testing methods, and
agency data sets [see Supplemental Material, Table 2 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1103695)]. To
calculate cancer risk at the levels detected in Gulf shellfish, we combined results generated using comparable
analytical methods (FDA and NOAA data sets). To evaluate a worst-case scenario, and in light of high
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analytical limits of detection, we calculated cancer risks based on detected values and 10-year exposure
duration. (See Supplemental Material for more information on our data analysis methods.)
Based on the mean of the detected PAH concentrations in shellfish, cancer risks for the woman and
pregnancy scenarios were 0.008 and 4.2 in 1 million, respectively, from total BaP equivalent concentrations
and 0.5 and 3.9 in 1 million from naphthalene. Combined cancer risk from all PAHs, including naphthalene,
was highest for the pregnancy scenario at 8.1 [95% confidence interval (CI): 4.3, 12.9] in 1 million (Table
4). When we compared measured PAH levels (using the HPLC method) with the revised LOCs in shellfish
using the pregnancy scenario, we found that 0–27% exceeded the revised LOCs set for consumption of one
type of shellfish (shrimp, crab, or oysters) and 17–55% exceeded the LOC for consumption of combined
shellfish types. In contrast, a much smaller number of shrimp samples (2–8%) had PAH concentrations that
exceeded the revised cumulative exposure LOCs for the adult woman scenario [see Supplemental Material,
Table 3 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1103695)]. Levels of naphthalene and BaP equivalents measured in
our pilot shrimp-sampling project were lower than values reported using the HPLC method in the FDA and
NOAA data sets, and only 1 of 13 samples exceeded any of the relevant LOCs (see Supplemental Material,
Table 3). Notably, using revised risk calculations and the pregnancy scenario, the revised LOCs for BaP in
shrimp and total shellfish are below the limit of detection for BaP using the HPLC method (0.39 ppb). The
LOC for naphthalene in shrimp for the pregnant woman scenario is below the limit of quantification of the
HPLC method (15.0 ppb) (FDA 2010b).
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that the FDA’s conclusion that there were no risks to Gulf
populations from oil spill–related contaminants in seafood missed some exposures of concern, particularly for
pregnant women who are high-end seafood consumers. Additionally, the use of the HPLC-fluorescence
analytical method, although improving the speed of analysis, may have missed low levels of PAH
contamination of public health relevance for vulnerable populations.
Conclusions
Environmental risk assessment requires the use of scientifically founded assumptions and appropriate default
estimates about the exposed population, the intensity and duration of exposure, and the dose–response
relationship. The risk assessment methods used by the FDA to set safe exposure levels for Gulf Coast
seafood after the oil spill do not incorporate current best practices and do not protect vulnerable populations.
The FDA’s conclusions about risks from Gulf seafood should be interpreted with caution in coastal populations
with higher rates of seafood consumption and in vulnerable populations such as children, small adults, and
pregnant women. Our analysis demonstrates that a revised approach, using standard risk assessment
methods, results in significantly lower acceptable levels of PAHs in seafood and identifies populations that
could be at risk from contaminants in Gulf Coast seafood. Health advisories targeted at high-end consumers
would better protect vulnerable populations such as pregnant women, women who may become pregnant,
and children. Our approach did not address infant exposure to PAHs via maternal seafood consumption and
lactational transfer. The NRC (2008) found up to 50-fold interindividual variability in cancer risk and
recommends incorporation of estimates of uncertainty, as well as population risk distributions, into future
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risk assessments. Improved public health protection from contaminants in food will require reforming FDA
risk assessment practices.
Supplemental Material
(238 KB) PDF.
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July 16, 2010
CONSENSUS STATEMENT:
Scientists oppose the use of dispersant chemicals in the Gulf of Mexico
Statement drafted by Dr. Susan D. Shaw, Marine Environmental Research Institute, www.meriresearch.org
We oppose the use of chemical dispersants in the Gulf, and urgently recommend an immediate halt
to their application. We believe that Corexit dispersants, in combination with crude oil, pose grave
health risks to marine life and human health, and threaten to deplete critical niches in the Gulf food
web that may never recover.
We urge federal and state agencies to fund independent research immediately to produce
transparent, timely information that will inform us about the damage to the ecosystem and protect
the health of Gulf response workers, residents, and wildlife.
Background
Since the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, BP has
applied almost two million gallons of dispersants, both on the surface and beneath Gulf waters. Government
officials acknowledge that the quantity and manner in which dispersants have been applied in the Gulf are
unprecedented. The application of dispersant at the source of the discharge, 5,000 feet under the surface of
the water, is also unprecedented.
By enhancing the amount of oil that physically mixes into the water column, dispersants reduce the amount
of oil that reaches shoreline habitats. Although called for in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 as a tool for
minimizing the impact of oil spills, chemical dispersants are controversial (NRC, 2005) because of the toxicity
of dispersed mixtures and their potential negative impacts on ocean life. Another point of controversy is that
once oil is dispersed in deep water, it cannot be recovered. Oil, when combined with dispersants in the
water column is more toxic to marine species than either oil or dispersant alone.
At a Senate hearing on June 15, 2010, EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson stated, “In the use of dispersants we
are faced with environmental tradeoffs.” In fact, the use of dispersants does not represent a science-based,
quantifiable “tradeoff” but rather amounts to a large-scale experiment on the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem
that runs contrary to a precautionary approach, an experiment where the costs may ultimately outweigh
the benefits.
Moreover, this “trade-off” has been confounded by the lack of a vigorous, technologically adequate effort to
collect crude oil from the surface. Berms and booms quickly proved to be ineffective in this deepwater
system. As a result, crude oil has penetrated 30 miles into the coastal wetlands of Louisiana and has reached
the shores of other Gulf states.
Dispersants applied by BP have resulted in widely disseminated undersea plumes of oil, confirmed by NOAA
on June 8. (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/06/government-confirms-undersea-oil-in-gulfof-mexico.html).
Samples were collected by scientists from University of South Florida on the MV
Weatherbird II and tested by NOAA's lab. Subsequently, the plumes have migrated outward from the
discharge source and over time are likely to travel with prevailing currents to the Florida Keys, Cuba, Mexico,
and the eastern seaboard of the US. The vast quantities of dispersed oil in these plumes can enter the marine
food chain and bioaccumulate in animal tissue, potentially impacting marine ecosystems over many years and
over a broad geographical area.

Corexit Dispersants Used in the Gulf
Two dispersants, Corexit 9500 and 9527A, produced by Nalco of Naperville, Illinois, have been used in the
Gulf (http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/site/2931/). Although listed among EPA-approved
dispersants, Corexits are oil industry-insider products, and are ranked by the EPA as more toxic and less
effective than other approved dispersants, which has raised questions about their use in the Gulf (Scarlett et
al 2005). A comprehensive report on the health hazards of crude oil and the known ingredients of Corexits is
available at: http://www.sciencecorps.org/crudeoilhazards.htm.
Corexit 9527A contains 2-BTE (2-butoxyethanol), a toxic solvent that ruptures red blood cells, causing
hemolysis (bleeding) and liver and kidney damage (Johanson and Bowman, 1991, Nalco, 2010). Both Corexit
dispersants contain petroleum solvents that mix with the crude oil mass and move through it, thus increasing
the uptake of oil by organisms (NRC, 2005, Nalco, 2010).
The properties that facilitate the movement of dispersants through oil also make it easier for them to move
through cell walls, skin barriers, and membranes that protect vital organs, underlying layers of skin, the
surfaces of eyes, mouths, and other structures.
Crude Oil & Corexit Combined Are More Toxic Than Either Alone
The combination of Corexit and crude oil can be more toxic than either alone, since they contain many
ingredients that target the same organs in the body. In addition, Corexit dispersants facilitate the entry of oil
into the body, into cells, which can result in damage to every organ system (Burns and Harbut, 2010).
Exposure to chemicals in crude oil and dispersants can occur through skin contact, inhalation of
contaminated air or soil/sand, and ingestion of contaminated water or food. These can occur simultaneously.
Chemicals in crude oil and dispersants can cause a wide range of health effects in people and
wildlife. Crude oil has many highly toxic chemical ingredients, including polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), that can damage every system in the body. These include:
respiratory system nervous system, including the brain
liver reproductive/urogenital system
kidneys endocrine system
circulatory system gastrointestinal system
immune system sensory systems
musculoskeletal system hematopoietic system (blood forming)
skin and integumentary system disruption of normal metabolism
Damage to these systems can cause a wide range of diseases and conditions. Some may be immediately
evident, and others can appear months or years later. The chemicals can impair normal growth and
development through a variety of mechanisms, including endocrine disruption and direct fetal damage. Some
of the chemicals, such as the PAHs, cause mutations that may lead to cancer and multi-generational birth
defects (Burns and Harbut, 2010). Of note, benzene, a human carcinogen, is a VOC that is released by crude
oil (CDC, 1999). It is not known what additional VOCs (if any) are added to the crude oil mix by dispersants,
due to a lack of disclosure about dispersant ingredients.
Potential human health effects include burning skin, difficulty breathing, headaches, heart palpitations,
dizziness, confusion, and nausea — which have already been reported by some workers — as well as
chemical pneumonia and internal bleeding (Burns and Harbut, 2010, US EPA 2010). These are more often
2

noticed than more serious effects that don't have obvious signs and symptoms - lung, liver and kidney
damage, infertility, immune system suppression, disruption of hormone levels, blood disorders, mutations,
and cancer. Coastal communities could also experience more extreme health consequences, including longterm
neurological effects on children and developing fetuses, and hereditary mutations. As of June 21, the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals reported 143 cases of illness "believed to be related to oil
exposure", including 108 response workers (mostly men) and 35 coastal residents (two-thirds women)
(http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/). The most common symptoms were headache, nausea, throat irritation,
vomiting, cough and difficulty breathing.
Corexit Dispersant Ingredients Have Not Been Fully Disclosed
On June 8th, US EPA provided a list of chemicals they stated were in the two Corexit products used to date.
Companies are not required to list all ingredients in their products, or to provide detailed information on
those that they do list. They can claim ingredients are "proprietary" to avoid disclosure. Ingredients in a
product may be listed as a group rather than a single chemical.
For example, the group "petroleum distillates, hydrotreated light" is listed on the MSDS for Corexit 9500.
There are hundreds of chemicals within this group. Similarly, "organic sulfonic acid salts" are listed as an
ingredient, but these may include many potential organic components. Without specific information, it
isn't possible to fully assess short or long-term human health hazards or ecological effects.
Toxic Impacts on Marine Life
Oil spill impacts can occur by 1) physical contact (oiling), 2) toxicity, and 3) loss of food web niches. Some of
the effects of this spill are visible – 1866 dead oiled birds, 463 sea turtles, 59 dolphins, one sperm whale (DH
Response Report July 14). Many scientists suspect that the worst of the impacts on the Gulf are yet to
come and will not be apparent without deliberate tracking and scientific assessment.
Since the 1970s, it has been known that application of dispersants to oil spills increases toxicity by increasing
oil and hydrocarbon exposure to water column species. A review of the literature by Dye et al (1980) reported
that "virtually every author who has investigated the toxicity of oil-dispersant mixtures reports dramatic
increases in mortality compared to oil or dispersant alone, indicating the existence of supra-additive synergy."
Today, many scientists are concerned about the likelihood of severe, acute impacts on a wide range of Gulf
species that are now being exposed to Corexit and oil in the water column. For vulnerable species such as
seagrass, corals, plankton, shrimp, crabs, and small fish, acute effects can be lethal, particularly during the
spring spawning season (Ibemesim et al, 2008, Barron et al, 2003, Rhoton et al, 1998, Bhattacharyya et al 2003,
Chapman et al 2007, Anderson et al, 2009, Couillard et al, 2005, Ramachandran et al, 2004, Fisher et al, 1993,
Gulec et al, 1997). Coral larvae are extremely sensitive to the combined effects, with 0% fertilization rates in
the presence of dispersant and dispersed oil, compared with 98% fertilization in the presence of oil alone
(Negri and Heyward, 2000, Shafir et al, 2007, Epstein et al 2000).
As plumes of dispersed oil form in the water column, globules of oil and dispersant envelop and kill floating
plankton, fish eggs and larvae – and everything else at sensitive life stages. Planktivorous species like herring
and whale sharks indiscriminately feed on these globules and may break the oil down to more toxic byproducts.
Already, vast numbers of bottom-feeders and filter-feeders have been decimated in heavily oiled
areas such as Louisiana’s Barataria Bay (Shaw, CNN 2010). Depletion of these critical niches in the food
web can set the stage for “trophic cascades,” causing the collapse of higher organisms (Peterson et al.
2003).
At the top of the food web, large fish (amberjacks, tuna, grouper) and marine mammals are exposed to oil
and dispersant through feeding on contaminated fish. Air-breathing animals like dolphins and sperm whales
are exposed to volatile petroleum fumes every time they surface for air - and taking oil into the blowhole can
3

cause chemical pneumonia and liver and kidney damage. Skin contact with Corexit and oil can cause ulcers
and burns to membranes of the eyes and mouth. Corexit 9527, which was used in the Gulf until supplies ran
out in May, contains the toxic solvent, 2-butoxyethanol, that ruptures red blood cells, causing animals to
undergo hemolysis (internal bleeding) (Burns and Harbut, 2010, Nalco 2010). Fishermen in the Gulf have
reported that dolphins spouting oil from the blowhole have approached their boats (Shaw, TEDXOilSpill,
2010). These dolphins are likely suffocating from petrochemical solvent-related burning of lung membranes
(“chemical pneumonia”) and thus are dying before our eyes. As scientists, the question is, how will we know?
Finally, dispersing oil at depth means that a significant volume of oil is not able to be recovered at the surface.
This dispersed oil can enter the marine food chain at many points and bioaccumulate in animal tissue,
potentially impacting marine ecosystems over many years and over a broad geographical area.
Scientists Express Concerns
On July 10, 2010 the journal Nature reported concerns expressed by scientists about the implications of the
use of dispersants (Nature News, July 10, 2010). David Valentine, a geomicrobiologist at the University of
California, Santa Barbara, described BP’s use of dispersants as “an experiment that’s never been performed
before – to dump that much of an industrial chemical into the ocean.”
Susan Shaw, a marine toxicologist and director of the Marine Environmental Research Institute, responded to
the EPA’s announcement on 30 June that its initial round of toxicity testing on eight dispersants, including
Corexit 9500 found no "biologically significant" endocrine-disrupting effects on the small estuarine fish and
mysid shrimp tested. "We already know that dispersants are less toxic than oil if you compare the two," says
Shaw. "But because Corexit contains a petroleum solvent, we're actually putting petroleum solvent on top of
a petroleum spill. So it's increasing the hydrocarbons in the water column." Furthermore, says Shaw, the
dispersant can increase the toxicity of the oil for those marine organisms that encounter it. "It's like a delivery
system," says Shaw. "The [dispersed] oil enters the body more readily and it goes into the organs faster."
Dispersion is thought to speed up oil degradation because tiny droplets can be more readily metabolized by
oil-eating microbes. Samantha Joye, a biogeochemist at the University of Georgia in Athens disagrees: "It
assumes that the dispersant doesn't impact the microbial community, and we have no idea if that's true or not.
There's just as good a chance that this dispersant is killing off a critical portion of the microbial community as
it is that it's stimulating the breakdown of oil."
Federal Agencies Need to Fully Disclose Test Results
Although EPA has listed extensive sampling and analysis plans on the federal spill website, they have not
provided most of the results that they have. They do not describe the chemicals that people are inhaling, nor
do they warn people that many volatile organic chemicals from crude oil can have serious long term health
consequences, including cancer.
Similarly, NOAA has been accused of “hoarding” its Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) data
on the extent and effect of undersea oil plumes. Despite early urgent warnings from independent scientists
that oil suspended in the water column is likely killing wide swaths of sea life, NOAA was slow to send out
research vessels to probe the extent of the problem. To date, very little of the NRDA data has been released
to researchers, presumably because of pending litigation. However, the raw data is being immediately turned
over to the Joint Incident Command, and thus to the lead defendant, BP.
4

The Need to Know
Beyond the 11 men who were killed in the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion, the human toll of the Gulf oil
spill is unknown. In past disasters, inadequate public information and protections have caused serious health
problems among responders and local communities that were poorly informed about hazards.
To mitigate past and future damage to human and wildlife populations as well as the ocean ecosystem, it is
critical that the federal government and state agencies provide the results of their air, water, seafood,
and other testing to the public as soon as the information becomes available.
Withholding information, however well-intentioned, is dangerous and should be avoided at all costs. Testing
results must be made available as quickly as possible to enable Gulf officials, response workers, and individual
citizens to make informed decisions regarding potential health risks and the best courses of action.
We urge federal agencies to provide the following to ensure the best possible health for
people and wildlife in the Gulf Region:
1. An immediate halt to the use of chemical dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico, particularly the application of
dispersants at depth.
2. Full disclosure of all the chemical ingredients in the Corexit formulations and full toxicity data on these
chemicals in combination with oil – this information should be posted on a website and should include
studies submitted by the manufacturers to EPA, not meaningless summaries.
3. A federal site that provides adverse effects information from the previous uses of Corexit dispersants. This
should cover environmental media, wildlife, and human populations. This information was collected after
Corexit 9527 was used in the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska.
4. Access to the extensive monitoring data that EPA and NOAA have collected documenting what chemicals
are in the air and water and their observed adverse impacts. Only limited summary data have been provided
to the public.
5. Funding for independent research on short-term and long-term impacts; money that is available to
qualified researchers NOW, not months later (as in the Exxon Valdez spill) when exposure has lessened and
impacts will be difficult, if not impossible, to document.
5

References
Anderson, B.S., Arenella-Parkerson, D., Phillips, B.M., Tjeerdema, R.S., Crane, D., 2009. Preliminary investigation of the effects
of dispersed Prudhoe Bay Crude Oil on developing topsmelt embryos, Atherinops affinis. Environmental Pollution 157,
1058-1061.
Barron, M.G., Carls, M.G., Short, J.W., Rice, S.D., 2003. Photoenhanced toxicity of aqueous phase and chemically dispersed
weathered Alaska North Slope crude oil to Pacific herring eggs and larvae. Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry
22, 650-660.
Bhattacharyya, S., Klerks, P.L., Nyman, J.A., 2003. Toxicity to freshwater organisms from oils and oil spill chemical treatments
in laboratory microcosms. Environmental Pollution 122, , 205-215.
Burns, K. and Harbut, M.R., 2010. Gulf Oil Spill Hazards, Sciencecorps, Lexington, MA, June 14, 2010. Available at
http://www.sciencecorps.org/crudeoilhazards.htm
Chapman, H., Purnell, K., Law, R.J., Kirby, M.F., 2007. The use of chemical dispersants to combat oil spills at sea: A review of
practice and research needs in Europe. Marine Pollution Bulletin 54, 827-838.
Couillard, C.M., Lee, K., Légaré, B., King, T.L., 2005. Effect of dispersant on the composition of the water-accommodated
fraction of crude oil and its toxicity to larval marine fish. Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 24, 1496-1504.
Deepwater Horizon Response Consolidated Fish & Wildlife Report July 14, 2010. Available at:
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/site/2931/.
Dye, C.W., Frydenborg, R.B., 1980. Oil dispersants and the environmental consequences of their usage: A literature review.
Technical Series. State of Florida - Department of Environmental Regulation.
Epstein, N., R. P. M. Bak, et al. 2000. Toxicity of third generation dispersants and dispersed Egyptian crude oil on Red Sea coral
larvae. Marine Pollution Bulletin 40(6), 497-503.
Fisher, W.S., Foss, S.S., 1993. A simple test for toxicity of Number 2 fuel oil and oil dispersants to embryos of grass
shrimp, Palaemonetes pugio. Marine Pollution Bulletin 26, 385-391.
Gulec, I., Holdway, D.A., 1997. Toxicity of dispersant, oil, and dispersed oil to two marine organisms. 1997 International
Oil Spill Conference, pp. 1010-1011.
Ibemesim, R.I., Bamidele, J.F., 2008. Comparative toxicity of two oil types and two dispersants on the growth of a
seashore grass, Paspalum vaginatum (swartz). International Oil Spill Conference - IOSC 2008, Proceedings, pp. 875-880.
Johanson, G., Boman, A., 1991. Percutaneous absorption of 2-butoxyethanol vapour in human subjects. British Journal of Industrial
Medicine 48, 788-792.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Public Health, 2010. Oil Spill Health Effect Summary: MS Canyon 252
Oil Spill Surveillance Report Week 24 06/13/2010 to 06/19/2010. Available at http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/.
NALCO 2010. Material Safety Data Sheet Corexit EC9500A.
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/posted/2931/Corexit_EC9500A_MSDS.539287.pdf
NALCO 2010. Material Safety Data Sheet Corexit EC9527A.
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/posted/2931/Corexit_EC9527A_MSDS.539295.pdf
National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 2005. Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects. Available at:
http://www.hap.edu/catalog/11283.html
Negri, A.P., Heyward, A.J., 2000. Inhibition of fertilization and larval metamorphosis of the coral Acropora millepora
(Ehrenberg, 1834) by petroleum products. Marine Pollution Bulletin 41, 420-427.
Peterson, C.H., Rice, S.D., Short, J.W., Esler, D., Bodkin, J.L., Ballachey, B.E., Irons, D.B., 2003. Long-term ecosystem
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Science 302, 2082-2986.
Ramachandran, S. D., Hodson, P.V. Khan, C.W. Lee, K. 2004. Oil dispersant increases PAH uptake by fish exposed to crude oil.
Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 59(3), 300-308.
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dispersed oil to an Alaskan marine organism. International Oil Spill Conference, pp. 8485-8488
Scarlett, A., Galloway, T.S., Canty, M., Smith, E.L., Nilsson, J., Rowland, S.J., 2005. Comparative toxicity of two oil dispersants,
Superdispersant-25 and Corexit 9527, to a range of coastal species. Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 24, 1219-
1227
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2) Washington DC Available at
Consensus Statement drafted by Dr. Susan D. Shaw, Marine Environmental Research Institute, www.meriresearch.org July 16, 2010
6

Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Residual
Tar Product Sourced from Crude Oil Released during the Deepwater
Horizon MC252 Spill of National Significance
James H “Rip” Kirby III,
University of South Florida, Dept of Geology, 4202 E Fowler Ave, SCA 528, Tampa, FL 33620
jkirby@usf.edu
ABSTRACT
Crude oil product washed ashore in the northern Gulf of Mexico (GOM) starting in
late April 2010. Field expeditions in May 2010 were conducted to baseline the pristine
conditions of the beaches were done prior to arrival of crude oil product. Field work to
collect tar product samples for a trend analysis of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
(PAH) concentration levels started in late March 2011 and ended in November 2011. Six
sample sets were collected approximately at one month intervals and submitted for
analysis. A total of 71 samples were tested. Tests for 38 different PAH analytes were
done on 48 samples. Oil range organics (ORO) tests were done on 23 samples.
Compared to the Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) or carcinogenic
exposure limit for PAH analytes listed as coal tar derivatives, 90% of the positively
identified analytes exceeded the IDLH limit. The use of ultraviolet light equipment in
the field showed distinct fluorescent responses to illumination by a 370nm UV light
source. UV light equipment was found to be very efficient in identifying tar product on
the beach for evaluating the visual level of contamination on the beach. Fluorescent
responses from tar product found in the field and laboratory created tar product were
measured by fluorometry equipment. The collection area was between Waveland, MS
and Cape San Blas, FL. Most sampling efforts centered on the AL and NW FL
Panhandle shorelines.
Keywords: Tar product, Macondo, oil pollution, dispersant, Corexit®, fluorescence, UV
light, beach, swash zone, plunge step, contaminated sediment, toxicants, PAH
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the accidental sinking of the MDV Deepwater Horizon (DWH) and
subsequent release of crude oil into the waters of the GOM, the USCG declared the
accident a Spill of National Significance (SONS), the first ever declaration for an oil spill.
On May 10-11, 2010, the author and a team of geologists conducted a beach front study
on behalf of private property owners in Walton County, FL and Destin, FL to determine
a baseline for the exact level of any contamination that may have been present prior to
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
the expected arrival of crude oil from the SONS accident site. Results were conclusive
that no contamination was present. This comports with the physical inspections
conducted by geologists monitoring the NW Florida panhandle coastline since August
2004 as part of the USF Coastal Research Lab’s hurricane impact studies. Prior to the
arrival of crude oil along the coastline of the northern GOM in Alabama and NW
Florida, no physical signs of oil pollution were encountered.
USCG and other agencies collected crude oil and weathered tar product from the
coastal zone. Tests by the EPA and USGS established fingerprint techniques and
standards for identifying contaminants as being sourced from the DWH accident site.
The samples collected for this study were not fingerprinted for identifying the source of
the tar product collected. Samples were collected to determine the level of toxic PAH
material contained in those samples. The UV signature of the tar sample was used to
visually identify the probability of the sample as having been treated with Corexit®
brand dispersants. Determining the toxicity of tar product was the main focus of this
research effort. Identification of the provenance of tar product was not part of this
sample collection and analysis effort.
The contamination from crude oil and subsequent tar product it created negatively
affected the tourism industry and the fishing industry, both economically and
environmentally. The determination of the toxicity of tar product remaining in the
environment and whether there is any extraordinary affect of Corexit® brand
dispersants on the behavior of the resulting tar product provides information that links
the economic and environmental aspects together. Tourism in the northern GOM
declined sharply following the SONS event. Maritime fishing areas were closed down
during the clean up response effort. These industries have begun to recover
economically, but the environmental damage from persistently toxic PAH levels in tar
product is still being studied and is not fully understood.
Results of current field work show that the swash zone is a major area where tar
product is concentrating. Field investigations in the affected area (Figure 1) conducted
after crude oil arrived in the coastal zone of the northern GOM showed a pattern of
shoreline concentration along the plunge step (Figure 2) that forms during certain wave
conditions. Specifically when a plunge step forms at the base of the wave run-up slope,
tar product in the form of small flakes to large tar patties, are frequently found mixed
into the shell debris at the base of the plunge step. This was observed in several
different locations along northern GOM coastal beaches whenever a plunge step formed
in the swash zone.
The plunge step area forms in response to low energy, small wave conditions that
are continuous over 2-4 tidal cycles. Once formed, the plunge step maintains its
geomorphic shape until higher energy, larger waves flatten the swash zone beach face
and its attendant plunge step. During the destruction of the plunge step, field
investigations did not find tar product to be present in high volumes in the sediment of
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
the area where the plunge step previously existed. Observations indicate that any
weathered tar product sequestered in the plunge step area was remobilized into the
long shore swash zone and likely moved landward at high tide to be stranded in the
back beach wrack line area.
During the collection time period, which roughly coincided with the annual
hurricane season, tar product collected by researchers and trained volunteers was found
during daylight and at night. Night operations used UV light sources that would cause
the tar product to fluoresce a distinct yellow-orange color (550-630nm wavelength).
Clean glass bottles were used to hold the samples until processed for lab analysis.
Containers were stored in cold storage at 38°F or less in a dedicated refrigerator while
being held for processing. Processing involved examining the samples under controlled
conditions using ambient and UV light sources, recording imagery of the fluorescent
signature or lack thereof, and documenting the date, time, and location of the collected
specimen on a chain of custody receipt. Samples were packed in coolers surrounded by
bagged ice and shipped overnight via FedEx to the lab in Baton Rouge, LA.
The lab analyzed the samples for PAH analytes (see lab reports in the appendix)
using method SW 8272-Modified by Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories. Data was
reported in both PDF and comma delimited formats. The PDF files are attached in the
appendix and represent the official certified reports. The comma-delimited format was
used for processing data found in the tables in this report. All the data was processed
through a combination of FileMaker Pro v8.5 and MS Excel spreadsheet software
programs.
During the research effort, the use of ultraviolet light from handheld equipment
allowed weathered tar product to be easily detected at night. The UV light source
wavelength was 365-370nm. The same light source was used in the lab to distinguish
fluorescent signatures of laboratory created tar product from crude oil and dispersant
products supplied to the USF Coastal Research Lab by BP and Nalco.
FINDINGS
1. Tar product is being remobilized along the shorelines of the northern GOM when
higher energy wave sets eroded and redeposit beach sediment.
a. Field investigations have shown that low energy conditions will create plunge
step morphology that effectively concentrates tar product and shell debris at its
base. Tar product will adhere to the shell material.
b. Low energy wave conditions that help create plunge step morphology result from
what is generally regarded as “good weather” for recreational activities on the
beach. In response to such conditions, visitors to the beach tend to increase in
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
number. More people at the beach means a higher probability of human contact
with tar product found in the plunge step area.
2. Weathered tar product sourced from crude oil dispersed with Corexit® brand
chemical dispersants were found to have PAH concentrations consistently in excess
of the IDLH limits (80mg/m³) as stated in the NIOSH/OSHA Occupational Health
Guidelines for Chemical Hazards and published in the NIOSH Pocket Guide to
Chemical Hazards, 2007 (third printing).
a. From March to November, 2011, weathered tar product samples were collected for
analysis. The collection area ranged from Cape San Blas, FL to Waveland, MS.
There were 26 primary sample collection sites (Table 1). When primary sites
displayed wider contamination levels, sub-sampling was done at that primary
site. An additional 6 sub-sampling variations occurred to make a total of 32
sample locations. Most samples were collected along beaches in Alabama and NW
Florida counties of Escambia and Walton. Of the 32 collection sites, only 3 were
found to be free of PAH contamination. Of those 32 collection sites, 26 had
contamination levels in excess of the IDLH for PAH analytes (Table 2).
b. Seventy one samples were collected at roughly one month intervals and sent to
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratory, a certified analytical lab in Baton Rouge, LA.
Twenty three were ORO tests and 48 were PAH tests. The analytical reports are
included in the appendix. Of the 48 samples submitted for PAH analysis, 90% of
these returned detection values of PAH analytes at concentration levels that
exceeded the IDLH (Table 3).
3. Published scientific documentation shows that microbial degradation
(biodegradation) of crude oil is the natural and primary remediation path for crude
oil that can’t be physically or chemically removed from the environment.
a. The life cycle of weathered tar product created from crude oil sources that pollute
shorelines downdrift of oil spill incident locations is well known. Wilcock et al,
(1996) reported:
i. The main influence on PAH persistence is biological degradation by bacteria,
fungi and physical weathering
ii. Biodegradation of PAHs with fewer than four rings readily occurred in the
first month. Compounds with higher molecular weights persisted much
longer, in some cases greater than 200 weeks.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
iii. Total concentrations of PAH mass rapidly declined during the first few days
after application with a reported 38% loss during the first tidal cycle. After
that, levels declined slowly and consistently finally yielding an approximate
half-life of 200 + 100 days.
b. The data reported by Wilcock et al, (1996) did not mirror the reported data on the
samples collected for analysis along the northern GOM coast. The high
concentration levels of PAH analytes remained consistent throughout the sample
collection time period. The only difference between the two situations was that
PAH compounds studied by Wilcock et al, (1996) had not been treated with
Corexit® dispersant.
c. The study by Wilcock et al, (1996) is one of many that support the concept of
biological degradation of weathered crude oil product in coastal zone
environments as a primary mechanism for the remediation of crude oil pollutants
that contaminate shorelines. They also reported that areas with higher levels of
pollution from more frequent incidents of spills likely have “microbial adaption”
evident that result in more rapid biological degradation of the hydrocarbon
pollutants from those more frequent incidents. Given the lack of oil spill impacts
on the coastlines of NW Florida and the rare oil spill frequency on Alabama
beaches, it is doubtful that any natural selection favoring bacteria that are more
tolerant of toxic oil concentrations and more aggressive in consumption
capabilities has occurred.
4. Corexit® dispersant is toxic to the two main species of bacteria known to biodegrade
crude oil in situ.
a. Hamden and Fulmer (2011) of the US Naval Research Laboratory in Washington
DC, published an article titled the Effects of Corexit® EC9500A on bacteria from a
beach oiled by the Deepwater Horizon spill. Their results found that, at concentrations
that did not pose a significant hazard to adult test organisms, “...dispersants may
be highly toxic to communities directly involved in natural hydrocarbon
bioremediation.” They concluded that “The results of the current study
demonstrate that microbial populations are susceptible to toxicity from the use of
COREXIT® EC9500A when applied at prescribed concentrations.”
b. Given the estimate by Wilcock et al, of less than a year for microbial degradation
to remove crude oil with low molecular weights from the environment in warm
water environments, the persistency of toxic PAH levels supports the conclusion
by Hamden and Fulmer on the negative impact of Corexit® on microbial
populations that biodegrade oil product in situ. In addition, large tar product
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
remobilization events now occur along the affected coastline. If microbial
degradation were occurring on the schedule and scale that was predicted by
Wilcock et al,, these remobilization events would be decreasing in severity and
volume instead of continuing at a fairly constant level.
5. Corexit® brand dispersants used in the oil spill clean up response create a discernible
fluorescent signature when illuminated by 370nm UV light.
a. The author confirmed that field work showing different levels of fluorescent
response from weathered tar product was created by the presence, or lack, of
Corexit® brand dispersants, specifically Corexit® 9500A and Corexit® 9527A
(Figure 3). In laboratory experiments, a red shift was confirmed in crude oil
product that had been exposed to Corexit® brand dispersants and allowed to
weather in controlled conditions. By positively identifying residual tar product as
containing Corexit® dispersant through the correlation of its fluorescent response
to illumination by UV light and its relative ratio of Corexit® brand dispersant to
crude oil, the author provides a tool for identifying tar product as having high
probabilities of toxic levels of PAH compounds that need physical removal.
b. Field use of the UV light showed that it was an effective tool to identify tar
product when used in low ambient light conditions such as early evening and
night operations. It easily allowed identification of tar product without additional
special equipment.
6. Corexit® brand dispersants used in the oil spill clean up response could provide a
mechanism for leaching of PAH compounds found in weathered tar product into
lower layers of beach sediment. The probable mechanism is the hydrophilic property
of the dispersant that is attracted to water percolating through a sediment layer
containing contaminants affected by Corexit® brand dispersants. Supporting this
hypothesis is a Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometric result from a field analysis
of contaminated sediment in samples recovered from trenches on the beach of Orange
Beach, AL. It showed the presence of the same PAH compounds in upper and lower
layers of sediment. The lower layer was supposedly clean and free from
contamination.
a. In October 2010, the author identified highly contaminated layers of beach
sediment (Figure 4) that included oil coated sand grains and surface residual tar
product. These layers were identified using UV light to create a fluorescent
response that matched previous samples of contaminated sediment found at
locations reported by the USCG to contain crude oil product from the DWH spill.
Characteristics of the depositional layering of the oil coated sand grains indicate
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
eolian transport and deposition in the upper 20cm of the active surface in the back
beach area. Eolian deposition is the most reasonable deposition conclusion where
wave run up does not occur unless storm conditions are present. Larger, residual
tar product was likely buried in this layer by vehicular and beach cleaning
equipment.
b. The presence of Corexit® dispersant in the tar product was confirmed by positive
fluorescent signatures produced by the contaminated sediment when illuminated
by a 370nm wavelength high intensity UV lamp (Horizon 1 in Figure 4).
However, the lower, contaminated layer (Horizon 2 in Figure 4) did not provide a
fluorescent signature as did the overlying, contaminated layer. This lack of visual
fluorescent response initially led to classification of the lower layers as “visually
free of contamination.” Later, the presence of the oil related hydrocarbon
compounds in Horizons 1 and 2 was confirmed by Gas Chromatography Mass
Spectrometric methods (Figure 5). The implication is that while the presence of
contamination can be visually confirmed with UV light methods, the lack of a
fluorescent signature does not guarantee a contaminant-free surface or sub-surface
layer that is being illuminated by UV light. It is unknown as to why this difference
in fluorescence exists.
7. Corexit® brand dispersants used in the oil spill clean up response increased the
penetration of PAH compounds into the beach sediment which could lead to the
contamination of groundwater sources.
a. In 2012, Zuijdgeest et al, while investigating the effect on groundwater
contamination from leached hydrocarbons treated with Corexit® brand
dispersants, concluded that “the application of dispersants to oil slicks near shores
with sandy beaches can increase the penetration of PAHs into the beach, which
could lead to the contamination of groundwater if concentrations are sufficiently
high.”
b. The conclusions of Zuijdgeest et al, comport with the Gas Chromatography Mass
Spectrometric data of the author on the presence of hydrocarbons in lower layers
of beach sediment at Orange Beach, AL and physical observations in the field.
c. Physical observations from the field included the “sniff” test. When crude oil
contaminants first arrived on shore, trenching operations at Orange Beach, AL
conducted to find buried tar product and oil released vapors from the buried
contaminants. At times, the odor was strong enough to warrant the use of
appropriate PPE filter masks to avoid inhaling fumes. Even though no visual
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
evidence of contamination was present in the lower layers of these trenches, the
odor released from lower layers was obvious as trench sediment was removed.
8. Field observations show that wet skin dermal contact with tar product created from
weathered dispersed crude oil results in immediate absorption into the skin. In this
regard, tar product derived from weathered crude oil dispersed with Corexit® brand
dispersants behaves as though it contains a built-in absorption accelerant. The dermal
absorption is not visible under ambient light conditions, but will show up as a
fluorescent signature in response to 370nm UV light illumination of the skin surface.
a. In August 2011, the author found that wet skin contact with residual tar product
created from dispersed crude oil resulted in immediate dermal absorption of the
fluorescing material directly into wet skin. This was not adherence to the skin, it
was absorption. No tar product was found stuck to the skin surface and nothing
was able to be wiped off the skin onto another material, such as a paper towel or
rag. Figure 6 shows the area of skin where fluorescing material absorbed under
ambient light conditions. Figure 7 shows the same scene under UV light
conditions. Each fluorescing spot represents an individual absorption event.
Contamination via dermal absorption while in contact with submerged sediments
in the swash zone (Figure 8) had been discounted as highly improbable by the
Florida DOH early in the health threat assessment efforts. It is obvious from visual
evidence in Figures 6 and 7 that wet skin dermal absorption is not only possible,
but rapid and highly efficient. It is important to emphasize these points.
i. No tar product was seen attached to the legs of the subject during field work.
ii. All contact was done while kneeling on the bottom in shallow water in front
of the plunge step while gathering sediment samples for analysis.
iii. No residue could be removed by wiping a secondary material on the skin
surface. Nothing was adhering to the skin that could be physically detected.
iv. No skin samples or biopsies were collected. The only evidence of possible
contamination is the visual detection using UV light to fluoresce material that
was absorbed into the skin.
b. Moody, et al, (1995) found that detergents and strong soaps will create additional
forcing mechanisms for the absorption of benzo[a]pyrene across a dermal
boundary. Essentially, the dispersant bound to the hydrocarbon operates like a
detergent by accelerating wet skin dermal absorption rates.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
c. The exact level of toxicity in the fluorescing material of the toxic tar product is
unknown. However, it is known that the tar product encountered during this wet
skin dermal absorption event included PAH concentration levels that exceeded
the IDLH limits listed on page 74 of the NIOSH Pocket Guide To Chemical
Hazards (2007). For PAH compounds, these factors ranged from 110% to 2,863% of
the 80mg/m³ carcinogenic limit listed therein.
d. Because of this event. the author contacted two highly qualified toxicology
researchers and the FL DOH state toxicologist to obtain expert opinions on the
likelihood of this absorption mechanism representing a human health risk. Both
independent experts recommended a toxicology study be conducted to determine
what level of enhanced absorption might result from the presence of Corexit®
dispersant bound to hydrocarbon molecules in tar product found in coastal beach
sediments. The FL DOH state toxicologist reviewed the information provided and
decided the current model was adequate to assess risk and took no further action.
e. As noted by the various health agencies, avoiding contact with tar product is the
best way to prevent contamination. In the case of workers who are involved in
collecting samples or cleaning beaches, appropriate safety precautions to
minimize and preclude direct contact with tar product should be taken. People
who have been trained in HAZWOPR safety classes should be alerted to the fact
that tar product sourced from crude oil treated with Corexit® brand dispersant
will rapidly absorb through a wet skin dermal boundary. Wet skin is not simply
created from swimming, but the use of protective gloves also prevents
perspiration from evaporating. This situation creates wet skin and during the
removal of gloves, inadvertent contact with tar product affected by Corexit®
brand dispersant could easily result in an absorptive event. Risk reduction from
this chronic exposure scenario should be included for HAZWOPR training.
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH
The presence of Corexit® brand dispersant in tar product found on beaches in the
northern GOM is no longer in doubt. Use of Corexit® brand dispersants should be
halted immediately for any and all open water applications. The results of using
Corexit® dispersant are simply unknown at the present time and their effects on the
environment are clearly more widespread in the Gulf of Mexico than previously
thought. Other non-toxic dispersants are on the approved National Contingency Plan
(NCP) list for use in clean up operations and, based on laboratory testing to date by the
author, are more effective than Corexit® at creating non-toxic dispersed oil. Moreover,
models for dermal toxicity assessment using hydrocarbon product treated with
dispersant have not yet been evaluated or made known to the scientific community and
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
the effects of exposure over the long term are yet to be determined. Given the unknown
toxicity and potential for dermal absorption of tar product created from crude oil
dispersed with Corexit® brand dispersants, it is highly recommended that an
immediate examination of this rapid absorption contamination vector through wet skin
be started. Because toxicology studies are beyond the scope of this research effort, it is
hoped by the author that this early release of findings will prompt such an effort to
occur sooner rather than later.
CONCLUSION
The presence of Corexit® brand dispersant treated crude oil as provenance for
weathered tar product can be determined by examining its fluorescent response to
370nm wavelength UV light. The fluorescent response, or signature, of the tar product
shifts toward red as the amount of dispersant increases. Thus, higher ratios of
dispersant to crude oil used during clean up operations can be subjectively determined.
Published research confirms that microbial degradation of tar product is inhibited by
the presence of Corexit® dispersant still bound to its molecular structure. Finding tar
product using UV light is a proven solution to improving physical removal methods. In
addition, removal of tar product weathered from crude oil dispersed with Corexit®
dispersants would lower the number of contact events and thus reduce human health
and safety risks for recreational water activities at beaches. Toxicology studies to
determine effects of Corexit® dispersant on dermal absorption rates of carcinogenic
PAHs through wet skin are needed to assess risk to human health and safety.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was funded primarily by the Surfrider Foundation from financial
support by Patagonia, O'Neill, Norcross Foundation, and individual donors. The USF
Coastal Research Lab provided assistance and equipment. ARA/Vertek provided
equipment and expertise. The numerous volunteers supporting this ongoing project
are gratefully acknowledged and three of them, Jane Kirby, Michael Sturdivant, and
Susan Forsyth, deserve individual honors for going above and beyond the call of duty
in supporting the author’s research. BP P.L.C. and Ecolab-Nalco are acknowledged for
providing crude oil and dispersant product to conduct the research. Congressman Jeff
Miller (FL-1) and his staff helped to expedite the receipt of necessary products from BP
P.L.C. and Ecolab-Nalco.
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Analytical Reports require written request and permission from The Surfrider Foundation to be copied. Contact the
author to coordinate this request. All other material may be reproduced for academic and research purposes with
appropriate citation.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1. Area of operations ranged from Cape San Blas, FL to Waveland, MS. The predominant areas
observed were in Orange Beach, AL, Pensacola Beach, FL, Navarre Beach, FL, along with various beaches
in Okaloosa County and Walton County, FL. Graphic adapted from Google Earth.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Figure 2. The plunge step is a feature located at the base of the wave run-up slope and is generally
formed in response to low energy wave conditions that continue over 2-4 tidal cycles. During this
formation period, the increasing slope and height of the plunge step causes slightly negatively buoyant
material to accumulate at the base until a higher energy wave arrives with enough force to lift the
material onto the wave run-up slope. Tar product is negatively buoyant enough to be trapped at the base
of the plunge step along with shell material and other beach debris. Graphic adapted from Encyclopedia
of Coastal Science, 2005, p. 145, Figure B22.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Figure 3. Crude oil treated with dispersant and allowed to weather in laboratory controlled conditions
displayed a red shift of 60nm when illuminated by a 370nm UV light source. This red shift is easily
discerned by the human eye. Field use of the UV light showed that operations conducted after the sun
sets allowed the UV light to effectively fluoresce tar product without confusion with other materials that,
under ambient light conditions, could easily be mistaken for tar product. Inspections conducted after
clean up efforts also proved that beaches cleaned during daylight operations did not remove all the tar
product present that could be easily removed.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Figure 4. Panel “A” - Ambient light imagery of a trench wall dug to 75cm below grade. The tan layer is
the contaminated layer that is fluorescing in Panels “B” and “C”. The orange and yellow fluorescent
signature (Horizon 1) indicates contamination by weathered crude oil likely mixed with some unknown
amount of Corexit© brand dispersant during the clean up response. Panel “C” shows the expected
fluorescent response color (violet-purple) of supposedly uncontaminated sand (Horizon 2) below the
contaminated layer. As the GCMS results show in Figure 5, the same contamination in the upper layer is
present in the lower sediments that did not fluoresce.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Figure 5. Fluorescent signatures indicated contaminated sediment. Sediment below the
contaminated layer did not fluoresce. However, when examined by GCMS equipment,
contamination signatures matched. This indicated that PAH compounds were leaching from the
higher layers into the lower layers. Given the fluorescent color of the contaminated layer, it was
highly likely that the crude oil product had been mixed or treated with Corexit© dispersants
prior to making landfall and weathering on the beach. The presence of dispersant bound to the
crude oil would make it easier for water percolating downward to attach and create a micelle
that could be moved more easily through the water saturated sediment pore spaces during times
of heavy rainfall.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Figure 6. Ambient light shows no sign of contaminated skin.
Figure 7. UV light shows numerous spots of contamination absorbed in skin.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
Figure 8. Working conditions where the contamination occurred at the west end area of Pensacola Beach.
Bottom contact was constant, but generally less than a minute at any single spot as the sampling team
worked along 200m of shoreline.
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Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Saturday, April 14, 2012
Location
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
17
15
16
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Google Earth
Latitude (°N)
Google Earth
Longitude (°W) Location Description and Remarks
30.260800 89.403783 Waveland MS - pocket beach; 30° 15.648'N 89° 24.227'W
30.241866 87.721753 Gulf Shores, AL - 30.241866°N 087.721753° W
30.308912 87.372325
30.309523 87.369237
PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R46 - fore beach high water line -
tar balls standed in sand at the end of the wave run up line
PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R47 - mid beach shell debris wrack
line
30.310774 87.363065 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R49 - fore beach shell debris line
30.311425 87.359986
PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R50 - high water wrack line; tar
balls with embedded shell debris
30.313324 87.350726 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R53 - back beach wrack line
30.315202 87.341468
PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R56 - back beach wrack line tar
balls
30.316452 87.335294 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R58 - back beach tar balls
30.324810 87.313411
28.047300 87.216367
30.324767 87.183300
PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R66 - swash zone and plunge step
tar balls
N 28° 2.838' W 87° 12.982' - Offshore, approx 11 miles NE of DWH accident site-
surface oil
FT PICKENS - EAST END, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA - 30° 19.486'N
87° 10.998'W"
30.795833 87.166667 WEST END OF P'COLA BEACH, FL - 30° 19' 28.75" N 87° 10' 53.08''W
30.330489 87.141441
30.371807 86.913659
30.377267 86.875550
30.379957 86.860358
30.391050 86.634317
Pcola Bch, FL (Casino Beach due south of the water tower) -N 30.330489° W
087.141441°
N 30° 22’21” W 86°54’50” - Navarre Beach - west end public access at unpaved
prkng lot
N 30° 22.636' W 86° 52.533' - NAVARRE BEACH, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS
AREA
N 30° 22’49” W 86° 51’ 45” - Navarre Pier - east side beach area due south of
picnic lanai area
OK Island - near shore bottom sampling site - due south of the Eglin-western OK
Island boundary
30.403983 86.618017 N 30° 24.239' W 86° 37.081’ - The Boat Marina (oily debris in ICW)
30.383550 86.451683 N 30° 23.013' W 86° 27.101' - Henderson Beach SP
30.368167 86.324467
EAST END OF SAN DESTIN BEACH; boundary with Topsail Hill SP; N 30°
22.090' W 86° 19.468'
30.355541 86.265623 Stallworth Lake outfall -30.354632° 086.263097°
30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples
30.352150 86.251167
DUNE ALLEN BEACH, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA - 30° 21.129' N 86°
15.070' W
30.329581 86.172940 West end of Grayton Beach, FL - 30° 19' 38"N 86° 10' 26"W
29.724380 84.980860 N 29.72438° W 84.98086° - Appalachicola Bay area
Table 1. Summary of primary collection sites for tar product samples. In addition to these 26 primary sites, 6
sites adjacent to the most contaminated sites were sampled when conditions warranted. Google Earth was
used as a universal geocoord reference generator. The local description and remarks are copied from the
Chain of Custody forms and show the wide variety of GPS settings used by volunteer workers.
Copyright 2012 - All Rights Reserved by James H Kirby III Page 18 of 21

Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Saturday, April 14, 2012
Line
No.
Google Earth
Latitude (°N)
Google Earth
Longitude (°W)
Location Description and Remarks - 26 Sites with Positive Detects
1 30.260800 89.403783 Waveland MS - pocket beach; 30° 15.648'N 89° 24.227'W 0 10 10
2 30.241866 87.721753 Gulf Shores, AL - 30.241866°N 087.721753° W 0 6 6
3 30.309523 87.369237 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R47 - mid beach shell debris wrack line 0 2 2
4 30.310774 87.363065 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R49 - fore beach shell debris line 0 2 2
5 30.313324 87.350726 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R53 - back beach wrack line 0 2 2
6 30.315202 87.341468 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R56 - back beach wrack line tar balls 0 2 2
7 30.316452 87.335294 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R58 - back beach tar balls 0 2 2
8 30.324810 87.313411 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R66 - swash zone tar balls 0 4 4
9 30.324810 87.313411 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R66 - plunge step tar balls 0 3 3
10 28.047300 87.216367 N 28° 2.838' W 87° 12.982' - Offshore, approx 11 miles NE of DWH accident site- surface oil 0 22 22
11 30.324767 87.183300 FT PICKENS - EAST END, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA - 30° 19.486'N 87° 10.998'W" 1 4 4
12 30.330489 87.141441 Pcola Bch, FL (Casino Beach due south of the water tower) -N 30.330489° W 087.141441° 0 6 6
13 30.330700 87.140917 Pcola Bch, FL (Casino Beach due south of the water tower) -N 30° 19.842' W087° 8.455' 0 4 4
14 30.371807 86.913659 N 30° 22’21” W 86°54’50” - Navarre Beach - west end public access at unpaved prkng lot 1 10 10
15 30.403983 86.618017 N 30° 24.239' W 86° 37.081’ - The Boat Marina (oily debris in ICW) 1 0 0
16 30.383550 86.451683 N 30° 23.013' W 86° 27.101' - Henderson Beach SP 1 0 0
17 30.368167 86.324467 EAST END OF SAN DESTIN BEACH; boundary with Topsail Hill SP; N 30° 22.090' W 86° 19.468' 1 4 4
18 30.354632 86.263097 Stallworth Lake outfall -30.354632° 086.263097° 0 5 5
19 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.112' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples - swash zone 1 30 30
20 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples -SL001 0 10 10
21 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples -SL002 0 7 7
22 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples -SL003 0 6 6
23 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples -SL004 0 9 8
24 30.352150 86.251167 DUNE ALLEN BEACH, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA - 30° 21.129' N 86° 15.070' W 1 1 1
25 30.329581 86.172940 West end of Grayton Beach, FL - 30° 19' 38"N 86° 10' 26"W 0 13 13
26 29.724380 84.980860 N 29.72438° W 84.98086° - Appalachicola Bay area 0 22 22
Subtotals 7 186 185
Line
No.
Google Earth
Latitude (°N)
Google Earth
Longitude (°W)
Location Description and Remarks - 29 Collection Sites for "J" Detects
1 30.260800 89.403783 Waveland MS - pocket beach; 30° 15.648'N 89° 24.227'W 0 3 3
2 30.241866 87.721753 Gulf Shores, AL - 30.241866°N 087.721753° W 0 2 2
3 30.309523 87.369237 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R47 - mid beach shell debris wrack line 0 2 2
4 30.310774 87.363065 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R49 - fore beach shell debris line 0 1 1
5 30.315202 87.341468 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R56 - back beach wrack line tar balls 0 1 1
6 30.316452 87.335294 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R58 - back beach tar balls 0 2 2
7 30.324810 87.313411 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R66 - swash zone tar balls 0 2 0
8 30.324810 87.313411 PERDIDO KEY - GINS, Johnson Beach; CSM R66 - plunge step tar balls 0 2 2
9 28.047300 87.216367 N 28° 2.838' W 87° 12.982' - Offshore, approx 11 miles NE of DWH accident site- surface oil 0 2 2
10 30.324767 87.183300 FT PICKENS - EAST END, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA - 30° 19.486'N 87° 10.998'W" 0 8 8
11 30.330489 87.141441 Pcola Bch, FL (Casino Beach due south of the water tower) -N 30.330489° W 087.141441° 0 4 4
12 30.330489 87.141441 Pcola Bch, FL (Casino Beach due south of the water tower) -N 30.330489° W 087.141441° 0 2 2
13 30.32725 87.119503 PensacolaBch002 30° 19.635'N 87° 07.171'W - 14th street dive site 1 2 0
14 30.371807 86.913659 N 30° 22’21” W 86°54’50” - Navarre Beach - west end public access at unpaved prkng lot 0 2 2
15 30.372533 86.875750 NavarreBch001 30° 22.352'N 86° 52.545'W - nearshore dive site (60') 1 0 0
16 30.379957 86.860358 N 30° 22’49” W 86° 51’ 45” - Navarre Pier - east side beach area due south of picnic lanai area 0 1 1
17 30.403983 86.618017 N 30° 24.239' W 86° 37.081’ - The Boat Marina (oily debris in ICW) 1 10 10
18 30.388683 86.613200 OK Island - near shore bottom sampling site - 004 1 0 0
19 30.368167 86.324467 EAST END OF SAN DESTIN BEACH; boundary with Topsail Hill SP; N 30° 22.090' W 86° 19.468' 0 4 4
20 30.347705 86.266352 Stallworth001 30° 20.860'N 86° 15.984'W - nearshore SCUBA sample 4 0 0
21 30.351867 86.261050 Stallworth Swash Zone - sand bar samples - N 30° 21.112' W086° 15.663' 0 26 22
22 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples - SL001 0 3 0
23 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples - SL002 0 4 0
24 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples - SL003 0 1 1
25 30.354583 86.261050 N 30° 21.275' W086° 15.663' - Stallworth area beach samples - SL004 0 1 0
26 30.352150 86.251167 DUNE ALLEN BEACH, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA 30° 21.130'N 86° 15.100'W 1 5 0
27 30.352150 86.251167 DUNE ALLEN BEACH, FL; PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AREA - 30° 21.129' N 86° 15.070' W 0 8 3
28 30.329581 86.172940 West end of Grayton Beach, FL - 30° 19' 38"N 86° 10' 26"W 0 3 0
29 29.724380 84.980860 N 29.72438° W 84.98086° - Appalachicola Bay area 0 4 4
Subtotals 9 105 76
Summary - Out of 32 total locations, there were only 3 where PAH analytes were NOT detected during 6 months
of monitoring.
Copyright 2012 - All Rights Reserved by James H Kirby III Page 19 of 21
ORO
hits
ORO
hits
ORO
hits
PAH
hits
PAH
hits
PAH
hits
No. Hits
> IDLH
No. Hits
> IDLH
No. Hits
> IDLH
Grand Totals 16 291 261
Table 2. Summary of location and counts for PAH and ORO detects from sample population. Note that of the 32 locations, only 3 did not prove to be contaminated. Those 3 sites
were nearshore bottom sediment sites accessed by SCUBA teams. Of the 29 terrestrial locations, 26 contained contamination levels in excess of the IDLH for PAH analytes. Positive
detects are concentration levels that exceed the laboratory's reporting detection limit (RDL) for equipment and procedures used in the analysis. "J" detects are concentration levels that
exceed the laboratory's method detection limit (MDL) for equipment and procedures used in the analysis, but did not exceed the RDL. "J" detects are considered to have a larger
margin of error than positive detects. Both are considered to be positive indicators of the presence of analytes detected at that concentration level.

Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Saturday, April 14, 2012
Parameter (Total Samples per
Parameter = 48)
Positive
Detects
Count
Count of
Positive
Detects >
IDLH
Percentage of
Total Samples
with Positive
Detects
Minimum
Level
Detected
(ppb)
Chrysene 30 27 62.500% 1.1300
C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 29 29 60.417% 279.0000
C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 29 29 60.417% 309.0000
C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25 24 52.083% 1,080.0000
C1-Chrysenes 21 20 43.750% 2.1000
C2-Chrysenes 19 18 39.583% 2.3900
Benzo(e)pyrene 13 8 27.083% 1.1500
C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13 13 27.083% 195.0000
C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 9 9 18.750% 3,070.0000
C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 9 9 18.750% 1,690.0000
C2-Fluorenes 9 9 18.750% 3,320.0000
C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 9 9 18.750% 97.9000
Phenanthrene 9 7 18.750% 21.8000
Benzo(b)fluoranthene 7 3 14.583% 1.7700
Pyrene 7 4 14.583% 8.1100
C3-Chrysenes 6 6 12.500% 185.0000
C3-Fluorenes 6 6 12.500% 292.0000
C1-Fluorenes 5 5 10.417% 1,210.0000
Benzo(a)anthracene 4 2 8.333% 0.7730
Benzo(k)fluoranthene 4 1 8.333% 1.8200
Fluoranthene 4 1 8.333% 0.9570
Benzo(a)pyrene 3 2 6.250% 1.7500
C2-Naphthalenes 3 3 6.250% 60,400.0000
C3-Naphthalenes 3 3 6.250% 158,000.0000
C4-Naphthalenes 3 3 6.250% 129,000.0000
Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 2 2 4.167% 302.0000
Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 2 2 4.167% 291.0000
Fluorene 2 2 4.167% 5,160.0000
1-Methylnaphthalene 1 1 2.083% -
2-Methylnaphthalene 1 1 2.083% -
Acenaphthene 1 0 2.083% -
Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1 1 2.083% 422.0000
Naphthalene 1 1 2.083% 771.0000
Perylene 1 1 2.083% 8,840.0000
2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0 0 0.000% -
Acenaphthylene 0 0 0.000% -
Anthracene 0 0 0.000% -
C4-Chrysenes 0 0 0.000% -
Oil Range Organics (23 total
samples tested) 16 2 69.565% 2,650.0000
Maximum
Level
Detected
(ppb)
74,600.00
690,000.00
580,000.00
390,000.00
159,000.00
194,000.00
16,700.00
255,000.00
199,000.00
305,000.00
246,000.00
237,000.00
108,000.00
1,910.00
50,400.00
155,000.00
242,000.00
136,000.00
36,100.00
Max % of
Carcinogenic
IDLH Level
(80ppb)
93250%
862500%
725000%
487500%
198750%
242500%
20875%
318750%
248750%
381250%
307500%
296250%
135000%
Copyright 2012 - All Rights Reserved by James H Kirby III Page 20 of 21
262.00
450.00
14,100.00
198,000.00
360,000.00
263,000.00
7,430.00
4,920.00
26,000.00
22,300.00
25,100.00
34.00
422.00
771.00
8,840.00
-
-
-
-
15,900,000.00
2388%
63000%
193750%
302500%
170000%
45125%
328%
563%
17625%
247500%
450000%
328750%
9288%
6150%
32500%
27875%
31375%
Table 3. Parameter Count of Detects and Percentages of IDLH Exposure Limits. ORO Target Clean Up Level is 1,800,000 ppb.
Only 23 samples of ORO sediment were collected vs 48 for other analytes. The IDLH limit for these PAHs is 80ppb.
43%
528%
964%
11050%
0%
0%
0%
0%
883%

Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
References and Literature Cited
1. Northern Gulf of Mexico. (2012). N 30° 20' W086° 53', Sea Level. Image 2012
TerraMetrics, Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO. Google Earth Image.
[Accessed April 10, 2012]. Available from: http://www.google.com/earth/
index.html.
2. SCHWARTZ, MAURICE L. (ed). (2005). Encyclopedia of Coastal Science. Netherlands:
Springer. DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-3880-1_31, p. 145, Figure B22
3. Wilcock, R. J., Corban, G. A., Northcott, G. L., Wilkins, A. L. and Langdon, A. G.
(1996). Persistence of polycyclic aromatic compounds of different molecular size and
water solubility in surficial sediment of an intertidal sandflat.. Environmental
Toxicology and Chemistry. 15, pp.670-676.
4. Richard P. Moody, Brita Nadeau, Ih Chu (1995). In vivo and in vitro dermal absorption of
benzo[a]pyrene in rat, guinea pig, human and tissue-cultured skin. Journal of Dermatological
Science. 9, pp.48-58.
5. Leila J. Hamdan, Preston A. Fulmer (2011). Effects of COREXIT® EC9500A on bacteria
from a beach oiled by the Deepwater Horizon spill. AQUATIC MICROBIAL ECOLOGY. 63,
pp.101-109.
6. Alissa Zuijdgeest, Jack Middelburg, Markus Huettel (2012). Application of Corexit 9500A as
used in response to the Deepwater Horizon spill leads to higher PAH mobility and
degradation in saturated Pensacola Beach sands – an experimental study. In: NAC11, 29
March 2012, Koningshof, Veldhoven, Netherlands. Theme: Marine Geosciences poster.
7. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS; DHHS (NIOSH) Publication
No. 2005-149; Sept 2007
8. Operational Science Advisory Team, Summary Report For Fate And Effects Of
Remnant Oil Remaining In The Beach Environment, Dec 17, 2010; Annex F: Human
Health Considerations
9. USCG Commandant, ADM R.J. Papp, Jr., Cover Memorandum, dated MAR 18 2011,
for the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review
(ISPR), Final Report, January 2011
10. ExxonMobil Oil Spill Dispersant Guidelines, Copyright 2008 ExxonMobil Research
and Engineering Company; Table 14.2, p. 102
Copyright 2012 - All Rights Reserved by James H Kirby III! ! ! ! ! Page 21 of 21

Findings of Persistency of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons! Saturday, April 14, 2012
APPENDICES
Chemical Analysis Reports
by
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories Baton
Rouge, LA
PURPOSE: To Determine PAH Analyte Trends Along The Florida-
Alabama-Mississippi Coastal Environs and Beaches Derived From Oil
Product Contaminant Samples
Samples Collected By The Surfrider Foundation Local Chapter
Volunteers And Coastal Geologist James H. Kirby III From March
Through November 2011
Copyright 2012 - All Rights Reserved by James H Kirby III

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 1
Report Date 04/18/2011
GCAL Report 211041525
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

ANALYTICAL RESULTS
PERFORMED BY
GULF COAST ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
7979 GSRI Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
Report Date 04/18/2011
GCAL Report 211041525
*211041525*
Deliver To The November 9th Group, LLC
630 Fairway Ave. NE
Fort Walton Beach, FL 32547
850-862-7134
Attn James Kirby
Project State of the Beach
NELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER 01955
DOD ELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER ADE - 1482

Client: Surfrider Foundation Report: 211041525
CASE NARRATIVE
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories received and analyzed the sample(s) listed
on the sample cross-reference page of this report. Receipt of the sample(s) is documented
by the attached chain of custody. This applies only to the sample(s) listed in this report.
No sample integrity or quality control exceptions were identified unless noted below.
SEMI-VOLATILES GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY
In the SW-846 8015B analysis, samples 21104152502 (STALLWORTH-001) and 21104152503 (DUNE
ALLEN BEACH-003) had to be diluted to bracket the concentrations within the calibration range of the
instrument. The recovery for the surrogate is reported as diluted out.
MISCELLANEOUS
Sample 21104152502 (STALLWORTH-001) was received outside the 14-day holding time for ORO. The
client authorized the laboratory to proceed with the analysis. The sample is for a non-regulatory purpose.

Sample analysis was performed in accordance with approved methodologies provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency or other recognized agencies. The samples and their corresponding
extracts will be maintained for a period of 30 days unless otherwise arranged. Following this retention
period the samples will be disposed in accordance with GCAL's Standard Operating Procedures.
Common Abbreviations Utilized in this Report
ND Indicates the result was Not Detected at the specified RDL
DO Indicates the result was Diluted Out
MI Indicates the result was subject to Matrix Interference
TNTC Indicates the result was Too Numerous To Count
SUBC Indicates the analysis was Sub-Contracted
FLD Indicates the analysis was performed in the Field
PQL Practical Quantitation Limit
MDL Method Detection Limit
RDL Reporting Detection Limit
00:00 Reported as a time equivalent to 12:00 AM
Reporting Flags Utilized in this Report
J Indicates an estimated value
U Indicates the compound was analyzed for but not detected
B (ORGANICS) Indicates the analyte was detected in the associated Method Blank
B (INORGANICS) Indicates the result is between the RDL and MDL
Sample receipt at GCAL is documented through the attached chain of custody. In accordance with
NELAC, this report shall be reproduced only in full and with the written permission of GCAL. The results
contained within this report relate only to the samples reported. The documented results are presented
within this report.
This report pertains only to the samples listed in the Report Sample Summary and should be retained as
a permanent record thereof. The results contained within this report are intended for the use of the client.
Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this report is prohibited.
I certify that this data package is in compliance with the NELAC standard and terms and conditions of the
contract and Statement of Work both technically and for completeness, for other than the conditions in the
case narrative. Release of the data contained in this hardcopy data package and in the
computer-readable data submitted has been authorized by the Quality Assurance Manager or his/her
designee, as verified by the following signature.
Estimated uncertainty of measurement is available upon request. This report is in compliance with the
DOD QSM as specified in the contract if applicable.
Robyn Migues
Technical Director
GCAL REPORT 211041525
THIS REPORT CONTAINS _______ PAGES.
Laboratory Endorsement

Report Sample Summary
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152501 EAST FT PICKENS-002 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152502 STALLWORTH-001 Solid 03/15/2011 19:30 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152503 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-003 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152504 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-002 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
GCAL Report 211041525

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152501 EAST FT PICKENS-002 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 41300 13600 1950 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152502 STALLWORTH-001 Solid 03/15/2011 19:30 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 15900000 1540000 221000 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152503 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-003 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 8000000 1360000 196000 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152504 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-002 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
Summary of Compounds Detected
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2650J 13600 1960 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211041525

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152501 EAST FT PICKENS-002 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/16/2011 13:50 454429 3550B 1 04/18/2011 10:32 SMH 454567
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 41300 13600 1950 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1660 1510 ug/Kg 91 27 - 129
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041525

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152502 STALLWORTH-001 Solid 03/15/2011 19:30 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/16/2011 13:50 454429 3550B 100 04/18/2011 11:43 SMH 454567
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 15900000 1540000 221000 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 27 - 129
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041525

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152503 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-003 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/16/2011 13:50 454429 3550B 100 04/18/2011 12:02 SMH 454567
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 8000000 1360000 196000 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1660 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 27 - 129
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041525

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152504 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-002 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/16/2011 13:50 454429 3550B 1 04/18/2011 11:25 SMH 454567
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2650J 13600 1960 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1450 ug/Kg 87 27 - 129
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041525

General Chromatography Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 454567 Client ID MB454429 LCS454429 LCSD454429
Prep Batch 454429 GCAL ID 938331 938332 938333
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 04/16/2011 13:50 04/16/2011 13:50 04/16/2011 13:50
Analytical Date 04/18/2011 09:38 04/18/2011 09:56 04/18/2011 10:14
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 1910U 1910 66700 51800 78 47 - 120 50700 76 2 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1470 88 1670 1490 89 27 - 129 1590 95
Analytical Batch 454567 Client ID EAST FT PICKENS-002 938309MS 938309MSD
Prep Batch 454429 GCAL ID 21104152501 938334 938335
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type SAMPLE MS MSD
Prep Date 04/16/2011 13:50 04/16/2011 13:50 04/16/2011 13:50
Analytical Date 04/18/2011 10:32 04/18/2011 10:50 04/18/2011 11:08
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 40200 1900 66400 94200 81 47 - 120 99900 90 6 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1510 91 1660 1500 90 27 - 129 1410 85
GCAL Report 211041525
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 2
Report Date 04/28/2011
GCAL Report 211041526
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

ANALYTICAL RESULTS
PERFORMED BY
GULF COAST ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
7979 GSRI Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
Report Date 04/28/2011
GCAL Report 211041526
*211041526*
Deliver To The November 9th Group, LLC
630 Fairway Ave. NE
Fort Walton Beach, FL 32547
850-862-7134
Attn James Kirby
Project Surfrider State of the Beach
NELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER 01955
DOD ELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER ADE - 1482

CASE NARRATIVE
Client: The November 9th Group, LLC Report: 211041526
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories received and analyzed the sample(s) listed
on the sample cross-reference page of this report. Receipt of the sample(s) is documented
by the attached chain of custody. This applies only to the sample(s) listed in this report.
No sample integrity or quality control exceptions were identified unless noted below.
No anomalies were found for the analyzed sample(s).

Sample analysis was performed in accordance with approved methodologies provided by the
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extracts will be maintained for a period of 30 days unless otherwise arranged. Following this retention
period the samples will be disposed in accordance with GCAL's Standard Operating Procedures.
Common Abbreviations Utilized in this Report
ND Indicates the result was Not Detected at the specified RDL
DO Indicates the result was Diluted Out
MI Indicates the result was subject to Matrix Interference
TNTC Indicates the result was Too Numerous To Count
SUBC Indicates the analysis was Sub-Contracted
FLD Indicates the analysis was performed in the Field
PQL Practical Quantitation Limit
MDL Method Detection Limit
RDL Reporting Detection Limit
00:00 Reported as a time equivalent to 12:00 AM
Reporting Flags Utilized in this Report
J Indicates an estimated value
U Indicates the compound was analyzed for but not detected
B (ORGANICS) Indicates the analyte was detected in the associated Method Blank
B (INORGANICS) Indicates the result is between the RDL and MDL
Sample receipt at GCAL is documented through the attached chain of custody. In accordance with
NELAC, this report shall be reproduced only in full and with the written permission of GCAL. The results
contained within this report relate only to the samples reported. The documented results are presented
within this report.
This report pertains only to the samples listed in the Report Sample Summary and should be retained as
a permanent record thereof. The results contained within this report are intended for the use of the client.
Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this report is prohibited.
I certify that this data package is in compliance with the NELAC standard and terms and conditions of the
contract and Statement of Work both technically and for completeness, for other than the conditions in the
case narrative. Release of the data contained in this hardcopy data package and in the
computer-readable data submitted has been authorized by the Quality Assurance Manager or his/her
designee, as verified by the following signature.
Estimated uncertainty of measurement is available upon request. This report is in compliance with the
DOD QSM as specified in the contract if applicable.
Robyn Migues
Technical Director
GCAL REPORT 211041526
THIS REPORT CONTAINS _______ PAGES.
Laboratory Endorsement

Report Sample Summary
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152601 EAST FT PICKENS-001 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152602 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-001 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152603 EAST FT PICKENS-003 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152604 WAVELAND-001 Solid 03/16/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
21104152605 STALLWORTH-002 Solid 03/15/2011 19:30 04/15/2011 09:10
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152601 EAST FT PICKENS-001 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1280J 6600 1180 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 7730 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 3070J 6600 967 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 3780J 6600 1450 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 5690J 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4210J 6600 967 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13500 6600 1450 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 4130J 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 7220 6600 967 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 12400 6600 1450 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 5340J 6600 1380 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1380J 6600 1220 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152602 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-001 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.773J 4.12 0.728 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1.77J 4.12 0.597 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.485J 4.12 0.477 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.13J 4.12 0.860 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.957J 4.12 0.603 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152603 EAST FT PICKENS-003 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1.15J 4.11 0.733 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 2.10J 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 2.39J 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.24J 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152604 WAVELAND-001 Solid 03/16/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1910J 7460 1080 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 2270J 7460 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 22000 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8120 7460 1090 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152604 WAVELAND-001 Solid 03/16/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 33900 7460 1640 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 13300 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 10600 7460 1090 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 73300 7460 1640 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 8400 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 14200 7460 1090 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 49000 7460 1640 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 15500 7460 1560 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 2400J 7460 1640 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152605 STALLWORTH-002 Solid 03/15/2011 19:30 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1190J 5890 854 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1140J 5890 1050 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 10000 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4130J 5890 863 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 7900 5890 1300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 7090 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4630J 5890 863 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 27100 5890 1300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 3940J 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 7620 5890 863 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 19600 5890 1300 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 7450 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152601 EAST FT PICKENS-001 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/18/2011 15:00 454563 3550B 100 04/26/2011 11:07 DLB 455114
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 520U 6600 520 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 592U 6600 592 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 578U 6600 578 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 642U 6600 642 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 650U 6600 650 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1100U 6600 1100 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1170U 6600 1170 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1130U 6600 1130 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 957U 6600 957 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1280J 6600 1180 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1400U 6600 1400 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 766U 6600 766 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 7730 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 3070J 6600 967 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 815U 6600 815 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 3780J 6600 1450 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 5690J 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4210J 6600 967 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 815U 6600 815 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 753U 6600 753 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13500 6600 1450 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 4130J 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 7220 6600 967 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 815U 6600 815 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 753U 6600 753 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 12400 6600 1450 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1380U 6600 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 753U 6600 753 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1450U 6600 1450 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 5340J 6600 1380 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1580U 6600 1580 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 967U 6600 967 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 815U 6600 815 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1240U 6600 1240 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 753U 6600 753 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1350U 6600 1350 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1450U 6600 1450 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1380J 6600 1220 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152602 DUNE ALLEN BEACH-001 Solid 04/11/2011 19:53 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/18/2011 15:00 454563 3550B 1 04/25/2011 16:52 DLB 455017
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.324U 4.12 0.324 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.369U 4.12 0.369 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.360U 4.12 0.360 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.400U 4.12 0.400 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.405U 4.12 0.405 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.688U 4.12 0.688 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.773J 4.12 0.728 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.704U 4.12 0.704 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1.77J 4.12 0.597 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.735U 4.12 0.735 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.871U 4.12 0.871 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.485J 4.12 0.477 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.12 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.603U 4.12 0.603 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.508U 4.12 0.508 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.906U 4.12 0.906 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.12 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.603U 4.12 0.603 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.508U 4.12 0.508 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.469U 4.12 0.469 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.906U 4.12 0.906 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.12 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.603U 4.12 0.603 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.508U 4.12 0.508 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.469U 4.12 0.469 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.906U 4.12 0.906 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.12 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.469U 4.12 0.469 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.906U 4.12 0.906 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.13J 4.12 0.860 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.986U 4.12 0.986 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.957J 4.12 0.603 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.508U 4.12 0.508 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.774U 4.12 0.774 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.469U 4.12 0.469 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.843U 4.12 0.843 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.906U 4.12 0.906 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.758U 4.12 0.758 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 8.85 ug/Kg 66 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 8.08 ug/Kg 61 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 9.59 ug/Kg 72 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 7.71 ug/Kg 58 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152603 EAST FT PICKENS-003 Solid 04/10/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/18/2011 15:00 454563 3550B 1 04/25/2011 17:36 DLB 455017
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.323U 4.11 0.323 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.369U 4.11 0.369 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.359U 4.11 0.359 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.399U 4.11 0.399 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.405U 4.11 0.405 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.687U 4.11 0.687 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.726U 4.11 0.726 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.702U 4.11 0.702 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.596U 4.11 0.596 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1.15J 4.11 0.733 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.869U 4.11 0.869 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.476U 4.11 0.476 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 2.10J 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.602U 4.11 0.602 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.507U 4.11 0.507 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.904U 4.11 0.904 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 2.39J 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.602U 4.11 0.602 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.507U 4.11 0.507 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.468U 4.11 0.468 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.904U 4.11 0.904 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.859U 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.602U 4.11 0.602 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.507U 4.11 0.507 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.468U 4.11 0.468 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.904U 4.11 0.904 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.859U 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.468U 4.11 0.468 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.904U 4.11 0.904 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.24J 4.11 0.859 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.984U 4.11 0.984 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.602U 4.11 0.602 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.507U 4.11 0.507 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.772U 4.11 0.772 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.468U 4.11 0.468 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.841U 4.11 0.841 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.904U 4.11 0.904 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.757U 4.11 0.757 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 8.68 ug/Kg 65 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 8.03 ug/Kg 60 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 9.62 ug/Kg 72 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 12 ug/Kg 90 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152604 WAVELAND-001 Solid 03/16/2011 19:45 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/18/2011 15:00 454563 3550B 100 04/26/2011 14:05 DLB 455114
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 587U 7460 587 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 669U 7460 669 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 653U 7460 653 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 725U 7460 725 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 735U 7460 735 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1250U 7460 1250 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1320U 7460 1320 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1280U 7460 1280 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1910J 7460 1080 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 2270J 7460 1330 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1580U 7460 1580 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 865U 7460 865 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 22000 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8120 7460 1090 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 921U 7460 921 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 33900 7460 1640 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 13300 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 10600 7460 1090 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 921U 7460 921 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 850U 7460 850 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 73300 7460 1640 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 8400 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 14200 7460 1090 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 921U 7460 921 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 850U 7460 850 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 49000 7460 1640 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1560U 7460 1560 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 850U 7460 850 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1640U 7460 1640 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 15500 7460 1560 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1790U 7460 1790 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 1090U 7460 1090 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 921U 7460 921 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1400U 7460 1400 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 850U 7460 850 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1530U 7460 1530 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 2400J 7460 1640 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1370U 7460 1370 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041526

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21104152605 STALLWORTH-002 Solid 03/15/2011 19:30 04/15/2011 09:10
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
04/18/2011 15:00 454563 3550B 100 04/26/2011 15:33 DLB 455114
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 464U 5890 464 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 528U 5890 528 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 515U 5890 515 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 573U 5890 573 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 580U 5890 580 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 985U 5890 985 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1040U 5890 1040 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1010U 5890 1010 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1190J 5890 854 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1140J 5890 1050 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1250U 5890 1250 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 683U 5890 683 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 10000 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4130J 5890 863 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 727U 5890 727 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 7900 5890 1300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 7090 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4630J 5890 863 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 727U 5890 727 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 671U 5890 671 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 27100 5890 1300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 3940J 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 7620 5890 863 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 727U 5890 727 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 671U 5890 671 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 19600 5890 1300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1230U 5890 1230 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 671U 5890 671 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1300U 5890 1300 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 7450 5890 1230 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1410U 5890 1410 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 863U 5890 863 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 727U 5890 727 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1110U 5890 1110 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 671U 5890 671 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1210U 5890 1210 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1300U 5890 1300 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1080U 5890 1080 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 174 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 174 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 174 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 174 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211041526

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 455017 Client ID MB454563 LCS454563
Prep Batch 454563 GCAL ID 938911 939129
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS
Prep Date 04/18/2011 15:00 04/18/2011 15:00
Analytical Date 04/25/2011 14:39 04/25/2011 15:23
Matrix Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.456U 0.456
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.359U 0.359
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.315U 0.315
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.350U 0.350 13.3 8.83 66 50 - 150
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.394U 0.394
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.389U 0.389
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.669U 0.669
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.586U 0.586
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.737U 0.737
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.707U 0.707
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.580U 0.580
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.464U 0.464
GCAL Report 211041526

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 455017 Client ID MB454563 LCS454563
Prep Batch 454563 GCAL ID 938911 939129
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS
Prep Date 04/18/2011 15:00 04/18/2011 15:00
Analytical Date 04/25/2011 14:39 04/25/2011 15:23
Matrix Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.714U 0.714
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.684U 0.684
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.819U 0.819
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.752U 0.752
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.958U 0.958
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.846U 0.846
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 9.68 73 13.3 8.93 67 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 11.2 84 13.3 8.89 67 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 9.88 74 13.3 9.44 71 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 8.98 67 13.3 7.77 58 43 - 111
Analytical Batch 455017 Client ID EAST FT PICKENS-003 938316MS 938316MSD
Prep Batch 454563 GCAL ID 21104152603 938914 938915
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type SAMPLE MS MSD
Prep Date 04/18/2011 15:00 04/18/2011 15:00 04/18/2011 15:00
Analytical Date 04/25/2011 17:36 04/25/2011 18:19 04/25/2011 19:03
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.00 0.349 13.3 8.18 61 50 - 150 8.07 61 1 40
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 8.68 65 13.3 8.23 62 20 - 97 9.04 68
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 8.03 60 13.3 8.27 62 22 - 98 8.12 61
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 9.62 72 13.3 8.99 67 51 - 120 8.93 67
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 12 90 13.3 12.2 92 43 - 111 14.7 110
GCAL Report 211041526
RPD
Limit

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 3
Report Date 07/27/2011
GCAL Report 211060827
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

ANALYTICAL RESULTS
PERFORMED BY
GULF COAST ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
7979 GSRI Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
Report Date 07/27/2011
GCAL Report 211060827
*211060827*
Deliver To The November 9th Group, LLC
630 Fairway Ave. NE
Fort Walton Beach, FL 32547
850-862-7134
Attn James Kirby
Project Surfrider State of the Beach
NELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER 01955
DOD ELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER ADE - 1482

CASE NARRATIVE
Client: The November 9th Group, LLC Report: 211060827
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories received and analyzed the sample(s) listed
on the sample cross-reference page of this report. Receipt of the sample(s) is documented
by the attached chain of custody. This applies only to the sample(s) listed in this report.
No sample integrity or quality control exceptions were identified unless noted below.
SEMI-VOLATILES MASS SPECTROMETRY
In the SW-846 8272 Modified analysis, samples 21106082701 (004008-TAR BALLS), 21106082702
(003988-TAR BALLS), 21106082704 (003973-SURFACE), and 21106082708 (003968-DUNE SCARP)
had to be diluted to bracket the concentration of target compounds within the calibration range of the
instrument and to eliminate interference that affected the recoveries of the internal standards. This is reflected
in elevated detection limits. The recoveries for the surrogates are reported as diluted out.
In the SW-846 8272 Modified analysis, samples 21106082703 (004011-HBSP), 21106082707 (004007-
FLOTSAM), and 21106082708 (003968-DUNE SCARP) had to be diluted to eliminate interference from
non-target background that may have affected the recoveries of the internal standards. This is reflected in
elevated detection limits. The recoveries for the surrogates are reported as diluted out.
SEMI-VOLATILES GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY
In the SW-846 8015B ORO analysis, sample 21106082709 (003968-DUNE SCARP) had to be diluted to
bracket the concentration within the calibration range of the instrument.
MISCELLANEOUS
All samples were received outside the specified holding times for the requested methods.

Sample analysis was performed in accordance with approved methodologies provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency or other recognized agencies. The samples and their corresponding
extracts will be maintained for a period of 30 days unless otherwise arranged. Following this retention
period the samples will be disposed in accordance with GCAL's Standard Operating Procedures.
Common Abbreviations Utilized in this Report
ND Indicates the result was Not Detected at the specified RDL
DO Indicates the result was Diluted Out
MI Indicates the result was subject to Matrix Interference
TNTC Indicates the result was Too Numerous To Count
SUBC Indicates the analysis was Sub-Contracted
FLD Indicates the analysis was performed in the Field
PQL Practical Quantitation Limit
MDL Method Detection Limit
RDL Reporting Detection Limit
00:00 Reported as a time equivalent to 12:00 AM
Reporting Flags Utilized in this Report
J Indicates an estimated value
U Indicates the compound was analyzed for but not detected
B (ORGANICS) Indicates the analyte was detected in the associated Method Blank
B (INORGANICS) Indicates the result is between the RDL and MDL
Sample receipt at GCAL is documented through the attached chain of custody. In accordance with
NELAC, this report shall be reproduced only in full and with the written permission of GCAL. The results
contained within this report relate only to the samples reported. The documented results are presented
within this report.
This report pertains only to the samples listed in the Report Sample Summary and should be retained as
a permanent record thereof. The results contained within this report are intended for the use of the client.
Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this report is prohibited.
I certify that this data package is in compliance with the NELAC standard and terms and conditions of the
contract and Statement of Work both technically and for completeness, for other than the conditions in the
case narrative. Release of the data contained in this hardcopy data package and in the
computer-readable data submitted has been authorized by the Quality Assurance Manager or his/her
designee, as verified by the following signature.
Estimated uncertainty of measurement is available upon request. This report is in compliance with the
DOD QSM as specified in the contract if applicable.
Robyn Migues
Technical Director
GCAL REPORT 211060827
THIS REPORT CONTAINS _______ PAGES.
Laboratory Endorsement

Report Sample Summary
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082701 004008-TAR BALLS Solid 05/22/2011 20:41 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082702 003988-TAR BALLS Solid 05/01/2011 09:00 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082703 004011-HBSP Solid 04/20/2011 08:00 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082704 003973-SURFACE Solid 06/08/2010 14:45 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082705 003998-TRENCH WALL Solid 05/22/2011 19:45 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082706 004001-HBSP Solid 05/22/2011 09:10 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082707 004007-FLOTSAM #1 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082708 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082709 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
21106082710 004002-FLOTSAM #2 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082701 004008-TAR BALLS Solid 05/22/2011 20:41 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 5500 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1730J 3010 662 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 3580 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 19400 3010 662 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 16200 3010 662 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3860 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082702 003988-TAR BALLS Solid 05/01/2011 09:00 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 36100 9470 1670 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 14100 9470 1620 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 16700 9470 1690 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 7430J 9470 2000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 159000 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 199000 9470 1390 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 60300 9470 1170 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 313000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 194000 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 305000 9470 1390 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 134000 9470 1170 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 73400 9470 1080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 690000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 155000 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 237000 9470 1390 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 199000 9470 1170 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 211000 9470 1080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 580000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 165000 9470 1080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 255000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 60300 9470 1980 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 4920J 9470 2270 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 5160J 9470 1170 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 8840J 9470 1940 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 58500 9470 2080 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 50400 9470 1750 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082704 003973-SURFACE Solid 06/08/2010 14:45 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 22300 3650 287 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082704 003973-SURFACE Solid 06/08/2010 14:45 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 25100 3650 327 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 70200 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 59600 3650 534 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 136000 3650 451 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 390000 3650 803 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 70000 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 75200 3650 534 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 246000 3650 451 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 198000 3650 416 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 508000 3650 803 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 37900 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 80600 3650 534 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 242000 3650 451 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 360000 3650 416 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 314000 3650 803 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 263000 3650 416 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 112000 3650 803 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 44300 3650 762 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 26000 3650 451 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 771J 3650 416 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 108000 3650 803 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 8150 3650 672 ug/Kg
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 10400J 36500 6510 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082706 004001-HBSP Solid 05/22/2011 09:10 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 540000 228000 32800 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082707 004007-FLOTSAM #1 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 215J 937 166 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 268J 937 160 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 461J 937 136 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 302J 937 198 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082707 004007-FLOTSAM #1 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 262J 937 109 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 294J 937 196 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 291J 937 224 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 450J 937 137 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 422J 937 176 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 212J 937 173 ug/Kg
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 486000 312000 44700 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082708 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 3770 2790 583 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1080J 2790 613 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1690J 2790 408 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4590 2790 613 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4390 2790 613 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4150 2790 613 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2820 2790 583 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082709 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 89900 27000 3880 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082710 004002-FLOTSAM #2 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 43000J 84700 12200 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082701 004008-TAR BALLS Solid 05/22/2011 20:41 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 50 07/12/2011 18:40 DLB 460584
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 237U 3010 237 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 270U 3010 270 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 263U 3010 263 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 293U 3010 293 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 296U 3010 296 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 503U 3010 503 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 532U 3010 532 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 514U 3010 514 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 436U 3010 436 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 537U 3010 537 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 636U 3010 636 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 349U 3010 349 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 5500 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 441U 3010 441 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1730J 3010 662 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 3580 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 441U 3010 441 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 343U 3010 343 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 19400 3010 662 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 629U 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 441U 3010 441 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 343U 3010 343 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 16200 3010 662 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 629U 3010 629 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 343U 3010 343 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 662U 3010 662 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3860 3010 629 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 720U 3010 720 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 441U 3010 441 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 566U 3010 566 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 343U 3010 343 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 616U 3010 616 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 662U 3010 662 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 554U 3010 554 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 100 07/13/2011 12:36 DLB 460843
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 743U 6020 743 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 743U 6020 743 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082701 004008-TAR BALLS Solid 05/22/2011 20:41 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 100 07/13/2011 12:36 DLB 460843
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 743U 6020 743 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 743U 6020 743 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082702 003988-TAR BALLS Solid 05/01/2011 09:00 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 100 07/12/2011 21:33 DLB 460584
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 746U 9470 746 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 850U 9470 850 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 829U 9470 829 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 921U 9470 921 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 933U 9470 933 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1580U 9470 1580 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 36100 9470 1670 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 14100 9470 1620 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1370U 9470 1370 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 16700 9470 1690 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 7430J 9470 2000 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 1100U 9470 1100 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 159000 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 199000 9470 1390 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 60300 9470 1170 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 313000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 194000 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 305000 9470 1390 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 134000 9470 1170 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 73400 9470 1080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 690000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 155000 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 237000 9470 1390 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 199000 9470 1170 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 211000 9470 1080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 580000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1980U 9470 1980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 165000 9470 1080 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 255000 9470 2080 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 60300 9470 1980 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 4920J 9470 2270 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 1390U 9470 1390 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 5160J 9470 1170 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1780U 9470 1780 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 1080U 9470 1080 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 8840J 9470 1940 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 58500 9470 2080 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 50400 9470 1750 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 190 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 190 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 190 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 190 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082703 004011-HBSP Solid 04/20/2011 08:00 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 50 07/12/2011 19:23 DLB 460584
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 233U 2960 233 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 265U 2960 265 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 259U 2960 259 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 287U 2960 287 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 291U 2960 291 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 494U 2960 494 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 522U 2960 522 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 505U 2960 505 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 428U 2960 428 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 527U 2960 527 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 625U 2960 625 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 343U 2960 343 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 618U 2960 618 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 433U 2960 433 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 365U 2960 365 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 650U 2960 650 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 618U 2960 618 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 433U 2960 433 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 365U 2960 365 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 337U 2960 337 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 650U 2960 650 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 618U 2960 618 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 433U 2960 433 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 365U 2960 365 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 337U 2960 337 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 650U 2960 650 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 618U 2960 618 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 337U 2960 337 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 650U 2960 650 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 618U 2960 618 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 708U 2960 708 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 433U 2960 433 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 365U 2960 365 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 556U 2960 556 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 337U 2960 337 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 605U 2960 605 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 650U 2960 650 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 544U 2960 544 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082704 003973-SURFACE Solid 06/08/2010 14:45 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 50 07/12/2011 20:06 DLB 460584
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 22300 3650 287 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 25100 3650 327 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 319U 3650 319 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 355U 3650 355 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 359U 3650 359 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 610U 3650 610 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 645U 3650 645 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 70200 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 59600 3650 534 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 136000 3650 451 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 390000 3650 803 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 70000 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 75200 3650 534 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 246000 3650 451 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 198000 3650 416 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 508000 3650 803 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 37900 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 80600 3650 534 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 242000 3650 451 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 360000 3650 416 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 314000 3650 803 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 762U 3650 762 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 263000 3650 416 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 112000 3650 803 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 44300 3650 762 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 534U 3650 534 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 26000 3650 451 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 771J 3650 416 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 108000 3650 803 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 8150 3650 672 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 500 07/14/2011 12:46 DLB 460845
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 6240U 36500 6240 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 5290U 36500 5290 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 10400J 36500 6510 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 7720U 36500 7720 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 4230U 36500 4230 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 8740U 36500 8740 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082704 003973-SURFACE Solid 06/08/2010 14:45 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 500 07/14/2011 12:46 DLB 460845
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 6860U 36500 6860 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 7470U 36500 7470 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082705 003998-TRENCH WALL Solid 05/22/2011 19:45 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/08/2011 16:30 457988 3550B 1 06/10/2011 19:58 SMH 458248
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2020U 14100 2020 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1650 1230 ug/Kg 75 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082706 004001-HBSP Solid 05/22/2011 09:10 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/12/2011 16:15 458261 3550B 1 06/13/2011 13:04 SMH 458374
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 540000 228000 32800 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 25000 21600 ug/Kg 86 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082707 004007-FLOTSAM #1 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/30/2011 10:20 459676 3550B 10 07/13/2011 11:53 DLB 460843
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 73.8U 937 73.8 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 84.1U 937 84.1 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 82.0U 937 82.0 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 91.1U 937 91.1 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 92.3U 937 92.3 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 157U 937 157 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 215J 937 166 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 268J 937 160 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 461J 937 136 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 167U 937 167 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 302J 937 198 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 262J 937 109 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 196U 937 196 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 137U 937 137 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 116U 937 116 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 206U 937 206 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 196U 937 196 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 137U 937 137 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 116U 937 116 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 107U 937 107 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 206U 937 206 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 196U 937 196 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 137U 937 137 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 116U 937 116 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 107U 937 107 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 206U 937 206 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 196U 937 196 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 107U 937 107 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 206U 937 206 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 294J 937 196 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 291J 937 224 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 450J 937 137 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 116U 937 116 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 422J 937 176 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 107U 937 107 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 192U 937 192 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 206U 937 206 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 212J 937 173 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 40 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 40 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 40 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 40 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082707 004007-FLOTSAM #1 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/08/2011 16:30 457988 3550B 1 06/10/2011 19:22 SMH 458248
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 486000 312000 44700 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 5000 4070 ug/Kg 81 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082708 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 50 07/12/2011 20:50 DLB 460584
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 220U 2790 220 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 250U 2790 250 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 244U 2790 244 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 271U 2790 271 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 275U 2790 275 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 466U 2790 466 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 493U 2790 493 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 3770 2790 583 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 408U 2790 408 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 344U 2790 344 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1080J 2790 613 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 583U 2790 583 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1690J 2790 408 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 344U 2790 344 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 318U 2790 318 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4590 2790 613 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 583U 2790 583 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 408U 2790 408 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 344U 2790 344 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 318U 2790 318 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4390 2790 613 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 583U 2790 583 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 318U 2790 318 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4150 2790 613 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2820 2790 583 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 408U 2790 408 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 344U 2790 344 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 318U 2790 318 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 613U 2790 613 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 514U 2790 514 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 182 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 500 07/14/2011 13:29 DLB 460845
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 4770U 27900 4770 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 4040U 27900 4040 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 4980U 27900 4980 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 5900U 27900 5900 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 3230U 27900 3230 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 6680U 27900 6680 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082708 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:00 457991 3550B 500 07/14/2011 13:29 DLB 460845
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 5240U 27900 5240 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 5710U 27900 5710 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082709 003968-DUNE SCARP Solid 05/22/2011 21:21 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/09/2011 10:30 457988 3550B 2 06/10/2011 20:16 SMH 458248
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 89900 27000 3880 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1660 1240 ug/Kg 75 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21106082710 004002-FLOTSAM #2 Solid 05/12/2011 14:30 06/07/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
06/11/2011 08:40 458143 3550B 1 06/13/2011 13:23 SMH 458374
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 43000J 84700 12200 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1650 1640 ug/Kg 99 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211060827

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 460584 Client ID MB457991 LCS457991 LCSD457991
Prep Batch 457991 GCAL ID 954980 954981 954982
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/09/2011 10:00 06/09/2011 10:00 06/09/2011 10:00
Analytical Date 07/12/2011 15:47 07/12/2011 16:30 07/12/2011 17:13
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.456U 0.456
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.359U 0.359
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.315U 0.315
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.350U 0.350 13.3 7.54 57 50 - 150 7.45 56 1 40
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.394U 0.394
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.389U 0.389
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.669U 0.669
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.586U 0.586
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.737U 0.737
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.707U 0.707
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.580U 0.580
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.464U 0.464
GCAL Report 211060827
RPD
Limit

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 460584 Client ID MB457991 LCS457991 LCSD457991
Prep Batch 457991 GCAL ID 954980 954981 954982
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/09/2011 10:00 06/09/2011 10:00 06/09/2011 10:00
Analytical Date 07/12/2011 15:47 07/12/2011 16:30 07/12/2011 17:13
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.714U 0.714
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.684U 0.684
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.819U 0.819
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.752U 0.752
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.958U 0.958
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.846U 0.846
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 7.36 55 13.3 7.93 59 20 - 97 7.76 58
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 7.81 59 13.3 5.76 43 22 - 98 9.64 72
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 8.15 61 13.3 7.49 56 51 - 120 7.54 57
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 7.12 53 13.3 7.52 56 43 - 111 9.78 73
Analytical Batch 460584 Client ID MB459676 LCS459676 LCSD459676
Prep Batch 459676 GCAL ID 963023 963024 963025
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/30/2011 10:20 06/30/2011 10:20 06/30/2011 10:20
Analytical Date 07/12/2011 13:35 07/12/2011 14:19 07/12/2011 15:03
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
Result
% R RPD
% R RPD
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.454U 0.454
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.358U 0.358
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.314U 0.314
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.454U 0.454
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.454U 0.454
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.454U 0.454
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.349U 0.349 13.3 7.92 60 50 - 150 10.1 77 24 40
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.393U 0.393
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.388U 0.388
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.492U 0.492
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.492U 0.492
GCAL Report 211060827
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 460584 Client ID MB459676 LCS459676 LCSD459676
Prep Batch 459676 GCAL ID 963023 963024 963025
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/30/2011 10:20 06/30/2011 10:20 06/30/2011 10:20
Analytical Date 07/12/2011 13:35 07/12/2011 14:19 07/12/2011 15:03
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.492U 0.492
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.492U 0.492
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.877U 0.877
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.877U 0.877
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.877U 0.877
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.877U 0.877
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.877U 0.877
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.667U 0.667
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.584U 0.584
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.735U 0.735
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.584U 0.584
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.584U 0.584
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.584U 0.584
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.833U 0.833
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.833U 0.833
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.833U 0.833
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.833U 0.833
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.833U 0.833
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.705U 0.705
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.578U 0.578
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.462U 0.462
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.712U 0.712
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.682U 0.682
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.816U 0.816
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.750U 0.750
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.955U 0.955
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.843U 0.843
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 6.57 49 13.3 6.99 53 20 - 97 10.3 78
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 7.57 57 13.3 7.05 53 22 - 98 11 84
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 7.21 54 13.3 7.63 57 51 - 120 10.7 81
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 6.01 45 13.3 7.94 60 43 - 111 11.7 89
GCAL Report 211060827
Result
% R RPD
RPD
Limit

General Chromatography Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 458126 Client ID MB457988 LCS457988 LCSD457988
Prep Batch 457988 GCAL ID 954970 954971 954972
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/08/2011 16:30 06/08/2011 16:30 06/08/2011 16:30
Analytical Date 06/09/2011 12:34 06/09/2011 13:28 06/09/2011 13:46
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 1900U 1900 66400 47600 72 47 - 120 57400 86 19 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1400 84 1660 1310 79 67 - 120 1480 89
Analytical Batch 458126 Client ID 106041IDW1 954134MS 954134MSD
Prep Batch 457988 GCAL ID 21106072001 954973 954974
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type SAMPLE MS MSD
Prep Date 06/08/2011 16:30 06/08/2011 16:30 06/08/2011 16:30
Analytical Date 06/09/2011 17:38 06/09/2011 17:56 06/09/2011 18:13
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 13100 1880 65800 55800 65 47 - 120 52600 60 6 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1640 1350 82 67 - 120 1280 77
Analytical Batch 458344 Client ID MB458143 LCS458143 LCSD458143
Prep Batch 458143 GCAL ID 955882 955883 955884
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/11/2011 08:40 06/11/2011 08:40 06/11/2011 08:40
Analytical Date 06/12/2011 10:15 06/12/2011 11:09 06/12/2011 11:27
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 1880U 1880 65800 52400 80 47 - 120 54000 81 3 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1460 89 1640 1550 94 67 - 120 1530 92
GCAL Report 211060827
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit

General Chromatography Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 458344 Client ID 106058IDW1 955832MS 955832MSD
Prep Batch 458143 GCAL ID 21106102002 955885 955886
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type SAMPLE MS MSD
Prep Date 06/11/2011 08:40 06/11/2011 08:40 06/11/2011 08:40
Analytical Date 06/12/2011 12:38 06/12/2011 12:56 06/12/2011 13:50
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 5810 1910 66700 57500 78 47 - 120 56300 76 2 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1620 97 67 - 120 1540 93
Analytical Batch 458374 Client ID MB458261 LCS458261 LCSD458261
Prep Batch 458261 GCAL ID 956359 956360 956361
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 06/12/2011 16:15 06/12/2011 16:15 06/12/2011 16:15
Analytical Date 06/13/2011 12:11 06/13/2011 12:29 06/13/2011 12:47
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 1910U 1910 66700 48000 72 47 - 120 46400 70 4 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1500 90 1670 1540 92 67 - 120 1490 89
GCAL Report 211060827
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 4
Report Date 07/27/2011
GCAL Report 211070813
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 5
Report Date 08/12/2011
GCAL Report 211072028
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

ANALYTICAL RESULTS
PERFORMED BY
GULF COAST ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
7979 GSRI Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
Report Date 08/12/2011
GCAL Report 211072028
*211072028*
Deliver To The November 9th Group, LLC
630 Fairway Ave. NE
Fort Walton Beach, FL 32547
850-862-7134
Attn James Kirby
Project Surfrider SOTB - July 2011
NELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER 01955
DOD ELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER ADE - 1482

CASE NARRATIVE
Client: The November 9th Group, LLC Report: 211072028
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories received and analyzed the sample(s) listed
on the sample cross-reference page of this report. Receipt of the sample(s) is documented
by the attached chain of custody. This applies only to the sample(s) listed in this report.
No sample integrity or quality control exceptions were identified unless noted below.
MISCELLANEOUS
The samples were received at the laboratory at a temperature of 13.9ºC. All ice in the cooler had melted.
The client was contacted and authorized the laboratory to proceed with the analyses.
The analysis of several samples by SW-846 8272 was added after expiration of the 14-day holding time.

Sample analysis was performed in accordance with approved methodologies provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency or other recognized agencies. The samples and their corresponding
extracts will be maintained for a period of 30 days unless otherwise arranged. Following this retention
period the samples will be disposed in accordance with GCAL's Standard Operating Procedures.
Common Abbreviations Utilized in this Report
ND Indicates the result was Not Detected at the specified RDL
DO Indicates the result was Diluted Out
MI Indicates the result was subject to Matrix Interference
TNTC Indicates the result was Too Numerous To Count
SUBC Indicates the analysis was Sub-Contracted
FLD Indicates the analysis was performed in the Field
PQL Practical Quantitation Limit
MDL Method Detection Limit
RDL Reporting Detection Limit
00:00 Reported as a time equivalent to 12:00 AM
Reporting Flags Utilized in this Report
J Indicates an estimated value
U Indicates the compound was analyzed for but not detected
B (ORGANICS) Indicates the analyte was detected in the associated Method Blank
B (INORGANICS) Indicates the result is between the RDL and MDL
Sample receipt at GCAL is documented through the attached chain of custody. In accordance with
NELAC, this report shall be reproduced only in full and with the written permission of GCAL. The results
contained within this report relate only to the samples reported. The documented results are presented
within this report.
This report pertains only to the samples listed in the Report Sample Summary and should be retained as
a permanent record thereof. The results contained within this report are intended for the use of the client.
Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this report is prohibited.
I certify that this data package is in compliance with the NELAC standard and terms and conditions of the
contract and Statement of Work both technically and for completeness, for other than the conditions in the
case narrative. Release of the data contained in this hardcopy data package and in the
computer-readable data submitted has been authorized by the Quality Assurance Manager or his/her
designee, as verified by the following signature.
Estimated uncertainty of measurement is available upon request. This report is in compliance with the
DOD QSM as specified in the contract if applicable.
Robyn Migues
Technical Director
GCAL REPORT 211072028
THIS REPORT CONTAINS _______ PAGES.
Laboratory Endorsement

Report Sample Summary
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202801 000822-BOT SED 60 Solid 07/12/2011 14:15 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202802 000787-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 16:05 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202803 000815-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 16:10 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202804 000796 BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:15 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202805 000817-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:20 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202806 000821-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:25 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202807 000761-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:30 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202808 000805-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:15 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202809 000758-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:20 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202810 000757-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:25 07/20/2011 09:05
21107202811 000803-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:30 07/20/2011 09:05
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202801 000822-BOT SED 60 Solid 07/12/2011 14:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 5450J 17900 2570 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202802 000787-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 16:05 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 6750J 35900 5150 ug/Kg
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1.80J 10.8 1.57 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 1.95J 10.8 1.58 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202804 000796 BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 9380J 17100 2450 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202805 000817-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:20 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 5340J 17500 2520 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202806 000821-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:25 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Summary of Compounds Detected
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 11700J 17400 2490 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202807 000761-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:30 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 4340J 17100 2460 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202811 000803-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:30 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2700J 16600 2390 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202801 000822-BOT SED 60 Solid 07/12/2011 14:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 10:59 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.421U 5.35 0.421 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.480U 5.35 0.480 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.468U 5.35 0.468 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.520U 5.35 0.520 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.527U 5.35 0.527 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.895U 5.35 0.895 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.946U 5.35 0.946 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.915U 5.35 0.915 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.776U 5.35 0.776 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.955U 5.35 0.955 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1.13U 5.35 1.13 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.621U 5.35 0.621 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1.12U 5.35 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.784U 5.35 0.784 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.661U 5.35 0.661 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.18U 5.35 1.18 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1.12U 5.35 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.784U 5.35 0.784 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.661U 5.35 0.661 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.610U 5.35 0.610 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.18U 5.35 1.18 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1.12U 5.35 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.784U 5.35 0.784 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.661U 5.35 0.661 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.610U 5.35 0.610 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.18U 5.35 1.18 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1.12U 5.35 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.610U 5.35 0.610 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.18U 5.35 1.18 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.12U 5.35 1.12 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1.28U 5.35 1.28 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.784U 5.35 0.784 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.661U 5.35 0.661 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1.01U 5.35 1.01 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.610U 5.35 0.610 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1.10U 5.35 1.10 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1.18U 5.35 1.18 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.986U 5.35 0.986 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 8.87 ug/Kg 67 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 8.86 ug/Kg 67 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 7.5 ug/Kg 57 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 10.8 ug/Kg 82 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202801 000822-BOT SED 60 Solid 07/12/2011 14:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 20:53 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 5450J 17900 2570 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1350 ug/Kg 81 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202802 000787-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 16:05 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 11:42 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.850U 10.8 0.850 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.969U 10.8 0.969 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.944U 10.8 0.944 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 1.05U 10.8 1.05 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 1.06U 10.8 1.06 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1.81U 10.8 1.81 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1.91U 10.8 1.91 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1.85U 10.8 1.85 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 1.80J 10.8 1.57 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1.93U 10.8 1.93 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 2.28U 10.8 2.28 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 1.25U 10.8 1.25 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 2.26U 10.8 2.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1.58U 10.8 1.58 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 1.33U 10.8 1.33 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2.37U 10.8 2.37 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 2.26U 10.8 2.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1.58U 10.8 1.58 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 1.33U 10.8 1.33 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 1.23U 10.8 1.23 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2.37U 10.8 2.37 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 2.26U 10.8 2.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1.58U 10.8 1.58 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 1.33U 10.8 1.33 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 1.23U 10.8 1.23 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2.37U 10.8 2.37 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 2.26U 10.8 2.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 1.23U 10.8 1.23 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2.37U 10.8 2.37 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2.26U 10.8 2.26 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 2.59U 10.8 2.59 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 1.95J 10.8 1.58 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 1.33U 10.8 1.33 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 2.03U 10.8 2.03 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 1.23U 10.8 1.23 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 2.21U 10.8 2.21 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 2.37U 10.8 2.37 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1.99U 10.8 1.99 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 11.7 ug/Kg 88 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 11 ug/Kg 83 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 9.94 ug/Kg 75 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 14.5 ug/Kg 109 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202802 000787-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 16:05 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 21:11 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 6750J 35900 5150 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1350 ug/Kg 81 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202803 000815-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 16:10 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 21:29 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 3040U 21200 3040 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1470 ug/Kg 88 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202804 000796 BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 12:26 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.402U 5.10 0.402 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.458U 5.10 0.458 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.446U 5.10 0.446 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.496U 5.10 0.496 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.502U 5.10 0.502 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.853U 5.10 0.853 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.901U 5.10 0.901 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.872U 5.10 0.872 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.739U 5.10 0.739 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.910U 5.10 0.910 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1.08U 5.10 1.08 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.591U 5.10 0.591 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1.07U 5.10 1.07 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.747U 5.10 0.747 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.630U 5.10 0.630 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.12U 5.10 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1.07U 5.10 1.07 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.747U 5.10 0.747 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.630U 5.10 0.630 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.581U 5.10 0.581 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.12U 5.10 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1.07U 5.10 1.07 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.747U 5.10 0.747 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.630U 5.10 0.630 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.581U 5.10 0.581 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.12U 5.10 1.12 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1.07U 5.10 1.07 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.581U 5.10 0.581 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.12U 5.10 1.12 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.07U 5.10 1.07 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1.22U 5.10 1.22 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.747U 5.10 0.747 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.630U 5.10 0.630 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.959U 5.10 0.959 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.581U 5.10 0.581 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1.04U 5.10 1.04 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1.12U 5.10 1.12 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.939U 5.10 0.939 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 9.22 ug/Kg 70 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 10.1 ug/Kg 76 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 8.83 ug/Kg 67 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 14.4 ug/Kg 109 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202804 000796 BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 17:54 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 9380J 17100 2450 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1410 ug/Kg 85 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202805 000817-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:20 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 13:10 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.411U 5.22 0.411 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.468U 5.22 0.468 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.457U 5.22 0.457 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.508U 5.22 0.508 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.514U 5.22 0.514 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.873U 5.22 0.873 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.922U 5.22 0.922 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.892U 5.22 0.892 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.757U 5.22 0.757 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.932U 5.22 0.932 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1.10U 5.22 1.10 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.605U 5.22 0.605 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.644U 5.22 0.644 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.644U 5.22 0.644 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.644U 5.22 0.644 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1.25U 5.22 1.25 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.644U 5.22 0.644 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.981U 5.22 0.981 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1.07U 5.22 1.07 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.962U 5.22 0.962 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 10.8 ug/Kg 82 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 10.7 ug/Kg 81 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 9.41 ug/Kg 71 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 14 ug/Kg 106 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202805 000817-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:20 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 18:12 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 5340J 17500 2520 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1440 ug/Kg 86 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202806 000821-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:25 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 13:53 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.410U 5.21 0.410 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.467U 5.21 0.467 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.456U 5.21 0.456 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.506U 5.21 0.506 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.513U 5.21 0.513 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.871U 5.21 0.871 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.920U 5.21 0.920 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.891U 5.21 0.891 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.755U 5.21 0.755 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.930U 5.21 0.930 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1.10U 5.21 1.10 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.604U 5.21 0.604 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.21 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.763U 5.21 0.763 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.643U 5.21 0.643 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.21 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.21 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.763U 5.21 0.763 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.643U 5.21 0.643 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.594U 5.21 0.594 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.21 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.21 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.763U 5.21 0.763 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.643U 5.21 0.643 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.594U 5.21 0.594 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.21 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.21 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.594U 5.21 0.594 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.21 1.15 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.09U 5.21 1.09 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1.25U 5.21 1.25 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.763U 5.21 0.763 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.643U 5.21 0.643 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.979U 5.21 0.979 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.594U 5.21 0.594 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1.07U 5.21 1.07 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1.15U 5.21 1.15 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.960U 5.21 0.960 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 10.9 ug/Kg 82 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 10.7 ug/Kg 81 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 9.36 ug/Kg 71 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 13.8 ug/Kg 104 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202806 000821-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:25 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 18:30 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 11700J 17400 2490 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1660 1430 ug/Kg 86 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202807 000761-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:30 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 14:37 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.411U 5.22 0.411 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.469U 5.22 0.469 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.457U 5.22 0.457 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.508U 5.22 0.508 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.514U 5.22 0.514 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.873U 5.22 0.873 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.923U 5.22 0.923 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.893U 5.22 0.893 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.757U 5.22 0.757 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.932U 5.22 0.932 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1.10U 5.22 1.10 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.606U 5.22 0.606 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.645U 5.22 0.645 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.645U 5.22 0.645 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.645U 5.22 0.645 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.09U 5.22 1.09 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1.25U 5.22 1.25 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.765U 5.22 0.765 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.645U 5.22 0.645 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.982U 5.22 0.982 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.595U 5.22 0.595 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1.07U 5.22 1.07 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1.15U 5.22 1.15 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.962U 5.22 0.962 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 9.05 ug/Kg 68 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 8.92 ug/Kg 67 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 7.47 ug/Kg 56 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 11.6 ug/Kg 87 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202807 000761-BOTTOM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 09:30 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 18:48 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 4340J 17100 2460 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1640 1260 ug/Kg 77 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202808 000805-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:15 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 19:06 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2420U 16900 2420 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1660 1460 ug/Kg 88 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202809 000758-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:20 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 19:24 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2460U 17100 2460 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1660 1400 ug/Kg 84 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202810 000757-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:25 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 20:17 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2430U 16900 2430 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1640 1480 ug/Kg 90 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202811 000803-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:30 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/31/2011 08:30 462382 3550B 1 08/10/2011 15:21 DLB 463127
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.390U 4.95 0.390 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.445U 4.95 0.445 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.434U 4.95 0.434 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.482U 4.95 0.482 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.488U 4.95 0.488 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.829U 4.95 0.829 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.876U 4.95 0.876 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.847U 4.95 0.847 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.718U 4.95 0.718 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.884U 4.95 0.884 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1.05U 4.95 1.05 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.575U 4.95 0.575 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1.04U 4.95 1.04 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.726U 4.95 0.726 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.612U 4.95 0.612 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.09U 4.95 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1.04U 4.95 1.04 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.726U 4.95 0.726 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.612U 4.95 0.612 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.565U 4.95 0.565 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.09U 4.95 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1.04U 4.95 1.04 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.726U 4.95 0.726 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.612U 4.95 0.612 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.565U 4.95 0.565 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.09U 4.95 1.09 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1.04U 4.95 1.04 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.565U 4.95 0.565 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1.09U 4.95 1.09 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.04U 4.95 1.04 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1.19U 4.95 1.19 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.726U 4.95 0.726 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.612U 4.95 0.612 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.931U 4.95 0.931 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.565U 4.95 0.565 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1.01U 4.95 1.01 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1.09U 4.95 1.09 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.913U 4.95 0.913 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 9.28 ug/Kg 70 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 8.32 ug/Kg 63 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 7.63 ug/Kg 58 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 11 ug/Kg 83 43 - 111
GCAL Report 211072028

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21107202811 000803-BOTTEM SED 30 Solid 07/12/2011 12:30 07/20/2011 09:05
SW-846 8015B
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
07/25/2011 14:30 461885 3550B 1 07/26/2011 20:35 SMH 462140
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 2700J 16600 2390 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1670 1450 ug/Kg 87 67 - 120
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211072028

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 463127 Client ID MB462382 LCS462382 LCSD462382
Prep Batch 462382 GCAL ID 974741 974742 974743
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 07/31/2011 08:30 07/31/2011 08:30 07/31/2011 08:30
Analytical Date 08/10/2011 08:48 08/10/2011 09:32 08/10/2011 10:15
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.456U 0.456
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.359U 0.359
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.315U 0.315
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.350U 0.350 13.3 10.4 78 50 - 150 9.16 69 13 40
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.394U 0.394
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.389U 0.389
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.669U 0.669
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.586U 0.586
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.737U 0.737
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.707U 0.707
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.580U 0.580
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.464U 0.464
GCAL Report 211072028
RPD
Limit

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 463127 Client ID MB462382 LCS462382 LCSD462382
Prep Batch 462382 GCAL ID 974741 974742 974743
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 07/31/2011 08:30 07/31/2011 08:30 07/31/2011 08:30
Analytical Date 08/10/2011 08:48 08/10/2011 09:32 08/10/2011 10:15
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.714U 0.714
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.684U 0.684
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.819U 0.819
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.752U 0.752
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.958U 0.958
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.846U 0.846
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 10.9 82 13.3 10.5 79 20 - 97 10.5 79
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 11 83 13.3 11.2 84 22 - 98 9.57 72
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 9.5 71 13.3 10.9 82 51 - 120 9.51 71
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 11.6 87 13.3 12.2 92 43 - 111 10.1 76
Analytical Batch 463127 Client ID 000803-BOTTEM SED 30 970634MS 970634MSD
Prep Batch 462382 GCAL ID 21107202811 974744 974745
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type SAMPLE MS MSD
Prep Date 07/31/2011 08:30 07/31/2011 08:30 07/31/2011 08:30
Analytical Date 08/10/2011 15:21 08/10/2011 16:05 08/10/2011 16:49
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
Result
% R RPD
% R RPD
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.00 0.347 13.3 9.88 74 50 - 150 8.21 62 18 40
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 9.28 70 13.3 10.8 81 20 - 97 8.94 67
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 8.32 63 13.3 9.08 68 22 - 98 8.15 61
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 7.63 58 13.3 8.47 64 51 - 120 7.37 55
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 11 83 13.3 13.2 99 43 - 111 11.1 84
GCAL Report 211072028
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit

General Chromatography Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 462140 Client ID MB461885 LCS461885 LCSD461885
Prep Batch 461885 GCAL ID 972581 972582 972583
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 07/25/2011 14:30 07/25/2011 14:30 07/25/2011 14:30
Analytical Date 07/26/2011 14:00 07/26/2011 14:54 07/26/2011 15:12
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 1880U 1880 65800 52800 80 47 - 120 56000 85 6 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1460 89 1640 1430 87 67 - 120 1490 91
Analytical Batch 462140 Client ID 106052IDW1 972351MS 972351MSD
Prep Batch 461885 GCAL ID 21107230701 972584 972585
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type SAMPLE MS MSD
Prep Date 07/25/2011 14:30 07/25/2011 14:30 07/25/2011 14:30
Analytical Date 07/26/2011 15:30 07/26/2011 15:48 07/26/2011 16:42
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8015B
Units
Result
ug/Kg
RDL
Spike
Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
GCSV-00-44 Oil Range Organics 4130 1880 65600 57000 81 47 - 120 63900 90 12 40
Surrogate
84-15-1 o-Terphenyl 1640 1410 86 67 - 120 1650 99
GCAL Report 211072028
RPD
Limit
RPD
Limit

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 6
Report Date 10/18/2011
GCAL Report 211093016
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

ANALYTICAL RESULTS
PERFORMED BY
GULF COAST ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
7979 GSRI Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
Report Date 10/18/2011
GCAL Report 211093016
*211093016*
Deliver To The November 9th Group, LLC
630 Fairway Ave. NE
Fort Walton Beach, FL 32547
850-862-7134
Attn James Kirby
Project Surfrider State of the Beach
NELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER 01955
DOD ELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER ADE - 1482

Client: Surfrider Foundation Report: 211093016
CASE NARRATIVE
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories received and analyzed the sample(s) listed
on the sample cross-reference page of this report. Receipt of the sample(s) is documented
by the attached chain of custody. This applies only to the sample(s) listed in this report.
No sample integrity or quality control exceptions were identified unless noted below.
SEMI-VOLATILES MASS SPECTROMETRY
In the SW-846 8272 Modified analysis, samples 21109301608 (005374), 21109301601 (005335),
21109301602 (005363), 21109301603 (005361), 21109301605 (005337), 21109301604 (005320),
21109301606 (005333), 21109301607 (005342), 21109301609 (005329) and 21109301610 (005340) had to
be diluted to eliminate interference from non-target background. This is reflected in elevated detection limits.
The recoveries for the surrogates are reported as diluted out.

Sample analysis was performed in accordance with approved methodologies provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency or other recognized agencies. The samples and their corresponding
extracts will be maintained for a period of 30 days unless otherwise arranged. Following this retention
period the samples will be disposed in accordance with GCAL's Standard Operating Procedures.
Common Abbreviations Utilized in this Report
ND Indicates the result was Not Detected at the specified RDL
DO Indicates the result was Diluted Out
MI Indicates the result was subject to Matrix Interference
TNTC Indicates the result was Too Numerous To Count
SUBC Indicates the analysis was Sub-Contracted
FLD Indicates the analysis was performed in the Field
PQL Practical Quantitation Limit
MDL Method Detection Limit
RDL Reporting Detection Limit
00:00 Reported as a time equivalent to 12:00 AM
Reporting Flags Utilized in this Report
J Indicates an estimated value
U Indicates the compound was analyzed for but not detected
B (ORGANICS) Indicates the analyte was detected in the associated Method Blank
B (INORGANICS) Indicates the result is between the RDL and MDL
Sample receipt at GCAL is documented through the attached chain of custody. In accordance with
NELAC, this report shall be reproduced only in full and with the written permission of GCAL. The results
contained within this report relate only to the samples reported. The documented results are presented
within this report.
This report pertains only to the samples listed in the Report Sample Summary and should be retained as
a permanent record thereof. The results contained within this report are intended for the use of the client.
Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this report is prohibited.
I certify that this data package is in compliance with the NELAC standard and terms and conditions of the
contract and Statement of Work both technically and for completeness, for other than the conditions in the
case narrative. Release of the data contained in this hardcopy data package and in the
computer-readable data submitted has been authorized by the Quality Assurance Manager or his/her
designee, as verified by the following signature.
Estimated uncertainty of measurement is available upon request. This report is in compliance with the
DOD QSM as specified in the contract if applicable.
Robyn Migues
Technical Director
GCAL REPORT 211093016
THIS REPORT CONTAINS _______ PAGES.
Laboratory Endorsement

Report Sample Summary
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301601 005335 Solid 09/11/2011 00:30 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301602 005363 Solid 09/11/2011 22:30 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301603 005361 Solid 09/23/2011 22:00 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301604 005320 Solid 09/29/2011 15:44 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301605 005337 Solid 09/29/2011 15:44 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301606 005333 Solid 08/30/2011 10:30 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301607 005342 Solid 08/30/2011 11:14 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301608 005374 Solid 08/30/2011 11:45 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301609 005329 Solid 08/30/2011 12:15 09/30/2011 09:15
21109301610 005340 Solid 09/01/2011 09:30 09/30/2011 09:15
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301601 005335 Solid 09/11/2011 00:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 796J 3050 544 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 9900 3050 637 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 22700 3050 670 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 6370 3050 637 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 40100 3050 670 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25700 3050 670 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 6200 3050 637 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 2360J 3050 670 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301602 005363 Solid 09/11/2011 22:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 6280 3680 769 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 3840 3680 810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13900 3680 810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 10300 3680 810 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3740 3680 769 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301603 005361 Solid 09/23/2011 22:00 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 952J 4000 714 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 9900 4000 836 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15700 4000 880 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 6320 4000 836 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 34200 4000 880 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 24100 4000 880 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 6690 4000 836 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1580J 4000 880 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301604 005320 Solid 09/29/2011 15:44 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1040J 1200 265 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1250 1200 265 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 345J 1200 176 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 380J 1200 265 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301606 005333 Solid 08/30/2011 10:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 58.4J 86.9 15.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 602 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 238 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 531 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 493 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 256 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1500 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 265 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1360 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 744 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 334 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 21.8J 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 22.6J 86.9 16.0 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301607 005342 Solid 08/30/2011 11:14 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 8.22J 42.7 6.19 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 15.6J 42.7 7.63 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 5.17J 42.7 4.96 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 165 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 99.6 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 137 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 330 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 309 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 195 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 88.3 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 8.11J 42.7 7.87 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301608 005374 Solid 08/30/2011 11:45 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 125J 452 80.6 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 970 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 492 452 99.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 780 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2070 452 99.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2290 452 99.3 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 579 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301609 005329 Solid 08/30/2011 12:15 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 22.5J 46.5 8.31 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 186 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 65.7 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 179 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 96.1 46.5 6.82 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 279 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 97.9 46.5 6.82 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 326 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 199 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 97.6 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301610 005340 Solid 09/01/2011 09:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 37.0J 45.7 8.15 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 410 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 144 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 365 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 348 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 184 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 208 45.7 5.64 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1100 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 185 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 227 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 292 45.7 5.64 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 994 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 461 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 256 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 24.1J 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 15.8J 45.7 8.42 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301601 005335 Solid 09/11/2011 00:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 100 10/12/2011 15:13 DLB 466969
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 240U 3050 240 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 273U 3050 273 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 266U 3050 266 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 296U 3050 296 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 300U 3050 300 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 509U 3050 509 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 538U 3050 538 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 521U 3050 521 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 442U 3050 442 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 796J 3050 544 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 644U 3050 644 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 353U 3050 353 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 9900 3050 637 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 446U 3050 446 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 376U 3050 376 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 22700 3050 670 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 6370 3050 637 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 446U 3050 446 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 376U 3050 376 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 347U 3050 347 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 40100 3050 670 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 637U 3050 637 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 446U 3050 446 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 376U 3050 376 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 347U 3050 347 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25700 3050 670 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 637U 3050 637 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 347U 3050 347 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 670U 3050 670 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 6200 3050 637 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 729U 3050 729 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 446U 3050 446 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 376U 3050 376 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 573U 3050 573 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 347U 3050 347 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 624U 3050 624 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 2360J 3050 670 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 561U 3050 561 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 20.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 20.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 20.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 20.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A WET WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301602 005363 Solid 09/11/2011 22:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 100 10/12/2011 15:56 DLB 466969
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 290U 3680 290 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 330U 3680 330 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 322U 3680 322 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 358U 3680 358 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 363U 3680 363 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 616U 3680 616 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 651U 3680 651 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 629U 3680 629 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 534U 3680 534 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 657U 3680 657 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 779U 3680 779 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 427U 3680 427 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 6280 3680 769 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 539U 3680 539 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 455U 3680 455 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 3840 3680 810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 769U 3680 769 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 539U 3680 539 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 455U 3680 455 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 420U 3680 420 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13900 3680 810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 769U 3680 769 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 539U 3680 539 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 455U 3680 455 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 420U 3680 420 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 10300 3680 810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 769U 3680 769 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 420U 3680 420 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 810U 3680 810 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3740 3680 769 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 882U 3680 882 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 539U 3680 539 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 455U 3680 455 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 692U 3680 692 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 420U 3680 420 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 754U 3680 754 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 810U 3680 810 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 678U 3680 678 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 24.5 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 24.5 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 24.5 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 24.5 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A WET WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301603 005361 Solid 09/23/2011 22:00 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 100 10/12/2011 16:40 DLB 466969
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 315U 4000 315 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 359U 4000 359 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 350U 4000 350 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 389U 4000 389 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 394U 4000 394 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 669U 4000 669 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 707U 4000 707 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 684U 4000 684 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 580U 4000 580 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 952J 4000 714 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 846U 4000 846 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 464U 4000 464 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 9900 4000 836 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 586U 4000 586 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 494U 4000 494 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15700 4000 880 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 6320 4000 836 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 586U 4000 586 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 494U 4000 494 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 456U 4000 456 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 34200 4000 880 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 836U 4000 836 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 586U 4000 586 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 494U 4000 494 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 456U 4000 456 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 24100 4000 880 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 836U 4000 836 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 456U 4000 456 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 880U 4000 880 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 6690 4000 836 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 958U 4000 958 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 586U 4000 586 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 494U 4000 494 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 752U 4000 752 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 456U 4000 456 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 819U 4000 819 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1580J 4000 880 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 737U 4000 737 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 26.7 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 26.7 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 26.7 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 26.7 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A WET WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301604 005320 Solid 09/29/2011 15:44 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 10 10/12/2011 18:08 DLB 466969
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 94.8U 1200 94.8 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 108U 1200 108 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 105U 1200 105 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 117U 1200 117 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 119U 1200 119 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 201U 1200 201 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 213U 1200 213 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 252U 1200 252 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 176U 1200 176 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 149U 1200 149 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1040J 1200 265 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 252U 1200 252 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 176U 1200 176 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 149U 1200 149 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 137U 1200 137 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1250 1200 265 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 252U 1200 252 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 176U 1200 176 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 149U 1200 149 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 137U 1200 137 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 265U 1200 265 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 252U 1200 252 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 137U 1200 137 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 265U 1200 265 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 252U 1200 252 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 345J 1200 176 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 149U 1200 149 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 137U 1200 137 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 380J 1200 265 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 222U 1200 222 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 20 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 20 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 20 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 20 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 20 10/13/2011 10:58 DLB 467045
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 412U 2410 412 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 349U 2410 349 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 430U 2410 430 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 509U 2410 509 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 279U 2410 279 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 577U 2410 577 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301604 005320 Solid 09/29/2011 15:44 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 20 10/13/2011 10:58 DLB 467045
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 453U 2410 453 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 493U 2410 493 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301605 005337 Solid 09/29/2011 15:44 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 10 10/12/2011 17:24 DLB 466969
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 527U 6690 527 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 600U 6690 600 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 585U 6690 585 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 651U 6690 651 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 659U 6690 659 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1120U 6690 1120 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1180U 6690 1180 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1140U 6690 1140 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 970U 6690 970 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1190U 6690 1190 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1410U 6690 1410 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 776U 6690 776 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1400U 6690 1400 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 980U 6690 980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 826U 6690 826 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1470U 6690 1470 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1400U 6690 1400 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 980U 6690 980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 826U 6690 826 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 763U 6690 763 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1470U 6690 1470 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1400U 6690 1400 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 980U 6690 980 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 826U 6690 826 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 763U 6690 763 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1470U 6690 1470 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1400U 6690 1400 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 763U 6690 763 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1470U 6690 1470 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1400U 6690 1400 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1600U 6690 1600 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 980U 6690 980 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 826U 6690 826 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1260U 6690 1260 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 763U 6690 763 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1370U 6690 1370 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1470U 6690 1470 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1230U 6690 1230 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 222 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 222 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 222 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 222 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301606 005333 Solid 08/30/2011 10:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 20 10/13/2011 12:26 DLB 467045
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 6.84U 86.9 6.84 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 7.80U 86.9 7.80 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 7.60U 86.9 7.60 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 8.45U 86.9 8.45 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 8.56U 86.9 8.56 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 14.5U 86.9 14.5 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 15.4U 86.9 15.4 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 14.9U 86.9 14.9 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 12.6U 86.9 12.6 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 58.4J 86.9 15.5 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 18.4U 86.9 18.4 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 10.1U 86.9 10.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 602 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 238 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 10.7U 86.9 10.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 531 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 493 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 256 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 10.7U 86.9 10.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 9.90U 86.9 9.90 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1500 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 18.2U 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 265 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 10.7U 86.9 10.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 9.90U 86.9 9.90 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1360 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 18.2U 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 9.90U 86.9 9.90 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 744 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 334 86.9 18.2 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 20.8U 86.9 20.8 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 12.7U 86.9 12.7 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 10.7U 86.9 10.7 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 16.3U 86.9 16.3 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 9.90U 86.9 9.90 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 17.8U 86.9 17.8 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 21.8J 86.9 19.1 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 22.6J 86.9 16.0 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301607 005342 Solid 08/30/2011 11:14 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 10 10/13/2011 13:10 DLB 467045
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 3.36U 42.7 3.36 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 3.83U 42.7 3.83 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 3.74U 42.7 3.74 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 4.15U 42.7 4.15 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 4.21U 42.7 4.21 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 7.14U 42.7 7.14 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 7.55U 42.7 7.55 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 7.31U 42.7 7.31 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 8.22J 42.7 6.19 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 15.6J 42.7 7.63 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 9.04U 42.7 9.04 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 5.17J 42.7 4.96 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 165 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 6.26U 42.7 6.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 5.28U 42.7 5.28 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 99.6 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 137 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 6.26U 42.7 6.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 5.28U 42.7 5.28 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 4.87U 42.7 4.87 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 330 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 8.93U 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 6.26U 42.7 6.26 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 5.28U 42.7 5.28 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 4.87U 42.7 4.87 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 309 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 8.93U 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 4.87U 42.7 4.87 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 195 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 88.3 42.7 8.93 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 10.2U 42.7 10.2 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 6.26U 42.7 6.26 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 5.28U 42.7 5.28 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 8.03U 42.7 8.03 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 4.87U 42.7 4.87 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 8.75U 42.7 8.75 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 9.40U 42.7 9.40 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 8.11J 42.7 7.87 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.1 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.1 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.1 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.1 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301608 005374 Solid 08/30/2011 11:45 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 100 10/12/2011 13:04 DLB 466969
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 35.6U 452 35.6 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 40.5U 452 40.5 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 39.5U 452 39.5 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 43.9U 452 43.9 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 44.5U 452 44.5 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 75.5U 452 75.5 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 79.8U 452 79.8 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 77.2U 452 77.2 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 65.5U 452 65.5 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 125J 452 80.6 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 95.5U 452 95.5 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 52.4U 452 52.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 970 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 66.2U 452 66.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 55.8U 452 55.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 492 452 99.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 780 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 66.2U 452 66.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 55.8U 452 55.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 51.5U 452 51.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2070 452 99.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 94.4U 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 66.2U 452 66.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 55.8U 452 55.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 51.5U 452 51.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 2290 452 99.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 94.4U 452 94.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 51.5U 452 51.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 99.3U 452 99.3 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 579 452 94.4 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 108U 452 108 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 66.2U 452 66.2 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 55.8U 452 55.8 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 84.9U 452 84.9 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 51.5U 452 51.5 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 92.5U 452 92.5 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 99.3U 452 99.3 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 83.2U 452 83.2 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301609 005329 Solid 08/30/2011 12:15 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 10 10/13/2011 13:53 DLB 467045
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 3.66U 46.5 3.66 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 4.18U 46.5 4.18 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 4.07U 46.5 4.07 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 4.53U 46.5 4.53 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 4.58U 46.5 4.58 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 7.78U 46.5 7.78 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 8.22U 46.5 8.22 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 7.96U 46.5 7.96 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 6.75U 46.5 6.75 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 22.5J 46.5 8.31 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 9.84U 46.5 9.84 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 5.40U 46.5 5.40 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 186 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 6.82U 46.5 6.82 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 5.75U 46.5 5.75 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 65.7 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 179 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 96.1 46.5 6.82 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 5.75U 46.5 5.75 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 5.30U 46.5 5.30 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 279 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 9.73U 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 97.9 46.5 6.82 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 5.75U 46.5 5.75 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 5.30U 46.5 5.30 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 326 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 9.73U 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 5.30U 46.5 5.30 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 199 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 97.6 46.5 9.73 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 11.1U 46.5 11.1 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 6.82U 46.5 6.82 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 5.75U 46.5 5.75 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 8.75U 46.5 8.75 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 5.30U 46.5 5.30 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 9.53U 46.5 9.53 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 10.2U 46.5 10.2 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 8.57U 46.5 8.57 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21109301610 005340 Solid 09/01/2011 09:30 09/30/2011 09:15
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
10/05/2011 14:10 466478 3550B 10 10/13/2011 14:38 DLB 467045
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 3.60U 45.7 3.60 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 4.10U 45.7 4.10 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 4.00U 45.7 4.00 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 4.44U 45.7 4.44 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 4.50U 45.7 4.50 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 7.64U 45.7 7.64 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 8.07U 45.7 8.07 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 7.81U 45.7 7.81 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 6.62U 45.7 6.62 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 37.0J 45.7 8.15 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 9.66U 45.7 9.66 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 5.30U 45.7 5.30 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 410 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 144 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 5.64U 45.7 5.64 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 365 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 348 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 184 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 208 45.7 5.64 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 5.21U 45.7 5.21 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1100 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 185 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 227 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 292 45.7 5.64 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 5.21U 45.7 5.21 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 994 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 9.55U 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 5.21U 45.7 5.21 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 461 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 256 45.7 9.55 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 10.9U 45.7 10.9 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 6.69U 45.7 6.69 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 5.64U 45.7 5.64 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 8.59U 45.7 8.59 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 5.21U 45.7 5.21 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 9.35U 45.7 9.35 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 24.1J 45.7 10.0 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 15.8J 45.7 8.42 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211093016

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 466903 Client ID MB466478 LCS466478 LCSD466478
Prep Batch 466478 GCAL ID 992988 992989 992990
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 10/05/2011 14:10 10/05/2011 14:10 10/05/2011 14:10
Analytical Date 10/12/2011 10:52 10/11/2011 19:28 10/11/2011 20:12
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.456U 0.456
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.359U 0.359
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.315U 0.315
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.350U 0.350 13.3 9.20 69 50 - 150 8.53 64 8 40
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.394U 0.394
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.389U 0.389
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.669U 0.669
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.586U 0.586
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.737U 0.737
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.707U 0.707
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.580U 0.580
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.464U 0.464
GCAL Report 211093016
RPD
Limit

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 466903 Client ID MB466478 LCS466478 LCSD466478
Prep Batch 466478 GCAL ID 992988 992989 992990
Prep Method 3550B Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 10/05/2011 14:10 10/05/2011 14:10 10/05/2011 14:10
Analytical Date 10/12/2011 10:52 10/11/2011 19:28 10/11/2011 20:12
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.714U 0.714
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.684U 0.684
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.819U 0.819
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.752U 0.752
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.958U 0.958
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.846U 0.846
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 9.43 71 13.3 11.3 85 20 - 97 10.7 80
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 7.49 56 13.3 11.9 89 22 - 98 10.1 76
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 10.4 78 13.3 11.8 89 51 - 120 10.6 80
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 6.82 51 13.3 14.4 108 43 - 111 11.5 86
GCAL Report 211093016
Result
% R RPD
RPD
Limit

PAH Analyte Trends - March to November 2012
Appendix 7
Report Date 12/19/2011
GCAL Report 211111116
Report of Certified Lab Results for Surfrider Foundation! January 25, 2012

ANALYTICAL RESULTS
PERFORMED BY
GULF COAST ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
7979 GSRI Avenue
Baton Rouge, LA 70820
Report Date 12/19/2011
GCAL Report 211111116
*211111116*
Deliver To The November 9th Group, LLC
630 Fairway Ave. NE
Fort Walton Beach, FL 32547
850-862-7134
Attn James Kirby
Project Surfrider State of the Beach
NELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER 01955
DOD ELAP CERTIFICATE NUMBER ADE - 1482

Client: Surfrider Foundation Report: 211111116
CASE NARRATIVE
Gulf Coast Analytical Laboratories received and analyzed the sample(s) listed
on the sample cross-reference page of this report. Receipt of the sample(s) is documented
by the attached chain of custody. This applies only to the sample(s) listed in this report.
No sample integrity or quality control exceptions were identified unless noted below.
SEMI-VOLATILES MASS SPECTROMETRY
In the SW-846 8272 Modified analysis, samples 21111111601 (1365-DA 001-TAR BALLS), 21111111604
(1335-FP001-TAR BALLS), 21111111606 (0460-R49-TAR BALLS) 21111111608 (1341-R58-TAR
BALLS), 21111111609 (1347-R56-TAR BALLS), 21111111610 (0454-R66 PLUNGE STEP), 21111111611
(1329-R66A-TAR BALLS), 21111111613 (1351-R53-BLACK JELLY BEAN), 21111111614 (0463-R47-
TAR BALLS), and 21111111615 (0438-R48R51-TAR BALLS) had to be diluted to eliminate interference
from non-target background. Samples 21111111610 (0454-R66 PLUNGE STEP), 21111111611 (1329-
R66A-TAR BALLS), and 21111111613 (1351-R53-BLACK JELLY BEAN) required additional dilutions
for compounds associated with failed internal standards in the lower dilution. The dilution are reflected in
elevated detection limits. The recoveries for the surrogates are reported as diluted out.
In the SW-846 8272 Modified analysis, the recovery for the surrogate Acenaphthylene-d8 is outside the
control limits for sample 21111111607 (0458-R46-TARBALLS WITH SAND). All other surrogate
recoveries are acceptable.

Sample analysis was performed in accordance with approved methodologies provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency or other recognized agencies. The samples and their corresponding
extracts will be maintained for a period of 30 days unless otherwise arranged. Following this retention
period the samples will be disposed in accordance with GCAL's Standard Operating Procedures.
Common Abbreviations Utilized in this Report
ND Indicates the result was Not Detected at the specified RDL
DO Indicates the result was Diluted Out
MI Indicates the result was subject to Matrix Interference
TNTC Indicates the result was Too Numerous To Count
SUBC Indicates the analysis was Sub-Contracted
FLD Indicates the analysis was performed in the Field
PQL Practical Quantitation Limit
MDL Method Detection Limit
RDL Reporting Detection Limit
00:00 Reported as a time equivalent to 12:00 AM
Reporting Flags Utilized in this Report
J Indicates the result is between the MDL and RDL
U Indicates the compound was analyzed for but not detected
B Indicates the analyte was detected in the associated Method Blank
Sample receipt at GCAL is documented through the attached chain of custody. In accordance with
NELAC, this report shall be reproduced only in full and with the written permission of GCAL. The results
contained within this report relate only to the samples reported. The documented results are presented
within this report.
This report pertains only to the samples listed in the Report Sample Summary and should be retained as
a permanent record thereof. The results contained within this report are intended for the use of the client.
Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this report is prohibited.
I certify that this data package is in compliance with the NELAC standard and terms and conditions of the
contract and Statement of Work both technically and for completeness, for other than the conditions in the
case narrative. Release of the data contained in this hardcopy data package and in the
computer-readable data submitted has been authorized by the Quality Assurance Manager or his/her
designee, as verified by the following signature.
Estimated uncertainty of measurement is available upon request. This report is in compliance with the
DOD QSM as specified in the contract if applicable.
Robyn Migues
Technical Director
GCAL REPORT 211111116
THIS REPORT CONTAINS _______ PAGES.
Laboratory Endorsement

Report Sample Summary
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111601 1365-DA 001-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 00:30 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111602 0486 -DA 002-SAND-CARB HOLE Solid 11/04/2011 01:00 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111603 0471-NB001-SAND Solid 11/03/2011 18:00 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111604 1335-FP001-TAR BALLS Solid 10/15/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111605 0457-PB001-WEST-SAND Solid 11/03/2011 21:00 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111606 0460-R49-TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:20 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111607 0458-R46-TARBALLS WITH SAND Solid 11/03/2011 08:45 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111608 1341-R58-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 09:15 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111609 1347-R56-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 08:30 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111610 0454-R66 PLUNGE STEP Solid 11/04/2011 11:00 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111611 1329-R66A-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111612 1339-R66B-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111613 1351-R53-BLACK JELLY BEAN Solid 11/03/2011 21:30 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111614 0463-R47- TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:00 11/11/2011 08:40
21111111615 0438-R48R51-TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:15 11/11/2011 08:40
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111601 1365-DA 001-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 00:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1890J 6270 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 6520 6270 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 5560J 6270 1380 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3140J 6270 1310 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111602 0486 -DA 002-SAND-CARB HOLE Solid 11/04/2011 01:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1.13J 4.11 0.727 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1.75J 4.11 0.704 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 2.40J 4.11 0.597 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 1.82J 4.11 0.477 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.43J 4.11 0.860 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111606 0460-R49-TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:20 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4500 3070 675 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 5940 3070 675 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2530J 3070 641 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111608 1341-R58-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 09:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1790J 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 8070 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 7490 6040 1330 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3610J 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111609 1347-R56-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 08:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 7190 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111609 1347-R56-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 08:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 6610 6040 1330 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2640J 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111610 0454-R66 PLUNGE STEP Solid 11/04/2011 11:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15600 7650 1680 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 4810J 7650 944 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 36300 7650 1680 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25800 7650 1680 ug/Kg
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
218-01-9 Chrysene 4040J 15300 3200 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111611 1329-R66A-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 156000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 472000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 368000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 212000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111612 1339-R66B-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 34.0J 70.4 6.85 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 15.8J 70.4 10.3 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111613 1351-R53-BLACK JELLY BEAN Solid 11/03/2011 21:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 88600 60200 13200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 132000 60200 13200 ug/Kg
GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111614 0463-R47- TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Summary of Compounds Detected (con't)
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25900J 31500 6940 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 51200 31500 6940 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 36500 31500 6940 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 7370J 31500 6590 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111601 1365-DA 001-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 00:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 16:09 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 493U 6270 493 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 562U 6270 562 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 548U 6270 548 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 609U 6270 609 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 617U 6270 617 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1050U 6270 1050 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1110U 6270 1110 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1070U 6270 1070 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 909U 6270 909 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1120U 6270 1120 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1330U 6270 1330 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 727U 6270 727 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1310U 6270 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 918U 6270 918 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 774U 6270 774 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1890J 6270 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1310U 6270 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 918U 6270 918 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 774U 6270 774 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 714U 6270 714 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 6520 6270 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1310U 6270 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 918U 6270 918 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 774U 6270 774 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 714U 6270 714 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 5560J 6270 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1310U 6270 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 714U 6270 714 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6270 1380 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3140J 6270 1310 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1500U 6270 1500 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 918U 6270 918 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 774U 6270 774 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1180U 6270 1180 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 714U 6270 714 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1280U 6270 1280 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1380U 6270 1380 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1150U 6270 1150 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111602 0486 -DA 002-SAND-CARB HOLE Solid 11/04/2011 01:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 1 12/07/2011 20:43 JEW 470615
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.324U 4.11 0.324 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.369U 4.11 0.369 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.360U 4.11 0.360 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.400U 4.11 0.400 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.405U 4.11 0.405 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.688U 4.11 0.688 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1.13J 4.11 0.727 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1.75J 4.11 0.704 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 2.40J 4.11 0.597 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.734U 4.11 0.734 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.870U 4.11 0.870 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 1.82J 4.11 0.477 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.11 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.603U 4.11 0.603 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.508U 4.11 0.508 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.905U 4.11 0.905 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.11 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.603U 4.11 0.603 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.508U 4.11 0.508 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.469U 4.11 0.469 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.905U 4.11 0.905 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.11 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.603U 4.11 0.603 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.508U 4.11 0.508 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.469U 4.11 0.469 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.905U 4.11 0.905 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.860U 4.11 0.860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.469U 4.11 0.469 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.905U 4.11 0.905 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1.43J 4.11 0.860 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.985U 4.11 0.985 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.603U 4.11 0.603 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.508U 4.11 0.508 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.773U 4.11 0.773 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.469U 4.11 0.469 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.842U 4.11 0.842 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.905U 4.11 0.905 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.758U 4.11 0.758 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.2 12.2 ug/Kg 92 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.2 11.3 ug/Kg 86 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.2 10.2 ug/Kg 77 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.2 8.93 ug/Kg 68 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111603 0471-NB001-SAND Solid 11/03/2011 18:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 1 12/07/2011 21:27 JEW 470615
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.319U 4.05 0.319 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.363U 4.05 0.363 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.354U 4.05 0.354 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.394U 4.05 0.394 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.399U 4.05 0.399 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.677U 4.05 0.677 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.716U 4.05 0.716 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.692U 4.05 0.692 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.587U 4.05 0.587 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.723U 4.05 0.723 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.856U 4.05 0.856 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.470U 4.05 0.470 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.846U 4.05 0.846 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.593U 4.05 0.593 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.500U 4.05 0.500 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.891U 4.05 0.891 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.846U 4.05 0.846 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.593U 4.05 0.593 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.500U 4.05 0.500 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.462U 4.05 0.462 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.891U 4.05 0.891 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.846U 4.05 0.846 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.593U 4.05 0.593 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.500U 4.05 0.500 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.462U 4.05 0.462 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.891U 4.05 0.891 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.846U 4.05 0.846 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.462U 4.05 0.462 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.891U 4.05 0.891 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.846U 4.05 0.846 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.970U 4.05 0.970 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.593U 4.05 0.593 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.500U 4.05 0.500 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.761U 4.05 0.761 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.462U 4.05 0.462 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.829U 4.05 0.829 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.891U 4.05 0.891 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.746U 4.05 0.746 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.1 9.87 ug/Kg 75 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.1 7.55 ug/Kg 58 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.1 8.72 ug/Kg 66 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.1 5.88 ug/Kg 45 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111604 1335-FP001-TAR BALLS Solid 10/15/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 19:46 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 495U 6290 495 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 564U 6290 564 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 550U 6290 550 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 611U 6290 611 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 619U 6290 619 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1050U 6290 1050 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1110U 6290 1110 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1070U 6290 1070 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 911U 6290 911 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1120U 6290 1120 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1330U 6290 1330 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 729U 6290 729 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1310U 6290 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 921U 6290 921 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 776U 6290 776 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6290 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1310U 6290 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 921U 6290 921 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 776U 6290 776 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 717U 6290 717 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6290 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1310U 6290 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 921U 6290 921 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 776U 6290 776 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 717U 6290 717 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6290 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1310U 6290 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 717U 6290 717 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6290 1380 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1310U 6290 1310 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1510U 6290 1510 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 921U 6290 921 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 776U 6290 776 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1180U 6290 1180 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 717U 6290 717 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1290U 6290 1290 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1380U 6290 1380 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1160U 6290 1160 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111605 0457-PB001-WEST-SAND Solid 11/03/2011 21:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 1 12/07/2011 22:11 JEW 470615
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.322U 4.09 0.322 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.367U 4.09 0.367 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.358U 4.09 0.358 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.398U 4.09 0.398 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.403U 4.09 0.403 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.685U 4.09 0.685 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.724U 4.09 0.724 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.700U 4.09 0.700 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.594U 4.09 0.594 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.731U 4.09 0.731 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.866U 4.09 0.866 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.475U 4.09 0.475 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.856U 4.09 0.856 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.600U 4.09 0.600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.506U 4.09 0.506 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.901U 4.09 0.901 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.856U 4.09 0.856 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.600U 4.09 0.600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.506U 4.09 0.506 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.467U 4.09 0.467 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.901U 4.09 0.901 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.856U 4.09 0.856 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.600U 4.09 0.600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.506U 4.09 0.506 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.467U 4.09 0.467 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.901U 4.09 0.901 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.856U 4.09 0.856 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.467U 4.09 0.467 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.901U 4.09 0.901 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.856U 4.09 0.856 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.980U 4.09 0.980 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.600U 4.09 0.600 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.506U 4.09 0.506 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.770U 4.09 0.770 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.467U 4.09 0.467 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.838U 4.09 0.838 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.901U 4.09 0.901 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.754U 4.09 0.754 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 13.3 9.37 ug/Kg 70 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 13.3 10.3 ug/Kg 77 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 13.3 10.2 ug/Kg 77 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 13.3 9.32 ug/Kg 70 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111606 0460-R49-TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:20 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 50 12/12/2011 09:18 JEW 470897
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 241U 3070 241 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 275U 3070 275 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 268U 3070 268 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 298U 3070 298 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 302U 3070 302 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 513U 3070 513 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 542U 3070 542 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 524U 3070 524 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 445U 3070 445 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 547U 3070 547 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 648U 3070 648 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 356U 3070 356 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 641U 3070 641 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 449U 3070 449 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 379U 3070 379 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 675U 3070 675 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 641U 3070 641 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 449U 3070 449 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 379U 3070 379 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 350U 3070 350 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 4500 3070 675 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 641U 3070 641 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 449U 3070 449 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 379U 3070 379 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 350U 3070 350 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 5940 3070 675 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 641U 3070 641 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 350U 3070 350 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 675U 3070 675 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2530J 3070 641 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 734U 3070 734 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 449U 3070 449 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 379U 3070 379 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 576U 3070 576 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 350U 3070 350 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 628U 3070 628 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 675U 3070 675 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 565U 3070 565 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111607 0458-R46-TARBALLS WITH SAND Solid 11/03/2011 08:45 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 1 12/07/2011 16:19 JEW 470615
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 4.81U 61.1 4.81 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 5.48U 61.1 5.48 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 5.34U 61.1 5.34 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 5.94U 61.1 5.94 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 6.02U 61.1 6.02 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 10.2U 61.1 10.2 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 10.8U 61.1 10.8 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 10.4U 61.1 10.4 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 8.86U 61.1 8.86 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 10.9U 61.1 10.9 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 12.9U 61.1 12.9 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 7.08U 61.1 7.08 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 12.8U 61.1 12.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8.95U 61.1 8.95 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 7.54U 61.1 7.54 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13.4U 61.1 13.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 12.8U 61.1 12.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8.95U 61.1 8.95 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 7.54U 61.1 7.54 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 6.96U 61.1 6.96 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13.4U 61.1 13.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 12.8U 61.1 12.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8.95U 61.1 8.95 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 7.54U 61.1 7.54 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 6.96U 61.1 6.96 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13.4U 61.1 13.4 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 12.8U 61.1 12.8 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 6.96U 61.1 6.96 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13.4U 61.1 13.4 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 12.8U 61.1 12.8 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 14.6U 61.1 14.6 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 8.95U 61.1 8.95 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 7.54U 61.1 7.54 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 11.5U 61.1 11.5 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 6.96U 61.1 6.96 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 12.5U 61.1 12.5 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 13.4U 61.1 13.4 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 11.3U 61.1 11.3 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 205 ug/Kg 103* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 194 ug/Kg 97 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 172 ug/Kg 86 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 151 ug/Kg 76 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111608 1341-R58-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 09:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 15:25 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 476U 6040 476 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 542U 6040 542 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 528U 6040 528 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 587U 6040 587 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 595U 6040 595 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1010U 6040 1010 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1070U 6040 1070 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1030U 6040 1030 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 876U 6040 876 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1080U 6040 1080 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1280U 6040 1280 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 701U 6040 701 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1790J 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 688U 6040 688 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 8070 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 688U 6040 688 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 7490 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 688U 6040 688 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1330U 6040 1330 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 3610J 6040 1260 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1450U 6040 1450 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1140U 6040 1140 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 688U 6040 688 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1240U 6040 1240 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1330U 6040 1330 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1110U 6040 1110 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111609 1347-R56-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 08:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 14:40 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 476U 6040 476 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 542U 6040 542 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 529U 6040 529 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 588U 6040 588 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 595U 6040 595 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1010U 6040 1010 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1070U 6040 1070 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1030U 6040 1030 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 876U 6040 876 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1080U 6040 1080 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1280U 6040 1280 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 701U 6040 701 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1330U 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 689U 6040 689 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 7190 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 689U 6040 689 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 6610 6040 1330 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1260U 6040 1260 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 689U 6040 689 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1330U 6040 1330 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 2640J 6040 1260 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1450U 6040 1450 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 885U 6040 885 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 746U 6040 746 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1140U 6040 1140 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 689U 6040 689 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1240U 6040 1240 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1330U 6040 1330 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1110U 6040 1110 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111610 0454-R66 PLUNGE STEP Solid 11/04/2011 11:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 16:53 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 602U 7650 602 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 686U 7650 686 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 669U 7650 669 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 744U 7650 744 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 753U 7650 753 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1280U 7650 1280 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1120U 7650 1120 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 944U 7650 944 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15600 7650 1680 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1120U 7650 1120 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 4810J 7650 944 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 872U 7650 872 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 36300 7650 1680 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 1120U 7650 1120 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 944U 7650 944 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 872U 7650 872 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25800 7650 1680 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 872U 7650 872 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1680U 7650 1680 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 1120U 7650 1120 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 944U 7650 944 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 872U 7650 872 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1680U 7650 1680 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1410U 7650 1410 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 235 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 235 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 235 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 235 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 200 12/09/2011 09:33 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 2700U 15300 2700 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 2620U 15300 2620 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 2220U 15300 2220 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 2730U 15300 2730 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 3230U 15300 3230 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 1770U 15300 1770 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 3200U 15300 3200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 3200U 15300 3200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 3200U 15300 3200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 3200U 15300 3200 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 4040J 15300 3200 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 3660U 15300 3660 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111610 0454-R66 PLUNGE STEP Solid 11/04/2011 11:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 200 12/09/2011 09:33 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 2880U 15300 2880 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 3130U 15300 3130 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111611 1329-R66A-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 19:02 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 5000U 63500 5000 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 5700U 63500 5700 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 5550U 63500 5550 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 6170U 63500 6170 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 6250U 63500 6250 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 10600U 63500 10600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 9300U 63500 9300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 7840U 63500 7840 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 156000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 9300U 63500 9300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 7840U 63500 7840 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 7240U 63500 7240 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 472000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 9300U 63500 9300 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 7840U 63500 7840 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 7240U 63500 7240 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 368000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 7240U 63500 7240 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 212000 63500 14000 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 9300U 63500 9300 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 7840U 63500 7840 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 7240U 63500 7240 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 14000U 63500 14000 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 11700U 63500 11700 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 200 12/09/2011 11:02 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 22400U 127000 22400 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 21700U 127000 21700 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 18400U 127000 18400 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 22700U 127000 22700 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 26900U 127000 26900 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 14700U 127000 14700 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 26500U 127000 26500 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 26500U 127000 26500 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 26500U 127000 26500 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 26500U 127000 26500 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 26500U 127000 26500 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 30400U 127000 30400 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111611 1329-R66A-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 200 12/09/2011 11:02 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 23900U 127000 23900 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 26000U 127000 26000 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111612 1339-R66B-TAR BALLS Solid 11/04/2011 10:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 1 12/07/2011 22:55 JEW 470615
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 5.55U 70.4 5.55 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 6.32U 70.4 6.32 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 6.16U 70.4 6.16 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 34.0J 70.4 6.85 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 6.94U 70.4 6.94 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 11.8U 70.4 11.8 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 12.4U 70.4 12.4 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 12.0U 70.4 12.0 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 10.2U 70.4 10.2 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 12.6U 70.4 12.6 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 14.9U 70.4 14.9 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 8.17U 70.4 8.17 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 14.7U 70.4 14.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 10.3U 70.4 10.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 8.70U 70.4 8.70 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15.5U 70.4 15.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 14.7U 70.4 14.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 10.3U 70.4 10.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 8.70U 70.4 8.70 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 8.03U 70.4 8.03 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15.5U 70.4 15.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 14.7U 70.4 14.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 10.3U 70.4 10.3 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 8.70U 70.4 8.70 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 8.03U 70.4 8.03 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15.5U 70.4 15.5 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 14.7U 70.4 14.7 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 8.03U 70.4 8.03 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 15.5U 70.4 15.5 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 14.7U 70.4 14.7 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 16.9U 70.4 16.9 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 15.8J 70.4 10.3 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 8.70U 70.4 8.70 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 13.2U 70.4 13.2 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 8.03U 70.4 8.03 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 14.4U 70.4 14.4 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 15.5U 70.4 15.5 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 13.0U 70.4 13.0 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 158 ug/Kg 79 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 146 ug/Kg 73 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 148 ug/Kg 74 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 128 ug/Kg 64 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111613 1351-R53-BLACK JELLY BEAN Solid 11/03/2011 21:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 17:36 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 4740U 60200 4740 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 5400U 60200 5400 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 5260U 60200 5260 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 5850U 60200 5850 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 5930U 60200 5930 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 10100U 60200 10100 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8810U 60200 8810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 7430U 60200 7430 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13200U 60200 13200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8810U 60200 8810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 7430U 60200 7430 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 6860U 60200 6860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 88600 60200 13200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 8810U 60200 8810 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 7430U 60200 7430 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 6860U 60200 6860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 132000 60200 13200 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 6860U 60200 6860 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 13200U 60200 13200 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 8810U 60200 8810 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 7430U 60200 7430 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 6860U 60200 6860 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 13200U 60200 13200 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 11100U 60200 11100 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 200 12/09/2011 10:17 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 21300U 120000 21300 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 20600U 120000 20600 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 17400U 120000 17400 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 21500U 120000 21500 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 25400U 120000 25400 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 14000U 120000 14000 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 25100U 120000 25100 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 25100U 120000 25100 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 25100U 120000 25100 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 25100U 120000 25100 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 25100U 120000 25100 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 28800U 120000 28800 ug/Kg
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111613 1351-R53-BLACK JELLY BEAN Solid 11/03/2011 21:30 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 200 12/09/2011 10:17 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 22600U 120000 22600 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 24600U 120000 24600 ug/Kg
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111614 0463-R47- TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:00 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 50 12/09/2011 15:25 JEW 470787
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 2480U 31500 2480 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 2830U 31500 2830 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 2760U 31500 2760 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 3070U 31500 3070 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 3110U 31500 3110 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 5280U 31500 5280 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 5580U 31500 5580 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 5390U 31500 5390 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 4570U 31500 4570 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 5630U 31500 5630 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 6670U 31500 6670 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 3660U 31500 3660 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 6590U 31500 6590 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4620U 31500 4620 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 3900U 31500 3900 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 25900J 31500 6940 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 6590U 31500 6590 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4620U 31500 4620 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 3900U 31500 3900 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 3600U 31500 3600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 51200 31500 6940 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 6590U 31500 6590 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 4620U 31500 4620 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 3900U 31500 3900 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 3600U 31500 3600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 36500 31500 6940 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 6590U 31500 6590 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 3600U 31500 3600 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 6940U 31500 6940 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 7370J 31500 6590 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 7560U 31500 7560 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 4620U 31500 4620 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 3900U 31500 3900 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 5930U 31500 5930 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 3600U 31500 3600 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 6460U 31500 6460 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 6940U 31500 6940 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 5810U 31500 5810 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 Diluted Out ug/Kg 0* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GCAL ID Client ID Matrix Collect Date/Time Receive Date/Time
21111111615 0438-R48R51-TAR BALLS Solid 11/03/2011 09:15 11/11/2011 08:40
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Prep Date Prep Batch Prep Method Dilution Analyzed By Analytical Batch
11/22/2011 07:20 469322 3550C 100 12/08/2011 18:19 JEW 470697
CAS# Parameter Result RDL MDL Units
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 492U 6250 492 ug/Kg
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 561U 6250 561 ug/Kg
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 547U 6250 547 ug/Kg
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 608U 6250 608 ug/Kg
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 616U 6250 616 ug/Kg
120-12-7 Anthracene 1050U 6250 1050 ug/Kg
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 1110U 6250 1110 ug/Kg
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 1070U 6250 1070 ug/Kg
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 907U 6250 907 ug/Kg
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 1120U 6250 1120 ug/Kg
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 1320U 6250 1320 ug/Kg
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 725U 6250 725 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 1310U 6250 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 916U 6250 916 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 772U 6250 772 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6250 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 1310U 6250 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 916U 6250 916 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 772U 6250 772 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 713U 6250 713 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6250 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 1310U 6250 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 916U 6250 916 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 772U 6250 772 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 713U 6250 713 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6250 1380 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 1310U 6250 1310 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 713U 6250 713 ug/Kg
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 1380U 6250 1380 ug/Kg
218-01-9 Chrysene 1310U 6250 1310 ug/Kg
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 1500U 6250 1500 ug/Kg
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 916U 6250 916 ug/Kg
86-73-7 Fluorene 772U 6250 772 ug/Kg
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 1180U 6250 1180 ug/Kg
91-20-3 Naphthalene 713U 6250 713 ug/Kg
77392-71-3 Perylene 1280U 6250 1280 ug/Kg
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 1380U 6250 1380 ug/Kg
129-00-0 Pyrene 1150U 6250 1150 ug/Kg
CAS# Surrogate Conc. Spiked Conc. Rec Units % Recovery Rec Limits
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 200 37.8 ug/Kg 19* 20 - 97
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 200 26300 ug/Kg 13200* 22 - 98
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 200 242 ug/Kg 121* 51 - 120
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 200 22300 ug/Kg 11200* 43 - 111
RESULTS REPORTED ON A DRY WEIGHT BASIS
GCAL Report 211111116

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 470375 Client ID MB469322 LCS469322 LCSD469322
Prep Batch 469322 GCAL ID 1006924 1006925 1006926
Prep Method 3550C Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 11/22/2011 07:20 11/22/2011 07:20 11/22/2011 07:20
Analytical Date 12/06/2011 14:55 12/06/2011 15:38 12/06/2011 16:21
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
Result
% R RPD
91-20-3 Naphthalene 0.456U 0.456
91-57-6 2-Methylnaphthalene 0.359U 0.359
90-12-0 1-Methylnaphthalene 0.315U 0.315
GCSV-08-01 C2-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-02 C3-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
GCSV-08-03 C4-Naphthalenes 0.456U 0.456
7297-45-2 2-Methylnaphthalene-d10 0.350U 0.350 13.3 11.1 83 50 - 150 11.8 89 6 40
208-96-8 Acenaphthylene 0.394U 0.394
83-32-9 Acenaphthene 0.389U 0.389
86-73-7 Fluorene 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-04 C1-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-05 C2-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
GCSV-08-06 C3-Fluorenes 0.494U 0.494
85-01-8 Phenanthrene 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-07 C1-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-08 C2-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-09 C3-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
GCSV-08-10 C4-Phenanthrenes/anthracenes 0.880U 0.880
120-12-7 Anthracene 0.669U 0.669
206-44-0 Fluoranthene 0.586U 0.586
129-00-0 Pyrene 0.737U 0.737
GCSV-08-11 C1-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-12 C2-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
GCSV-08-13 C3-Fluoranthenes/pyrenes 0.586U 0.586
218-01-9 Chrysene 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-14 C1-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-15 C2-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-16 C3-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
GCSV-08-17 C4-Chrysenes 0.836U 0.836
56-55-3 Benzo(a)anthracene 0.707U 0.707
205-99-2 Benzo(b)fluoranthene 0.580U 0.580
207-08-9 Benzo(k)fluoranthene 0.464U 0.464
GCAL Report 211111116
RPD
Limit

GC/MS Semi-Volatiles Quality Control Summary
Analytical Batch 470375 Client ID MB469322 LCS469322 LCSD469322
Prep Batch 469322 GCAL ID 1006924 1006925 1006926
Prep Method 3550C Sample Type Method Blank LCS LCSD
Prep Date 11/22/2011 07:20 11/22/2011 07:20 11/22/2011 07:20
Analytical Date 12/06/2011 14:55 12/06/2011 15:38 12/06/2011 16:21
Matrix Solid Solid Solid
SW-846 8272 Modified Solid
Units ug/Kg Spike
Result RDL Added
Result
%R
Control
Limits % R
192-97-2 Benzo(e)pyrene 0.714U 0.714
50-32-8 Benzo(a)pyrene 0.684U 0.684
77392-71-3 Perylene 0.819U 0.819
193-39-5 Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 0.752U 0.752
53-70-3 Dibenz(a,h)anthracene 0.958U 0.958
191-24-2 Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 0.846U 0.846
Surrogate
93951-97-4 Acenaphthylene-d8 11.7 88 13.3 12.1 91 20 - 97 10.8 81
1719-06-8 Anthracene-d10 10.1 76 13.3 8.17 61 22 - 98 9.57 72
1718-52-1 Pyrene-d10 11.3 85 13.3 12.1 91 51 - 120 10.4 78
63466-71-7 Benzo(a)pyrene-d12 8.38 63 13.3 12.4 93 43 - 111 10.8 81
GCAL Report 211111116
Result
% R RPD
RPD
Limit

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Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill
Gina M. Solomon; Sarah Janssen
JAMA.
published online Aug 16, 2010; (doi:10.1001/jama.2010.1254)
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/jama.2010.1254v1
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COMMENTARY
Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill
Gina M. Solomon, MD, MPH
Sarah Janssen, MD, PhD, MPH
THE OIL SPILL IN THE GULF OF MEXICO POSES DIRECT
threats to human health from inhalation or dermal
contact with the oil and dispersant chemicals, and
indirect threats to seafood safety and mental health.
Physicians should be familiar with health effects from oil
spills to appropriately advise, diagnose, and treat patients
who live and work along the Gulf Coast or wherever a major
oil spill occurs.
The main components of crude oil are aliphatic and aromatic
hydrocarbons. 1 Lower-molecular-weight aromatics—
such as benzene, toluene, and xylene—are volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) and evaporate within hours after the
oil reaches the surface. Volatile organic compounds can cause
respiratory irritation and central nervous system (CNS) depression.
Benzene is known to cause leukemia in humans,
and toluene is a recognized teratogen at high doses. 1 Highermolecular-weight
chemicals such as naphthalene evaporate
more slowly. Naphthalene is listed by the National Toxicology
Program as “reasonably anticipated to cause cancer
in humans” based on olfactory neuroblastomas, nasal tumors,
and lung cancers in animals. 2 Oil can also release hydrogen
sulfide gas and contains traces of heavy metals, as
well as nonvolatile polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)
that can contaminate the food chain. Hydrogen sulfide gas
is neurotoxic and has been linked to both acute and chronic
CNS effects; PAHs include mutagens and probable carcinogens.
1 Burning oil generates particulate matter, which is associated
with cardiac and respiratory symptoms and premature
mortality. The Gulf oil spill is unique because of the
large-scale use of dispersants to break up the oil slick. By
late July, more than 1.8 million gallons of dispersant had
been applied in the Gulf. Dispersants contain detergents,
surfactants, and petroleum distillates, including respiratory
irritants such as 2-butoxyethanol, propylene glycol, and
sulfonic acid salts.
Acute Health Effects From Oil and Dispersants
In Louisiana in the early months of the oil spill, more than
300 individuals, three-fourths of whom were cleanup workers,
sought medical care for constitutional symptoms such
as headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, cough, respira-
tory distress, and chest pain. These symptoms are typical
of acute exposure to hydrocarbons or hydrogen sulfide, but
it is difficult to clinically distinguish toxic symptoms from
other common illnesses. 1
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set up
an air monitoring network to test for VOCs, particulate
matter, hydrogen sulfide, and naphthalene. A Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention analysis of the EPA data
concluded: “The levels of some of the pollutants that
have been reported to date may cause temporary eye,
nose, or throat irritation, nausea, or headaches, but are
not thought to be high enough to cause long-term
harm.” 3 Data posted on BP’s Web site suggest that air
quality for workers offshore is worse than on land. Local
temperatures pose a risk of heat-related illness, which is
exacerbated by wearing coveralls and respirators, implying
a trade-off between protection from chemical hazards
and heat.
Skin contact with oil and dispersants causes defatting, resulting
in dermatitis and secondary skin infections. Some
individuals may develop a dermal hypersensitivity reaction,
erythema, edema, burning sensations, or a follicular
rash. Some hydrocarbons are phototoxic.
Potential Long-term Health Risks
In the near term, various hydrocarbons from the oil will contaminate
fish and shellfish. Although vertebrate marine life
can clear PAHs from their system, these chemicals accumulate
for years in invertebrates. 4 The Gulf provides about
two-thirds of the oysters in the United States and is a major
fishery for shrimp and crab. Trace amounts of cadmium, mercury,
and lead occur in crude oil and can accumulate over
time in fish tissues, potentially increasing future health hazards
from consumption of large fin fish such as tuna and
mackerel.
Health Effects From Historic Oil Spills
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, a total of 1811
workers’ compensation claims were filed by cleanup
workers; most were for acute injuries but 15% were for
Author Affiliations: Department of Medicine, University of California-San Francisco,
and Natural Resources Defense Council, San Francisco, California.
Corresponding Author: Gina M. Solomon, MD, MPH, Department of Medicine,
UCSF, and Natural Resources Defense Council, 111 Sutter St, 20th Floor, San Francisco,
CA 94104 (gsolomon@nrdc.org).
©2010 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. (Reprinted) JAMA, Published online August 16, 2010 E1
Downloaded from
www.jama.com by guest on August 20, 2010

COMMENTARY
respiratory problems and 2% for dermatitis. 5 No information
is available in the peer-reviewed literature about
longer-term health effects of this spill. A survey of the
health status of workers 14 years after the cleanup found
a greater prevalence of symptoms of chronic airway disease
among workers with high oil exposures, as well as
self-reports of neurological impairment and multiple
chemical sensitivity. 6
Symptom surveys performed in the weeks or months
following oil spills have reported a higher prevalence of
headache, throat irritation, and sore or itchy eyes in
exposed individuals compared with controls. Some studies
have also reported modestly increased rates of diarrhea,
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, rash, wheezing,
cough, and chest pain. 7 One study of 6780 fishermen,
which included 4271 oil spill cleanup workers, found a
higher prevalence of lower respiratory tract symptoms 2
years after oil spill cleanup activities. The risk of lower
respiratory tract symptoms increased with the intensity of
exposure. 8
A study of 858 individuals involved in the cleanup of
the Prestige oil spill in Spain in 2002 investigated acute
genetic toxicity in volunteers and workers. Increased DNA
damage, as assessed by the Comet assay, was found in volunteers,
especially in those working on the beaches. 7 In
the same study, workers had lower levels of CD4 cells,
IL-2, IL-4, IL-10, and interferon compared with their
own preexposure levels.
Studies following major oil spills in Alaska, Spain, Korea,
and Wales have documented elevated rates of anxiety,
depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and psychological
stress. 9 A mental health survey of 599 local residents 1
year after the Exxon Valdez spill found that exposed individuals
were 3.6 times more likely to have anxiety disorder,
2.9 times more likely to have posttraumatic stress disorder,
and 2.1 times more likely to score high on a depression
index. 10 Adverse mental health effects were observed up to
6 years after the oil spill.
Approach to Patients
Clinicians should be aware of toxicity from exposures to oil
and related chemicals. Patients presenting with constitutional
symptoms should be asked about occupational exposures
and location of residence. The physical examination
should focus on the skin, respiratory tract, and
neurological system, documenting any signs that could be
associated with oil-related chemicals. Care consists primarily
of documentation of signs and symptoms, evaluation to
rule out or treat other potential causes of the symptoms, removal
from exposure, and supportive care.
Prevention of illness from oil and related chemicals on
the Gulf Coast during the cleanup period includes proper
protective equipment for workers and common-sense precautions
for community residents. Workers require proper
training and equipment that includes boots, gloves, coveralls,
and safety glasses, as well as respirators when potentially
hazardous levels of airborne vapors, aerosols, or particulate
matter exist. Workers should also take precautions
to avoid heat-related illness (rest breaks and drinking sufficient
fluids). All worker injuries and illnesses should be
reported to ensure proper tracking.
Community residents should not fish in off-limit areas
or where there is evidence of oil. Fish or shellfish with an
oily odor should be discarded. Direct skin contact with contaminated
water, oil, or tar balls should be avoided. If community
residents notice a strong odor of oil or chemicals
and are concerned about health effects, they should seek refuge
in an air-conditioned environment. Interventions to address
mental health in the local population should be incorporated
into clinical and public health response efforts.
Over the longer term, cohort studies of Gulf cleanup workers
and local residents will greatly enhance the scientific data
on the health sequelae of oil spills.
Published Online: August 16, 2010. doi:10.1001/jama.2010.1254
Financial Disclosures: None reported.
Additional Contributions: We thank Miriam Rotkin-Ellman, MPH, Staff Scientist,
Natural Resources Defense Council; Kathleen Navarro, BS, University of California-
Berkeley; and Diane Bailey, MS, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council,
for their assistance with the literature review.
REFERENCES
1. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). Toxicological Profile
for Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPH). Atlanta, GA: US Dept of Health and
Human Services, Public Health Service; 1999.
2. National Toxicology Program. Naphthalene. Report on Carcinogens. 11th ed.
Research Triangle Park, NC: US Dept of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service; 2005. http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/eleventh/profiles/s116znph
.pdf. Accessed August 9, 2010.
3. US Environmental Protection Agency. Odors from the BP Oil Spill. http://epa
.gov/bpspill/odor.html. Accessed June 7, 2010.
4. Law RJ, Hellou J. Contamination of fish and shellfish following oil spill incidents.
Environ Geosci. 1999;6(2):90-98.
5. Gorma RW, Berardinelli SP, Bender TR. HETA 89-200 and 89-273-2111, Exxon/
Valdez Alaska Oil Spill. Health Hazard Evaluation Report. Cincinnati, OH: National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; 1991.
6. O’Neill AK. Self-Reported Exposures and Health Status Among Workers From
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Cleanup [master’s thesis]. New Haven, CT: Yale University;
2003.
7. Rodríguez-Trigo G, Zock JP, Isidro Montes I. Health effects of exposure to oil
spills [in Spanish]. Arch Bronconeumol. 2007;43(11):628-635.
8. Zock JP, Rodríguez-Trigo G, Pozo-Rodríguez F, et al; SEPAR-Prestige Study Group.
Prolonged respiratory symptoms in clean-up workers of the Prestige oil spill. Am
J Respir Crit Care Med. 2007;176(6):610-616.
9. Sabucedo JM, Arce C, Senra C, Seoane G, Vázquez I. Symptomatic profile and
health-related quality of life of persons affected by the Prestige catastrophe. Disasters.
2010;34(3):809-820.
10. Palinkas LA, Petterson JS, Russell J, Downs MA. Community patterns of psychiatric
disorders after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Am J Psychiatry. 1993;150
(10):1517-1523.
E2 JAMA, Published online August 16, 2010 (Reprinted) ©2010 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.
Downloaded from
www.jama.com by guest on August 20, 2010

BOLD = HIGHEST PERCENTAGE IN CATEGORY
PRE AND POST DWH DISASTER HEALTH SURVEY
MARCH 1, 2012 THROUGH MARCH 29, 2012
BY T. JAMES
1 = NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER; 2 = OCCASIONALLY, BUT IS NOT SEVERE; 3 = OCCASIONALLY, BUT IS SEVERE;
4 = FREQUENTLY, BUT IS NOT SEVERE; 5 = FREQUENTLY, BUT IS SEVERE
PRE DWH
DURING DWH
POST DWH
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Head - Headaches 39.1 41.3 13.0 4.3 2.2 10.8 18.9 27.0 18.9 24.3 11.4 40.0 11.4 17.1 20.0
Head - Faintness 60.9 26.1 8.7 2.2 2.2 16.7 16.7 19.4 30.6 16.7 28.6 37.1 8.6 17.1 8.6
Head - Dizziness 54.3 23.9 17.4 4.3 0.0 13.9 25.0 11.1 22.2 27.8 22.9 34.3 11.4 14.3 17.1
Head - Insomnia 52.2 15.2 13.0 0.0 19.6 19.4 8.3 8.3 22.2 41.7 20.0 17.1 8.6 11.4 42.9
Eyes - Watery or Itchy 54.3 26.1 10.9 6.5 2.2 16.7 8.3 16.7 22.2 36.1 22.9 28.6 14.3 8.6 25.7
Eyes - Swollen, reddened or sticky eyelids 71.7 10.9 10.9 4.3 2.2 27.8 22.2 2.8 19.4 27.8 40.0 17.1 8.6 11.4 22.9
Eyes - Bags or dark circles under eyes 58.7 21.7 0.0 6.5 13.0 25.7 20.0 8.6 14.3 31.4 14.3 37.1 5.7 14.3 28.6
Eyes - Blurred or tunnel vision 69.6 10.9 6.5 4.3 8.7 30.6 19.4 16.7 13.9 19.4 37.1 14.3 14.3 5.7 28.6
Ears - Itchy Ears 69.6 17.4 2.2 8.7 2.2 30.6 41.7 13.9 8.3 5.6 41.2 26.5 8.8 11.8 11.8
Ears - Ear aches, ear infections 68.9 20.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 47.2 30.6 8.3 5.6 8.3 58.8 11.8 11.8 5.9 11.8
Ears - Drainage from Ears 78.7 6.4 10.6 2.1 2.1 58.3 22.2 8.3 8.3 2.8 60.0 17.1 11.4 5.7 5.7
Ears - Ringing in Ears, hearing loss 56.5 17.4 10.9 6.5 8.7 27.8 27.8 11.1 11.1 22.2 40.0 11.4 2.9 14.3 31.4
Nose - Stuffy Nose 22.2 46.7 4.4 17.8 8.9 11.1 19.4 11.1 19.4 38.9 8.6 28.6 5.7 28.6 28.6
Nose - Sinus problems 19.6 41.3 13.0 13.0 13.0 8.3 16.7 8.3 19.4 47.2 8.6 25.7 5.7 22.9 37.1
Nose - Hay Fever 47.8 30.4 10.9 8.7 2.2 45.7 20.0 0.0 17.1 17.1 54.3 11.4 5.7 8.6 20.0
Nose - Sneezing Attacks 46.7 37.8 6.7 6.7 2.2 31.4 11.4 17.1 25.7 14.3 31.4 17.1 14.3 22.9 14.3
Nose - Excessive Mucous Formation 39.1 39.1 4.3 6.5 10.9 16.7 8.3 11.1 19.4 44.4 22.9 20.0 8.6 17.1 31.4
Mouth/Throat - Chronic Coughing 55.3 19.1 6.4 10.6 8.5 13.9 16.7 11.1 19.4 38.9 22.9 20.0 14.3 11.4 31.4
Mouth/Throat - Gagging, frequent need to clear throat 64.4 13.3 6.7 4.4 11.1 11.4 22.9 11.4 22.9 31.4 26.5 17.6 8.8 17.6 29.4
Mouth/Throat - Sore Throat, hoarseness, loss of voice 63.6 22.7 0.0 6.8 6.8 13.9 19.4 16.7 22.2 27.8 22.9 22.9 5.7 20.0 28.6
Mouth/Throat - Swollen or discolored Tongue, Gums, Lips 84.8 4.3 0.0 8.7 2.2 58.3 13.9 5.6 2.8 19.4 65.7 11.4 2.9 2.9 17.1
Mouth/Throat - Canker Sores 80.0 17.8 2.2 0.0 0.0 55.6 22.2 13.9 2.8 5.6 65.7 17.1 5.7 5.7 5.7
Skin - Acne 63.0 21.7 4.3 10.9 0.0 48.6 22.9 14.3 8.6 5.7 55.9 23.5 11.8 0.0 8.8
Skin - Hives, rashes, dry skin 65.2 13.0 4.3 13.0 4.3 25.0 22.2 2.8 16.7 33.3 25.7 20.0 8.6 14.3 31.4
Skin - Hair Loss 70.2 10.6 2.1 12.8 4.3 40.0 20.0 5.7 8.6 25.7 37.1 28.6 5.7 5.7 22.9
Skin - Flushing, Hot flashes 58.7 19.6 4.3 6.5 10.9 33.3 16.7 8.3 13.9 27.8 34.3 20.0 8.6 14.3 22.9
Skin - Excessive Sweating 68.9 17.8 2.2 2.2 8.9 30.6 19.4 13.9 5.6 30.6 42.9 11.4 0.0 22.9 22.9
Heart - Chest Pain 64.4 15.6 4.4 6.7 8.9 36.1 11.1 16.7 5.6 30.6 34.3 20.0 14.3 20.0 11.4
Heart - Irregular or skipped Heartbeat 61.7 21.3 6.4 6.4 4.3 41.7 13.9 22.2 5.6 16.7 45.7 14.3 11.4 5.7 22.9
Heart - Rapid or Pounding Heartbeat 68.9 11.1 11.1 6.7 2.2 22.2 13.9 25.0 16.7 22.2 22.9 22.9 17.1 14.3 22.9
Lungs - Chest Congestion 52.2 30.4 6.5 2.2 8.7 19.4 16.7 11.1 22.2 30.6 25.7 20.0 17.1 8.6 28.6
Lungs - Asthma, Bronchitis 57.4 21.3 6.4 8.5 6.4 30.6 19.4 5.6 11.1 33.3 41.2 5.9 14.7 17.6 20.6
Lungs - Shortness of Breath 61.7 19.1 10.6 6.4 2.1 11.4 22.9 5.7 17.1 42.9 20.0 20.0 20.0 17.1 22.9
Lungs - Difficulty Breathing 74.5 10.6 6.4 4.3 4.3 11.4 17.1 5.7 28.6 37.1 25.7 11.4 22.9 22.9 17.1
Digestive Tract - Nausea, Vomiting 67.4 26.1 4.3 0.0 2.2 31.4 20.0 17.1 8.6 22.9 41.2 23.5 11.8 11.8 11.8
Digestive Tract - Diarrhea 56.5 30.4 2.2 6.5 4.3 25.0 27.8 2.8 13.9 30.6 31.4 31.4 2.9 20.0 14.3

BOLD = HIGHEST PERCENTAGE IN CATEGORY
PRE AND POST DWH DISASTER HEALTH SURVEY
MARCH 1, 2012 THROUGH MARCH 29, 2012
BY T. JAMES
1 = NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER; 2 = OCCASIONALLY, BUT IS NOT SEVERE; 3 = OCCASIONALLY, BUT IS SEVERE;
4 = FREQUENTLY, BUT IS NOT SEVERE; 5 = FREQUENTLY, BUT IS SEVERE
PRE DWH
DURING DWH
POST DWH
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Digestive Tract - Constipation 67.4 21.7 4.3 4.3 2.2 50.0 27.8 2.8 11.1 8.3 51.4 22.9 8.6 8.6 8.6
Digestive Tract - Bloated feeling 50.0 21.7 4.3 17.4 6.5 30.6 25.0 2.8 16.7 25.0 17.6 29.4 11.8 17.6 23.5
Digestive Tract - Belching, Passing Gas 58.7 28.3 2.2 8.7 2.2 27.8 30.6 5.6 25.0 11.1 28.6 28.6 14.3 17.1 11.4
Digestive Tract - Heartburn 58.7 28.3 6.5 2.2 4.3 30.6 27.8 13.9 11.1 16.7 34.3 31.4 5.7 8.6 20.0
Digestive Tract - Intestinal / Stomach Pain 63.0 19.6 8.7 6.5 2.2 30.6 25.0 11.1 5.6 27.8 34.3 25.7 8.6 14.3 17.1
Joints / Muscles - Pains or Aches in Joints 37.8 31.1 11.1 4.4 15.6 25.0 19.4 11.1 16.7 27.8 14.3 20.0 11.4 25.7 28.6
Joints / Muscles - Arthritis 48.9 24.4 11.1 6.7 8.9 37.1 14.3 11.4 11.4 25.7 37.1 20.0 0.0 8.6 34.3
Joints / Muscles - Stiffness or Limitation of Movement 51.1 26.7 6.7 6.7 8.9 20.0 25.7 11.4 8.6 34.3 28.6 17.1 8.6 11.4 34.3
Joints / Muscles - Feeling of Weakness or Tiredness 45.7 28.3 4.3 6.5 15.2 8.3 5.6 8.3 27.8 50.0 11.4 14.3 2.9 25.7 45.7
Joints / Muscles - Pain or Aches in Muscles 45.7 30.4 8.7 8.7 6.5 22.2 19.4 8.3 22.2 27.8 14.7 14.7 8.8 17.6 44.1
Weight - Binge Eating / Drinking 76.1 13.0 0.0 2.2 8.7 52.8 25.0 5.6 11.1 5.6 62.9 17.1 5.7 5.7 8.6
Weight - Craving certain Foods 52.2 30.4 4.3 6.5 6.5 47.2 27.8 5.6 8.3 11.1 54.3 20.0 8.6 5.7 11.4
Weight - Excessive Weight 69.6 19.6 0.0 4.3 6.5 41.7 25.0 5.6 2.8 25.0 42.9 14.3 11.4 5.7 25.7
Weight - Water Retention 60.0 24.4 4.4 2.2 8.9 41.7 22.2 11.1 8.3 16.7 45.7 14.3 11.4 11.4 17.1
Weight - Underweight 89.1 8.7 0.0 0.0 2.2 75.0 8.3 11.1 2.8 2.8 82.9 8.6 2.9 2.9 2.9
Weight - Compulsive Eating 80.4 10.9 4.3 2.2 2.2 63.9 16.7 5.6 5.6 8.3 71.4 11.4 5.7 2.9 8.6
Energy / Activity - Fatigue, sluggishness 43.5 30.4 2.2 8.7 15.2 8.3 8.3 11.1 16.7 55.6 2.9 17.1 14.3 20.0 45.7
Energy / Activity - Apathy / Lethargy 45.7 30.4 2.2 4.3 17.4 11.1 8.3 11.1 19.4 50.0 8.6 20.0 14.3 14.3 42.9
Energy / Activity - Hyperactivity 73.9 17.4 8.7 0.0 0.0 77.8 11.1 2.8 5.6 2.8 68.6 11.4 5.7 0.0 14.3
Energy / Activity - Restlessness 54.3 28.3 6.5 2.2 8.7 33.3 13.9 16.7 13.9 22.2 22.9 28.6 14.3 14.3 20.0
Mind - Poor Memory 51.1 25.5 2.1 4.3 17.0 14.3 14.3 17.1 5.7 48.6 5.7 34.3 11.4 14.3 34.3
Mind - Confusion, poor Comprehension 68.1 12.8 2.1 8.5 8.5 19.4 33.3 8.3 8.3 30.6 14.3 37.1 14.3 8.6 25.7
Mind - Difficulty in making Decisions 66.0 12.8 6.4 8.5 6.4 25.0 22.2 13.9 11.1 27.8 20.0 31.4 14.3 11.4 22.9
Mind - Stuttering or Stammering 83.0 8.5 2.1 2.1 4.3 50.0 19.4 5.6 11.1 13.9 45.7 31.4 8.6 5.7 8.6
Mind - Slurred Speech 83.0 4.3 4.3 6.4 2.1 61.1 13.9 2.8 11.1 11.1 62.9 20.0 5.7 2.9 1.6
Mind - Learning Disabilities 87.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 6.5 65.7 8.6 8.6 2.9 14.3 62.9 14.3 11.4 0.0 11.4
Mind - Poor Concentration 58.7 21.7 2.2 4.3 13.0 13.9 25.0 13.9 13.9 33.3 17.6 26.5 11.8 8.8 35.3
Mind - Poor Physical Coordination 73.9 8.7 8.7 2.2 6.5 22.2 33.3 13.9 8.3 22.2 20.6 32.4 2.9 17.6 26.5
Emotions - Mood Swings 56.5 28.3 2.2 2.2 10.9 30.6 22.2 11.1 5.6 30.6 20.0 28.6 11.4 11.4 28.6
Emotions - Anxiety, Fear, Nervousness 45.7 30.4 8.7 2.2 13.0 22.2 11.1 11.1 11.1 44.4 14.3 31.4 8.6 11.4 34.3
Emotions - Anger, Irritability, Aggressiveness 50.0 32.6 0.0 6.5 10.9 22.2 19.4 16.7 13.9 27.8 28.6 22.9 11.4 14.3 22.9
Emotions - Depression 41.3 32.6 10.9 4.3 10.9 19.4 19.4 8.3 13.9 38.9 17.1 28.6 5.7 22.9 25.7
Other - Frequent Illness 76.1 10.9 4.3 0.0 8.7 31.4 11.4 14.3 17.1 25.7 40.0 17.1 2.9 20.0 20.0
Other - Frequent or Urgent Urination 60.9 26.1 4.3 0.0 8.7 34.3 17.1 2.9 14.3 31.4 40.0 22.9 5.7 14.3 17.1
Other - Genital Itch or Discharge 76.1 17.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 77.1 11.4 2.9 5.7 2.9 74.3 17.1 0.0 5.7 2.9

PRE AND POST DWH DISASTER HEALTH SURVEY
MARCH 1, 2012 THROUGH MARCH 29, 2012
BY T. JAMES

PRE AND POST DWH DISASTER HEALTH SURVEY
MARCH 1, 2012 THROUGH MARCH 29, 2012
BY T. JAMES

PRE AND POST DWH DISASTER HEALTH SURVEY
MARCH 1, 2012 THROUGH MARCH 10, 2012
BY T. JAMES
PERCENTAGE RATE BY RESPONSES YES NO
Are you currently using prescription drugs?
Do you currently use or within the last 6 months had you regularly used
54.3 45.7
tobacco products?
Do you have strong negative reactions to caffeine or caffeine containing
51.4 48.6
products? 20.0 80.0
Do you commonly experience "brain fog," fatigue or drowsiness?
Do you develop symptoms from exposure to fragrances, exhaust fumes or
90.9 9.1
strong odors? 80.0 20.0
Do you feel ill after you consume small amounts of alcohol?
Do you have a history of significant exposure to harmful chemicals such as
52.9 47.1
herbicides, insecticides, pesticides, or organic solvents? 17.1 82.9
Do you have an adverse or allergic reaction when you consume sulfite
containing foods such as wine, dried fruit, salad bar vegetables, etc.? 20.6 79.4
PREVIOUS PERSONAL HISTORY YES NO
Environmental and/or Chemical Sensitivities 25.7 74.3
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 8.6 91.4
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity 17.1 82.9
Fibromyalgia 17.1 82.9
Parkinson's Type Symptoms 2.9 97.1
Alcohol or Chemical Dependence 8.6 91.4
Asthma 25.7 74.3

PRE AND POST DWH DISASTER HEALTH SURVEY
MARCH 1, 2012 THROUGH MARCH 29, 2012
BY T. JAMES
DOB GENDER DOB GENDER
01/1967 Female 03/1953 Female 26 Females
03/1973 Male 12/1957 Female 10 Males
02/1941 Male 01/1965 Female 14 No Response
07/1951 Female 03/1961 Female
10/1975 Female 05/1962 Female
02/1974 Female 01/1963 Female
10/1956 Male 08/1953 Male
06/1963 Female 06/1971 Female
01/1959 Female 09/1972 Female
09/1961 Female 01/1969 Male
08/1956 Female 12/1965 Female
07/1967 Male 12/1974 Female
03/1965 Male 06/1964 Male
08/1951 Female 04/1957 Female
04/2010 Female 06/1977 Male
09/1943 Male 09/1955 Female
01/1995 Female 11/1954 Female
07/1959 Female
COMMENTS
NO money for doctors with no jobs down here due to DWH
Destin condo - back to LA, nervous system issues, 4th time, intestinal issues with dizziness
Sick in May 2010, now dental issues and pancreatic tumor
Always very tired, difficult to do this survey
Dizzy, spilling things, lost sense of direction, following instructions difficult
Capt. Of a shrimp boat, exposed 04/22/2010, please help us asap
Almost died from mystery illness
7 benign colon polyps removed, new "spot" being watched from mammogram in early 2011, anal and
vaginal bleeding - post menopausal for 13 years.
I now expectorate phlegm since 12/2010. Asthmatic episodes are now daily. Cannot afford meds.
First skin burns and rashes, irritated eyes, nose and mouth. Later developed chest and throat
congestion, persistent coughing and then earaches, headaches. Profound grief, uncontrollable crying -
all out of my character. Minor PTSD now, have gained weight
I have developed an auto immune disorder. My spine is arthritic and I have degenerative disc disease
with fatigue. I worked cleaning condos during the oil spill.
I had my appendix removed

Honorable Stanley Sporkin
BP America Ombudsman
BP America Ombudsman Program
1130 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20036
Attn: Billie Garde, Esq., Deputy Ombudsman
Dear Judge Sporkin:
Government Accountability Project
1612 K St. NW Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006
Louisiana Environmental Action Network
162 Croydon Ave
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
March 2, 2012
This letter seeks your explanation for the enclosed resource manual provided by an anonymous
Government Accountability Project (GAP) client on the Deepwater Horizon spill cleanup. We write to
seek your explanation for apparent contradictions between British Petroleum (BP) statements to the
public and its employees, compared to the “Deepwater Horizon MC252, Vessels of Opportunity Near
Shore Oil Recovery Groups, Vessel Captains Hazard Communication, Resource Manual.” The Louisiana
Environmental Action Network (LEAN) has been actively monitoring BP’s cleanup efforts since the spill,
and GAP has been conducting a whistleblower investigation since last August.
Because the apparent contradictions concern matters of the highest public significance, we are publicly
posting the manual, this query and any response you provide.
Under the United States OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, all employers are required to provide
"information to their employees about the hazardous chemicals to which they are exposed, by means of a
hazard communication program, labels and other forms of warning, material safety data sheets, and
information and training." 1 The anonymous whistleblower shared that this resource manual was removed
from all job sites.
To illustrate our concerns, BP has aerially sprayed or otherwise released over two million gallons of
COREXIT as the primary dispersant in the spill’s cleanup. BP and contractors have reassured cleanup
crews that COREXIT is as safe as Dawn dishwasher soap. However, the manufacturer’s Material Safety
Data Sheets (MSDS) included in the manual indicate that the dispersants utilized contain hazardous
ingredients such as 2-butoxyethanol, petroleum distillates, and sulfonic acids. The specific petroleum
distillates and sulfonic acids within COREXIT EC9257A and EC9500A have never been disclosed to the
public.
1 See 29 CFR 1910.1200

Similarly, BP and contractors told cleanup workers that special protective clothing and equipment was
unnecessary. Further, both of our organizations have received numerous reports that when cleanup
workers sought additional Personal Protective Equipment such as respirators that LEAN donated, they
were threatened with termination. By contrast, the resource manual indicates that anyone exposed to the
dispersant should “[w]ear suitable protective clothing.”
We also are concerned that despite reassurances of the dispersant’s harmless nature, the manual lists the
following symptoms of exposure for COREXIT EC9527A and/or COREXIT EC9500A:
Injury to red blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or the liver
Irritate the upper respiratory tract
Central nervous system effects
Nausea
Vomiting
Anesthetic or narcotic effects
Defat and dry the skin, leading to discomfort and dermatitis
Chemical pneumonia if aspirated into lungs following ingestion
The MSDSs for COREXIT indicate that no toxicity studies have been conducted on this product. Further,
the potential human hazard is “High” for COREXIT EC9527A, and there is an “Immediate (Acute)
Health Hazard” for COREXIT EC9500A.
We write to request verification of the enclosed document’s authenticity. If it is genuine, we think it only
fair to seek BP’s explanation for the apparent contradictions. If statements to the public and work force
cannot be reconciled, we seek your explanation for BP’s repeated denials of any intentional action that
could have threatened public health and safety.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Tom Devine, Legal Director Marylee Orr, Executive Director
Government Accountability Project Louisiana Environmental Action Network

CREDIT: B. E. WITHERINGTON
ECOLOGY
Better Science Needed for
Restoration in the Gulf of Mexico
Karen A. Bjorndal, 1 * Brian W. Bowen, 2 Milani Chaloupka, 3 Larry B. Crowder, 4 Selina S. Heppell, 5
Cynthia M. Jones, 6 Molly E. Lutcavage, 7 David Policansky, 8 Andrew R. Solow, 9
Blair E. Witherington 10
The 2010 BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico (GoM) has
damaged marine ecosystems and
jeopardized endangered and commercial
species under U.S. jurisdiction
(see the figure). Agencies
that manage protected species—including
the U.S. National
Marine Fisheries Service and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—
are tasked with recovering these
populations. But many populations
have not been adequately
assessed, so recovery cannot be
measured. Achieving mandated
recovery goals depends on understanding
both population trends
and the demographic processes
that drive those trends. After the
1989 Exxon Valdez Alaskan oil spill, evaluations
of effects on wildlife were ambiguous,
in part because limited data on abundance
and demography precluded detection
of change (1). Sadly, the situation in the GoM
is similar more than 20 years later. As concluded
in the National Commission report on
the BP spill (2) released 11 January, “Scientists
simply do not yet know how to predict
the ecological consequences and effects on
key species that might result from oil exposure…”
We argue that scientists know how to
make these assessments, but lack critical data
to achieve this goal.
For example, the BP spill may have had
1 Archie Carr Center for Sea Turtle Research and Department
of Biology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
32611, USA. 2 Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology, University
of Hawaii, Kaneohe, HI 96744, USA. 3 Ecological Modelling
Services Pty. Ltd., University of Queensland, St. Lucia,
Queensland 4067, Australia. 4 Center for Marine Conservation,
Duke University Marine Lab, Beaufort, NC 28516,
USA. 5 Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Oregon State
University, Corvallis, OR 97331, USA. 6 Center for Quantitative
Fisheries Ecology, Old Dominion University, Norfolk,
VA 23529, USA. 7 Large Pelagics Research Center, Department
of Environmental Conservation, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Gloucester, MA 01930, USA. 8 National
Research Council, Washington, DC 20001, USA. 9 Marine
Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
Woods Hole, MA 02543, USA. 10 Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation
Commission, Melbourne Beach, FL 32951, USA.
*Author for correspondence. E-mail: bjorndal@ufl .edu
A dead juvenile Kemp’s ridley sea turtle
(Lepidochelys kempii). It was recovered from an oil
line within the BP spill area, 115 km ESE from Venice,
Louisiana, 6 June 2010.
a substantial impact on Atlantic
bluefi n tuna (Thunnus thynnus),
because it occurred during
spawning. The spill could
have affected 20% of the 2010
bluefin larvae (2). But the
impact of that loss is diffi cult to
assess because bluefin migration
paths, reproductive habits,
and early life history are inadequately
resolved (3). At the ecosystem
level, long-term effects
of food web alteration by oil
or dispersants could suppress
wildlife populations (1, 2).
Tens of millions of dollars
from BP intended to restore
wildlife populations and ecosystems
have already been disbursed
(4, 5), and hundreds of
millions more are at risk of being distributed
without a clear strategic plan to ensure that
projects improve our understanding of population
dynamics and the impacts of proposed
management actions (4). In contrast, strategic
national research plans for key marine
species and ecosystems could guide research
efforts to provide the data required to assess
populations and design recovery strategies
to address environmental insults before the
next crisis occurs. Broad policies such as the
POLICYFORUM
In the wake of the BP oil spill, U.S. agencies
need research plans to collect data that will aid
in managing and assessing marine species
and ecosystems.
ASSESSING SEA TURTLE POPULATIONS
In the United States and much of the world, sea
turtle populations are monitored almost exclusively
by counting nests on beaches ( 27). Adult
females take decades to reach sexual maturity,
do not nest every year, and are a small fraction
of any sea turtle population ( 10). Florida hosts
the largest nesting aggregation of loggerhead
sea turtles (Caretta caretta) in the Atlantic,
and nesting has been monitored consistently
since 1989 (fi g. S1). Until 1998, nest numbers
increased. But the available data did not
permit a determination of which, if any, management
actions were responsible. After 1998, numbers
plummeted, and by 2006, had declined by 43% ( 27).
Many factors could account for this decline, but the specifi
c cause(s) could not be determined. Therefore, developing
effective management plans remains an elusive
goal. Likewise, the long-term effects of the BP oil spill
on this and other sea turtle species cannot be evaluated.
Nest counts in the United States continue to provide
essential data for population assessments, but critical
data gaps, especially in demographic parameters, exist
( 28). This need not be the case. Australian researchers
have 30 years of data on sex- and age-class–specifi c
abundance and demographic parameters for loggerheads
on the southern Great Barrier Reef (sGBR) ( 29)
that allowed the steep decline in turtle abundance during
the 1980s and 1990s in the sGBR to be attributed
to two of many potential hazards: predation by foxes
on the coastal nesting beaches and incidental capture
in coastal trawl fi sheries. Both hazards have now been
miti gated by government agencies, resulting in an
apparently recovering stock ( 30).
new U.S. National Ocean Policy (6) are not
intended to provide specifi c guidance. And
species recovery plans often list many variables
scientists could measure but do not prioritize
which variables to measure and with
what precision (7). As in medicine, you cannot
effi ciently produce a diagnosis and cure
by measuring everything or ordering every
test. We must identify and measure the most
predictive variables fi rst.
It is not too late to invest funds from BP
www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 331 4 FEBRUARY 2011 537
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POLICYFORUM
538
to support teams of experts to develop effective
strategic plans that identify, prioritize,
and provide methodologies for collecting
essential data ( 8). The plans will vary among
species and ecosystems because our current
knowledge varies widely. But the following
seven elements should be included in most,
if not all, plans.
Integrate demography with abundance
trends for multiple life stages and determine
environmental effects on those parameters.
Both demographic and abundance data are
essential to diagnose causes of population
declines. Even for high-profi le megafauna,
too little is known about abundance of different
life stages and key demographic rates:
survival, breeding and recruitment probabilities;
growth rates; and age at maturity. These
strongly infl uence how perturbations like the
BP spill will affect population growth ( 9).
Most of these animals are long-lived and
can move thousands of kilometers between
seasons and life stages. Often, there is only
an estimate of abundance for one easily
observed life stage. This is analogous to estimating
human population trends by counting
women in maternity wards. Useful data
would emerge, but if the children were decimated
by disease, this mortality would not be
detected in the maternity ward for decades.
Sea turtles provide a striking example of this
problem (see text box).
Emphasize analyses of cumulative effects.
Too often, individual threats (e.g., pollution,
fi sheries bycatch, or habitat loss) are
addressed separately, not as cumulative
effects ( 10). A recent controversy over the
suggestion that fisheries’ bycatch of seabirds
could be mitigated by removing egg and
chick predators could not be resolved without
understanding demography and cumulative
effects ( 11). Management priorities for
multiple threats can be set by assessing the
relative impact of each threat on population
growth rate ( 12).
Elucidate links among and within populations
with new tools in genetics, statistical
models, and tracking ( 13– 15). Compared
with terrestrial systems, oceans have greater
rates of import and export, genetic exchange,
and dispersal among life stages ( 16). Knowledge
of linkages can identify human actions
that may disrupt important connections
within and among populations and amplify
an environmental insult ( 17). For example,
linkages would reveal the geographic extent
of bluefi n tuna populations affected by the oil
spill at their GoM spawning grounds ( 18).
Revise the permitting processes that now
hinder peer-reviewed studies of critical processes
and management alternatives for
protected species, such as impacts of petroleum
on sea turtles ( 19). Prolonged reviews
and restrictions on scientifi c research arising
from unproven conservation concerns may
actually impede conservation efforts ( 20,
21). The process should be expedited without
compromising legislative mandates.
Encourage data sharing. Because of
proprietary issues, many databases in the
United States useful for population assessments
are diffi cult to access. Critical data
held by individuals are at risk as data owners
retire or die. Because these data were
collected under past environmental conditions
and population densities, they cannot
be replaced by new research. Incentives to
increase data sharing, such as making it a
requirement of funding, permits, or publication,
should be developed ( 22).
Improve assessment tools for evaluation
of anthropogenic impacts on populations by
fostering interdisciplinary research among
fi sheries science, marine ecology, and conservation
biology and by funding opportunities
for student training and continuing education
for managers in the quantitative sciences
( 23). The Bering Sea Project is an excellent
example of such a program ( 24).
Prioritize investments. Although diffi cult
to set, priorities should be provided to direct
funding to address long-term population
management needs. This specifi c guidance,
which will vary among species and ecosystems,
is lacking in other plans and policies.
Having funding priorities in place for key
species and ecosystems will allow effi cient,
strategic use of funds that become available
after a crisis.
With a growing human population and
continuing habitat degradation ( 25, 26), our
ability to assess and understand changes in
marine wildlife and ecosystems becomes ever
more important. The United States needs strategic
national research plans for key marine
species and ecosystems based on evaluation
of cause and effect and on integrated monitoring
of abundance and demographic traits. We
know how to create these research plans—
what is needed now is the political will and
leadership to do so and to fulfi ll our responsibilities
under the U.S. Endangered Species,
Marine Mammal Protection, and Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Acts. Agencies should focus resources
and expertise on research that identifi es why
populations change and that enables modeling
future impacts. In the wake of the BP oil
spill, the need for this policy shift is as clear
as it is compelling. The largest offshore oil
spill in U.S. history should provide the impetus
and opportunity to effect this policy shift.
4 FEBRUARY 2011 VOL 331 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org
Published by AAAS
References and Notes
1. R. T. Paine et al., Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 27, 197 (1996).
2. B. Graham et al., National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (Commission,
Washington, DC, 2011); www.oilspillcommission.
gov/fi nal-report.
3. B. Galuardi et al., Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 67, 966
(2010).
4. Funds from BP include $500 million to Gulf of Mexico
Research Initiative; >$8 million to National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation Recovered Oil Fund for Wildlife; and
undetermined millions through NOAA’s Damage Assessment,
Remediation, and Restoration Program;
www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=
2012968&contentId=7062936.
5. National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, www.nfwf.
org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Charter_Programs_
List&CONTENTID=18320& TEMPLATE=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
6. Ocean Policy Task Force, Final Recommendations of
the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, July 19, 2010
(White House Council on Environmental Quality, Washington,
DC 2010); www.whitehouse.gov/administration/
eop/oceans/policy.
7. J. M. Hoekstra et al., Ecol. Appl. 12, 630 (2002).
8. Funds not yet disbursed include $450 million through
the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative and undetermined
millions through National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA’s) Damage Assessment,
Remediation, and Restoration Program.
9. S. S. Heppell, H. Caswell, L. B. Crowder, Ecology 81, 654
(2000).
10. M. Chaloupka, in Loggerhead Sea Turtles, A. B. Bolten,
B. E. Witherington, Eds. (Smithsonian Books,
Washington, DC, 2003), pp. 274–294.
11. M. Finkelstein et al., PLoS ONE 3, e2480 (2008).
12. A. B. Bolten et al., Front. Ecol. Environ 28, (2010).
10.1890/090126
13. K. A. Selkoe, R. J. Toonen, Ecol. Lett. 9, 615 (2006).
14. B. M. Bolker, T. Okuyama, K. A. Bjorndal, A. B. Bolten,
Mol. Ecol. 16, 685 (2007).
15. J. L. Nielsen et al., Eds., Tagging and Tracking of Marine
Animals with Electronic Devices, vol. 9 of Reviews:
Methods and Technologies in Fish Biology and Fisheries
(Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2009).
16. M. H. Carr et al., Ecol. Appl. 13, (suppl. 1), 90 (2003).
17. A. L. Harrison, K. A. Bjorndal, in Connectivity Conservation,
K. R. Crooks and M. A. Sanjayan, Eds. (Cambridge
Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 213–232.
18. P. Lehodey, R. Murtugudde, I. Senina, Prog. Oceanogr.
84, 69 (2010).
19. M. E. Lutcavage, P. Plotkin, B. E. Witherington, P. L. Lutz,
in The Biology of Sea Turtles, P. L. Lutz, J. A. Musick, Eds.
(CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida, 1997), pp. 387–409.
20. B. W. Bowen, J. C. Avise, Science 266, 713 (1994).
21. B. W. Bowen, W. N. Witzell, NOAA Tech. Memo.
NMFS-SEFSC 396, 1 (1996).
22. J. L. Contreras, Science 329, 393 (2010).
23. A. M. Ellison, B. Dennis, Front. Ecol. Environ 8, 362
(2010).
24. Bering Sea Project, http://bsierp.nprb.org/index.html.
25. J. B. C. Jackson et al., Science 293, 629 (2001).
26. O. Hoegh-Guldberg, J. F. Bruno, Science 328, 1523
(2010).
27. B. E. Witherington et al., Ecol. Appl. 19, 30 (2009).
28. National Research Council, Assessment of Sea-Turtle Status
and Trends: Integrating Demography and Abundance
(National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2010).
29. C. J. Limpus and M. Chaloupka led the data collection
and analyses summarized in ( 10).
30. M. Chaloupka, N. Kamezaki, C. Limpus, J. Exp. Mar. Biol.
Ecol. 356, 136 (2008).
31. N. Baron and M. Wright of COMPASS and A. B. Bolten of
the University of Florida made valuable comments.
Supporting Online Material
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/331/6017/537/DC1
10.1126/science.1199935
on February 4, 2011
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Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 2026-2028.
JournalofCosmology.com, June, 2010
The Gulf Oil Spill:
We Have Been Here Before. Can We Learn
From the Past?
Commentary
M. S. Goñi Urriza, Ph.D., and R. Duran, Ph.D.,
Equipe Environnement et Microbiologie – UMR CNRS IPREM 5254, Université
de Pau et des Pays de L’Adour BP1155 - 64013 Pau cedex, France.
Abstract
The the worst "oil spill" in the history of America began on April 20, 2010, causing
death along the ocean surface and beneath the sea. This commentary briefly
reviews the consequences of other major oil disasters on marine and ecosystem
health.
Keywords: Deepwater Horizon, Oil Spill, Louisiana, New Orleans, Gulf of
Mexico, Gulf Stream, Undersea Oil Plumes, Tracking, Modeling
Oil spills at sea are among the most spectacular and dramatic polluting events
which threaten wildlife, livelihoods and regional economies. The April 20, 2010
Deepwater Horizon oil well blow out and massive amounts of oil and gas which
are spewing out into the Gulf of Mexico is one of the more recent disasters that is
drastically affecting the marine and coastline ecosystems. This has happened once
before in 1979 with the Ixtoc I disaster when 1 500 000 tons of oil spilled into the
sea and washed to shore along the Gulf Northwest coast. The best predictor of the
future is sometimes the past, and the experience with the 1979 disaster can provide
lessons as to what is and will continue to occur in the Gulf of Mexico and US
coastlines following the April 20 oil spill, where, as of June 10, 2010, oil continues
to flow into the gulf in amounts of around 40,000 barrels a day. These lessons
already learned could help minimize the impact of the pollution.
The first and most spectacular effects of massive oil spills are most evident when
oil arrives on the coastlines, covering the beaches, plants, sea birds, aquatic

mammals and dead fish washing to shore covered with oil. How much death might
the April 10 blowout cause? In 1999 the Erika oil tanker sank off the coast of
France, causing one of the worst environmental disasters in the history of Europe.
Over 20,000 tones of fuel oil spilled into the ocean, killing more than 150 000 birds
representing 65 species along 400 Km of coastlines (Laubier, 2007). Unfortunately,
the deadly impact is not limited to birds and fish, but to the environment.
Crude oils and petroleum are mixtures containing thousand of different molecules
among which hydrocarbon compounds are dominant. Once in the water the fate of
the oil dependis on its own properties (e.g., light vs heavy crude) and on physicalchemical
parameters. As oil spreads along the water surface it undergoes a
weathering due to wind, ocean waves and swell and heat and sun-induced
evaporation. In consequence, the oil is transformed and undergoes physicalchemical
modification, dispersion, emulsification, dissolution and sedimentation.
For example, hydrocarbons are transformed by both biological reactions and
photooxidation, leading respectively to their mineralization or to compounds
resistant to degradation.
These modified petroleum and the hydrocarbon molecules are transported to coastal
ecosystems which also react differently, due to their own unique characteristics,
e.g. beaches, estuaries, mudflats, marshlands, mangroves. They are also dispersed
in a variety of ways: the water column, the sea bed and the sediments, thereby
affecting organisms all along the food chain.
When oil seeps beneath the surface it sedimentation such that oil is trapped in
anoxic layers which prevent it from undergoing biotic or abiotic degradation
(Garcia de Oteyza & Grimalt, 2006). This creates pollutant reservoirs that will for
years menace and damage the ecosystem when released in the water column due to
biotic and abiotic reworking of the sediments.
Residual contamination was detected in the Prince William Sound ecosystem
(Alaska) seventeen years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Harwell & Gentile, 2006)
and thus the potential toxic effect of this residues is under debate (Deepthike et al.
2009). During the accident in 1989, there were anecdotal reports of respiratory,
nervous system, liver, kidney, heart and blood disorders, including the killing of
fish eggs.
The toxicity of hydrocarbons and petroleum derived compounds depends on the
nature of the hydrocarbons, the poly-aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) are the most
toxic and persistent components in coastal sediments (Menzie et al. 1992). It has
been demonstrated that below 10 mg/L of hydrocarbons the food chain is polluted
resulting in fecundity decreases and apparition of genetic anomalies while over 10
mg/L plankton, mollusks, crustaceans, gastropods, worms, larva and fishes will be
destroyed(Hyland & Schneider, 1976). These impacts have been observed during

the previous Erika and Sea Empress oil spills (Law & Kelly, 2004; Bocquené et al.
2004).
At sub-lethal levels these hydrocarbons can be bio-accumulated through the food
chain as has been demonstrated for the Erika oil spill. These hydrocarbons were
transferred from mussels to mammals by ingestion and resulted in genotoxic
damages to liver cells (Lemière et al. 2004). Human health was also directly
impacted. Cytogenetic damages and alterations in hormonal status was directly
attributed to the 2002 Prestige oil spill (Pérez-Cadahía et al. 2007), after the
Prestige oil tanker sank off the Galician coast.
The oil toxicity is increased by the application of dispersant, during cleanup
operations. These oil dispersants have high toxicity and can dissolve hydrocarbons
resulting in enhancing its bioavailability (Ramachandran et al. 2004).
Oil spills change the structure of microbial communities, such that microorganisms
able to digest hydrocarbons become dominant (Bordenave et al. 2007), and deplete
ocean waters of oxygen thereby killing oxygen dependent life forms. For example,
oil dispersants destroyed microbial mats which structure guarantees fundamental
functions in the ecosystem including oxygen production by photosynthetic
cyanobacteria and sulfur recycling by Sulfur-Oxidizing bacteria (Duran & Goñi,
2010).In mangroves, microbial communities play a key role in dinitrogen fixation
maintaining the balance of C:N:P ratio necessary for organic matter mineralization
including oil biodegradation (Taketani et al. 2009), these microbes are also
impacted by the oil and the toxic dispersants. Oil perturbation of microbial
communities could break the fragile balance in the ecosystem resulting on
important damages similar to dystrophic crisis.
Considering the current estimation, as of June 1, 2010, of more than 240 000 tons
of oil having so far flowed from the broken oil well at the bottom of the gulf, this
oil spill is now among the top10 of the worst oil spills in the history of this planet,
with the Ixtoc I and the 1991 Arabian Gulf spills being considered as the largest
and worst of them all. However, whereas the Ixtoc I oil spill blow out in the Bay of
Campeche of the Gulf of Mexico, occurred at depths of 50 m (160 ft) deep and was
eventually contained, the oil blow out off the coast of Louisiana has taken place at a
depth of 5,000 ft and as of June 15, 2010, is still pouring around 40,000 barrels of
oil a day into the gulf. The 1991 Arabian Gulf took place on land, was purposeful,
but was also eventually brought under control. Thus, the April 10 gulf disaster has
the potential to become the worst oil spill in the history of this planet.
Marine currents will carry the petroleum from the April 20 blowout ashore and will
impact several thousand Km of US coasts from Louisiana to Florida. The proximity
of the loop current and its connection with the Gulf Stream and given that oil
continues to gush into the gulf, leads to the possibility of a worst scenario with oil

carried into the Atlantic Ocean affecting the East coast of Florida and reaching the
North Atlantic Ocean (Vanvleet et al. 1983).
Although the current oil spill still limited to the US coasts of the Gulf, this accident
is already entering in history because it is injuring an unprecedented large variety
of ecosystems characterized by their unique biodiversity and richness.
The Deepwater Horizon blow out in the Mexico Gulf will have unprecedented
ecological impact and will damage more than 12 hectares of highly productive and
sensitive coastal ecosystems such as mangroves and marshes in preserved areas as
diverse as Louisiana’s Bayous in fresh water, black and white mangroves along the
Louisiana and Florida coasts. These ecosystems, impossible to cleanup with the
classic mechanical procedures, will suffer from the oil spill, and it may be hundreds
of year before these ecosystems recover.
Oil will persist for long periods due to the vegetation density and slow degradation
in anaerobic sediments. The oil will also asphyxiate mangrove trees, perturb
microbial communities and disrupt the ecological stability affecting animals and
microbes throughout the food chain for decades into the future. If oil continues to
flow into the Gulf into late August as predicted, it will become the worst and
possibly the most far reaching of any previous oil disaster in the history of this
planet.
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