the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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confirmed, <strong>the</strong>re is evidence that such weapons were developed. Basson, much<br />
like his counterparts in o<strong>the</strong>r countries (e.g., Iraq), had difficulties developing<br />
effective delivery systems for using <strong>biological</strong> agents as a weapon <strong>of</strong> mass<br />
destruction. While Project Coast researchers undertook conceptual studies in<br />
<strong>the</strong> aerosolization <strong>of</strong> <strong>biological</strong> agents, <strong>the</strong> evidence available to date indicates<br />
that sophisticated aerosolization delivery systems were not developed.<br />
However, conceptual studies <strong>of</strong> such systems were well underway at <strong>the</strong> time<br />
Project Coast was shut down. Much more progress appears to have been<br />
achieved developing sophisticated artillery warheads and tactical missiles that<br />
were capable <strong>of</strong> delivering NBC warheads. What types <strong>of</strong> missiles and<br />
warheads were built, possibly tested and sold abroad remain among <strong>the</strong> most<br />
important questions related to South Africa’s CBN <strong>program</strong>s to still be<br />
answered.<br />
Project Coast and <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Weapons Program Compared<br />
From <strong>the</strong> start, Project Coast had a secretive military culture that was<br />
impervious to scrutiny by civilian authorities. Project Coast was more<br />
compartmentalized, secretive, and loosely managed than <strong>the</strong> nuclear weapons<br />
<strong>program</strong>, which was controlled by ARMSCOR. A pr<strong>of</strong>essor who worked on<br />
<strong>the</strong> nuclear weapons <strong>program</strong> claims that <strong>the</strong> highly technical nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
nuclear weapons <strong>program</strong> required that it should be well controlled. 84 The<br />
nuclear weapons <strong>program</strong> was militarized in <strong>the</strong> 1970s but remained under <strong>the</strong><br />
control <strong>of</strong> ARMSCOR. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nuclear scientists who worked on <strong>the</strong><br />
nuclear <strong>program</strong> did not know about <strong>the</strong> CBW <strong>program</strong> and were surprised to<br />
learn that South Africa had one at all. 85 As <strong>the</strong> money required to support P.W.<br />
Botha’s covert project, especially for <strong>the</strong> nuclear and missile <strong>program</strong>s, <strong>the</strong><br />
budgets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regular forces were increasingly squeezed. By <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
1980s, this money crunch was creating tensions between <strong>the</strong> top pr<strong>of</strong>essional<br />
military and <strong>the</strong> “securocrats.” Concerns <strong>of</strong> senior pr<strong>of</strong>essional military leaders<br />
about <strong>the</strong> adverse effects on <strong>the</strong> air force, navy, and army if “PW was allowed<br />
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