CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

66 JAFFEE
tures, characterized as they are by hierarchy and formal constraints, will
themselves inevitably produce “latent conflict” (Pondy, 1967) and unintended
consequences (Blau, 1955; Gouldner, 1954; Merton, 1957; Selznick,
1957). We shall consider several more specific bureaucratic sources of conflict
that have been widely observed and analyzed in organizations.
The first was originally posed as a theoretical problem (Gouldner, 1954;
Parsons, 1947), but it has practical implications for organizational harmony.
It pertains directly to Weber’s (1947) argument about rational legal
authority. In Weber’s model, the exercise of authority (by those who command)
in bureaucratic organizations was legitimate (accepted by those
who obey) because it is derived from a formal position (e.g., manager,
supervisor) filled on the basis of technical competence (e.g., credentials,
knowledge, demonstrated skill, experience). An obvious and real source
of conflict in any organization can be found where subordinates do not
regard the exercise of authority as legitimate due to the demonstrated
absence of technical competence by those in formal positions of authority.
Organizational members are then faced with the dilemma of whether
they should comply with the directives from a superior purely because
the person occupies a formal position of authority, or must that person
also demonstrate superior knowledge? If the two characteristics are not
joined and those in authoritative positions demonstrate less technical
competence than their subordinates, each group has a legitimate claim
to exercise authority over the other. This can generate instability and conflict.
Gaining the willing compliance of workers may also be problematic
because a normative foundation for the exercise of authority—superior
knowledge—is being violated.
The notion of “legitimate authority” acknowledges that humans are not
bureaucratically programmed automatons but that they have the capacity
to subjectively evaluate the authority structure and engage in opposition
and resistance. For example, workers can decide that their bosses
are not technically competent, that particular methods are not the best
way to achieve some goal, or that the goals of the organization conflict
with their goals. In all of these cases, the mechanistic bureaucratic model
breaks down and other arrangements are required to gain cooperation
and compliance.
A second source of bureaucratic conflict, most lucidly identified in the
work of Alvin Gouldner (1954, 1955), was discovered during his extensive
fieldwork in an industrial mining and manufacturing enterprise.
Gouldner was interested in the relationship between the constituency
responsible for proposing an organization’s bureaucratic rules and the
extent to which members comply with the rules. His analysis assumed
organizational members do not have the same political and economic
interests or goals. More specifically, workers were likely to have different
interests than management on most work-related issues. Therefore,
bureaucratic rules and regulations should be examined to see whether
they represent, or conflict with, the interests of the different parties in