the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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tear gas and to incapacitate without lethality or excessive irritation. 66 NGT<br />
(CR) gas was intended to counteract rolling mass actions led by <strong>the</strong> ANC or its<br />
surrogates. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, NGT (CR) gas was used rarely<br />
and only on <strong>the</strong> Chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s say-so. When NGT (CR) gas was used, it<br />
was usually mixed with CS gas and dissolved in water to be used by water<br />
cannon.<br />
Suspected Chemical Warfare in Angola, 1985-1989<br />
In 1985, UNITA leaders made <strong>the</strong> first <strong>of</strong> several claims (between 1985 and<br />
1989) that <strong>the</strong>ir troops had been attacked by chemical weapons (in this case,<br />
organophosphates) and asked SADF for assistance. In <strong>the</strong> 1985 incident,<br />
UNITA guerrillas reported that <strong>the</strong>y had surrounded a town, and <strong>the</strong> Angolan<br />
government garrison had responded by using chemical agents. 67 In 1985, Col.<br />
Wouter Basson took command <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 7 th SAMS Battalion and assumed overall<br />
responsibility for protecting SADF and UNITA forces from CBW attack.<br />
Therefore, Basson came to inspect <strong>the</strong> alleged CW attack. Lt. Col. Johann<br />
Smith, a SADF liaison with UNITA, assisted Basson and claims that<br />
convincing evidence <strong>of</strong> chemical weapons use was found. 68 In a second<br />
incident, in 1986, UNITA forces spotted a brown vapor, which <strong>the</strong>y thought<br />
was mustard gas, and asked SADF for safeguards against CW. According to<br />
Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion, who served in Angola <strong>of</strong>f and on for 20 years, on a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> occasions between 1985 and 1988 <strong>the</strong> local population in<br />
sou<strong>the</strong>astern Angola exhibited <strong>the</strong> type <strong>of</strong> disorientation indicative <strong>of</strong> CW. 69<br />
UNITA claims and intelligence data heightened SADF fears <strong>of</strong> CBW<br />
attack in Angola, Namibia, and inside South Africa. According to Gen. (ret.)<br />
Bill Sass, former State Security Council member and SADF Chief <strong>of</strong><br />
Operations, SADF had evidence that <strong>the</strong> Cubans actually brought <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
chemical <strong>warfare</strong> <strong>program</strong> to <strong>the</strong> battlefield as early as 1985. 70 According to<br />
Gen. (ret.) Jannie Geldenhuys, SADF Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff, 1985-1990, <strong>the</strong> Cubans in<br />
Angola had <strong>the</strong> delivery capability and intention to use CBW, as indicated by<br />
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