CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

96 OLEKALNS, PUTNAM, WEINGART, AND METCALF
Negotiation Level: Analysis of Bargaining Phases
Analyzing strategy sequences centers on the immediate actions and
reactions of the negotiators. Even though these analyses incorporate a
temporal element to understanding the negation process, the focus is
short term. Phase research also adopts a temporal perspective but investigates
how bargaining strategies aggregate over longer periods of time.
Similar to the work on behavioral sequences, a negotiator’s actions can
either maintain or challenge the strategic approach that dominates in the
interaction (Olekalns & Weingart, 2003).
Phase models of the negotiation process blend cooperative and competitive
strategies. They differ from the research on sequential patterns
by casting integrative and distributive bargaining as critical activities at
different points during the negotiation process (Holmes, 1992; Putnam,
1990; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Negotiation theorists and researchers
have adopted two distinct approaches to capture how negotiation strategies
aggregate over time, both falling within the phase model perspective.
From one phase model perspective, sometimes referred to as “stages”
of negotiation, negotiators must complete a series of tasks in one phase/
stage before shifting to the next one; thus, task-completion triggers phase
changes. Episodic models provide an alternative view, one which captures
moment-to-moment changes in negotiation behaviors. These models define
an episode as an uninterrupted sequence of the same strategies with
phases shifting through an interruption in the prolonged use of a strategic
pattern (Baxter, 1982; Holmes, 1992; Olekalns, Brett, & Weingart, 2003).
These models fit within a broader literature on stages and interruptions of
sequential patterns in group processes (Gersick, 1989; Jett & George, 2003;
Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002).
Stage models imply a gradual transition from one dominant strategy to
another. Typically, researchers who adopt this approach segment negotiations
into equal time periods and analyze changes in strategy use over
these time segments. Several studies demonstrate that strategy use varies
over time or across negotiation phases. The patterns that emerge indicate
that the precise nature of these phases is also context dependent. For example,
when in distributive negotiations, bargainers increase the frequency
of messages to each other over time and increase the number of offers that
they make immediately before their deadlines (Lim & Murnighan, 1994). In
mixed-motive negotiations, the pattern is somewhat different in that negotiators
move back and forth between integrative and distributive approaches
over time (Olekalns et al., 1996; Olekalns et al., 2003). Overall, these studies
revealed the time sensitive nature of strategy use.
Three studies examined the distribution of strategies across negotiation
phases and the effects of these phases on joint gains. These studies
showed that integrative agreements emerge from increases in flexibility
and problem solving tactics over time, whereas distributive agreements
evolve from the use of power struggles and contentious tactics (Olekalns