the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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nuclear weapons <strong>program</strong> and Project Coast. 127<br />
In contrast to <strong>the</strong> nuclear weapons <strong>program</strong>, no pressure was exerted in<br />
1989 or 1990 over <strong>the</strong> CBW <strong>program</strong>, even though <strong>the</strong> CIA released a report in<br />
1989 which placed South Africa on a list <strong>of</strong> countries that had developed and<br />
stockpiled chemical weapons. However, <strong>the</strong> main focus <strong>of</strong> concern for <strong>the</strong><br />
United States and her allies was nuclear proliferation. For a brief time,<br />
between 1987 and August 1990, when South Africa sold <strong>the</strong> G-6 155mm gun<br />
and chemical <strong>warfare</strong> agents, including NGT (CR) gas, to Iraq, <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States became concerned about <strong>the</strong> proliferation <strong>of</strong> a conventional weapon that<br />
had <strong>the</strong> capability to throw “exotic” shells. 128 However, <strong>the</strong>re was little or no<br />
interest among U.S. policy and intelligence communities about possible<br />
proliferation threats associated with South Africa’s <strong>biological</strong> <strong>warfare</strong><br />
<strong>program</strong>. The information that <strong>the</strong> CIA and MI-6 possessed was widely<br />
circulated or available within <strong>the</strong> Bush administration or <strong>the</strong> Thatcher/Major<br />
governments. This lack <strong>of</strong> interest changed in 1993, as <strong>the</strong> U.S. learned more<br />
about South Africa’s CBW and missile <strong>program</strong>s. Wouter Basson’s trips,<br />
particularly to Libya, and access to an informant, who provided <strong>the</strong> U.S. and<br />
allies with key details <strong>of</strong> Project Coast, increased <strong>the</strong> interest and concern <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> United States, Great Britain and o<strong>the</strong>r allies. The new information led <strong>the</strong><br />
U.S. and Britain to issue a demarche in April 1994. Israeli <strong>of</strong>ficials probably<br />
knew more about <strong>the</strong> <strong>program</strong> but did not want <strong>the</strong> U.S. and Britain to know<br />
that <strong>the</strong>y were involved with it.<br />
According to Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion, 129 as <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> SADF<br />
intelligence, he was asked for access to Project Coast secrets by good friends<br />
overseas. These included pr<strong>of</strong>essional contacts in Germany, <strong>the</strong> U.S.,<br />
Switzerland, and Austria. Also, top South African authorities, Generals<br />
Liebenberg and Meiring asked him if he could put Basson in touch with <strong>the</strong><br />
right people. He refused to ask his U.S. counterparts, because he customarily<br />
met with <strong>the</strong>m collectively and thought it would be awkward to ask. In <strong>the</strong><br />
47