CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

438 CARNEVALE
such as those of Walton and Mckersie, and Stevens (1963); for example,
ideas about the function of mediation, such as face saving (Pruitt & Johnson,
1970).
But the behavioral work also leans heavily on another tradition, mathematical
models of rational behavior developed by economists and game
theorists (e.g., Luce & Raiffa, 1957), and variations on that theme that combine
the tools of rational analysis to examine the wide range of tactics
faced by most negotiators and third parties (e.g., Raiffa, 1982; Schelling,
1960). In addition, important collaborations between economists and psychologists
provided, and continue to provide, much theoretical leverage
to the domain. For example, the classic work by Siegel and Fouraker (1960)
inspired early studies on aspirations (Kelley, Beckman, & Fisher, 1967),
which provided the foundation for the dual concern theory developed by
Pruitt (1981). This theory distinguished between self-concern, which was
reflected in the Kelley et al. notion of resistance and other concern, which
has a foundation in the work on leadership style that emerged from the
Ohio State Leadership Studies, that is, the notion of consideration (see Hollander,
1979). The essay by Beersma, Conlon, and Hollenbeck (chapter 4,
this volume) nicely represents this work.
Whither
I began this comment with the observation that the study of organizational
conflict reflects the fads and fancies of broader disciplines—social
psychology, sociology, economics, and so on—and whither they wander
the study of organization conflict will go as well. However, the whither
will wither, in my humble opinion, if the core areas of industrial–organizational
psychology are not more vigorously brought to bear on the study
of organizational conflict. In particular, matters of measurement. Conflict
has a lot of parts and pieces, even when we place the “organizational”
boundary on it. So when we ask the Asch question—what is it that we are
trying to explain?—there is no easy answer, a point also made in several
of these essays (e.g., Spector & Bruk-Lee, chapter 9, this volume). This was
apparent also in Jaffee’s comments on forms of resistance in organizations:
“covert political conflict” can include “material and personal sabotage, theft,
noncooperation, strategic inaction, and symbolic disrespect or escape”
(chapter 2, this volume). Consider these forms in conjunction with the
set of behaviors identified by Raver and Barling (chapter 7, this volume):
“offensive remarks, threatening others, isolating an individual so he or
she has difficulty working, harshly criticizing others, making obscene
gestures, giving someone the ‘silent treatment,’ failing to transmit information,
physical assault, and theft from other employees” (p. 211).
To build a cumulative science of organizational conflict we need good
measures of the parts and pieces. Moreover, there are areas that the field
needs to do a better job of integrating. The traditional, core areas of indus-