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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

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4. <strong>CONFLICT</strong> AND GROUP DECISION MAKING: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATION 139<br />

confronted with those high on proself motives shifted toward a more<br />

proself motivation, whereas individuals identified as high on proself<br />

motives tended to stick to their orientation <strong>and</strong> “exploited” more prosocial<br />

individuals (see also Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Steinel & De Dreu,<br />

2004). <strong>The</strong> findings by Weingart et al. (2003), discussed earlier in this<br />

chapter, are in line with this.<br />

This suggests asymmetrical contagion <strong>of</strong> social motivation: Proself<br />

motives tend to be more contagious than prosocial ones. As an aside, this<br />

is one <strong>of</strong> the major propositions <strong>of</strong> structural adaptation theory (SAT; see<br />

Ellis, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Humphrey, & Li, 2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Moon<br />

et al., 2004). According to SAT, it is easier for individuals <strong>and</strong> groups to<br />

move to a more chaotic, less ordered structure than to a more ordered one.<br />

Like physical systems, social systems are differentiated by their degree <strong>of</strong><br />

complexity, <strong>and</strong> more energy is required to maintain the structure <strong>of</strong> complex<br />

systems than simpler ones. In terms <strong>of</strong> complexity, structures that<br />

embody high levels <strong>of</strong> interdependence <strong>and</strong> mutual adjustment between<br />

individuals are more complex relative to those where each individual is<br />

an independent decision-making agent concerned only with his or her<br />

own outcomes. Thus, as a proself context requires less organization <strong>and</strong><br />

coordination than a prosocial one, SAT would predict that having a proself<br />

minority in an otherwise prosocial group would make the group as<br />

a whole shift to a proself motive. It is interesting to investigate whether<br />

this process could undermine the positive effects <strong>of</strong> prosocial motivation<br />

on convergent tasks <strong>and</strong>, likewise, whether having a proself minority in<br />

an otherwise prosocial group may benefit performance on divergent tasks<br />

because <strong>of</strong> the same process. Studies examining this question could also<br />

vary the extent to which certain group members are empowered by the<br />

group’s decision procedures <strong>and</strong> rules (cf. Ten Velden et al., 2007) to examine<br />

whether power position affects the influence <strong>of</strong> different team members’<br />

social motives.<br />

We also believe that studying the impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> types on further<br />

group decision making is a topic that deserves attention. In the experimental<br />

studies on the effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> on further decision making that<br />

have been conducted so far, a <strong>conflict</strong> <strong>of</strong> interests or negotiation-type <strong>conflict</strong><br />

task has been used to induce <strong>conflict</strong> (cf. Beersma & De Dreu, 2005;<br />

Beersma, Hollenbeck, et al., 2007). According to McGrath (1984), two types<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> can be distinguished: (a) <strong>conflict</strong>s over interests <strong>and</strong> over points<br />

<strong>of</strong> view or (b) cognitive <strong>conflict</strong>. Likewise, Druckman <strong>and</strong> colleagues<br />

(Druckman, Rozelle, & Zechmeister, 1976; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973)<br />

distinguished between three types <strong>of</strong> <strong>conflict</strong>: (a) <strong>conflict</strong>s over interests,<br />

(b) intellective <strong>conflict</strong>s (<strong>conflict</strong>s about “who is right” in which the topic<br />

over which there is a <strong>conflict</strong> could ultimately be objectively verified), <strong>and</strong><br />

(c) evaluative <strong>conflict</strong>s (<strong>conflict</strong>s over “who is right” in which the topic<br />

over which there is a <strong>conflict</strong> is a matter <strong>of</strong> taste or opinion). Some scholars<br />

argued that the type <strong>of</strong> <strong>conflict</strong> does not matter in determining its effects<br />

on decision making. For example, Tjosvold (1998) argued that for future

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