The "boomerang" effect of the radicalism in discourse analysis
The "boomerang" effect of the radicalism in discourse analysis
The "boomerang" effect of the radicalism in discourse analysis
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“How should we deal with <strong>the</strong> fact that our accounts <strong>of</strong> how people’s language use is constructed are<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves constructions? (…)<br />
It is possible to aknowledge that one’s own language is construct<strong>in</strong>g a version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, while<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>g with analys<strong>in</strong>g texts and <strong>the</strong>ir implications for people’s social and political lives. In this respect,<br />
<strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong>ts are simply more honest than o<strong>the</strong>r researchers, recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir own work is not<br />
immune from <strong>the</strong> social psychological processes be<strong>in</strong>g studied.”<br />
(Potter & We<strong>the</strong>rell, 1987, p. 182)<br />
<strong>The</strong> practice <strong>of</strong> reflexivity implies not only a meta-<strong>the</strong>oretical glance (namely a<br />
problemis<strong>in</strong>g reflection on one own's <strong>the</strong>oretical op<strong>in</strong>ions and on one's own research<br />
methods <strong>in</strong> comparison with o<strong>the</strong>r options and o<strong>the</strong>r methods), but also a glance <strong>of</strong>, so to<br />
say, meta-<strong>in</strong>stitutional nature (i.e. a reflection on <strong>the</strong> "strategic" role that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oreticalmethodological<br />
options perform <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scientific community, sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> various reference<br />
network one with respect to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, with<strong>in</strong> a composite series <strong>of</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant, dissident and<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>al positions, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r terms that which is def<strong>in</strong>ed "psy-complex" - i.e. “<strong>the</strong><br />
sprawl<strong>in</strong>g speculative and regulative network <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories and practice that constitute<br />
psychology” (Ingleby, 1985; Rose, 1985)”. (Parker, 1994, p. 246).<br />
“<strong>The</strong> way that social research is contextualized now will also look a little more complex, for <strong>the</strong><br />
“context” is, <strong>in</strong> this account, not an objective background aga<strong>in</strong>st which <strong>the</strong> researcher renders an account <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>in</strong> question. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> context is <strong>the</strong> network <strong>of</strong> forms <strong>of</strong> subjectivity that place<br />
contradictory demands on <strong>the</strong> research. In social psychological research <strong>the</strong>re is an array <strong>of</strong> competive<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests and agendas that frame <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong> proposals; <strong>the</strong> expectations and demands <strong>of</strong> “subjects” or<br />
co-researchers; and <strong>the</strong> career <strong>in</strong>vestiments and projected autobiographies that exist <strong>in</strong> tension <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
academic world. (...) Among <strong>the</strong> structure that frame <strong>the</strong> experience and reflection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> researcher are those<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> psy-complex. If we want to take reflexivity serioulsy, we have to “ground” it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional context<br />
<strong>in</strong> which we carry out our research.”<br />
(Parker, 1994, p. 250)<br />
<strong>The</strong> argument <strong>of</strong> tu quoque or <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reflexivity (application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory to itself)<br />
makes it not only legitimate, but also desirable, that <strong>the</strong> auto-reflective caution should enter<br />
to become part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deontology equipment <strong>of</strong> each researcher attentive to <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong><br />
his specific research contributions (whatever his paradigmatic orientation may be).<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less doubts are raised regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> reflexivity is, <strong>in</strong> fact,<br />
practised <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scientific community <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supporters <strong>of</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong>.<br />
“It would not be helpful, <strong>in</strong> this case, to write <strong>of</strong>f experience as just ano<strong>the</strong>r social construction, or to<br />
reduce <strong>the</strong> expressed dissatisfaction with positivism as a rhetorical trope, discursive position, or warrant. It is<br />
here that <strong>the</strong> political limitations <strong>of</strong> social constructuionist (Gergen, 1985) and some discursive analytic<br />
approach (Edwards and Potter, 1992) become apparent. It is necessary to reflect on <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>of</strong> psychology as it operates now.”<br />
(Parker, 1994, p. 240)<br />
“Reflexivitiy also refers to <strong>the</strong> equal status, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong>, <strong>of</strong> researchers and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
respondents, as well as <strong>the</strong> accounts <strong>of</strong>fered by each. This means that <strong>discourse</strong> analysts must f<strong>in</strong>d a way <strong>of</strong><br />
build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir research opportunities for participants to comment upon <strong>the</strong>ir own accounts and those <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> researcher. Sherrard (1991) criticises <strong>discourse</strong> analysts for not always meet<strong>in</strong>g this criterion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
research.”<br />
(Burr, 1995, p. 181)<br />
It must be recognised that <strong>the</strong> criticisms on this side are jo<strong>in</strong>ed by as many detractors<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong>, as by <strong>the</strong>ir own exponents (<strong>in</strong>ter-alia: Abrams & Hogg, 1990;<br />
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