In the Court of Appeals For the Fifth Court of Appeals District Dallas ...

No. 05-11-01360-CV
In the Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Court of Appeals District
Dallas, Texas
COLONIAL COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
v.
DALIA AMAYA,
Appellant
Appellee
on interlocutory appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court of
Dallas County, Texas (Cause No. DC–09–15049–I)
Honorable Lorraine A. Raggio, Presiding
APPELLEE’S AMENDED OPENING BRIEF
Adam R. Hardison
HARDISON LAW FIRM
5050 Quorum Drive, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75254
972-687-9050 phone
972-687-9053 fax
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
ACCEPTED
225EFJ016854805
FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
12 April 30 P3:13
Lisa Matz
CLERK

No. 05-11-01360-CV
In the Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Court of Appeals District
Dallas, Texas
COLONIAL COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
v.
DALIA AMAYA,
i
Appellant
Appellee
on interlocutory appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court of
Dallas County, Texas (Cause No. DC–09–15049–I)
Honorable Lorraine A. Raggio, Presiding
APPELLEE’S AMENDED OPENING BRIEF
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Adam R. Hardison
_________________________
Adam R. Hardison
HARDISON LAW FIRM
5050 Quorum Drive, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75254
972-687-9050 phone
972-687-9053 fax
Counsel for Appellee

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellee adopts the disclosures and the naming references of the Appellant.
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel ........................................................................................ ii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iii
Index of Authorities ........................................................................................................... v
Statement of Jurisdiction ................................................................................................. vi
Statement of Case ........................................................................................................... vii
Citations to the Record ................................................................................................... vii
Issue presented ............................................................................................................... viii
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................. 1
Summary of Argument ..................................................................................................... 1
Argument ............................................................................................................................ 3
A. Colonial failed to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction ................. 3
B. Colonial’s obligation to comply with the Texas Insurance Code
and fulfill its duty of good faith and fair dealing when determining
whether an applicable insuring agreement is in place does not
disappear when such determination later reveals that there is
no such insuring agreement.. ...................................................................... 6
Prayer ................................................................................................................................. 9
Certificate of Service ....................................................................................................... 10
iii

CASES
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson,
53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001) ...................................................................................... 5
Baylor College of Med. v. Camberg,
247 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008). ................................... 8
Diamond Products International, Inc. v. Handsel,
2004 WL 1607689 (Tex. App. [14th Dist.] July 20,2004) ....................................... 4
E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline,
307 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2010) .................................................................................... 5
Geisler v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
712 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986). .................................... 6
Guarantee Ins. Co. of Texas v. Boggs,
527 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1975) ................................................. 6
In re D.B.,
80 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2002) ................................................................. 4
Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,
764 P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1988) ..................................................................................... 8
Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
955 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997). ............................................ 6, 7
Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker,
903 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1995). ................................................................................. 7
Sentry Ins. v. R.J. Weber Co.,
2 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................ 7
Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) .................................................................................... 5
iv

Trahan v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
739 So. 2d 811 (La. App. [1 Cir.] 1999) .................................................................. 8
U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Doss,
764 So. 2d 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. [4th Dist.] 2000); ............................................. 8
Zurcher v. Nat'l Sur. Corp.,
2002 Ohio 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002, app. denied.) ................................................. 8
OTHER
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f) ................................................................. 3
v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an interlocutory appeal brought under sections 51.014(d-f) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. [Appendix, p.1-3 at 2.] Both Amaya and Colonial
agreed to the interlocutory appeal, as required under the version of the Code in effect
prior to September 1, 2011. Regrettably, Amaya cannot represent to this Court that
Colonial has properly invoked appellate jurisdiction. Amaya’s disclosure in this regard is
set forth on page 3 of her brief.
vi

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of Colonial’s motion for
summary judgment. The issue in the summary judgment was whether Colonial’s conduct
in handling a PIP claim could never constitute a violation of the Texas Insurance Code or
could never expose Colonial to extra contractual damages upon a showing that there was
not a PIP insuring agreement in place. Amaya’s amended pleadings abandoned her quest
for benefits under the insurance contract, and she did not respond to Colonial’s summary
judgment grounds on those issues.
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
The record in this case consists of a one-volume, sequentially numbered Clerk’s
Record and a one volume, sequentially numbered Supplemental Clerk’s Record.
Citations to this record are in the format [CR:pp and SCR:pp, as appropriate.].
This appeal does not have a Reporter’s Record.
vii

ISSUE PRESENTED
A. Whether, as a matter of law, an insurer is never obligated to comply with the
Texas Insurance Code and an insurer never owes a claimant the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in determining whether an applicable insuring agreement is in
place when such determination later reveals that there is no such insuring
agreement.
viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amaya offers the following Statement of Facts under TRAP 38.1(f):
On May 17, 2009, Amaya had a car accident while she was the permissive user of a
motor vehicle owned by Colonial's named insured, Antonio Orellana. [CR:89]. Mr.
Orellana is not a party. At the time of the accident, Mr. Orellana’s insurance information
revealed a policy number of 7842A 759168. [CR:98]. On August 13, 2009, Amaya’s
attorney contacted Colonial requiting either an application for PIP benefits or a signed
written rejection of PIP coverage. [CR:112]. The next day, August 14, 2009, Colonial
replied to Amaya’s letter stating, “Personal Injury Protection ... is optional and requires
an endorsement to the initial policy. Research of your policy revealed that you did not
carry Personal Injury Protection (PIP) ... coverage. Therefore, there is no first party
coverage for any medical bills under this automobile policy and your injury claim must
be denied.” [CR:113]. Colonial’s reply did not contain a written PIP rejection. Amaya
wrote again to Colonial on September 3, 2009, asking that Colonial deliver either a PIP
application or a written rejection of PIP. [CR:114]. Colonial responded that same day by
providing a signed waiver for a policy different from the policy in question. [CR:115-17
at 117]. The document provided was for Policy Number 7894A 1 0443, but Colonial did
not provide a signed waiver for the policy in question and did not offer an explanation for
this variance. [CR:117]. Amaya acknowledged receipt of Colonial’s earlier response,
notified Colonial that the rejection was for a different policy number, and asked for a
correct rejection or confirmation that the two policies are the same. [CR:118]. Amaya
1

made additional attempts to obtain either PIP benefits or a written rejection on September
15, 2009 [CR:122], September 23, 2009 [CR:123], September 28, 2009 [CR:124].
Colonial responded on September 30, 2009 with a declarations page but still did not
provide a written rejection. [CR:126-28]. Amaya made her sixth request for a written
rejection of PIP on October 5, 2009. [CR:129]. She made her seventh request for a
written rejection on October 12, 2009 [CR:130-131].
Colonial never produced a written rejection in response to Amaya’s seven
requests, and Amaya filed suit on or about October 30, 2009 seeking PIP benefits and
extra-contractual damages.
After Amaya had incurred attorney’s fees and expenses in filing and serving
Colonial with her lawsuit, Colonial finally produced a written rejection of PIP for the
policy in question on November 11, 2009.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to each precedent relied upon as authority by Colonial, the underlying
facts in this case do not concern an insurer’s determination of whether, under a specified
insuring agreement, a claim was a “Covered Claim” or the claimant was a “Covered
Person.” Each of those determinations requires analysis and investigation of facts
external to the insurer itself. Here, by contrast, the question is whether a PIP insuring
agreement is in place. Texas law is clear that, absent a written rejection of such coverage,
each Texas auto policy provides PIP coverage. The existence or absence of a written
2

ejection was a fact uniquely within the purview of Colonial, yet Colonial required
Amaya to file a lawsuit to obtain that written rejection.
ARGUMENT
A. Colonial failed to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
This appeal is brought under 51.014(d-f) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. Prior to September 1, 2011, this section required an agreement of the parties along
with other prerequisites. H.B. 274 (the “loser pays” bill) eliminated the requirement for
an agreement and allowed for such appeals upon a party’s motion or on the trial court’s
own initiative. See H.B. 274, §3.01, 82nd Leg.
Section 51.014 was subjected to many changes over the years. From its enactment
in 1985 until a modification in 2005, section 51.014(f) read as follows:
If application is made to the court of appeals that has appellate jurisdiction
over the action not later than the 10 th day after the date an interlocutory
order under Subsection (d) is entered, the appellate court may permit an
appeal to be taken from that order.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f)(As it existed prior to enactment of H.B. 1294,
79 th Leg., effective June 1, 2005). Thus, prior to June 1, 2005, the parties had 10 days to
make application to the Court of Appeals for review under this section.
H.B. 1294, however, completely eliminated section (f) in 2005. Presumably, the
requirement for an application was no longer in effect and the time to perfect appeal
defaulted to the standard 20 days for accelerated appeals under TRAP 26.1(b).
3

Section (f) was reinstated with the Loser Pays bill, marking the return of the
concept of an application for interlocutory appeal and specifying a 15-day window for
filing. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f)(2011).
For the following reasons, Amaya cannot represent to this Court that its
jurisdiction has been invoked by Colonial.
1. The version of 51.014 in effect at the time the trial court made its order
under that section, and at the time the notice of appeal was filed, specified a 15-day time
period for such filings. The trial court’s order was dated September 12, 2011 and the
notice of appeal was filed 18 days later on September 30, 2011. [CR:276-77; 280]. The
lack of timeliness casts doubt on appellate jurisdiction. Amaya is aware of later-drafted
commentary to the Rule enacted pursuant to this legislation which specifies the operative
date is the date the action was filed “in the trial court,” but nothing in the legislation
itself—which solely concerns appellate jurisdiction—supports this expansive
interpretation.
2. Colonial never made application for interlocutory appeal. While the
version of section 51.014(f) that existed prior to 2005 referenced an “application,” some
courts of appeal gave an expansive definition to this term and allowed a notice of appeal
to serve as an application. See Diamond Products International, Inc. v. Handsel, No. 14-
03-00990-CV, 2004 WL 1607689 (Tex. App. [14th Dist.] July 20,2004, no pet.);
Compare In re D.B., 80 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2002, no pet.)(Dismissing appeal
for want of jurisdiction upon holding that a notice of appeal could not substitute for an
application and finding that, regardless, the notice was filed two days late.) Justice Frost,
4

concurring in Diamond Products, identified the need for procedural clarification in this
area. The Texas Legislature responded in 2011, and the current (and controlling) version
of 51.014(f) clearly requires a separate application for interlocutory appeal within 15
days. Upon grant of that application, the TRAP 20-day time period for accelerated
appeals commences. Because Colonial never made application, appellate jurisdiction is in
doubt.
3. Finally, and distinct from the procedural shortcomings listed above, section
51.014(d) requires that the “order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” While this is an issue of
first impression in Texas courts, Amaya has doubts whether the jurisdiction contemplated
over pure questions of law extends to the mixed question of law and fact raised in
Colonial’s first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Issues Presented. [Appellant’s Brief at p.
2]. Jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals must be narrowly construed. See E. Tex. Salt
Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 277 (Tex. 2010), citing Tex. A&M Univ.
Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2007)(Observing that courts strictly
construe the general interlocutory appeals statute as “a narrow exception to the general
rule that only final judgments are appealable.” (quoting Bally Total Fitness Corp. v.
Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. 2001)).
5

B. Colonial’s obligation to comply with the Texas Insurance Code and fulfill its
duty of good faith and fair dealing when determining whether an applicable
insuring agreement is in place does not disappear when such determination
later reveals that there is no such insuring agreement.
“[A]bsent a written rejection, UM/UIM and PIP coverage exist as a matter of
law.” Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-357 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1997, pet denied.); see also Howard v. INA County Mutual Ins. Co., 933
S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, n.w.h.); Guarantee Ins. Co. of Texas v.
Boggs, 527 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1975, writ dism'd); Geisler v.
Mid-Century Ins. Co., 712 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). No other automobile coverages have this “opt-out” requirement.
In the trial court, Amaya raised the issue that the written rejection Colonial finally
produced bore indicia of forgery. For purposes of the narrow issue before this Court,
however, Amaya will presume the rejection is valid to focus the question on whether a
subsequent determination that PIP coverage was rejected will excuse misconduct in
delivering that rejection.
Regarding that conduct, Colonial agreed it owed Amaya the same duty it owes to a
named insured [SCR:38], that its adjuster made multiple misrepresentations to Amaya
[SCR:41, 44, 46, 47-48, 56], and that the first indication in its records that an attempt was
made to investigate coverage was two weeks after the claim was made, and 13 days after
it was denied [SCR:458]. Colonial further agreed that it did not provide a rejection for
the policy number listed in the policy report, did not explain why it did not, that this
failure was a violation of its internal policies, and this failure was a breach of its duty to
6

Amaya. [SCR:54, 55, 56, 68-69]. Colonial knew of no reason why the written rejection
could not have been delivered to Amaya months earlier, in response to her repeated
requests. [SCR:63, 64]. Colonial further agree that its actions damaged Amaya.
[SCR:60-61, 65, 66].
Colonial cites Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker as the sole source for an exception to the
general rule that bad faith will not be found when the claim was not covered. 903 S.W.2d
338, 341 (Tex. 1995). As a threshold observation, the language in Stoker and its progeny
concerns a claim that is “promptly” denied. Colonial’s own admissions show that the
denial was not prompt and was not in accordance with Colonial’s polices.
All authority cited by Colonial share a common theme that is absent in the case at
bar. Specifically, in each case, an insurance policy and insuring agreement were in place,
but disputes arose as to whether a particular claim was within the ambit of the coverage
provided by that insuring agreement. Here, by contrast, Colonial did not make a fact-
specific denial of a claim on its merits; rather, Colonial’s sole task was to determine
whether PIP coverage was rejected.
Generally, an insured bears the burden of showing that a claim against an insurer
is within the policy’s coverage. See Sentry Ins. v. R.J. Weber Co., 2 F.3d 554, 556 (5th
Cir. 1993) (interpreting Texas law). But this is a PIP claim, and “absent a written
rejection, UM/UIM and PIP coverage exist as a matter of law.” Ortiz v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1997). The existence of a
written rejection is uniquely within the knowledge of Colonial, and Colonial has
exclusive access to the sole document that would reject coverage. As such, this case is
7

distinguishable from Colonial’s cited authority were claims analysis required the insured
to come forth with facts demonstrating the existence of a covered claim.
As the Appellant, Colonial bears the burden to provide this Court with authority
supporting its position. See Baylor College of Med. v. Camberg, 247 S.W.3d 342, 349
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). It has not done so.
While the issue of coverage rejections (whether UM or PIP), and potential bad
faith findings and statutory violations for a failure to timely deliver proof of rejection, is
an issue of first impression in Texas, states with similar statutory schemes have spoken
clearly on the issue:
� “The burden of proof is upon the insurer to come forward with a written rejection
in order to relieve the insurer from its duty to provide the statutory uninsured
motorist coverage.” Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Okla.
1988);
� A review of the record supports the trial court's conclusion, in directing a verdict
in favor of the insureds, that the insurer failed to meet its burden to prove, absent a
written rejection, that there was an informed knowing rejection of uninsured
motorist coverage.” U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Doss, 764 So. 2d 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
[4th Dist.] 2000);
� “The insurer bears the burden of proving any insured named in the policy rejected
in writing UM coverage equal to bodily injury limits or selected lower limits.”
Trahan v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 811, 814 (La. App. [1
Cir.] 1999, writ denied);
� “Under Ohio Law, insurance companies bear “the burden of showing that any
rejection of UM/UIM coverage was knowingly made by the customer.” Zurcher
v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 2002 Ohio 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002, app. denied.)
Notably, no state with an “opt out” statute for PIP or UM/UIM has placed the burden on
the insured to prove the negative; that is, no state requires an insured to prove the absence
of a written rejection.
8

Amaya agrees that, in those coverage analyses where the insured bears the burden
to prove coverage, bad faith claims will only follow once the insured has successfully
met that burden. Here, Amaya met her burden and Colonial’s corporate representative
admits Colonial did not timely provide proof of written rejection. Colonial cites no
authority that, contrary to cases where a duty had not yet attached, it can breach its duty
and remain immunized for bad faith claims. And of course, Colonial’s arguments touch
only bad faith claims and not claims for breaches of duties under the Insurance Code.
CONCLUSION; PRAYER
Based on the forgoing, Colonial has not established that, as a matter law, an
insurer will never owe a duty to its insureds, or will never be required to comply with the
Texas Insurance Code, in cases where it eventually delivers a written rejection of
otherwise mandatory coverage. By extension, of course, Colonial also has not
established that it is immunized from traditional remedies availed to its insureds for such
breaches and violations.
Amaya prays that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment.
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has
been served on all counsel of record on this the 30th day of April 2012, in accordance with the
rules.
MR. RANDALL G. WALTERS
WALTERS BALIDO & CRAIN
900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 600
DALLAS, TX 75202
/s/ Adam R. Hardison
__________________________________
Adam R. Hardison
10

APPENDIX
11

LexisNexis (R) Texas Annotated Statutes
Copyright © 2012 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group
All rights reserved.
*** This document is current through the 2011 First Called Session ***
*** Federal case annotations: Jan. 3, 2012 postings on Lexis ***
*** State case annotations: Dec. 16, 2011 postings on Lexis ***
CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE
TITLE 2. TRIAL, JUDGMENT, AND APPEAL
SUBTITLE D. APPEALS
CHAPTER 51. APPEALS
SUBCHAPTER B. APPEALS FROM COUNTY OR DISTRICT COURT
§ 51.014. Appeal from Interlocutory Order
GO TO TEXAS CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (2012)
(a) A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that:
Page 1
(1) appoints a receiver or trustee;
(2) overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or trustee;
(3) certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;
(4) grants or refuses a temporary injunction or grants or overrules a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction as
provided by Chapter 65;
(5) denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an
officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state;
(6) denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon a claim against or defense by a
member of the electronic or print media, acting in such capacity, or a person whose communication appears in or is
published by the electronic or print media, arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73;
(7) grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except
in a suit brought under the Family Code;
(8) grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001;
(9) denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an appeal may not be
taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351;
(10) grants relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(l); or
(11) denies a motion to dismiss filed under Section 90.007.
Appendix - Page 1

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014
Page 2
(b) An interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a), other than an appeal under Subsection (a)(4), stays the commencement
of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal. An interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a)(3),
(5), or (8) also stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of that appeal.
(c) A denial of a motion for summary judgment, special appearance, or plea to the jurisdiction described by Subsection
(a)(5), (7), or (8) is not subject to the automatic stay under Subsection (b) unless the motion, special appearance,
or plea to the jurisdiction is filed and requested for submission or hearing before the trial court not later than the later of:
(1) a date set by the trial court in a scheduling order entered under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(2) the 180th day after the date the defendant files:
(A) the original answer;
(B) the first other responsive pleading to the plaintiff's petition; or
(C) if the plaintiff files an amended pleading that alleges a new cause of action against the defendant and the
defendant is able to raise a defense to the new cause of action under Subsection (a)(5), (7), or (8), the responsive pleading
that raises that defense.
(d) On a party's motion or on its own initiative, a trial court in a civil action may, by written order, permit an appeal
from an order that is not otherwise appealable if:
(1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion; and
(2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
(d-1) Subsection (d) does not apply to an action brought under the Family Code.
(e) An appeal under Subsection (d) does not stay proceedings in the trial court unless:
(1) the parties agree to a stay; or
(2) the trial or appellate court orders a stay of the proceedings pending appeal.
(f) An appellate court may accept an appeal permitted by Subsection (d) if the appealing party, not later than the
15th day after the date the trial court signs the order to be appealed, files in the court of appeals having appellate jurisdiction
over the action an application for interlocutory appeal explaining why an appeal is warranted under Subsection
(d). If the court of appeals accepts the appeal, the appeal is governed by the procedures in the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure for pursuing an accelerated appeal. The date the court of appeals enters the order accepting the appeal starts
the time applicable to filing the notice of appeal.
HISTORY: Enacted by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959 (S.B. 797), § 1, effective September 1, 1985; am. Acts 1987,
70th Leg., ch. 167 (S.B. 892), § 3.10, effective September 1, 1987; am. Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 915 (S.B. 908), § 1,
effective June 14, 1989; am. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 855 (S.B. 76), § 1, effective September 1, 1993; am. Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 1296 (S.B. 453), § 1, effective June 20, 1997; am. Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1389 (H.B. 978), § 1, effective
September 1, 2001; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204 (H.B. 4), § 1.03, effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts
2005, 79th Leg., ch. 97 (S.B. 15), § 5, effective September 1, 2005; am. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 1051 (H.B. 1294), §§
1, 2, effective June 18, 2005; am. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 203 (H.B. 274), § 3.01, effective September 1, 2011.
NOTES:
2001 Note:
This Act applies only to a suit that is commenced on or after the effective date of this Act. A suit that is commenced
before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law applicable to the suit immediately before the effective date
of this Act, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose. Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1389, § 3.
2003 Note:
The changes in law made by Section 1.03 of Ch. 204 to Sections 51.014(b) and (c), Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, apply to any case in which an appeal allowed by Section 51.014(a), Civil Practice and Remedies Code, as
amended by ch. 204, is taken and the notice of appeal is filed on or after September 1, 2003. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.
204, § 1.05(b).
Appendix - Page 2

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014
Page 3
* See Texas Litigation Guide, Ch. 153, Accelerated Appeals.
* See also Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 21--51.
Editor's Notes. --
A former (f) was repealed by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 1051 (H.B. 1294), § effective June 18, 2005.
Applicability. --
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 97 (S.B. 15), § 10 provides: "There is a direct appeal to the supreme court from an order,
however characterized, of a trial court granting or denying a temporary or otherwise interlocutory injunction or a permanent
injunction on the grounds of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality, or other validity or invalidity, under the
state or federal constitution of all or any part of this Act. The direct appeal is an accelerated appeal."
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 203 (H.B. 274), § 6.01 provides: "The changes in law made by this Act apply only to a civil
action commenced on or after the effective date of the change in law as provided by this article [September 1, 2011]. A
civil action commenced before the effective date of the change in law as provided by this article is governed by the law
in effect immediately before the effective date of the change in law, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose."
2005 amendment,
by ch. 97, added (a)(11).
2005 amendment,
by ch. 1051, added "county court at law, or county court" after "A district court" in (d); substituted "trial court" for
"district court" or variants in (e); and repealed (f), which read: "If application is made to the court of appeals that has
appellate jurisdiction over the action not later than the 10th day after the date an interlocutory order under Subsection
(d) is entered, the appellate court may permit an appeal to be taken from that order."
2011 amendment,
in the introductory language of (d), substituted "On a party's motion or on its own initiative, a trial court in a civil action
may, by" for "A district court, county court at law, or county court may issue a," substituted "permit an appeal from
an order that is" for "for interlocutory appeal in a civil action," and deleted "under this section" after "appealable"; in
(d)(1), deleted "the parties agree that" from the beginning and added "to be appealed"; deleted former (d)(3), which
read: "the parties agree to the order"; added (d-1); added the (e)(1) and (e)(2) designations; added "to a stay; or" in
(e)(1); in (e)(2), deleted "and" from the beginning, added "or appellate," deleted "the court of appeals, or a judge of the
court of appeals" before "orders," and added "pending appeal"; added (f); and made related changes.
LexisNexis (R) Notes:
CASE NOTES
1. Where a former school district employee did not initiate grievance proceedings as required by Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
554.006 because she immediately withdrew the grievance filed after her first termination by the district without ever
attempting to reinstitute it prior to filing suit and did not institute a grievance of any kind after her involuntary separation
from employment occurring three months later, those omissions were jurisdictional defects that precluded the employee
from bringing her whistleblower claim. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Watley, 216 S.W.3d 374, 2006 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4499 (Tex. App. Eastland 2006).
2. Should a state district court refuse a requested order restraining implementation of an agency order, that denial is itself
appealable pursuant to former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2251 (see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014);
therefore, a car manufacturer was not deprived of due process rights where a mechanism existed for review of Texas
Motor Vehicle Commission decisions that complied with the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act. Chrysler
Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Com., 755 F.2d 1192, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28490, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P66498, 51 A.L.R.4th 845 (5th Cir. Tex. 1985).
Appendix - Page 3