CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The Psychology of conflict and conflict ...

3. COMMUNICATION PROCESSES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 93
Past studies revealed that the presence of either positive or negative affect
influenced the type and frequency of negotiator behaviors. When manipulated
prior to the negotiation, having a positive as opposed to a negative
or neutral mood relates to using few contentious tactics, more problem
solving behaviors, more concessions, and greater willingness to reach a
compromise (Baron, 1990; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Druckman & Broome,
1991; Forgas, 1998; Hollingshead & Carnevale, 1990; Isen & Patrick, 1983).
The use of negative affect, in turn, increases the use of contentious tactics
(Baron, 1990) and leads to greater variety in the expression of ideas (Baron,
Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990).
Dyad Level: Analysis of Sequences
A second way of characterizing the negotiation process is to view
integrative and distributive processes as interdependent components of
a single approach (Putnam, 1990). This orientation acknowledges that
most negotiations involve both competitive and cooperative elements and
that negotiators attempt to satisfy the dual goals of maximizing joint and
personal gains (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Consequently,
one of the key tasks facing negotiators is to blend integrative
and distributive strategies judiciously as the negotiation progresses. This
model of negotiation draws attention to how bargainers structure or organize
their interactions (e.g., Diez, 1986; Smith, Olekalns, & Weingart, 2005;
Taylor & Donald, 2003), in particular how the two negotiators sequence
their use of strategies. This section explores the relationship between
strategy sequences and outcomes.
Structure of Strategy Sequences. Negotiation researchers describe three
kinds of strategy sequences—reciprocal, transformational, and complementary
(Brett, Weingart, & Olekalns, 2004; Olekalns & Smith, 2000).
Reciprocal sequences capture those occasions in which negotiators match
each other’s strategies exactly, for example, a sequence in which priority
information from one party is matched by priority information from the
other party. Transformational sequences describe patterns in which negotiators
mismatch strategies by pairing a cooperative and a competitive strategy,
for example, one negotiator offers priority information and the other
responds with a threat. Finally, complementary sequences have some components
of matching and mismatching. They pair broadly similar strategies
(cooperative or competitive) but they mismatch the specific behavior.
For example, a demand elicits a threat.
Reciprocity is a two-edged sword for negotiators. On the one hand,
reciprocal cooperation, which assists in value creation, is difficult
to maintain. The frequency and duration of reciprocal cooperation is
increased when individuals are given tactical knowledge (especially
regarding integrative tactics) before they negotiate (Weingart, Prietula,