the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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nephew of Magnus Malan) and noted that all three had served in SADF’s medical service (SAMS). The Weekly Mail and Guardian reported, from correspondence between Basson and Mijburgh, that they were researching the legal aspects of CBW. The same newspaper also reported that SADF military officials used the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) facilities to obtain and develop different strains of germs, some of which were highly toxic to humans. 170 One week before an article in The Weekly Mail and Guardian, ARMSCOR acknowledged at the end of 1994 that it owned Protechnik, a chemical warfare research plant. Protechnik described itself as the biggest nuclear, biological and chemical laboratory in Africa. It was officially designed to develop only defensive equipment against chemical weapons. However, its operations stirred protests (and continue to do so) in the Pretoria metropolitan area, especially due to fears of accidents. By the end of 1994, more information about the CBW program was emerging from several sources. They included an investigation by a team from the Attorney General’s office and reports in The Sunday Tribune, and The Weekly Mail and Guardian, based on their independent investigations. Reports emerged of experiments at SADF research firms, including some bizarre experiments involving dogs. 171 In 1995, Basson’s trips to Libya continued. In February 1995, an article appeared in The Times of London on possible South African CBW links to Libya. Evidently, someone in MI-6 tipped off the Times. In March 1995, the CIA and DIA informed President Clinton of Basson’s activities, who authorized the sending of a delegation to South Africa, which met with Mandela. It is not certain if the delegation met with Basson or if was he in Libya. Once again, the Americans urged the Mandela government to bring Basson under control by rehiring him. On 15 April 1995, South Africa submitted a much-revised Confidence Building Measure (CBM). This was nearly two years after the U.S. and UK challenged the 1993 CBM (no CBM 66
was submitted in 1994). This time U.S. and UK objections were addressed satisfactorily. Even so, the Americans and British continued to share concerns about proliferation of the secrets on the CD-ROMs by Basson and others. In May 1995, Defense Minister Modise and Secretary of Defense Pierre Steyn rehired Basson as a regular SANDF surgeon (he had been on reserve status). In early 1995, Generals Meiring and Knobel sat down and discussed Basson, after receiving information from NIA, CIA, and MI-6. Basson had been asked by government and SANDF officials to curb his behavior, but there was no way to do so, except to rehire him. Meiring and Knobel went to Deputy Minister of Defense Ronnie Kasrils and urged that Basson be rehired. 172 Kasrils went to Modise and Steyn and recommended the same. Later, Kasrils defended the government’s action in rehiring Basson, by saying it was to stop him from giving valuable and potentially dangerous secrets about the chemical and biological warfare programs to other countries. 173 Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, said that Basson was rehired in order to bring him under parliamentary scrutiny at a time when no legislation was in place that could stop his activities. 174 Evidently, great concern existed within the government, the SANDF, and among foreign governments about the possibility that Basson was selling Project Coast secrets. Even after being rehired by SANDF, Basson made another, albeit his final, trip to Libya in October 1995. 175 A U.S. government lawsuit in Philadelphia against ARMSCOR created tense relations with the U.S. This hampered U.S. investigators in exploring possible ARMSCOR involvement in chemical and biological weaponization. However, overall U.S. relations with the Mandela government remained reasonably sound, and the investigations into Project Coast concluded satisfactorily. Finally, in October 1996 Vice Presidents Mbeki and Gore worked out an agreement so that ARMSCOR could plea bargain at a meeting of the US-South African Bi-national Commission. In early 1997, the Defense Committee and Modese signed the agreement in July 1997. 67
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THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BI
Page 5 and 6:
TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword vii Exec
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FOREWORD We are pleased to publish
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The profile of So
Page 11 and 12:
The Rollback of the South African B
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During WWII, South African Prime Mi
Page 15 and 16:
dollars) estimate to build a CBW pr
Page 17 and 18:
learn first-hand how the Portuguese
Page 19 and 20:
use of chemical and biological agen
Page 21 and 22:
incidents underscored the variable
Page 23 and 24:
Convention (BWC). According to form
Page 25 and 26: Project Coast, which would countera
Page 27 and 28: internal suppression of political d
Page 29 and 30: Malan, and the Minister of Finance,
Page 31 and 32: The chain of command demonstrates t
Page 33 and 34: omb could be used to wipe out or in
Page 35 and 36: tear gas and to incapacitate withou
Page 37 and 38: In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale
Page 39 and 40: confirmed, there is evidence that s
Page 41 and 42: the SSC. At this time, the security
Page 43 and 44: Given the breadth and depth of coop
Page 45 and 46: instruct scientists working with a
Page 47 and 48: the South African President’s off
Page 49 and 50: Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produ
Page 51 and 52: overseas business deals. 114 In Aug
Page 53 and 54: South Africa negotiated the withdra
Page 55 and 56: political party or organization. Pr
Page 57 and 58: nuclear weapons program and Project
Page 59 and 60: TRC, the men who tried to kill Chik
Page 61 and 62: In 1991, Basson began to build Mert
Page 63 and 64: Military personnel from several cou
Page 65 and 66: Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary
Page 67 and 68: leave the SADF at the end of March
Page 69 and 70: Knobel’s testimony to the TRC, SA
Page 71 and 72: objected to the South African CBM a
Page 73 and 74: Basson and his trips to Libya were
Page 75: experiences for the military leader
Page 79 and 80: as the U.S., Great Britain, and oth
Page 81 and 82: investigation phase ended. Initiall
Page 83 and 84: June 1998. However, several weeks b
Page 85 and 86: penalties did finally force him to
Page 87 and 88: public. The State was operating on
Page 89 and 90: The limited news coverage of the Ba
Page 91 and 92: South African court for crimes comm
Page 93 and 94: ulings excluding evidence, his timi
Page 95 and 96: had asked him to set up a facility
Page 97 and 98: cover illegal personal gains from t
Page 99 and 100: who had detailed knowledge of many
Page 101 and 102: 9. What specifically and when did t
Page 103 and 104: e delivered through food and water,
Page 105 and 106: Reconciliation Commission of South
Page 107 and 108: 41 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, fo
Page 109 and 110: 56 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 57 In
Page 111 and 112: weaponization took place. Donald Ma
Page 113 and 114: home of Jerry Nilsson, who was ques
Page 115 and 116: he still need to raise cash in Sout
Page 117 and 118: military bases and was familiar to
Page 119 and 120: 162 According to Dr. Ian Phillips,
Page 121 and 122: Basson’s arrest was the result of
Page 123 and 124: 200 By the seventh week of the tria
Page 125: 115
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