the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

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30 The Cassinga raid highlights the difficulties involved in verifying CBW incidents. The TRC concluded that this alleged use was developed under auspices of Project B. A report on the Cassinga attack was prepared by a joint UNHCR/WHO mission on 30 May 1978 and reproduced as Annexure V in UN document 13473 of 27 July 1979. However, observers who arrived 30 minutes after the attack found no evidence of chemical weapons use. (Interviews with former SADF special forces officers and defense analysts, July 2000). 31 Interviews with former SADF Special Forces officers, July 2000 32 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Medical Hospital One Pretoria, 6 July 2000. 33 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Georg Meiring, Pretoria, 3 July 2000. 34 Interview with former Defense Minister Magnus Malan, Pretoria, 23 June 2000. 35 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, Pretoria, 12 June 2000. This rationale for developing nuclear weapons is the one most frequently mentioned by former SADF generals and some former politicians. For a further discussion of other rationales that have been provided by South African officials during and after the apartheid era, see Badenhorst (unpublished manuscript), Hounam and McQuillen (1995), Reiss (1995), and Stumpf (1995/96). 36 According to Brig. Gen. (ret.) Phillip Schalwyk, South African forces in Angola received an urgent cable from UNITA commanders during Operation Savannah asking for help because they had been attacked by Cuban troops who wore “pig face masks.” Interview, 12 July 2000. 37 Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 38 Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June 2000. 39 Interview with Dr. Vernon Joynt, Pretoria, 14 June 2000. Dr. Joynt claims that Surgeon-General Nieuwoudt sent Major Wouter Basson to him in 1978 and offered him the directorship of a chemical weapons program. While Joynt refused, many scientists and specialists accepted research projects by Nieuwoudt and Basson, and many did not tell their superiors. 40 Seegers, The Military. See also S.A. Watt, “The Anglo-Boer War: The Medical Arrangements and implications thereof during the British occupation of Bloemfontein: March-August, 1900,” Military History Journal Vol. 9 No. 2 (August). South African Military History Society / military.history@rapidttp.com. (Accessed 15 June 2000). 96
41 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Military Medical Hospital One (Pretoria), 5 July 2000. Although 7th Medical Battalion Group is still in existence and tasked with the mission of supporting the 44th Parachute Brigade and Special Forces Brigade, the military medical service has undergone a dramatic reorganization since 1994. Authorization for a reorganized service, renamed the SADF Medical Service (SAMS) was approved by the Minister of Defense in March 1999. SAMS has a much broader mandate today that includes providing assistance to the health services of South Africa, in addition to providing comprehensive military health service to the National Defence Force and South African Police Service. 42 In an interview in Pretoria on 13 June 2000, Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion stated that he first met Basson when the latter was earmarked in the late 1970s to become the doctor for SADF Special Forces. Thirion claims that Basson was arrogant, that he was Defense Minister Magnus Malan’s “blue-eyed boy,” and that he had the ear of General Kat Liebenberg of Special Forces. Thirion complained when Basson was given access to military intelligence and when Basson short-circuited the command structure. Thirion continued by commenting that, in the 1980s, Malan became a member of parliament and started the custom of showing people in his constituency that the SADF was winning the war in Namibia and Angola. He would bring generals from each branch of the service. However, Basson represented the Medical Health Service and not the Surgeon General. 43 According to ANC defense expert Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000, Dr. Basson was a “Dr. Strangelove” who was part of a group of young scientists, specialists, intellectuals and soldiers who emerged in the 1970s and enthusiastically supported the apartheid regime. Their “patriotism” provided them with the motivation to commit “perfect crimes” on behalf of the regime. Later, some members this group would claim that they were “only following orders.” Others, such as Dr. Daan Goosen, who was the managing director at RRL, remain unrepentant noting that “South Africa was in a war situation…the terrorists and political figures were the targets on the ANC side.” Dr. Goosen went on in this interview to explain that Basson spelled out to him, at the time they were negotiating Goosen’s employment, “that it would be a biological chemical weapons program [and that] it would be offensive. We initially spent a lot of time on the ethical use of these things, and I was convinced that the products would be used in a war sense, very ethically. There isn’t much of a difference if you use a gun to kill someone or if you use a more refined product to do that.” Frontline transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological weapons threats and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bioweapons. Transcript from television show 97
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THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BI
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword vii Exec
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FOREWORD We are pleased to publish
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The profile of So
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The Rollback of the South African B
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During WWII, South African Prime Mi
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dollars) estimate to build a CBW pr
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learn first-hand how the Portuguese
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use of chemical and biological agen
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incidents underscored the variable
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Convention (BWC). According to form
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Project Coast, which would countera
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internal suppression of political d
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Malan, and the Minister of Finance,
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The chain of command demonstrates t
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omb could be used to wipe out or in
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tear gas and to incapacitate withou
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In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale
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confirmed, there is evidence that s
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the SSC. At this time, the security
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Given the breadth and depth of coop
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instruct scientists working with a
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the South African President’s off
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Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produ
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overseas business deals. 114 In Aug
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South Africa negotiated the withdra
Page 55 and 56: political party or organization. Pr
Page 57 and 58: nuclear weapons program and Project
Page 59 and 60: TRC, the men who tried to kill Chik
Page 61 and 62: In 1991, Basson began to build Mert
Page 63 and 64: Military personnel from several cou
Page 65 and 66: Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary
Page 67 and 68: leave the SADF at the end of March
Page 69 and 70: Knobel’s testimony to the TRC, SA
Page 71 and 72: objected to the South African CBM a
Page 73 and 74: Basson and his trips to Libya were
Page 75 and 76: experiences for the military leader
Page 77 and 78: was submitted in 1994). This time U
Page 79 and 80: as the U.S., Great Britain, and oth
Page 81 and 82: investigation phase ended. Initiall
Page 83 and 84: June 1998. However, several weeks b
Page 85 and 86: penalties did finally force him to
Page 87 and 88: public. The State was operating on
Page 89 and 90: The limited news coverage of the Ba
Page 91 and 92: South African court for crimes comm
Page 93 and 94: ulings excluding evidence, his timi
Page 95 and 96: had asked him to set up a facility
Page 97 and 98: cover illegal personal gains from t
Page 99 and 100: who had detailed knowledge of many
Page 101 and 102: 9. What specifically and when did t
Page 103 and 104: e delivered through food and water,
Page 105: Reconciliation Commission of South
Page 109 and 110: 56 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 57 In
Page 111 and 112: weaponization took place. Donald Ma
Page 113 and 114: home of Jerry Nilsson, who was ques
Page 115 and 116: he still need to raise cash in Sout
Page 117 and 118: military bases and was familiar to
Page 119 and 120: 162 According to Dr. Ian Phillips,
Page 121 and 122: Basson’s arrest was the result of
Page 123 and 124: 200 By the seventh week of the tria
Page 125: 115
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