the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
the rollback of south africa's biological warfare program
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e delivered through food and water, but <strong>the</strong> weapons could spread into one’s<br />
own population.<br />
10 Interviews with South African military and civilian <strong>of</strong>ficials, July 2000.<br />
11 For a fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> former Selous Scouts and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
foreigners in South Africa during <strong>the</strong> 1980s see Mangold, 218-23. See also,<br />
Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla<br />
war in Rhodesia 1962-1980 (Gweru: Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989).<br />
12 Analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> TRC Report by <strong>the</strong> SADF Contact bureau, 28 May, 1998,<br />
Pretoria, South Africa, and The Military in a political arena: The South<br />
African Defence Force (SADF) and <strong>the</strong> Truth and Reconciliation Commission<br />
(TRC), Pretoria, June 2000.<br />
13 There was a general awareness during <strong>the</strong> 1960s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> potency <strong>of</strong> anthrax<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>biological</strong> agents as counter-insurgency weapons. In <strong>the</strong> 1960s,<br />
comic books featured “Captain Devil” who poured anthrax into <strong>the</strong> Orange<br />
River and killed communist guerrillas, according to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC<br />
defense expert, interviewed, 13 June 2000 in Pretoria, South Africa.<br />
14 South African military and political planners during <strong>the</strong> late 1960s and early<br />
1970s studied carefully <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Portuguese “protected villages” in<br />
preventing guerrillas from gaining control <strong>of</strong> large sections <strong>of</strong> Angola.<br />
However, South African planners viewed a guerrilla threat at home to be<br />
highly unlikely at <strong>the</strong> time (Interview with Rocklyn Williams 5 July 2000). In<br />
planning for <strong>the</strong> long-term possibility <strong>of</strong> guerrilla activity, <strong>the</strong> government<br />
moved to expand <strong>the</strong> Bantu homeland policy to Lebowa and Venda and<br />
instituted policies to depopulate nor<strong>the</strong>rn areas <strong>of</strong> South Africa. This approach<br />
was viewed as a more effective way <strong>of</strong> handling future problems and<br />
deflecting external critics with a promise <strong>of</strong> eventual independence for <strong>the</strong> ten<br />
designated homelands.<br />
In Angola, South African military planners however, were impressed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Portuguese to regain <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive in <strong>the</strong> late 1960s by using<br />
helicopters, poison, landmines, and o<strong>the</strong>r techniques to counter guerrilla gains.<br />
See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla<br />
Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), 116-118.<br />
15 Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000.<br />
16 The South African Police (SAP) started helping <strong>the</strong> Rhodesians to counter<br />
growing insurgency problem in <strong>the</strong> mid-1960s. Until 1974, <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> SAP<br />
(and SADF) personnel grew, until <strong>the</strong>re were about 1,200 SAPs stationed in<br />
Rhodesia. While South African help was welcomed initially, tensions quickly<br />
developed with reports that SAP personnel were illegally shooting<br />
93