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Lecture 3.1: Handling Remote Access: RADIUS Motivation

Lecture 3.1: Handling Remote Access: RADIUS Motivation

Lecture 3.1: Handling Remote Access: RADIUS Motivation

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Attack to shared secret based on<br />

User-Password<br />

User Password attribute<br />

XOR (password)<br />

Arbitrary User-ID<br />

Arbitrary Password (< 16 bytes)<br />

Giuseppe Bianchi<br />

NAS<br />

<strong>Access</strong>-Request<br />

User-Password attribute (16 bytes)<br />

Request Authenticator (16 bytes)<br />

MD5(secret, RequestAuth)<br />

<strong>RADIUS</strong> server<br />

Attack to the shared secret based on the<br />

User-Password attribute<br />

Exhaustive search attack<br />

But pre-computation of MD5 state not possible here, as<br />

secret is first<br />

Offline dictionary attacks<br />

Their “effectiveness” depends on chosen<br />

secret<br />

(Often ignored) advice from RFC 2865:<br />

“The secret (password shared between the client and the<br />

<strong>RADIUS</strong> server) SHOULD be at least as large and<br />

unguessable as a well-chosen password. It is preferred that the<br />

secret be at least 16 octets. This is to ensure a sufficiently<br />

large range for the secret to provide protection against<br />

exhaustive search attacks. The secret MUST NOT be empty<br />

(length 0) since this would allow packets to be trivially<br />

forged.”<br />

Many implementations only allow shared-secrets that are<br />

ASCII characters, and less than 16 characters;<br />

resulting <strong>RADIUS</strong> shared secrets are low entropy!<br />

Giuseppe Bianchi<br />

17

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