the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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objected to <strong>the</strong> South African CBM and began <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> interacting with<br />
<strong>the</strong> South African <strong>of</strong>ficials in an effort to see that Project Coast would be<br />
rolled back to <strong>the</strong>ir satisfaction. According to U.S. Ambassador Princeton<br />
Lyman, <strong>the</strong> South African CBM was not forthcoming on many aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
CBW <strong>program</strong>, including <strong>of</strong>fensive uses, weaponization, and proliferation. 160<br />
According to Peter Goosen, proliferation expert in <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign<br />
Affairs, <strong>the</strong> South Africans lacked <strong>the</strong> technical expertise to submit an<br />
acceptable CBM and sought British and American assistance. In <strong>the</strong> meantime,<br />
de Klerk and his colleagues attempted to reassure <strong>the</strong> U.S. and <strong>the</strong> UK that <strong>the</strong><br />
CBW <strong>program</strong> had been rolled back. 161<br />
In January 1994, negotiations between <strong>the</strong> de Klerk government and<br />
Nelson Mandela and <strong>the</strong> ANC finally broke through, and elections were<br />
scheduled for April 27. As <strong>the</strong> momentous hand-over <strong>of</strong> power approached, <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. and UK became increasingly concerned about Basson and o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
proliferating chemical and <strong>biological</strong> <strong>warfare</strong> secrets. On 11 April 1994, <strong>the</strong><br />
American Ambassador, Princeton Lyman, and <strong>the</strong> British High Commissioner,<br />
Anthony Reeve, delivered a demarche to President de Klerk. 162 The U.S. and<br />
Britain demanded that <strong>the</strong>ir experts be briefed, that all CBW systems and<br />
records including <strong>the</strong> CD-ROMs be destroyed, that abuses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>program</strong> be<br />
investigated and reported, and that Mandela be informed. According to David<br />
Steward, de Klerk’s chief <strong>of</strong> staff, <strong>the</strong> American and British ambassadors<br />
regarded Basson as a “dangerous agent.” 163<br />
Within <strong>the</strong> American team, <strong>the</strong>re were differences. Ambassador Lyman<br />
was primarily concerned with reducing <strong>the</strong> proliferation threat, and State<br />
Department and CIA <strong>of</strong>ficials joined him in this approach. However, <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
from <strong>the</strong> National Security Council (NSC) were outraged by evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
use <strong>of</strong> CBW and wanted to see that those responsible were punished.<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Defense <strong>of</strong>ficials were late in joining <strong>the</strong> U.S. team and felt<br />
marginalized. Consequently, <strong>the</strong>y sided with <strong>the</strong> NSC. Ultimately, Ambassador<br />
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