the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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a drug arrest in Chicago that involved the illegal possession of Ecstasy traced back to South Africa. Apparently one of the innovative processes developed by Project Coast researchers was an extremely pure type of the drug that had a unique root (e.g., no impurities). U.S. authorities were able to trace this particular sample back to Delta-G Laboratories. This incident led to greater international cooperation between U.S. and South African authorities involved in efforts to stem the flow of drugs internationally. 212 A similar pattern of heightened U.S. interest emerged after Dr. Ford’s suicide in Newport, California in 2000. Revelations of links between Ford and his associates and Basson, Knobel and Project Coast led the FBI to initiate a “weapons of mass destruction investigation” to determine whether a U.S. crime had been committed in South Africa. 213 Each of these experiences suggest that effective measures designed to limit the proliferation of CBW or illegal drugs in the future will require much greater inter-agency cooperation within nation-states and new forms of international cooperation among agencies in several countries. The South African case suggests the need for greater coordination between defense and counterproliferation agencies and agencies whose primary mission are crime solving and prevention. The Basson trail is also useful for illustrating the complex ways that CBW project managers may be able to exploit transnational financial flows and international corporate instruments to quickly move, launder, and house large sums of money for either political or personal motives. New and increased difficulties in penetrating complex international entities have already emerged as a major problem in countering transnational crime. A similar pattern emerges from the South African case in the context of covert NBC programs. Thus, nonproliferation experts may have a new set of problems to worry about in this era of globalization. The Basson trial may also serve as a useful reminder of what may become a more general trend: the initiation or continuation of covert CBW programs primarily as a means to 86
cover illegal personal gains from the sale of weapons (including CBW) and drugs. CONCLUSION In this monograph, the profile of South Africa as a state that developed a CBW program has been drawn. South Africa was an isolated state that felt threatened by a more powerful state actor, the Soviet Union, which was helping hostile regimes and movements in neighboring states. One response of the apartheid regime to changing threat perceptions in the region was to develop a CBW program and to accelerate a nuclear weapons program. The decision-making process, which was secretive and controlled by the military, enabled a very sophisticated program to be developed with little outside scrutiny. Military and police units used chemical and biological agents for counter-insurgency warfare, assassination, and execution of war prisoners. As the regime felt increasingly threatened by opposition at home, top political leaders approved plans for research and development of exotic means to neutralize opponents, large-scale offensive uses of the program, and weaponization. However, the plans were not operationalized. The end of the external threat led to a decision to unilaterally dismantle the program prior to a shift to majority rule. Lack of civilian control over military programs made the rollback difficult, rife with corruption and left proliferation concerns in place. Ultimately, the United States, Great Britain and other countries pressured the South African government to ensure that the CBW programs were dismantled and the former project manager, Dr. Wouter Basson, constrained. Since Basson secretly retained copies of Project Coast documents, proliferation concerns remain. The information that has emerged to date about Project Coast suggests that a country that possesses chemical and biological weapons is likely to use them against adversaries at home and abroad. The unpredictable and harsh environment of southern Africa did not deter conventional or counterinsurgency units from experimenting with these weapons. However, in both 87
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THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BI
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword vii Exec
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FOREWORD We are pleased to publish
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The profile of So
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The Rollback of the South African B
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During WWII, South African Prime Mi
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dollars) estimate to build a CBW pr
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learn first-hand how the Portuguese
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use of chemical and biological agen
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incidents underscored the variable
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Convention (BWC). According to form
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Project Coast, which would countera
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internal suppression of political d
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Malan, and the Minister of Finance,
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The chain of command demonstrates t
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omb could be used to wipe out or in
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tear gas and to incapacitate withou
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In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale
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confirmed, there is evidence that s
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the SSC. At this time, the security
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Given the breadth and depth of coop
Page 45 and 46: instruct scientists working with a
Page 47 and 48: the South African President’s off
Page 49 and 50: Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produ
Page 51 and 52: overseas business deals. 114 In Aug
Page 53 and 54: South Africa negotiated the withdra
Page 55 and 56: political party or organization. Pr
Page 57 and 58: nuclear weapons program and Project
Page 59 and 60: TRC, the men who tried to kill Chik
Page 61 and 62: In 1991, Basson began to build Mert
Page 63 and 64: Military personnel from several cou
Page 65 and 66: Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary
Page 67 and 68: leave the SADF at the end of March
Page 69 and 70: Knobel’s testimony to the TRC, SA
Page 71 and 72: objected to the South African CBM a
Page 73 and 74: Basson and his trips to Libya were
Page 75 and 76: experiences for the military leader
Page 77 and 78: was submitted in 1994). This time U
Page 79 and 80: as the U.S., Great Britain, and oth
Page 81 and 82: investigation phase ended. Initiall
Page 83 and 84: June 1998. However, several weeks b
Page 85 and 86: penalties did finally force him to
Page 87 and 88: public. The State was operating on
Page 89 and 90: The limited news coverage of the Ba
Page 91 and 92: South African court for crimes comm
Page 93 and 94: ulings excluding evidence, his timi
Page 95: had asked him to set up a facility
Page 99 and 100: who had detailed knowledge of many
Page 101 and 102: 9. What specifically and when did t
Page 103 and 104: e delivered through food and water,
Page 105 and 106: Reconciliation Commission of South
Page 107 and 108: 41 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, fo
Page 109 and 110: 56 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 57 In
Page 111 and 112: weaponization took place. Donald Ma
Page 113 and 114: home of Jerry Nilsson, who was ques
Page 115 and 116: he still need to raise cash in Sout
Page 117 and 118: military bases and was familiar to
Page 119 and 120: 162 According to Dr. Ian Phillips,
Page 121 and 122: Basson’s arrest was the result of
Page 123 and 124: 200 By the seventh week of the tria
Page 125: 115
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