the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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the Angolan and Rhodesian conflicts, conventional arms remained the primary instruments by combatants. The South African case illustrates that the threat perceptions of top political leaders are the determining factors in whether they decide to undertake costly, covert CBW programs. The South African case also supports the proposition that once a political regime has CBW capabilities, they will use these capabilities against political enemies at home and abroad. The South African case also dramatically shows how thin the line is between defensive and offensive weapons. First the Iraqi and now the South African cases suggest that it is prudent to assume that if a country is suspected of developing covert nuclear capabilities, it is probably supporting research into the offensive uses of chemical and biological weapons as well. South African CBW programs also underscore the importance of control by civilians, of transparency, and of accountability. Some aspects of the apartheid regime’s management of their CBW programs may be unique. However this case vividly illustrates what will happen when there is loose accountability of covert NBC research and development by senior military and political leaders. The efforts to dismantle the South African CBW program illustrate how difficult effective NBC non-proliferation agreements will be to enforce. The discovery that Wouter Basson secretly kept some of the classified documents is deeply disturbing to those who believe that South Africa developed highly sophisticated CBW capabilities during the Project Coast years. For others, the science involved in the 10 years of research conducted by Project Coast was so pedestrian that they are not worried about the possibility of proliferation. Perhaps, some of the differences among interviewees in this study about the scope and level of sophistication can be reconciled and understood as a matter of differing priorities, interpretations, and policy lessons. Dr. Daan Goosen, the former manager of RRL, was one of a very small group of scientists-mangers 88
who had detailed knowledge of many Project Coast projects. He readily acknowledged in a television interview that: Project Coast had the ability to be very, very sophisticated. We established the ability to do genetic engineering and all the fancy type of stuff that would produce good biological products, but nothing was really produced. In response to the next question, “But you don’t have to produce it, do you? You just have to have the knowledge, the production is easy. You and I could do it in a laboratory in 48 hours,” Goosen responded: Yes…this is one of the so-called myths surrounding biological warfare products, that is to a large extent misinformation. Any vaccines in any normal laboratory are producing tons and tons of the highest potent toxins, and it can be misused. So there wasn’t any super biological weapons developed and produced by the program. The interviewer next asked him to explain why the British and Americans were so worried about the program that they went to see President de Klerk, on one occasion, and, later, President Mandela, and said “Give this program up.” Dr. Goosen responded: The facilities were…state-of-the art. The laboratories, the P4 containments, everything. The scientists assembled there had the potential of developing really new and fancy biological weapons. But it was never done. When we got to the point that we should have produced, there was no support for the scientists to produce. It was very ineffective…. We produced some knowledge…and crude off-the-shelf assassination devices.… It is no use controlling scientists and laboratories, etc.; the real control lies in controlling the people who decide where to apply it or not, and that is the politicians. And as long as there is no agreement that can be enforced then you won’t control this [biological warfare]. 214 If Dr. Goosen’s assessment of what was developed by Project Coast is accurate, then one can find grounds to support either assessment regarding the sophistication of Project Coast. However, there are several unanswered 89
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THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BI
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword vii Exec
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FOREWORD We are pleased to publish
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The profile of So
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The Rollback of the South African B
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During WWII, South African Prime Mi
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dollars) estimate to build a CBW pr
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learn first-hand how the Portuguese
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use of chemical and biological agen
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incidents underscored the variable
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Convention (BWC). According to form
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Project Coast, which would countera
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internal suppression of political d
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Malan, and the Minister of Finance,
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The chain of command demonstrates t
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omb could be used to wipe out or in
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tear gas and to incapacitate withou
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In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale
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confirmed, there is evidence that s
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the SSC. At this time, the security
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Given the breadth and depth of coop
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instruct scientists working with a
Page 47 and 48: the South African President’s off
Page 49 and 50: Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produ
Page 51 and 52: overseas business deals. 114 In Aug
Page 53 and 54: South Africa negotiated the withdra
Page 55 and 56: political party or organization. Pr
Page 57 and 58: nuclear weapons program and Project
Page 59 and 60: TRC, the men who tried to kill Chik
Page 61 and 62: In 1991, Basson began to build Mert
Page 63 and 64: Military personnel from several cou
Page 65 and 66: Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary
Page 67 and 68: leave the SADF at the end of March
Page 69 and 70: Knobel’s testimony to the TRC, SA
Page 71 and 72: objected to the South African CBM a
Page 73 and 74: Basson and his trips to Libya were
Page 75 and 76: experiences for the military leader
Page 77 and 78: was submitted in 1994). This time U
Page 79 and 80: as the U.S., Great Britain, and oth
Page 81 and 82: investigation phase ended. Initiall
Page 83 and 84: June 1998. However, several weeks b
Page 85 and 86: penalties did finally force him to
Page 87 and 88: public. The State was operating on
Page 89 and 90: The limited news coverage of the Ba
Page 91 and 92: South African court for crimes comm
Page 93 and 94: ulings excluding evidence, his timi
Page 95 and 96: had asked him to set up a facility
Page 97: cover illegal personal gains from t
Page 101 and 102: 9. What specifically and when did t
Page 103 and 104: e delivered through food and water,
Page 105 and 106: Reconciliation Commission of South
Page 107 and 108: 41 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, fo
Page 109 and 110: 56 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 57 In
Page 111 and 112: weaponization took place. Donald Ma
Page 113 and 114: home of Jerry Nilsson, who was ques
Page 115 and 116: he still need to raise cash in Sout
Page 117 and 118: military bases and was familiar to
Page 119 and 120: 162 According to Dr. Ian Phillips,
Page 121 and 122: Basson’s arrest was the result of
Page 123 and 124: 200 By the seventh week of the tria
Page 125: 115
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the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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