the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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Meyer, <strong>the</strong> Acting Defense Secretary, 1991-92. In <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> 1992, <strong>the</strong><br />
Goldstone Commission began to investigate violence in South Africa. SADF<br />
generals became increasingly concerned. During <strong>the</strong> investigations, Justice<br />
Goldstone stumbled upon damning evidence and reported directly to <strong>the</strong><br />
President and not to <strong>the</strong> Cabinet or to <strong>the</strong> SADF. De Klerk was compelled to<br />
investigate and called Steyn to report to <strong>the</strong> Cabinet. The SADF Army Chief,<br />
General Meiring, and SAP General van der Merwe asked Steyn to investigate,<br />
and he agreed. On 18 November 1992, de Klerk appointed Lt. Gen. Steyn to<br />
investigate SADF secret projects, including Basson and Project Coast and<br />
"third force" activities that were racking <strong>the</strong> country. As a result, de Klerk<br />
learned <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> Basson, Project Coast, CCB and o<strong>the</strong>r covert<br />
units. 147<br />
SADF military procedures could not be used in <strong>the</strong> investigations,<br />
because <strong>the</strong> subjects <strong>of</strong> investigation were not all military personnel and<br />
because military procedures presupposed full cooperation from all involved.<br />
Instead, counterintelligence agencies were used. Upon request, President de<br />
Klerk made counterintelligence <strong>of</strong>fices available. The only check on <strong>the</strong><br />
validity <strong>of</strong> information was to utilize <strong>the</strong> National Intelligence Service (NIS)<br />
(later <strong>the</strong> National Intelligence Agency), headed by Dr. Barnard and Dr.<br />
Scholz and SADF counter-intelligence, led by J<strong>of</strong>fel van der Westhuizen,<br />
separately in order to confirm allegations. 148 The CIA and MI6 were concerned<br />
and were in touch with <strong>the</strong> NIS/NIA. While <strong>the</strong> different organizations <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
had to rely upon information obtained from <strong>the</strong> same source, it was probable<br />
that <strong>the</strong> information that <strong>the</strong>y received was valid. The NIS/NIA had been<br />
conducting its own intelligence operation, since 1989, investigating SADF and<br />
SAP secret projects. Targets for investigation included Project Coast and<br />
Basson, as well as Jan Lourens and Brian John Davie <strong>of</strong> Protechnik who were<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> CBW experiments. According to a Weekly Mail & Guardian<br />
account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Steyn report <strong>the</strong> three front companies (Delta G, Roodeplaat<br />
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