the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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<strong>the</strong> Angolan and Rhodesian conflicts, conventional arms remained <strong>the</strong> primary<br />
instruments by combatants. The South African case illustrates that <strong>the</strong> threat<br />
perceptions <strong>of</strong> top political leaders are <strong>the</strong> determining factors in whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y<br />
decide to undertake costly, covert CBW <strong>program</strong>s. The South African case<br />
also supports <strong>the</strong> proposition that once a political regime has CBW<br />
capabilities, <strong>the</strong>y will use <strong>the</strong>se capabilities against political enemies at home<br />
and abroad.<br />
The South African case also dramatically shows how thin <strong>the</strong> line is<br />
between defensive and <strong>of</strong>fensive weapons. First <strong>the</strong> Iraqi and now <strong>the</strong> South<br />
African cases suggest that it is prudent to assume that if a country is suspected<br />
<strong>of</strong> developing covert nuclear capabilities, it is probably supporting research<br />
into <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive uses <strong>of</strong> chemical and <strong>biological</strong> weapons as well.<br />
South African CBW <strong>program</strong>s also underscore <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> control<br />
by civilians, <strong>of</strong> transparency, and <strong>of</strong> accountability. Some aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
apar<strong>the</strong>id regime’s management <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir CBW <strong>program</strong>s may be unique.<br />
However this case vividly illustrates what will happen when <strong>the</strong>re is loose<br />
accountability <strong>of</strong> covert NBC research and development by senior military and<br />
political leaders.<br />
The efforts to dismantle <strong>the</strong> South African CBW <strong>program</strong> illustrate how<br />
difficult effective NBC non-proliferation agreements will be to enforce. The<br />
discovery that Wouter Basson secretly kept some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> classified documents<br />
is deeply disturbing to those who believe that South Africa developed highly<br />
sophisticated CBW capabilities during <strong>the</strong> Project Coast years. For o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong><br />
science involved in <strong>the</strong> 10 years <strong>of</strong> research conducted by Project Coast was so<br />
pedestrian that <strong>the</strong>y are not worried about <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> proliferation.<br />
Perhaps, some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> differences among interviewees in this study about <strong>the</strong><br />
scope and level <strong>of</strong> sophistication can be reconciled and understood as a matter<br />
<strong>of</strong> differing priorities, interpretations, and policy lessons. Dr. Daan Goosen, <strong>the</strong><br />
former manager <strong>of</strong> RRL, was one <strong>of</strong> a very small group <strong>of</strong> scientists-mangers<br />
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