the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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use <strong>of</strong> chemical and <strong>biological</strong> agents. Similar tactics were used in Namibia<br />
and Angola by personnel assigned to <strong>the</strong> 5 th Reconnaissance Commandos, by<br />
<strong>the</strong> SAP security branch “crowbar” (koevoet) unit, and by <strong>the</strong> SADF Special<br />
Forces D40 unit. They were also employed in covert support operations for <strong>the</strong><br />
Union for <strong>the</strong> Total Independence <strong>of</strong> Angola (UNITA) and in Operation<br />
Barnacle in <strong>the</strong> 1970s and 1980s. 22 The Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) in<br />
South Africa employed many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se same tactics against political dissidents<br />
in <strong>the</strong> late 1980s and early 1990s. Toward <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era, <strong>the</strong> use<br />
<strong>of</strong> poisons against dissidents became routine CCB practice. By <strong>the</strong> time<br />
Eugene De Kock took charge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CCB in 1988, he had a working<br />
relationship and regular contacts with Wouter Basson, <strong>the</strong> director <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CBW<br />
<strong>program</strong>, Project Coast. Whenever <strong>the</strong> CCB wanted “special tools” for<br />
interrogations or to eliminate political dissidents, Basson was available to<br />
supply customized orders. 23<br />
Variable Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> CBW in Counter-Insurgency and Difficulties<br />
Verifying Use <strong>of</strong> Biological Agents<br />
Evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>biological</strong> and toxic agents during <strong>the</strong> Rhodesian war<br />
indicates variability and, in some instances, unintended consequences. For<br />
example, <strong>the</strong> <strong>program</strong> developed by <strong>the</strong> Selous Scouts to poison new blue<br />
jeans that were <strong>the</strong>n to be worn by ZANLA guerrillas was aborted, after<br />
several farmers died when <strong>the</strong>y purchased and wore <strong>the</strong> jeans. Selous Scouts<br />
intermediaries, who were paid for each pair <strong>of</strong> jeans delivered to guerrillas,<br />
had started to sell <strong>the</strong> pants to stores that serviced rural populations. After <strong>the</strong><br />
Selous Scouts received reports that ZANLA rebels were using a village in Tete<br />
province, Mozambique, <strong>the</strong> Selous Scouts introduced poisonous <strong>biological</strong><br />
agents into <strong>the</strong> Ruya River to kill <strong>the</strong> guerrillas and <strong>the</strong>ir supporters. Despite<br />
intensive intelligence ga<strong>the</strong>ring efforts, no effects on <strong>the</strong> guerrillas were<br />
detected. However, over 200 villagers died suddenly after drinking <strong>the</strong> water in<br />
<strong>the</strong> reservoir that <strong>the</strong> Selous Scouts had poisoned. 24<br />
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