<strong>The</strong> auto-confutation <strong>of</strong> radical relativism 12
<strong>The</strong> auto-confutation <strong>of</strong> radical relativism. <strong>The</strong> most radical versions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong> - which <strong>in</strong> virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antiessentialistic and relativistic positions arise <strong>in</strong> contestualism and extreme cont<strong>in</strong>gentism - appear subject to a series <strong>of</strong> self-confutations. To tell <strong>the</strong> truth, <strong>the</strong> question is very much older. Already Plato had noted that <strong>the</strong> sophistic relativism, occurr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a non relativisable situation, went so far as to autoconfute itself. Still <strong>in</strong> a philosophical environment, but <strong>in</strong> a horizon referr<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, Franca D'Agost<strong>in</strong>i (1999, p. 285) identifies a series <strong>of</strong> "paradigmatic anomalies" <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> a critical review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> radically relativistic and contestualistic philosophic <strong>the</strong>ories, which may be summed up as follows: (a) “by declar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> absolute plurality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth, <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> specific assertion is presumed”; (b) “by affirm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> universal contestuality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g, a sovracontestual <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g is formulated”; (c) “by <strong>the</strong>oris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> relativity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> values and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs, an <strong>in</strong>conditional and absolute truth is <strong>the</strong>orised”. In o<strong>the</strong>r terms, <strong>the</strong> key propositions <strong>of</strong> relativism and contestualism, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir turn <strong>in</strong>capable <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g relativised and contestualised, seem to be self-contradictory. By declar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> absolute relativity <strong>of</strong> knowledge, <strong>the</strong> existence is, <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong>orised <strong>of</strong> an unconditional and absolute truth, which denies <strong>the</strong> very idea <strong>of</strong> relativity. If, go<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong>se arguments, one reflects on <strong>the</strong> radical socio-constructivistic positions expressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong>, <strong>the</strong> same difficulties <strong>of</strong> logic seem to arise, that were treated as “paradoxes” (see Smith, 2001, p. 82-92). One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most frequent criticisms addressed to <strong>the</strong> RDA is based on <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tu quoque (or you too) argument. By apply<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> RDA its own <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory, it is possible to affirm that <strong>the</strong> absolute cont<strong>in</strong>genism and relativism that characterised <strong>the</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> may also characterise <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical production <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> RDA and <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> its research (Ashmore, 1989; Burr, 1995). By act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, it may, <strong>in</strong> fact, be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that any <strong>the</strong>ory that postulates <strong>the</strong> total relativity <strong>of</strong> knowledge is itself relative and contextual. “Relativism <strong>of</strong> <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory makes it difficult to justify adopt<strong>in</strong>g one particular read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> an event or text ra<strong>the</strong>r than o<strong>the</strong>rs. This is a problem that occurs because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory’s own reflexivity, that is, <strong>the</strong> way that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory is applied to itself and its own research practice (<strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong>). A <strong>discourse</strong> <strong>analysis</strong> cannot be taken to reveal a 'truth' ly<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text, and must acknowledge its own research f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs as open to o<strong>the</strong>r, potentially valid, read<strong>in</strong>gs.” (Burr, 1995, p. 180) However, this criticism does not seem to form a problem for <strong>the</strong> RDA. On <strong>the</strong> contrary it is <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> respects shared by its supporters, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a cautious methodology <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> practise <strong>of</strong> research dom<strong>in</strong>ated reflexivity, observed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sphere <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sociology <strong>of</strong> knowledge. In fact, by assert<strong>in</strong>g that each <strong>discourse</strong> is a contestualised social practice directed towards <strong>the</strong> atta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>of</strong> aims, <strong>the</strong> RDA recognises <strong>the</strong> partially subjective and action-oriented character <strong>of</strong> it own works. 13
- Page 1 and 2: EAESP SMALL GROUP MEETING Theory an
- Page 3 and 4: A scientific dialogue or monologue?
- Page 5 and 6: potential for contributing to a soc
- Page 7 and 8: identified with the discursive prac
- Page 9 and 10: The misunderstanding of the Moscovi
- Page 11: “monologue”, nor “dialogue st
- Page 15 and 16: Sherrard, 1991; Marks, 1993, Figuer
- Page 17 and 18: It is undeniable that the articulat
- Page 19 and 20: The subject's role in a radical "co
- Page 21 and 22: of any structure intra-individual h
- Page 23 and 24: The "totalising" and "reifying" rol
- Page 25 and 26: No Communication without Representa
- Page 27 and 28: transferring messages occurs on the
- Page 29 and 30: The refusal of the communication co
- Page 31 and 32: Pol-lu-tion, s. Effect of defilemen
- Page 33 and 34: "Monological" versus "dialogical" p
- Page 35 and 36: Although the role of the action and
- Page 37 and 38: RDA, and even more the conversation
- Page 39 and 40: And even before in Arguing and Thin
- Page 41 and 42: Conclusion 41
- Page 43 and 44: Augoustionos, M. , Innes, J.M. (199
- Page 45 and 46: Jodelet, D. (1991) “L’idéologi
- Page 47: Wagner, W. (1998) Social representa