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pdf - Nyenrode Business Universiteit

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2.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 19<br />

Since RPE has been described in the literature (e.g., Holmstrom 1982), the applicability<br />

of RPE has been associated with uncertainty. More specifically, this argument applies<br />

to uncertainty shared amongst peers because peer performance is only informative to the<br />

extent that the uncertainties are common in nature (Holmstrom 1982, Frederickson 1992,<br />

Matsumura & Shin 2006). Only common events influence both the agent’s performance<br />

and peer performance. On the other hand, individual (or idiosyncratic) uncertainty only<br />

affects the agent’s performance, leaving peer performance unaffected. This reasoning follows<br />

Gibbons & Murphy (1990) and Kren (2002), who explain RPE use with its potential<br />

benefit of specifically filtering out common (as opposed to idiosyncratic) uncertainty 3 .<br />

I hypothesize specifically that RPE can provide insulation for the noise-increasing effects of<br />

common uncertainty. I expect more RPE use under higher levels of common uncertainty.<br />

This expectation results in the following hypothesis:<br />

H1: Common uncertainty has a positive effect on the use of RPE.<br />

2.2.2 RPE and Opportunism-Mitigation; the Use of Internally<br />

vs. Externally Determined Standards<br />

As argued in the introduction of this chapter, it is not only external events that can cause<br />

target-setting problems. Problems that originate from within the business unit can also<br />

cause problems by affecting the difficulty of the performance target. Specifically, this<br />

argument relates to managerial opportunism and the room that managers have to opportunistically<br />

affect (i.e., lower) their performance target level. Murphy’s (2001) findings<br />

imply that managers lower their performance targets if the possibility to do so, presents<br />

itself to them. This reduces the motivational properties of the target, which may lead to<br />

suboptimalization of managerial efforts.<br />

Murphy (2001) shows, both theoretically and empirically that RPE can reduce the room<br />

that managers have to behave opportunistically. This second perspective on RPE relates<br />

to the way in which performance standards are determined. Murphy distinguishes between<br />

two main ways in which standards can be set: 1) they can be determined in some internal,<br />

administrative process; or 2) they can be externally determined. The difference between<br />

these alternatives lies in the extent to which agents can influence the level (or: difficulty)<br />

of the performance standard. Internally determined standards include standards based on<br />

prior-year performance and standards derived from plans or budgets. Such standards are<br />

3 Both Gibbons & Murphy (1990) and Kren (2002) find partial support for this proposition.

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