The "boomerang" effect of the radicalism in discourse analysis

The refusal of the communication concept is linked, consequently, to a voluntary
omission, namely the exclusion of the interpretation codes and of the attribution of
meaning in orienting and producing the discourses and the social practices.
Nevertheless, another factor must be considered: not all the communication processes
are observable.
The metaphor of the communication is also refused because, although it is possible to
agree with Middleton and Edwards (1990, p. 41-42) that the discourse analysis may not
have a solely descriptive purpose, the focusing of this approach concerns exclusively
that which is observable. As Middleton and Edwards affirm (1990), in their study of the
relationship between discourse and remembering: "like the behaviourist, our analysis
remains at all times close to the observable, recorded conversational record.” (p. 43). It
is accordingly evident that the not directly observable aspects (but ones constitutive of
the communication) are conceived as an emerging feature of a discursive practice, and
not as an "external" item of the discourse itself. In this view everything is inside the
discourse: the cognitive phenomena (the memory, the purposes, the representations) are
"objects" of (or within) the discourse (Potter and Edwards, 1999).
“Analysis has concentrated not on the sense-making role of representations (although this is not
excluded in principle), but on the way the representations are constructed as solid and factual, and on their
use in, and orientation to, actions (assigning blame, eliciting invitations, etc.). Representations are treated
as produced, performed and constructed in precisely the way that they are for their role in activities.”
(Potter & Edwards, 1999, p. 448)
Although interesting, the fact of considering the processes and the objects of
representation as immanent to a discursive practice may lead to several criticisms. The
RDA is characterised by a "monologism" in which every traditional concept of social
psychology is brought back to discourse and to its pragmatic function. If taken to its
extreme limits, this epistemological vision risks generating a tautology in which every
concept, being a discursive practice or one of its characteristics, is equal to very other
concept. Here are some examples.
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