the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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the Cuban and Angolan forces to don suits, which would cut combat effectiveness in half. In 1981, General Constand Viljoen, SADF Chief of Staff, requested that the CBW program provide SADF with agents for crowd control in South Africa. Other possible uses considered included counter-insurgency, assassinations, and black population control. It is noteworthy that, during the process of launching the CBW program, no delegation from South Africa appeared at the 1980 review conference for the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention. In April 1981, a top-level SADF committee meeting finalized the principles for Project Coast. 45 One principle was that chemical and biological warfare (CBW) should be treated as a top-secret matter, because it was susceptible to deception by adversaries. Another was that, since the West had supposedly fallen behind the Soviet Union, South Africa had to fend for itself in the CBW arena. The SADF committee decided that secrecy was essential and that South Africa would use front companies to research and produce chemical and biological weapons in top-secret installations. The desire for secrecy meant secret funding for the project, the creation of front companies, and the exclusion of the state arms producer (ARMSCOR) from the initial phases of the project. ARMSCOR would only be brought in during the weaponization phace of the program. As Malan suggested, South Africa would experiment with a strategy of forcing the enemy in Angola to don protective suits. The CBW program would also investigate means of dealing with massive demonstrations, insurrection, and insurgency, as well as black population growth. Another principle was that biological warfare (BW) had to be used with caution. BW could be devastatingly effective and, therefore, attractive. However, the regime was concerned that BW was difficult to control and that it could cause tremendous, plague-like damage. In May 1981, the Surgeon General and head of SAMS, Maj. Gen. Nieuwoudt, established Project Coast, and the Minister of Defense, Magnus 18
Malan, and the Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis, approved the Program. 46 Nieuwoudt made Dr. Wouter Basson the Project Coast director, as well as specialist adviser to the Surgeon General. Basson also became a lieutenant colonel, joined the 7 th SAMS Battalion, and began making trips to Angola with the SADF. In addition, he continued making trips abroad to make contacts with scientists and to procure supplies for Project Coast. In August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea in Angola. During the operation, evidence was discovered that the Cubans might be preparing for chemical warfare. 47 Although the evidence was sketchy, top SADF generals chose to take action to counter CBW anyway. Defense Minister Malan took SADF generals to Angola to examine CBW protective suits and demonstrate problems that they created during combat. Afterwards, Malan reiterated his proposal that the SADF take measures that would force the Cubans rather than the South Africans to don suits. Accordingly, the SADF developed a strategy of deception, by firing “smoke” that would achieve such a result. In addition, Malan proposed that the CBW program be developed to counteract the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto we sizwe (MK), which was in the process of escalating a revolutionary war with more than 3,000 guerrilla forces. The SADF had evidence that some of the ANC/MK troops had been trained in the Soviet Union in CBW techniques. 48 Basson was “tasked” to develop Project Coast by a “kitchen cabinet,” composed of Minister of Defense Malan, SADC Chief (Gen. C. Viljoen), the Commanding Officer of Strategic Intelligence and Special Forces (Gen. K. Liebenberg), SAP Commissioner van der Merwe, and the Director General of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Basson was placed in charge of managing all aspects of Project Coast, including defensive and offensive measures. 49 The annual budget for Project Coast was estimated to be $10 million, with a staff of 200 involved. 50 Members of the Project Working Group included Surgeon-General Nieuwoudt and his deputy and successor, Dr. Niels 19
Page 1: THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BI
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword vii Exec
Page 7 and 8: FOREWORD We are pleased to publish
Page 9 and 10: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The profile of So
Page 11 and 12: The Rollback of the South African B
Page 13 and 14: During WWII, South African Prime Mi
Page 15 and 16: dollars) estimate to build a CBW pr
Page 17 and 18: learn first-hand how the Portuguese
Page 19 and 20: use of chemical and biological agen
Page 21 and 22: incidents underscored the variable
Page 23 and 24: Convention (BWC). According to form
Page 25 and 26: Project Coast, which would countera
Page 27: internal suppression of political d
Page 31 and 32: The chain of command demonstrates t
Page 33 and 34: omb could be used to wipe out or in
Page 35 and 36: tear gas and to incapacitate withou
Page 37 and 38: In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale
Page 39 and 40: confirmed, there is evidence that s
Page 41 and 42: the SSC. At this time, the security
Page 43 and 44: Given the breadth and depth of coop
Page 45 and 46: instruct scientists working with a
Page 47 and 48: the South African President’s off
Page 49 and 50: Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produ
Page 51 and 52: overseas business deals. 114 In Aug
Page 53 and 54: South Africa negotiated the withdra
Page 55 and 56: political party or organization. Pr
Page 57 and 58: nuclear weapons program and Project
Page 59 and 60: TRC, the men who tried to kill Chik
Page 61 and 62: In 1991, Basson began to build Mert
Page 63 and 64: Military personnel from several cou
Page 65 and 66: Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary
Page 67 and 68: leave the SADF at the end of March
Page 69 and 70: Knobel’s testimony to the TRC, SA
Page 71 and 72: objected to the South African CBM a
Page 73 and 74: Basson and his trips to Libya were
Page 75 and 76: experiences for the military leader
Page 77 and 78: was submitted in 1994). This time U
Page 79 and 80:
as the U.S., Great Britain, and oth
Page 81 and 82:
investigation phase ended. Initiall
Page 83 and 84:
June 1998. However, several weeks b
Page 85 and 86:
penalties did finally force him to
Page 87 and 88:
public. The State was operating on
Page 89 and 90:
The limited news coverage of the Ba
Page 91 and 92:
South African court for crimes comm
Page 93 and 94:
ulings excluding evidence, his timi
Page 95 and 96:
had asked him to set up a facility
Page 97 and 98:
cover illegal personal gains from t
Page 99 and 100:
who had detailed knowledge of many
Page 101 and 102:
9. What specifically and when did t
Page 103 and 104:
e delivered through food and water,
Page 105 and 106:
Reconciliation Commission of South
Page 107 and 108:
41 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, fo
Page 109 and 110:
56 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 57 In
Page 111 and 112:
weaponization took place. Donald Ma
Page 113 and 114:
home of Jerry Nilsson, who was ques
Page 115 and 116:
he still need to raise cash in Sout
Page 117 and 118:
military bases and was familiar to
Page 119 and 120:
162 According to Dr. Ian Phillips,
Page 121 and 122:
Basson’s arrest was the result of
Page 123 and 124:
200 By the seventh week of the tria
Page 125:
115
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the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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