CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

32 DE DREU AND GELFAND
well as in a variety of field studies, and has generally received good support
(for a review, see Tjosvold, 1998). This work has also shown that constructive
controversy yields desirable outcomes to disputants and their collective
alike. It promotes learning and innovation, team effectiveness, and the quality
of group decision making, to name but a few.
Another important theory about conflict management is Dual Concern
Theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; also see Blake & Mouton, 1964; Olekalns et al.,
chapter 3, this volume). In a nutshell, it argues that conflict management is
a function of high or low concern for self combined with high or low concern
for other. A high concern for self and low concern for other results in a
preference for forcing focused on imposing one’s will on the other side (unilateral
action). Forcing involves threats and bluffs, persuasive arguments,
and positional commitments. Low concern for self and high concern for
other results in a preference for yielding, which is oriented toward accepting
and incorporating other’s will. It involves unilateral concessions, unconditional
promises, and offering help (unilateral action). Low concern for self
and other results in a preference for avoiding, which involves reducing the
importance of the issues and attempts to suppress thinking about the issues
(unilateral action). High concern for self and other produces a preference for
problem solving, which is oriented toward an agreement that satisfies both
own and other’s aspirations as much as possible (joint action). It involves an
exchange of information about priorities and preferences, showing insights,
and making tradeoffs between important and unimportant issues.
Recently, some authors have suggested that intermediate concern for
self paired with intermediate concern for other results in a preference for
compromising. Some see compromising as “half-hearted problem solving”
(e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Others, however, see it as a distinct strategy
that involves the matching of other’s concessions, the making of conditional
promises and threats, and an active search for a middle ground
(e.g., Van de Vliert, 1997). Empirically, the debate seems to be settled in
favor of those viewing compromise as a separate strategy, although more
work needs to be done (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001).
Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1993) differentiated forcing and dominating into
two subcategories—rights and power—in their taxonomy of approaches to
dispute resolution. When using a rights-based approach, parties attempt to
resolve the dispute by applying some standard of fairness, precedent, contract,
or law. A focus on rights is likely to lead to agreements in which each
party has to give up something in order to reach an agreement, with the possibility
of one party giving more than receiving. A power-based approach
results in the dispute being resolved by determining which party is able to
force his or her desired outcome—who is stronger, has higher status, is able
to coerce the other, or can force a concession from the other party. A powerbased
approach usually leads to agreements that have greater potential to
escalate due to feelings of resentment and a desire for revenge (Brett et al.,
1998; Tinsley, 2001; also see Friedman et al., chapter 12, this volume; Goldman
et al., chapter 10, this volume; Pruitt, chapter 8, this volume). While