the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program

e delivered through food and water, but the weapons could spread into one’s
own population.
10 Interviews with South African military and civilian officials, July 2000.
11 For a further discussion of the role of former Selous Scouts and other
foreigners in South Africa during the 1980s see Mangold, 218-23. See also,
Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla
war in Rhodesia 1962-1980 (Gweru: Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989).
12 Analysis of the TRC Report by the SADF Contact bureau, 28 May, 1998,
Pretoria, South Africa, and The Military in a political arena: The South
African Defence Force (SADF) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC), Pretoria, June 2000.
13 There was a general awareness during the 1960s of the potency of anthrax
and other biological agents as counter-insurgency weapons. In the 1960s,
comic books featured “Captain Devil” who poured anthrax into the Orange
River and killed communist guerrillas, according to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC
defense expert, interviewed, 13 June 2000 in Pretoria, South Africa.
14 South African military and political planners during the late 1960s and early
1970s studied carefully the effectiveness of Portuguese “protected villages” in
preventing guerrillas from gaining control of large sections of Angola.
However, South African planners viewed a guerrilla threat at home to be
highly unlikely at the time (Interview with Rocklyn Williams 5 July 2000). In
planning for the long-term possibility of guerrilla activity, the government
moved to expand the Bantu homeland policy to Lebowa and Venda and
instituted policies to depopulate northern areas of South Africa. This approach
was viewed as a more effective way of handling future problems and
deflecting external critics with a promise of eventual independence for the ten
designated homelands.
In Angola, South African military planners however, were impressed by
the ability of the Portuguese to regain the offensive in the late 1960s by using
helicopters, poison, landmines, and other techniques to counter guerrilla gains.
See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla
Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), 116-118.
15 Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000.
16 The South African Police (SAP) started helping the Rhodesians to counter
growing insurgency problem in the mid-1960s. Until 1974, the number of SAP
(and SADF) personnel grew, until there were about 1,200 SAPs stationed in
Rhodesia. While South African help was welcomed initially, tensions quickly
developed with reports that SAP personnel were illegally shooting
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