CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

1. CONFLICT IN THE WORKPLACE 9
Van Lange, 2003). The theory builds on rational choice theories designed
by economists and mathematicians in the late 1940s and early 1950s and
includes important insights from Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif & Sherif,
1953), the theory of Cooperation and Competition (Deutsch, 1949, 1973;
Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999; Tjosvold, 1998), and work on negotiation
and bargaining (Pruitt, 1981).
In essence, Interdependence Theory assumes that participants within
any social system—a dyad, a group, or an entire organization—depend on
one another to obtain positive outcomes, and to avoid negative outcomes.
The way participants’ interests relate to one another, or are perceived to
be related, then has important implications for their subsequent behavioral
choices, the emerging interaction patterns, and the extent to which
participants reach their desired end-state. Within the theory, the options
and outcomes of interaction can be represented using a tool from classic
game theory, the outcome matrix. An outcome matrix describes interdependence
patterns involving two participants (individuals or groups A
and B), each of whom can enact one of two behaviors, yielding four combinations
representing the consequences of the participants’ choices in
terms of outcomes for A and B (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).
Figure 1.1 provides an example of an outcome matrix. The matrix
in Fig. 1.1 is a social dilemma (also called the Prisoner’s Dilemma). It
reflects the situation in which participants are better off individually by
choosing D (the noncooperative choice), whereas both are better off by
choosing C (the cooperative choice) than when they both choose D. From
a selfish point of view, each player is motivated to choose D because
no matter what the other player chooses, personal outcomes are maximized.
This is sometimes referred to as individual rationality. From a
collective point of view, however, each player is motivated to choose C
because no matter what the other player chooses, collective outcomes
are maximized. This is sometimes referred to as collective rationality.
Interestingly, individual rationality is collectively irrational, and collective
rationality is individually irrational. The dilemma facing participants
in this situation thus is to be individually or collectively rational
(Colman, 2003).
Mixtures of Motives as the Foundation of Resource Conflicts. The social
dilemma depicted in Fig. 1.1 reflects that in most organizations, each individual
employee is better off defecting (e.g., showing up late, not performing,
stealing company property, laying low) when colleagues cooperate
(e.g., work hard, help out, voice opinions), yet all employees are worse
off when all defect and nothing gets produced at all (Katz & Kahn, 1978;
Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). We note that social dilemmas can
take different forms (e.g., public good vs. resource dilemmas), and that
these different forms can have substantial impact on behavioral choices
and the emergence of resource-based conflict of interest. Discussing this
in greater depth, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.