Master Thesis - ERIM
Master Thesis - ERIM
Master Thesis - ERIM
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<strong>Master</strong> <strong>Thesis</strong><br />
“Dutch Entrepreneurship in the People’s Republic of China:<br />
problems, challenges and solutions”<br />
Student: Boris Peters<br />
Coach : Drs. Thomas Blekman<br />
Co-reader: Prof. Dr. Barbara Krug<br />
Entrepreneurship and New Business Venturing<br />
RSM Erasmus University
“There are more consultants that can help you start up a company in China than there are Dutch<br />
companies operating in China. Many of these so called consultants don’t have a clue what they are<br />
doing.”<br />
(Ron de Goeij, 2007, Director of KOW Asia)<br />
“When doing business in China, listen to your ‘gut feeling’, because this is the best information you<br />
can rely on.”<br />
(Hans Lensvelt, 2007, Director of Lensvelt)<br />
“If even huge companies like Prada, Hugo Boss and Louis Vuitton can not protect their brand, why<br />
even try to protect ours?”<br />
(Hans Lensvelt, 2007, Director of Lensvelt)<br />
“The notion of producing high quality is getting more familiar to the Chinese producers. However, as<br />
a buyer you must be very careful for asking a lower price because there are still producers that<br />
simply lower the quality of the product to lower the price and think that is perfectly normal to do.”<br />
(Rienk Hamstra, 2007, Owner of Beumer Agritech)<br />
“It is a very good thing when an expat or entrepreneur marries a Chinese woman because in that<br />
case at least somebody knows how to do business in China.”<br />
(Ari van der Steenhoven, 2007, Director of Eastwingate)<br />
“Copyright in China means for the Chinese; the right to copy.”<br />
(Jennifer Chan, 2007, Director of Sinova)<br />
Boris Peters 1
Acknowledgements<br />
The acknowledgement is an interesting part of a thesis as it is for the writer often the last part to write<br />
but for the reader the first part to read. As I now write the last sentences of my thesis I am not only<br />
finishing my thesis but also my academic career, which was definitely the most interesting part of my<br />
life until now. I cannot help but feeling sad that this part of my life has now ended but I am<br />
immensely grateful to all people that helped me to get where I am now.<br />
My deep thanks go to Rienk and Susanne Hamstra who took me under their wing during my stay in<br />
Shanghai and really made me feel right at home on the other side of the globe. I will never forget the<br />
valuable insights that Rienk taught me as my manager at HD China.<br />
Off course my internship at HD China would never happened without the trust and help of Aad<br />
Kuiper who made my internship at Hunter Douglas possible and gave me an experience that I will<br />
always remember.<br />
I wish to thank Thomas Blekman, Barbara Krug, Wynand Bodewes, Wim Hulsink and Andreas<br />
Rauch for teaching me a small part of their extensive knowledge. I also wish to thank Marcel<br />
Broersma in providing me the opportunity to finish my thesis while providing me with my first real<br />
job.<br />
Because of the strong support and love of my friends and family I always felt motivated to keep<br />
working hard. I am indebted to Merel Risselada and Jasmijn Nugteren, I am sorry I could not always<br />
give you the time that you deserved, thank you for your love. I am especially grateful to my parents,<br />
Ruud and Nan Peters who were tireless in motivating and supporting me to finish my study and I am<br />
sorry to test your tirelessness for such a long period of time.<br />
Most importantly, I thank my lovely girlfriend Nathalie Magnee for her endless understanding,<br />
support and love.<br />
Boris Peters 2
Preface<br />
During my study at the Erasmus University I was surprised that we learned so little about the Chinese<br />
economy and the impact on our economy. For the last quarter of a century the Chinese economy was<br />
the fastest growing economy in the world with an average growth rate above 10%. China holds about<br />
$ 500 billion of U.S. debt and it has a state owned investment vehicle with $ 200 billion worth of<br />
assets under management, which is literally able to influence economies of many nations. I wanted to<br />
learn more bout the Chinese economy and “way of doing business” and especially “how to start up a<br />
business in China” because the chance is high that in the future I need to do business with the<br />
Chinese.<br />
In that same time I met an entrepreneur who told me about his exhilarating time in China while setting<br />
up his factory. I concluded that one must be absolutely mad to start up a business in China due to all<br />
the problems one encounters. Strangely, everyone I met who lived in China for a while told me that,<br />
in order to understand why entrepreneurs are attracted to China, you need to go there. This fired up<br />
my interest even more and I decided that I wanted to write my thesis about Dutch entrepreneurs<br />
starting up in China.<br />
I talked to Mr. Kuiper, the CEO of Hunter Douglas Europe, about my burning desire to travel to<br />
China and after convincing the management team, I was offered an internship at Hunter Douglas<br />
China. It was an experience of a lifetime to work and live for 4 months in Shanghai. The huge city<br />
that never sleeps has a magical effect on everyone who lives there. It seems that everything goes twice<br />
as fast compared to Holland; doing business, eating, driving, walking and working. The hunger of the<br />
Chinese to grow is enormous, new huge sky scrapers are popping out of the ground every day and it<br />
seems that no one stops working on the end of the day.<br />
By working closely together with the Chinese employees at Hunter Douglas China I gained a lot of<br />
knowledge about the Chinese culture and interaction. My Dutch manager Mr. Hamstra took me along<br />
on business trips and I met many Dutch, Chinese and international entrepreneurs, businessmen and<br />
government officials who all provided me with valuable information for my thesis. It was very<br />
difficult to keep focused in my thesis because I learned so much more than I could write and this is<br />
most certainly the reason why my thesis has more pages than I intended. I literally had to stop myself<br />
many times from writing new insights but it made the process of writing my thesis very interesting<br />
and must say I am sad that I had to finish it.<br />
I hope that my enthusiasm is reflected in my thesis and I hope that as a reader you will have as much<br />
interest in reading it as I had writing it.<br />
Boris Peters 3
Table of Contents<br />
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................................................2<br />
Preface......................................................................................................................................................................3<br />
Executive summary..................................................................................................................................................6<br />
1. Research Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................7<br />
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................7<br />
1.2 Problem definition..........................................................................................................................................8<br />
1.3 Research objective..........................................................................................................................................9<br />
1.4 Research Questions ......................................................................................................................................10<br />
1.5 Theoretical framework .................................................................................................................................13<br />
2. Methodology......................................................................................................................................................14<br />
2.1 Research design............................................................................................................................................14<br />
2.2 Contents........................................................................................................................................................16<br />
3 Starting up in China ............................................................................................................................................17<br />
3.1 About China .................................................................................................................................................17<br />
3.2 Definitions....................................................................................................................................................18<br />
3.3 Entry modes..................................................................................................................................................23<br />
4 Problems when starting up in China ...................................................................................................................26<br />
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................26<br />
4.2 Problems encountered while starting up in China........................................................................................26<br />
Weak Regulatory Regime .............................................................................................................................26<br />
The newness of private enterprise................................................................................................................28<br />
Incomplete property rights ...........................................................................................................................29<br />
Problem of obtaining capital ........................................................................................................................30<br />
Diversity of local business systems across China ........................................................................................31<br />
Poorly functioning markets ..........................................................................................................................33<br />
Poorly Developed Institutional Arrangements.............................................................................................34<br />
Resource dependancy...................................................................................................................................34<br />
4.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................36<br />
5 Solutions derived from the literature ..................................................................................................................38<br />
6 Qualitative Research and Results........................................................................................................................41<br />
6.1 Case selection...............................................................................................................................................41<br />
6.2 Validation .....................................................................................................................................................42<br />
6.3 interview set up and analysis........................................................................................................................44<br />
6.4 Schematic overview of selected cases..........................................................................................................44<br />
6.5 Case studies ..................................................................................................................................................45<br />
Case #1: Kow Architecten............................................................................................................................45<br />
Case #2: Lensvelt Interieur ..........................................................................................................................51<br />
Boris Peters 4
Case #3: Holland Beumer Agritech .............................................................................................................57<br />
Case #4: Eastwingate Consultancy ..............................................................................................................63<br />
Case #5: Sinova............................................................................................................................................70<br />
6.5 Schematic overview .....................................................................................................................................77<br />
6.6 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................79<br />
7 Solutions to the Problems Encountered by entrepreneurs ..................................................................................81<br />
8 Conclusion and Recommendations.....................................................................................................................83<br />
8.1 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................83<br />
8.2 Limitations ...................................................................................................................................................85<br />
8.3 Managerial implications...............................................................................................................................87<br />
9 References...........................................................................................................................................................88<br />
10 Appendixes .......................................................................................................................................................95<br />
10.1 Questionnaire for interviews with entrepreneurs .......................................................................................95<br />
10.2 Questionnaire for interviews with service providers (accountants, lawyers, consultants and governmental<br />
institutions).........................................................................................................................................................96<br />
11 People that attributed to the thesis ....................................................................................................................97<br />
Boris Peters 5
Executive summary<br />
Many Dutch companies are now operating in China in pursuit of the opportunities that a big emerging<br />
market like China can provide. However, China is also a transitional market slowly changing from a<br />
planned economy to a free market economy. The fact that the Chinese economy is not only emerging<br />
but also in transition means that Dutch companies encounter problems setting up or operating a<br />
business in China.<br />
In the internationalization literature there is extensive knowledge about the problems and challenges<br />
encountered while setting up a business in China but in my opinion it is especially valuable to provide<br />
possible solutions to these problems. With this study the internationalization literature concerning<br />
China is analyzed to understand the problems that Dutch companies encounter when starting up a<br />
business in China but more importantly, solutions derived from the literature are given and<br />
empirically tested by a multiple case study performed in China under Dutch SME start-ups.<br />
This thesis indicates the importance of social networks as a solution to many problems encountered by<br />
Dutch entrepreneurs when starting up in China based on the literature study and empirical results.<br />
Moreover this thesis provides further insights into the mentioned solutions in the literature study.<br />
Answers are provided on how to establish a network with other (Chinese) businesspeople and<br />
government officials needed to overcome problems while starting up in China.<br />
It seems that networks with Chinese individuals and Dutch entrepreneurs are more easily initiated<br />
with the help of a Chinese employee working for the entrepreneur due to the emphasis that the<br />
Chinese lay on speaking the same language and having the same background in forming a social<br />
network. Trade fairs can be useful to meet trustworthy Chinese businesspeople because one can only<br />
attend a trade fair when having a business licence. A network with local government officials seem to<br />
be most helpful in comparison to other networks but the willingness of local government officials to<br />
form a social network depend on the location and activities of the Dutch start-up.<br />
Boris Peters 6
1. Research Introduction<br />
1.1 Introduction<br />
This chapter introduces the research and the problem definition and the research objective is stated.<br />
Fallowing are the listed research questions in order to answer the main research question and finally<br />
the theoretical framework visualizes the aim of the thesis.<br />
Due to the ‘Open Door Policy’ in 1978 and the accession to the WTO in 2001, the Chinese market is<br />
modernising and liberalising, changing form a planned economy into a market orientated economy.<br />
These developments are making China increasingly attractive for foreign investors seeking a higher<br />
turnover anticipating on a huge emerging market or low production costs due to low wages (Zhao,<br />
2002).<br />
Nowadays, there are increasingly more Dutch companies, setting up a business in China. In 2006,<br />
Holland had 2.126 million euro in Foreign Direct Investments in China which was a 16% increase<br />
compared to the previous year. According to the EVD (Dutch Economic Information Service), all the<br />
big Dutch multinationals have an entity in China and increasingly more Small and Medium sized<br />
Enterprises (SME’s) are starting up in China. Due to my interest in SME’s and the increase in SME<br />
start-ups in China, this thesis focuses on (Dutch) SME’s.<br />
The Chinese economy is not only emerging but also in transition. Emerging and transitional markets<br />
are characterized by market failures and uncertainty. (Hoskisson, et al., 2000; Nee, 1992; Khanna,<br />
2001). Although China seems to be an attractive market for Dutch entrepreneurs it is very likely that<br />
problems and challenges are encountered while starting up a business in China. For scholars and<br />
entrepreneurs it is interesting to understand what kind of problems and challenges will be encountered<br />
while starting up. More importantly it is vital for entrepreneurs to understand how to solve the<br />
problems and challenges in order to successfully set up a company in China.<br />
Boris Peters 7
1.2 Problem definition<br />
The challenges and problems encountered by entrepreneurs when starting up a company in the<br />
Chinese market will create uncertainty, which can increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1985; Krug<br />
and Metha, 2004). Transaction costs are known to be especially high in emerging economies, such as<br />
in China (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Transaction costs refer to the cost of providing some product or<br />
service through the market rather than having it provided from within the firm. In order to carry out a<br />
market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to conduct<br />
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to<br />
make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. More succinctly transaction<br />
costs are search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs and policing and enforcement<br />
costs or in short; all costs necessary to bring a good or service to the market (Coase, 1937).<br />
If solutions to the problems and challenges encountered are clear, it is possible to reduce uncertainty<br />
and thereby the transaction costs. Many scholars identified and researched the problems and<br />
challenges that entrepreneurs encounter when starting up a company China (Krug and Mehta, 2004;<br />
Krug and Pólos, 2004; Oi, 1996; Child and Tse, 2001; Li and Qian, 2001) however, the<br />
internationalization literature concerning China primarily focuses on the problems and less on<br />
solutions to these problems when starting up or operation a business in China. If solutions are given in<br />
the literature, they are often superficial but more importantly; often not empirically tested. For<br />
instance: Krug and Metha (2004) describe the problem of a weak regulatory regime and they indicate<br />
that it can be reduced by forming alliances with local government officials, but HOW can a Dutch<br />
entrepreneur form alliances with local government officials? WHY is this a good solution or are there<br />
more solutions to this problem?<br />
Boris Peters 8
1.3 Research objective<br />
The internationalization literature concerning China (Krug and Mehta, 2004; Krug and Pólos, 2004;<br />
Oi, 1996; Child and Tse, 2001; Li and Qian, 2001) primarily focuses on the problems and less on<br />
solutions to these problems when starting up a business in China. The objective of this thesis is to<br />
provide theoretical and empirical insights into the solutions to the problems and challenges<br />
encountered by Dutch entrepreneurs when starting up a business in China. Therefore this thesis has<br />
scientific relevance in deepening the knowledge of the internationalization literature concerning China<br />
by empirically testing the solutions provided by the internationalization literature.<br />
The problems stated can lead to uncertainty because it can affect the success of the start up. Because<br />
high transaction costs are associated with uncertainty it is important to understand the causes of<br />
uncertainty and deliver possible solutions to reduce the transaction costs. Lower transaction cost can<br />
increase the performance of a company and strengthen the competitive advantage as well as lowering<br />
the threshold for entering the Chinese market. This research can be useful for Dutch entrepreneurs<br />
considering setting up a business in China. They will here find an overview of possible problems and<br />
challenges encountered while setting up a business in China, but more importantly; possible solutions<br />
derived from the literature and derived from the case studies.<br />
My motivation is my interest in the Chinese market and the Dutch entrepreneurs that are operating in<br />
this market. When reading the internationalization literature I get the impression that one must be<br />
insane to start-up a business in China because of all the problems that one will encounter. Still many<br />
Dutch entrepreneurs do it and succeed and this triggered my interest: How do these heroes do it?<br />
This thesis focuses on SME’s that have started up in the last 5 years in China because there can be a<br />
difference in impact of the difficulties or problems encountered in China when starting up a SME<br />
compared to large company. Large firms often have many resources like capital, expertise and<br />
experience. An entrepreneur has less financial resources, must hire expertise and has often limited<br />
experience often making the effect of the problems larger.<br />
I decided that if I really wanted to understand my interest I had only one option and that was to travel<br />
to China and experience it first hand. Therefore I travelled to China and worked for a Dutch company;<br />
Hunter Douglas. I lived in Shanghai from September till December 2007.<br />
Boris Peters 9
1.4 Research Questions<br />
Krug and Mehta (2004) and Krug and Hendrischke (2006) defined in their articles idiosyncratic<br />
features of the business environment that generate a high level of institutional and economic<br />
uncertainty for entrepreneurs, which are called ‘problems’ in this thesis.<br />
In my conversations with Prof. Dr. Barbara Krug I selected six problems that Dutch entrepreneurs<br />
encounter.<br />
The six problems are: a weak regulatory regime, the newness of private enterprise, diversity of local<br />
business systems, incomplete property rights, missing and poorly functioning markets, and poorly<br />
developed institutional arrangements.<br />
I have added additional common economic and institutional problems in the literature survey, as they<br />
also seem to be problems that Dutch entrepreneurs encounter. The additional problems are: Obtaining<br />
capital (Marson et al., 2002 ; Ahstrom and Bruton, 2006 ; Krug , 2007) and resource dependency<br />
(Moran, 1985 ; Pfeffer, 1978 ; Child et al., 2001 ; Williamson ; 1985 ; Krug , 2007).<br />
More extensive literature concerning the listed problems is provided in chapter 5 of this thesis. In<br />
chapter ‘1.5 theoretical framework’ an overview is given of references used to lay the theoretical<br />
foundations for the treated problems in this thesis.<br />
The main research question for this study is:<br />
“How to cope with the listed problems encountered by Dutch entrepreneurs when starting up a<br />
Small to Medium sized Enterprise in China?”<br />
The listed problems and challenges are derived from the literature therefore answers to the sub-<br />
research questions must be provided in order to answer the main research question. The sub-research<br />
questions are:<br />
1. How can the effect of a weak regulatory regime be reduced?<br />
In the literature it is stated that the effect of a weak regulatory regime can be reduced when<br />
entrepreneurs form alliances with government officials and form a social network with other business<br />
people, but how can a successful alliance be formed with a government official? Can a government<br />
official be of any help for a Dutch entrepreneur?<br />
2. How can the problem of newness of private enterprise be reduced?<br />
Boris Peters 10
The literature indicates that the social network of the entrepreneur is very valuable and necessary in<br />
finding good business partners and employees. How can a Dutch entrepreneur effectively form a good<br />
social network in China when starting up? Can it be done through networks of others? Is it even<br />
possible for a Dutch entrepreneur to form a network with Chinese business people?<br />
3. How can the problem of incomplete property rights be reduced?<br />
It is stated in the literature that again alliances with government officials like Party members and<br />
bureaucrats can reduce the problem of incomplete property rights. It is also stated that alliances with<br />
economic agencies and local jurisdiction can reduce the problem of incomplete property rights. What<br />
kind of economic agencies or local jurisdictions can be persuaded to form an alliance? And again how<br />
can the alliance be formed?<br />
4. How can the problem of obtaining capital be reduced?<br />
Also it is stated that a good social network can increase the chance of obtaining capital but is this the<br />
only way? How can a Dutch entrepreneur effectively form a good social network in China when<br />
starting up? Can it be done through networks of others? Is it even possible for a Dutch entrepreneur to<br />
form a network with Chinese business people?<br />
5. How can the effect of Diversity of local business systems across China be reduced?<br />
In addition to form alliances with local officials it is stated in the literature that a company should<br />
reduce the reliance on the environment by relying on the company in the home country and that<br />
resources should be pooled with other companies. Are there other solutions to this problem? How do<br />
companies pool resources?<br />
6. How can the effect of poorly functioning markets be reduced?<br />
Local officials can provide information about markets, new products and technology. Are there other<br />
ways in obtaining information about markets? How can the local officials provide information and<br />
when is this information given?<br />
7. How can the problem of poorly developed institutional arrangements be reduced?<br />
Also it is stated that a good social network can increase the chance of obtaining capital but is this the<br />
only way? How can a Dutch entrepreneur effectively form a good social network in China when<br />
Boris Peters 11
starting up? Can it be done through networks of others? Is it even possible for a Dutch entrepreneur to<br />
form a network with Chinese business people?<br />
8. How can the dependency on Chinese resources be reduced?<br />
It is stated that Dutch firms can utilize more internal resources coming from its parents or subsidiaries<br />
but are there more ways to reduce external dependency? Is it favorable to limit commitment to the<br />
environment in China?<br />
9. Are there in addition to the mentioned problems other problems and solutions to these<br />
additional problems?<br />
It could be possible that entrepreneurs encountered other relevant problems in addition to the<br />
mentioned problems and found successful solutions to these problems. This sub research question can<br />
trigger potential further research.<br />
Boris Peters 12
1.5 Theoretical framework<br />
Weak Regulatory Regime<br />
The Newness Of Private Enterprise<br />
Incomplete Property rights<br />
Problem of Obtaining Capital<br />
Diversity of Local Business Systems<br />
Poorly Functioning Markets<br />
Poorly Developed Institutional Arrangements<br />
Resource Dependancy<br />
Problems listed in the thesis References used in the thesis<br />
Weak Regulatory Regime Oi, 1989 ; Krug and Mehta, 2004 ; Child et al., 2004 ; Zhou, 2002 ; Nee,<br />
Opper and Wong, 2007 ; Peng, 2001<br />
The Newness of Private Enterprise Zhou, 2002 ; Chen 1998; Krug and Mehta, 2004 ; Child et al., 2004<br />
Incomplete Property rights Oi, 1989 ; Krug and Mehta, 2004; Hendrischke, 2004 ; Krug and Pólos, 2004 ;<br />
Walder, 1995<br />
Problem of Obtaining Capital Marson et al., 2002 ; Ahstrom and Bruton, 2006 ; Krug , 2007<br />
Diversity of Local Business Systems Whitley, 1999 ; Krug and Hendrischke, 2006 ; Boisot, 1999 ; Hoskisson et al.,<br />
2000 ;<br />
Poorly functioning markets Krug and Mehta, 2004 ; Krug and Pólos, 2004 ; Hendrischke, 2004, Oi, 1989<br />
Poorly developed Institutional Arrangements Krug and Mehta, 2004 ; Child and Tse, 2001 ; Elfrink and Hulsink, 2003 ;<br />
Ellis, 2000<br />
Resource Interdependency Moran, 1985 ; Pfeffer, 1978 ; Child et al., 2001 ; Williamson ; 1985 ; Krug ,<br />
2007<br />
Less uncertainty<br />
(During start-up phase)<br />
Boris Peters 13
2. Methodology<br />
2.1 Research design<br />
In this chapter the research design and methodology used for the thesis is explained followed by the<br />
overview of the contents of the chapters.<br />
The research design for the thesis is a literature study followed by a multiple case study. The reason<br />
for this approach is that, although there is extensive literature on the problems and challenges<br />
encountered while starting-up a business in China, the solutions given by the internationalization<br />
literature are limited and often not empirically tested. Therefore possible solutions to the problems<br />
should be “explored” by asking “how” and “why” questions. “In general, case studies are the<br />
preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little<br />
controll over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life<br />
context.” (Yin, 2003). As stated earlier; China’s market is a transitional market, slowly changing from<br />
a planned economy to a free market economy and therefore some of the problems and challenges can<br />
be contemporary which strengthen the choice for multiple case studies.<br />
In order to explore the problems and challenges encountered while starting up a business in China and<br />
derive solutions given in the internationalization literature, an exploratory research was performed and<br />
research questions were generated during the exploratory research. Further literature study answers<br />
the research questions theoretically and provides a “framework” for the multiple case study. This<br />
method prevent the research and results on theory that is already known. As Eisenhardt (1989)<br />
describes in her article, this is a valuable approach because it permits researchers to gain a more<br />
accurate insight in a construct. Due to the extensive literature study previous to the interviews, it is<br />
possible to use the results as a framework for the interviews. The goal of the framework is to gain an<br />
understanding of the possible problems and challenges that Dutch entrepreneurs encounter while<br />
starting up a business in China and more importantly; the possible solutions to these problems given<br />
in the internationalization literature.<br />
The multiple case study is carried out to test the solutions derived from the in the literature study.<br />
“The results of multiple case research are typically more generizable and better grounded than those<br />
of single case studies.” (Graebner, M. and Eisenhardt, K., 2004). The multiple case study deepens the<br />
knowledge about possible solutions to the problems and challenges encountered. For instance: if it<br />
appears to be true that the problem of a weak regulatory regime can be reduced by forming alliances<br />
with government officials, HOW can a Dutch entrepreneur form alliances with government officials?<br />
WHY is this a good solution or are there more solutions to this problem? By asking these kind of<br />
Boris Peters 14
questions and more importantly; providing answers, the knowledge of internationalization literature<br />
will be deepened with this thesis.<br />
There is a common concern about case studies that they provide little basis for scientific<br />
generalisation. The answer to this concern is that case studies are generisable to theoretical<br />
propositions and not to populations or universes. The case study represents a sample. In doing a case<br />
study, the goal is to expand and generalize theories and not to enumerate frequencies (Yin, 2003).<br />
Boris Peters 15
2.2 Contents<br />
This thesis contains eight chapters. The first chapter gave an introduction on the topic of this thesis;<br />
Dutch entrepreneurship in China: problems, challenges and solutions. Also a problem definition and<br />
research questions are stated. Chapter two introduces the reason for research and a research design<br />
and operational plan are formulated.<br />
Following are the theoretical and empirical parts of the thesis. Chapter three to five conceptualize the<br />
theoretical part of the thesis. In chapter three some background information about China is given and<br />
definitions that are used in this thesis are explained. Finally the entry strategies into China are also<br />
discussed. Chapter four explains the problems and challenges that are encountered when<br />
entrepreneurs start up in China as given by the internationalization literature. Chapter five discusses<br />
the solutions that are given in the literature to the mentioned problems and challenges in chapter four.<br />
Subsequently, chapter six and seven form the empirical part. Chapter six contains the results of the<br />
interviews. Chapter seven combines the theoretical part with the interview results and defines the<br />
solutions to the problems and challenges that Dutch entrepreneurs encounter. Finally, chapter eight<br />
contains the conclusion and defines recommendations for further research and the limitations of the<br />
thesis.<br />
Chapter 3<br />
Starting up in China<br />
Chapter 4<br />
Problems when Starting Up in China<br />
Chapter 5<br />
Solutions Derived from the Literature<br />
Chapter 1<br />
Introduction and Problem Definition<br />
Chapter 2<br />
Methodology<br />
Chapter 8<br />
Conclusion and Recommendations<br />
Chapter 6<br />
Qualitative Research and Results<br />
Chapter 7<br />
Solutions to the Problems Encountered<br />
Boris Peters 16
3 Starting up in China<br />
3.1 About China<br />
In this chapter more insight is given about China itself and the definitions used in this thesis are<br />
explained. The different entry modes into China are also listed and explained.<br />
China is situated in the eastern Asia and it is the third largest country in the world, with a population<br />
of 1,288.40 million inhabitants. China is not only the world’s most populous nation, but it is also the<br />
world’s fastest growing developing country and it belongs to the 5 largest growing economies in the<br />
world, with an economic growth of more than 9.7 % per year since the late 1970s<br />
(www.worldbank.org).<br />
The country has a total land area of 9.571.300 square kilometres. The capital city of China is Beijing<br />
and its official language is Mandarin. The actual Chinese, the Han people, form by far the largest<br />
majority of the total population (92%). The other 8% comprises of many different ethnic groups, most<br />
of them live in the border regions, like Xizang (Tibetans) and Menggu (Mongols).<br />
China has a long history of civilization. Dynasties have ruled the country for almost three thousand<br />
years, before in 1912 the last emperor Pu Yi was forced to retreat. It was in 1946 that a civil war<br />
started. The war was won by the communists under guidance of Mao Zedong and on October 1 st 1949<br />
the People’s Republic was proclaimed. The Chinese Communist party (CCP) took over total control<br />
of the country (Encarta, 2001). In 1978 the Chinese economy was liberalized, allowing free trade and<br />
capitalization.<br />
It has been in recent years that China’s economy has been improved. In the early history China was an<br />
agricultural controlled culture. China had a weak economy in which there was an unbalance between<br />
the light and the heavy industries. But with the years passing by the proportion between the different<br />
industries has been improved.<br />
The growth of the China’s overall economy was formerly driving by the primary and secondary<br />
industries but now the secondary and the tertiary industries are driven China’s overall national<br />
economy growth. In the tertiary industry the proportion of traditional industries like communication,<br />
transportation and communication has declined and businesses such as banking telecommunications<br />
and real estate have developed rapidly (Source: http://www.asianinfo.org).<br />
Prior to the economic reform process that began in 1978 the Chinese economy was comprised almost<br />
solely of state-owned industries. State owned enterprises were an extension of government<br />
Boris Peters 17
organizations and were managed through the Central Administration (PWC, 2003). The Chinese state<br />
remains dominant within the economy, although during its transition the ‘invisible hand of the<br />
market’ has gradually been allowed more freedom. The period after 1978 is marked by a change in<br />
the composition in the industrial sector towards more urban and rural collective participation, with<br />
significant new participation by foreign and domestic private firms, but it was also marked by a<br />
massive shift from team to household level economic activity in agriculture and other small-scale<br />
sectors (Putterman, 1995).<br />
3.2 Definitions<br />
Culture<br />
Culture is acknowledged in this thesis in the form that national cultural distance between the Dutch<br />
entrepreneur and the Chinese can be a reason why problems occur when starting up in China. Cultural<br />
distance is the degree to which the shared norms and values in one country differ from those in<br />
another country (Hofstede, 2001) The larger the cultural distance between the interacting parties, the<br />
higher chance for problems because cultural differences can lead to misunderstandings (Very et al.,<br />
1996).<br />
If cultural difference is seen as a problem it is very difficult to provide a solution because of the tools<br />
of analysis that are used to indicate the differences. Hofstede is known for introducing 5 bipolar<br />
dimensions in order to compare cultures. As Hofstede (1993) states: “Culture is a construct, that<br />
means it is not directly accessible to observation but inferable from verbal statements and other<br />
behaviors and useful in predicting still other observable and measurable verbal and nonverbal<br />
behavior. It should not be reified; it is an auxiliary concept that should be used as long it proves<br />
useful but bypassed where we can predict behaviors without it. The same applies to the dimensions I<br />
introduced. They are constructs too that should not be reified. They do not ‘exist’; they are tools for<br />
analysis which may or may not clarify a situation.”<br />
Providing answers to problems resulting from differences in dimensions will trivialize the vastness of<br />
different aspects of culture. “Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes<br />
one group or category of people from another.” (Hofstede, 1993), When using the definition of<br />
culture as described by Hofstede, one could better ask what is not culture than what is culture.<br />
Moreover scale is something to consider in China because 1.300 million people are not readily<br />
compared with 16 million people in Holland. China is a continental system with many cultural and<br />
social practices. In a single province there can be a variety of languages, social practices, arts and<br />
cuisines. I therefore agree with the vision of Goodman (2007) who states “Of course, this is not to<br />
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argue that there is no such thing as Chinese culture, but rather that it is a concept of more limited<br />
usefulness than might immediately appear to be the case.”<br />
Similar to the view in the article of Krug and Hendrischke (2006) culture is seen in this thesis as “a<br />
repository of potential mechanisms and informal institutions which are likely to emerge at the micro-<br />
level and are open to empirical institutional analysis.” The vastness of the definition of culture makes<br />
it simply impossible to treat cultural distance as ‘one of the problems’ in this thesis due to limited<br />
research time and expertise.<br />
Entrepreneur<br />
Although many people argue that it is often very clear if someone is a typical entrepreneur, there still<br />
is not a consensus in the literature what the definition of an entrepreneur is. Is having your own<br />
company a good definition for entrepreneur? If that is the definition of an entrepreneur, is then<br />
someone that has 40 percent of the shares in a company not an entrepreneur anymore? And is a small<br />
shop owner also an entrepreneur like for instance Richard Brandson (Virgin) or Stelios Haji-Ioannou<br />
(Easyjet) who are always looking for new opportunities and innovations? Can someone who sets up a<br />
new venture in China for an existing company in Holland be seen as an entrepreneur and if not so, is<br />
this person then not acting more like an entrepreneur compared to the small shop owner?<br />
Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) define three main streams in the studies on entrepreneurship: what<br />
happens when entrepreneurs act: why they act; and how they act. In the first the researcher is not<br />
concerned about the entrepreneur him/herself or his/her actions but he is concerned about the results<br />
of the actions of the entrepreneur. Shumpeter and Kirzner are well known economists that share this<br />
point of view. The second stream is concerned about certain traits and characteristics that an<br />
individual must possess in order to understand why someone is an entrepreneur. Researchers in this<br />
stream use a psychological or sociological approach to define entrepreneurship. Finally how<br />
entrepreneurs act can be studied or in other words: how to succeed at being an entrepreneur.<br />
What happens when entrepreneurs act is a question that most economists seem to ask themselves.<br />
Schumpeter considers entrepreneurship as a process by which the whole economy goes forward. It<br />
disrupts the market equilibrium because of a radical change fuelled by innovation. In his book<br />
Schumpter (1934) defines an entrepreneur as follows: “The carrying out of new combinations we call<br />
‘enterprise’; the individuals whose function is to carry them out we call ‘entrepreneurs’.” He explains<br />
‘new combinations’ as: the introduction of a new good, the introduction of a new production method,<br />
the opening of a new market, a new source of supply or the carrying out of the new organization of<br />
any industry. The entrepreneur in the eyes of Schumpeter must be an innovator who creates<br />
disequilibrium but Kirzner (1999) argues in his article that there are also entrepreneurs that react on a<br />
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disequilibrium or market errors. Kirzner (1973) argues in his book that an entrepreneur can also react<br />
on a disequilibrium in stead of creating one. For instance: if someone discovers that certain goods are<br />
sold for a lower price than the market price, he discovers a market imperfection. When he buys at the<br />
lower price and sells them for the market price he is equilibrating the market. The Kirznerian<br />
entrepreneur is therefore much less innovative compared to the Shumpterian entrepreneur.<br />
In my opinion, an entrepreneur can be a Kirznerian entrepreneur or a Schumpterian entrepreneur but<br />
neither offer a satisfying definition for ‘entrepreneur’ because they offer a definition in retrospective,<br />
because if the individual is not yet equilibrating or disequilibrating a market, he is not an<br />
entrepreneur. I also agree with the view of Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) that “Generally speaking, it<br />
does not appear useful, in managerial terms, to delimit entrepreneurship by defining some economic<br />
functions as ‘entrepreneurial’ and other as non-entrepreneurial”, because this is more semantic than<br />
practical.<br />
Why entrepreneurs act can also be called the traits approach and this field of research on<br />
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship focus on the person of the entrepreneur. They ask the question<br />
why certain individuals start a venture when others, under similar conditions, do not? Researchers<br />
discovered that some entrepreneurs possess certain traits that non-entrepreneurs do not have like: need<br />
for achievement (McClelland, 1961; McClelland and Winter, 1969), locus of control (Brockhaus and<br />
Nord, 1979; Liles, 1974) and risk taking (Bosley, and Udell, 1982, Liles, 1974).<br />
The trait approach is, in my opinion, not the way to define entrepreneurship or the entrepreneur and I<br />
agree with the statement of Gartner (1988): “I believe the attempt to answer the question ‘who is an<br />
entrepreneur?’ will neither lead us to a definition of the entrepreneur nor help us to understand the<br />
phenomenon of entrepreneurship.” The sheer number of possible traits or characteristics that have<br />
been attributed to the entrepreneur makes it impossible to use the trait approach to define the<br />
entrepreneur and it is extremely difficult to link particular psychological or sociological traits causally<br />
to complex behavior like entrepreneurship (Gartner, 1988; Cooper, Dunkelberg, and Woo, 1988).<br />
Moreover, many individuals in our society attempt entrepreneurship and succeed even while they do<br />
not possess ‘the traits of the entrepreneur’.<br />
Finally it is now left to study ‘how’ to succeed at being an entrepreneur or, in other words, what is<br />
between the ‘causes’ and the ‘results’: the managerial behavior of the entrepreneur. In my obsession<br />
with the question ‘how do these heroes do it?’ I agree with Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) that “…it<br />
can be argued that in the case of defining entrepreneurship the question ‘how’ is the most appropriate<br />
for business school since it focuses on understanding (and, it is hoped, improving) actual managerial<br />
practice.”<br />
I therefore define entrepreneurship as follows:<br />
“Entrepreneurship is a process by which individuals –either on their own or inside organizations-<br />
pursue opportunities without regard to the resources they currently control” (Stevenson, Roberts, and<br />
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Grousbeck, 1989) as a result the definition for entrepreneur is: an individual who –either on his own<br />
or inside organizations- pursue opportunities without regard to the resources he currently controls.<br />
Opportunity is defined as: “a future situation which is deemed desirable and feasible” (Stevenson and<br />
Jarillo, 1990) Opportunity is relativistic concept because opportunities vary among individuals over<br />
time, because different individuals have different desires and they identify themselves with different<br />
capabilities. Desires vary with current position and future expectations. Capabilities vary depending<br />
upon their natural skills, training and competitive environment.<br />
The behavioral, situational definition fits well with the common experience that the level of<br />
‘entrepreneurship’ often varies during the life of the individual. This approach overcomes the<br />
dilemma whether entrepreneurs are only to be found in start-up companies and it allows us to deal<br />
with both individual and organizational entrepreneurship. The biggest advantage of the definition is<br />
that it concentrates on practice therefore leading us to study and then teach entrepreneurial skills as<br />
knowledge that results from training and experience.<br />
Start-up<br />
There are many theories on organizational life cycles and stages of development but most scholars<br />
agree that there are certain stages of development that companies go through. Start-up, Growth and<br />
Maturity are stages that most scholars use (Kuratko & Hodgetts, 1989; Olson, 1987; Gilbert, et al.,<br />
2006; Terpstra and Olson, 1993). However there is not a consensus on the definition of each stage.<br />
When has the start-up stage ended and when did the growth stage begin? Growth can be measured<br />
using different variables such as turnover, profit, number of employees, customer base, number of<br />
companies, etc. The point at which a company starts growing and the speed at which it will grow is<br />
also industry dependent. Therefore many different definitions for start up and growth exist. However<br />
the mentioned articles mention the term ‘survival’ as a basic criterion to start growing.<br />
Shane (2008) indicates in his book that generally over 55% of all start-ups will not survive the first 5<br />
years and after surviving this period the survival rate will increase. The start-up stage has certainly<br />
ended for most companies after five years and therefore case study subjects in this thesis are not older<br />
than 5 years. To define “starting up” to the interviewees it is explained that the startup stage consists<br />
of; gathering information for location choice, getting the business licenses and legal documents,<br />
opening a local presence, hiring the first employees needed to operate, serving the first customers and<br />
breaking even with costs and profit.<br />
Small to Medium sized Enterprise (SME)<br />
This thesis uses the definition for SME as prescribed by the European Commission based on<br />
headcount. The definition for SME consists of Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which have<br />
successively less than 10 employees, less than 50 employees and less than 250 employees.<br />
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Social Network<br />
A ‘social network’, ‘relational capital’ or ‘ social capital’ can be defined as “sets of two or more<br />
connected exchange relationships” (Axelsson and Easton, 1992). Some scholars state that a network is<br />
one of the most powerful assets that anybody can posses because it provides access to information,<br />
knowledge, capital and even other networks. Having a developed network can be more beneficial to a<br />
start –up then a less developed network. The quality of the network depends on the number of ties and<br />
the quality of the ties. (Larson and Starr, 1993) The ties, or relations, can either be strong or weak<br />
depending on the frequency of contacts, the emotional intensity of the relationship, the degree of<br />
intimacy and reciprocal commitments between the actors involved (Granovetter, 1982).<br />
National and local government<br />
Regulations are negotiated at national level in Beijing, every province or county is free to modify or<br />
manipulate and create its own regulations. As a result there is not a unified system of taxes, laws and<br />
regulations (Krug and Metha, 2004). Therefore a differentiation must be made in national government<br />
and local government. Often companies negotiate about tax, laws and regulations with government<br />
officials on local level.<br />
Guanxi<br />
The Chinese place a very high value on their network that is difficult to understand for many<br />
Westerners. The Chinese call a social network; ‘Guanxi’ but by just translating it would trivialize the<br />
meaning of the word. It goes further than the advantage that a network can offer, when the Chinese<br />
have a ‘Guanxi’ they will be loyal to the contact and it is far more difficult to disturb this loyalty than<br />
in the western social network but it is more difficult build up once disturbed. The Chinese are<br />
therefore far more critical about forming a relationship and much effort is needed to form the tie.<br />
Guanxi is considered important in almost every realm of life, from politics to business (Gold et al.,<br />
2002 ; Bjorkman and Kock, 1995).<br />
Internationalization<br />
With the click of a button it is possible to acquire information at the internet site of the Chinese<br />
ministry of foreign affairs about setting up a business in China and within a day it is possible to be in<br />
China from anywhere in the world to start setting up a business. It is increasingly easier to take<br />
advantage of business opportunities in foreign countries due to low-cost communication technology<br />
and transportation means. Foreign governments and economies are also more internationally<br />
orientated because of these developments. These developments make it possible for increasingly more<br />
small to medium sized companies to set up a business abroad (Oviat and McDougall, 1994).<br />
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“Internationalization refers to the increasing importance of international trade, international<br />
relations, treaties, alliances, etc. Inter-national, of course, means between or among nations.” (Daly,<br />
1999).<br />
In this thesis the term ‘internationalization’ is used to indicate the internationalization of companies,<br />
specifically Dutch companies starting up in China. Internationalization is a very broad term that does<br />
not have a consensus in the literature. Calof and Beamish (1995) have a broad definition of<br />
internationalization; the process of adapting firms’ operations (strategy, structure, resources, etc.) to<br />
international environments. Turnbul (1987) defines internationalization as “the outward movement of<br />
a firm’s international operations.” Using these definitions mean that a company that sometimes sends<br />
a product to a foreign country is then an internationalizing company, therefore this is not a suitable<br />
definition.<br />
The definition of internationalization used in this thesis is “… expanding a firm’ s business from its<br />
original location to one or more additional geographic sites.” (Barringer and Greening, 1998). This<br />
definition demands that the company needs to be physically present in the host country in order to be<br />
an internationalizing company and is therefore in my opinion most suitable for this thesis. By being<br />
physically present in the host country the entrepreneur can build up knowledge because of his<br />
experiences and it is his knowledge that I want to use to answer the research questions.<br />
Geographic expansion or internationalization present important opportunities for growth and value<br />
creation. Entrepreneurs pursue opportunities in other countries because of various reasons: because<br />
companies want to be ahead of competition or match the international market entry of a domestic<br />
rival. (Gaba, et al., 2002 ; Root, 1987), because the entrepreneur wants to create knowledge that he<br />
cannot access or is not present in the domestic country. (Zahra, et al., 2000 ; Barkema and Vermeulen,<br />
1998), the home market is saturated or the foreign market is has a large potential consumer base<br />
(Goedegebuure, 2000 ; Carliner, 2003) and reducing cost by achieving economy of scale or the<br />
reduction of transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1982 ; Williamson, 1975).<br />
3.3 Entry modes<br />
Selecting a mode for entering or expanding in a foreign market, is one of the most important strategic<br />
decisions that an internationalizing firm must take (Root, 1994).<br />
The decision is important for two reasons according to Kumar and Subramaniam (1997) First of all, it<br />
is costly to reverse because the firm has to commit a certain amount of resources in order to operate<br />
under that particular mode. Secondly, the decision involves a large commitment from the firm and<br />
future strategic decisions will be affected by the choice of the mode of entry.<br />
Boris Peters 23
Because of the irreversibility factor and the impact on future strategic decisions it is possible that the<br />
mode of entry has an effect on the solution found for the problems listed earlier. For instance an<br />
exporting company has fewer (or no) problems with recourse interdependency compared to a wholly-<br />
owned subsidiary because an exporting company needs far less resources than a wholly-owned<br />
subsidiary.<br />
The entry modes into China are: exporting, licensing, joint ventures, wholly-owned subsidiaries and<br />
an representative office (Osland, et al., 2001 ; Kumar and Subramaniam, 1997 ; Root, 1994 ; Guo,<br />
2003).<br />
Representative Office<br />
A representative office offers a company the possibility to set up a small office to make the first steps<br />
into the Chinese market. With the representative office a foreign parent company can make contact<br />
with government agencies, possible business partners and clients. It is possible to perform market<br />
research and gather legal information needed to set up the company in China. There are restrictions to<br />
what kind of activities a representative office can perform. Income generating activities are not<br />
allowed, it is mandatory to hire Chinese employees and the office that is used need to be approved by<br />
the Chinese government. The Representative office can therefore only be used to set up the company<br />
in china (Guo, 2003).<br />
Exporting<br />
The company’s final or intermediate product is manufactured outside the target country and<br />
subsequently transferred to it. With exporting, a company has the lowest degree of control. Control is<br />
the ability and willingness of a firm to influence decisions, systems, and methods in foreign markets.<br />
The resources needed for exporting are however low. Resources can be intangible or tangible.<br />
Technology risk is low in exporting, technology risk is the potential that a firm’s applied knowledge<br />
will be unintentionally spilled to a local firm (Osland, et al., 2001; Kumar and Subramaniam, 1997).<br />
Licensing<br />
Licensing is a non-equity, contractual mode with one or more local partner firms. A company<br />
transfers to a foreign organization the right to use some or all of the following property: patents,<br />
trademarks, company name, technology, and/or business methods. The licensee pays an initial fee<br />
and/or percentage of sales to the licensor. The degree of control, and the needed resources are higher<br />
as with exporting. The risk of knowledge spill over (technology risk) is highest in licensing (Osland,<br />
et al., 2001 ; Kumar and Subramaniam, 1997).<br />
Joint ventures<br />
Boris Peters 24
Joint ventures involve two or more organizations that share the ownership, management, risks, and<br />
rewards of the newly formed entity. Each partner contributes equity that may take the form of money,<br />
human resources, plant and equipment, and/or technology. The degree of control and the needed<br />
resources are higher as licensing. The risk of knowledge spill over is lower than with licensing<br />
(Osland, et al., 2001 ; Kumar and Subramaniam, 1997).<br />
Wholly-owned subsidiaries<br />
Wholly-owned operations are subsidiaries in another nation in which the parent company has full<br />
ownership and sole responsibility for the management of the operation. The degree of control and the<br />
needed resources is the highest of all possible entry modes. The risk of knowledge spill over is lowest<br />
for wholly-owned subsidiaries (Osland, et al., 2001 ; Kumar and Subramaniam, 1997).<br />
With exporting and licensing there is not a physical presence of the company in China. A<br />
representative office is restricted from making profit and can in fact only be used to gather<br />
information in order to potentially set up a company.<br />
In the case of a Joint venture there is a physical presence in China but it possible that many problems<br />
listed in this thesis have less influence on the foreign company because the Chinese partner already<br />
has elaborate knowledge of the market and regulations. The Chinese company can give advice to the<br />
partner or combine resources with the foreign company. However, because of working together with a<br />
Chinese partner also new problems arise; the language barrier and physical distance makes it more<br />
difficult to make fast decisions on complicated issues, there can be a difference in the routines of the<br />
companies which can result in disagreements and the monitoring costs are higher.<br />
Due to the former reasons and the fact that the entrepreneur has the highest degree of control, only<br />
wholly owned subsidiaries are selected for the case study. (more information about case selection can<br />
be found in chapter: 6.1 Case selection.)<br />
Boris Peters 25
4 Problems when starting up in China<br />
4.1 Introduction<br />
This chapter concentrates on problems and challenges encountered while starting up in China as given<br />
by the internationalization literature. Possible solutions found in the internationalization literature are<br />
discussed but further insights on the solutions are treated in chapter 5.<br />
A schematic overview of the literature on the problems can be found in the chapter: ‘1.5 Theoretical<br />
framework’. As stated in chapter ‘3.2 definitions’, culture as a concept or cultural distance as a<br />
problem is not treated in this thesis. The vastness of the definition of culture makes it simply<br />
impossible to treat cultural distance as ‘one of the problems’ in this thesis due to limited research time<br />
and expertise.<br />
4.2 Problems encountered while starting up in China<br />
Weak Regulatory Regime<br />
The biggest problem of the regulatory regime is the high level of taxes. On top of these come various<br />
‘fees’ levied in a rather unpredictable way by local government agencies. These may cover local<br />
infrastructure projects, community welfare needs, sponsorship of cultural activities, social security<br />
contribution, etcetera, and contribute to make the tax burden a major barrier to entrepreneurship for<br />
many organizations (Oi, 1989).<br />
Although regulations are negotiated and agreed in Beijing, every province or county is free to modify<br />
or manipulate and create its own regulations. Because of this reason there is not a unified system of<br />
taxes, laws and regulations. In many cases it is not clear as to what rules apply to a company in order<br />
to be approved to set up a company. It can also happen that a company has to pay an ‘ad hoc’ tax or<br />
get an ‘invitation’ to contribute to local community facilities but the application of regulation and<br />
taxes are experienced as open to negotiation to those with influence. Besides ‘ad hoc’ taxation there is<br />
also a risk of confiscation of assets (Krug and Mehta, 2004).<br />
In his observations Oi (1996) describes: “Under a local state corporatist system, the relationship<br />
between banks, finance and tax offices, and county, township and village officials is very close. Local<br />
officials at the county level help secure large loans for township and village-owned enterprises.<br />
Bureaus sometimes provide services well outside their administrative domain. … It may use its<br />
connections to influence other agencies, such as banks, to bend the rules in favour of a particular<br />
enterprise.”<br />
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China has particularly strong institutions that are embedded in the country's long administrative<br />
tradition, in which government continues to play a prominent role in economic and social affairs. Its<br />
institutions therefore lend a distinct character to China's business environment and importantly<br />
determine the transition path the country is taking. Institutional change in China is highly complex<br />
because in this formerly closed, state-dominated system, institutions have developed into a massive<br />
inter-dependent, multi-level network whose logic of operation depends as much on political influence<br />
and personal relationship as on concern for efficiency.<br />
State-owned enterprises are fighting price wars, selling their products at, or even below, costs. Given<br />
this situation, only firms with advanced technological resources or well-established brands are able to<br />
achieve satisfactory sales and make a good profit in China (Child et al., 2001).<br />
Political issues are interwoven into everything entrepreneurs might want to accomplish in China.<br />
Many areas of business are simply off limits to the private sector, and even more are disallowed for<br />
firms with foreign investment. Often, these areas are the least efficient and the most enticing to<br />
entrepreneurs. Some entrepreneurs have done well for themselves by seeking out and exploiting<br />
loopholes, ambiguities or gray areas, resulting from China’s underdeveloped legal and regulatory<br />
system. It is for example common use for many non-Chinese companies in China to transfer their<br />
profits (transfer pricing) through offices in Hong Kong in order to gain huge tax advantages. In many<br />
cases, the government later accepts the fait accompli and builds regulations that formalize and legalize<br />
what is already happening. In other cases, the government moves to close the loophole, resulting in<br />
losses for some companies.<br />
The legal structures under which new business can be registered in China differ significantly from<br />
those in most western countries. Individual-owned enterprises were not legalized until 1986. Intended<br />
merely to fill in the gaps in the planned economy, they were tightly restricted in their business<br />
activities. In 1994, China’s Company Law established rules for limited liability companies and joint<br />
stock companies. The flexibility to change investment structure is very low, so investors wanting to<br />
sell their shares in the company can only do so with the approval of a majority of the shareholders.<br />
Entrepreneurs can take advantage of socialistic organizational forms (such as the state-owned<br />
enterprises). Rather than to set up a private firm, they could find a government partner and register as<br />
a ‘collective’. However the findings of Nee, Opper and Wong (2007) and Peng (2001) indicate the<br />
state’s inability to provide positive economic effects through direct intervention at the firm level.<br />
Nee, et al. (2007) even found negative significant effects in the case of government involvement on<br />
personnel decisions and strategic firm decisions. Party intervention yields significant negative effects<br />
in the case of financial decisions and in overall perspective averaging all firm decisions.<br />
Boris Peters 27
It is evident that the regulatory regime adds to uncertainty of doing business in China therefore<br />
increasing transaction costs. Regulations are changing fast to keep up with the fast developing<br />
economy but due to the fact that every province or county is free to modify or manipulate and create<br />
its own regulations, the regulations are not always clear to the entrepreneur. The risk of confiscation<br />
of assets, ‘ad hoc’ taxation and badly enforced regulations indicate that the control of (local)<br />
politicians should be taken into account. Entrepreneurs need to have an extensive network of other<br />
business people to lobby bureaucrats and politicians together. Alliances with local government<br />
officials are needed to influence the enforcement of regulations and taxes. The bargaining power of a<br />
network of business people is off course higher and further stresses the need for business people to<br />
form a social network.<br />
The newness of private enterprise<br />
Entrepreneurs in China have a low level of expertise in organising production and management of<br />
private firms due to their formal education. There is a lack of business knowledge that equips Chinese<br />
entrepreneurs with assessing risks associated with doing business. There are no standardized routines<br />
of business practice because of lack of experience (Krug and Mehta, 2004). Here the problem of<br />
‘newness of private enterprise’ arises. Since the Chinese have little business experience due to the<br />
state planned economy until 1980, there is a chance that clients, suppliers, business partners and<br />
employees are incompetent.<br />
New businesses in China suffer from a shortage of experienced staff and outside providers of support<br />
services. Under the planned economy technical skills were prized above all while disciplines like<br />
marketing, finance and law were nonexistent. Exacerbating this, the country’s schools and universities<br />
were shut down entirely between 1966 and 1976. The generation that would otherwise have been<br />
educated during this period is now between forty and sixty years old. They would otherwise have<br />
provided a major source of middle and upper managers. Those who did receive a good education may<br />
not have built upon this with good work experiences. In the past, students received job assignments<br />
from the government and went to work for the state bureaucracy or equally bureaucratic state-owned<br />
enterprises. This created a conservative, cautious attitude towards work (Child et al., 2001).<br />
Barringer and Greening (1998) describe that growth and expansion is likely to exacerbate the need for<br />
formal planning. The task of getting a new geographic site up and running requires planning in terms<br />
of site selection, recruitment and selection of qualified personnel and the establishment of<br />
communication links between the headquarters location and the expansion site. The stage models,<br />
which depict the life-cycle of a firm as a multi-stage process, suggest that one of the most important<br />
management challenges associated with internationalisation is attracting and maintaining qualified<br />
personnel.<br />
Boris Peters 28
Emphasis must be laid on the employment of personal networks to carry out needed activities to<br />
select, monitor or add value. As Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) state in their article about venture capital<br />
in emerging markets, in the absence of formal institutions, firms or people need to be monitored<br />
through informal ties to entrepreneurs and families. Links to key customers, the government and other<br />
allied firms through personal connections are needed. This not only holds for venture capitalists but<br />
also for entrepreneurs in selecting competent potential buyers, suppliers, business partners and<br />
employees through their network.<br />
Incomplete property rights<br />
Property rights are incomplete in China and private property and intellectual property form the highest<br />
barriers for entrepreneurs starting up in China. Asset holders in China can exclude others from the use<br />
of the same assets under a State guaranty. The asset is however only binding when resources are used<br />
within the politically defined market sector and where effective law enforcement agencies exist (Krug<br />
and Mehta, 2004). Every province or country is free to modify the national regulations regarding<br />
property rights. As a result within the sectors of local governments, local officials, village Party<br />
secretary, township economic commission and township heads have a large influence on the<br />
assignment of rights to individuals (Oi, 1996). The research of Hendrischke (2004) suggests that<br />
“there is a strong informal side to the definition of property rights where administrative categories,<br />
status or partnership contracts matter less to the entrepreneurs than the substantial property rights<br />
that can be realized in co-operation with the local state in the form of networks.”<br />
Granting a private property right depends heavily on local government officials therefore networks<br />
with local government officials play a vital role in acquiring property rights by Dutch entrepreneurs.<br />
When private property is acquired, regulation often remains unclear or incomplete. For instance in<br />
many occasions it is possible to acquire a building (house, factory, etc) but the land on which it is<br />
built remains property of the local government. For obvious reasons it is therefore wise to maintain<br />
good contacts with the local government. Who owns property is sometimes difficult to find out as<br />
boundaries between public and private enterprises in villages and townships are sometimes vague. For<br />
instance: public assets are sometimes leased out to private individuals and private enterprises are<br />
sometimes partially owned by government officials (Walder, 1995).<br />
The Business Software Alliance (a US-based trade association), estimates that 94% of software used<br />
in China is pirated. Companies selling pharmaceuticals, chemicals, beverages and other products fight<br />
a constant struggle against mislabeled fakes, some of which are toxic or hazardous. In a number of<br />
Boris Peters 29
cases, domestic joint venture partners of foreign firms have literally emptied the joint venture factory<br />
and set up an identical plant down the road after learning how to manufacture and market the product.<br />
To prevent intellectual property from being ‘stolen’ one can use different techniques for instance<br />
giving the employees access on only one part of the production process, preventing them from gaining<br />
‘know-how’ of the entire production process. Patents are publicly accessible which means that the<br />
information within the patent can be used to copy the product. In cases where the product is difficult<br />
to copy it is in some cases wise to not patent the product at all.<br />
Theft of intellectual property, like copyrights, trademarks, or patents, is ubiquitous but the main<br />
problem is that law in this area is much less developed than it is in the west and it is poorly enforced<br />
even where it exists (Krug and Metha, 2004). This means that when an intellectual property right is<br />
infringed, it is very difficult to reprimand the infringer let alone getting a compensation for loss of<br />
income.<br />
A specialized court for Intellectual Property does not exist and litigation is under the jurisdiction<br />
where the infringer is located or where the alleged infringement took place. Therefore it is possible<br />
that a trial takes place in a part of China where the knowledge of the court about intellectual property<br />
is very limited. Outcome of a court decision is therefore mostly in benefit of the local (Jian, 2007).<br />
The fact remains that the property rights protection and granting mainly depend on the ‘connections’<br />
with local jurisdictions or economic agencies. Krug and Pólos (2004) therefore advice to form<br />
alliances with the local jurisdictions or economic agencies in order to enhance the probability that the<br />
property rights of the company are protected.<br />
Problem of obtaining capital<br />
China’s commercial banking system has provided little direct help to private businesses. Banks are<br />
often pressured by government agencies to loan to large state-owned enterprises or other firms with<br />
the implicit or explicit backing of a government bureau, leaving little for private businesses (Marson<br />
et al., 2002).<br />
There are alternatives to bank loans. The concept of venture capital is very new to China. Venture<br />
capitalists count on a stable institutional regime with a predictable rule of law and enforcement regime<br />
to facilitate and safeguard their investments. In addition to legal stability, venture capitalists look for<br />
environments with efficient markets for corporate control and capital, which readily allow exit from<br />
ventures as well as systems with minimal corruption. This institutional stability and predictability<br />
reduces uncertainty and risk, and enhances the likelihood of success in new ventures. Institutional<br />
stability is largely unknown in most emerging economies, such as China. Emerging economies are<br />
characterized by fundamental and comprehensive institutional transformations as their economies<br />
Boris Peters 30
egin to mature. Venture capitalists can still make and manage investments under such unsettled<br />
conditions with little protection of private property.<br />
Efficiency and accessibility to investors are important to venture capitalists in both developed and<br />
emerging economies. Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) state that in emerging economies, venture<br />
capitalists need to place greater importance on employing personal networks to carry out needed<br />
activities to select, monitor, add value, and someday exit from their invested firms. Personal<br />
connections and relationships with entrepreneurs, government officials, and customers, while<br />
important in any setting, are likely to be more important in China. With the weak formal institutions<br />
in China, less formal institutions sometimes provide some substitute for the lack of formal<br />
institutions. Venture capitalists monitor firms through informal ties to entrepreneurs and their<br />
families. They create links to key customers, the government and other important allied firms through<br />
personal connections, something that they stated was particularly important and essential in emerging<br />
economies.<br />
Krug (2007) states in her article that when scarcity is mentioned like the lack of (venture) capital, the<br />
reaction of entrepreneurs is that one needs to ‘know the right people’. Huge national and local<br />
bureaucracy or other groups control resources which indicate that the shortage is more a distribution<br />
problem. Who one knows is therefore a valuable asset.<br />
Diversity of local business systems across China<br />
“Business systems are distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and<br />
mode of authorative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization of, and<br />
interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees.” (Whitley, 1999)<br />
China’s economy is characterized by a variety of local business systems that are the result of the<br />
freedom that local governments have in forming their own economic regimes. Down from provincial<br />
to county and township level, the jurisdiction is not hierarchically prescribed. The local businesses<br />
interact with local governments to re-organize firms and industries in line with local institutions and<br />
due to the fact that local governments all have different regimes, the local business systems are<br />
different too. The difference in regimes is evident in the taxation of companies. Local governments<br />
are free to exempt any proportion of revenues or profits from taxation, given that the national tax rates<br />
may not be changed. Local government absorb both losses and “excess” revenues. The local<br />
government then reallocates excess revenues to organisations as investment capital, budgetary grants<br />
or public services (Walder, 1992, 1995). As a result there are companies in some local business<br />
systems that would not have existed without the “help” of the local government. These companies can<br />
have a negative impact on the Dutch start-up.<br />
Boris Peters 31
“The central government secures support from the lower administrative agencies on whose<br />
compliance the enforcement depends. Coordinated via contracts with the superior agencies or<br />
informally via networks such as authority and tax sharing systems enables local governments to<br />
capture the gains “at the margin” and thus directly profit from local economic development.” (Krug<br />
and Hendrischke, 2006) The different economic regimes of local governments and even the different<br />
economic regimes of different layers of government add to the complexity of entrepreneurship in<br />
China. This does not only affect the Dutch start-up but also the local business system in which it is<br />
operating.<br />
According to Boisot (1999) there are two major methods for handling the complexity due to diversity<br />
in local business systems across China; firstly to reduce complexity by bringing it under apparent<br />
control. Entrepreneurs endeavor to do this by securing direct control over their affiliates and sufficient<br />
external influence so as to influence critical aspects of the environment. This policy is intended to<br />
permit entrepreneurs to apply their standard policies and practices, which are well understood and<br />
compatible with their possible worldwide activities. In China, reducing reliance on partners and<br />
external relationships will lower the transaction costs of social exchange, but it is likely to raise the<br />
transaction costs of exercising direct managerial control. Moreover, this policy could be of limited<br />
effectiveness in reducing risk because it places low value on the support of local partners and may<br />
also alienate powerful officials in the institutional environment.<br />
The second option is to try to absorb the complexity of the Chinese situation through enlisting the<br />
support of local allies. This entails a greater degree of participation in local relational systems and<br />
hence raises the transaction costs of social exchange. It also engages the entrepreneur in a greater<br />
level of variance than he or she is familiar with, which may limit its ability to relate its policies and<br />
practices in China to its worldwide system.<br />
Krug and Hendrischke (2006) suggest in their article that: “The need to cope with an insecure quickly<br />
changing environment but also the lack of private savings or capital markets and the need to quickly<br />
acquire scarce market and political information make co-operation a profitable endeavour. Co-<br />
operation can take the form of an alliance with local government agencies.”<br />
Boris Peters 32
Poorly functioning markets<br />
Krug and Metha (2004) and Krug and Pólos (2004) state that the emerging Chinese market situation is<br />
characterized by poorly functioning markets and even missing markets. Information regarding the<br />
availability, price or location of resources is hard to find or even missing.<br />
Entrepreneurs in transition economies find it hard to estimate how successful technical innovations<br />
will be, or whether and how many competitors they have when production starts. Although<br />
entrepreneurs in market economies face the same uncertainty, entrepreneurs in transition economies<br />
face to additional forms of uncertainty. First, entrepreneurs in transitional markets face weak<br />
economic institutions. If economic institutions do not provide general purpose safeguards in the form<br />
of contracts, property rights and laws, uncertainty will increase. Second, if general purpose safeguards<br />
are provided but monitoring is infrequent and default behavior is not punished, uncertainty will<br />
increase too. Third, as described earlier in this thesis, the newness of the whole private business sector<br />
increases uncertainty. Dutch entrepreneurs starting up China must be aware of the fact that many<br />
Chinese companies do not have sufficiently developed routines or business practices and makes it<br />
hard to locate expertise. Moreover, many Chinese companies do not have past experience to rely on.<br />
Fourth, state owned companies that operate in certain markets can have a negative effect on the<br />
functioning of the market. State owned companies often do not need to make a profit but are<br />
operational to employ workers or provide output. Due to policy burdens such as irrational price<br />
control, redundant and retired workers, and bureaucratic intervention, profits or losses may not reflect<br />
managerial competence and effort. Therefore manager of state owned companies are not accountable<br />
for profits or losses which in turn does not provide a stimulance keep the company efficient (Peng,<br />
2001). Information about company ownership is therefore vital in order to select partners, suppliers<br />
and clients in markets.<br />
The four uncertainties combined make the use of networks and alliances necessary to obtain<br />
information about markets, technology and resources. “As there is no functioning market for assets<br />
and high level of uncertainty with respect to political and market risk, the next best institutions (to<br />
functioning capital markets) are networks which are driven by the need to seek full employment of all<br />
resources under their control, and have an incentive to expand to the degree that they are able to<br />
absorb know-how, business opportunities, and technical as well as human resources.” (Hendrischke,<br />
2004).<br />
Local officials can provide some information about markets or even resources as Oi, (1996) describes<br />
in his article: “Using information and contacts that they develop beyond the locality through their<br />
routine conduct of administrative work, local officials can provide an array of essential services to<br />
their local enterprises. This might include raw materials, but increasingly, it has become important<br />
for information about new products, technology and markets for finished goods.”<br />
Boris Peters 33
Poorly Developed Institutional Arrangements<br />
Institutional arrangements are poorly developed in China. There is a shortage in China of employment<br />
agencies, law and accountancy firms, commercial banks, insurance companies, and chambers of<br />
commerce. In 1997 there were only 6000 law firms in China (Islam and Chowdhurry, 1997). The<br />
intermediate institutions are needed to support the operation of firms and help entrepreneurs to start<br />
up (Krug and Mehta, 2004, Child and Tse, 2001). In countries with a long experience of private sector<br />
production, these agencies described earlier act as sources of information and expertise. The demand<br />
for intermediaries is especially high in negotiations between potential business partners. Although<br />
new agencies are evolving, the experience of the personnel is limited and incomplete.<br />
Because of the shortage of institutional arrangements, entrepreneurs must rely more on other<br />
entrepreneurs to gather information. Especially for emerging companies, the value of networks as a<br />
substitute for institutions is widely acknowledged. Elfrink and Hulsink (2003) state, that the network<br />
of an entrepreneur can provide opportunity recognition, legitimacy and resources. Groups or networks<br />
of business people can be used to raise capital jointly, lobby bureaucrats and politicians together,<br />
recruit managers as a group, and pool resources to invest in new ventures. Information may be<br />
exchanged at formal group meetings, in informal clubs, or at family gatherings; and members may<br />
buy and sell goods amongst themselves.<br />
Ellis (2000) also found that knowledge of foreign market opportunities is commonly acquired via<br />
interpersonal links rather than collected systematically via market research, also stressing the<br />
importance of networks in China.<br />
Resource dependancy<br />
According to the resource dependence theory, a foreign market environment is a source of scarce<br />
resources sought by competing international operating companies (Moran, 1985), and a dependency<br />
situation arises when these companies rely on irreplaceable resources controlled by local possessors<br />
(Pfeffer, 1978). The term 'resources' in this theory is extended beyond physical resources and<br />
production inputs such as natural resources, raw materials, land use, local capital and workforce to<br />
include infrastructure resources (e.g., transportation conditions), marketing resources (e.g.,<br />
distribution networks and consumer base), and information resources (e.g., internet use, openness of<br />
public information and transparency of government information).<br />
Market-seeking Dutch entrepreneurs depend not only on China's physical and infrastructure resources<br />
for local production, but also on its marketing and information resources for local operation,<br />
adaptation and expansion. Dependency on those resources can translate into power for China, who is<br />
then able to increase or withhold resources. If a Dutch firm subsidiary can therefore reduce its<br />
dependence on Chinese resources by utilizing more internal resources coming from its parent or<br />
Boris Peters 34
subsidiaries, the economic risks or transactional costs associated with resource acquisition will be<br />
substantially decreased. The reduction of external dependency requires improvements in parent-<br />
subsidiary relations on a number of fronts, notably resource support and intra-network information<br />
flow.<br />
The dynamics of competition in China are subject to interference by authorities because the economy<br />
is still state controled, a factor which foreign investors often find hard to predict. Under this condition,<br />
foreign companies have to depend heavily upon their strategic resources to compete against local<br />
rivals, especially long-established indigenous firms that in many cases maintain strong customer,<br />
supplier and distributor networks (Child et al., 2001).<br />
Social networks are very important in obtaining resources. “So long as a still huge national and local<br />
bureaucracy or other groups control resources such as much needed financial capital, land, or<br />
export-licenses, shortage appears as a distribution problem. Therefore, ‘who you know’, or guanxi is<br />
a valuable asset.” (Krug, 2007).<br />
When Dutch firms invest in China, an emerging market with an environment characterized by<br />
institutional stringency, regulatory ambiguity, structural uncertainty and a weak legal system, a<br />
reduced level of local dependence lessens their susceptibility to unverifiable and unpredictable risks<br />
that are often beyond control of the organization. Williamson (1985) therefore states that the<br />
transaction cost theory argues that when uncertainty is high, the firm should limit its commitment to<br />
the environment to a minimum.<br />
If it is possible an entrepreneur should rely as less as possible on the resources of China to reduce<br />
risks and try to develop an extensive network to obtain needed resources.<br />
Boris Peters 35
4.3 Conclusion<br />
The weak regulatory regime is a problem in the form that the regulations need to change fast to keep<br />
up with the fast developing economy and this creates uncertainty. The fact that every province or<br />
county is free to modify or manipulate and create its own regulations, the regulations are not always<br />
clear to the entrepreneur and this creates even more uncertainty. The risk of confiscation of assets, ‘ad<br />
hoc’ taxation and badly enforced regulations indicate that the control of (local) politicians should be<br />
taken into account. As enforcement of regulations are sometimes open to negotiation, the entrepreneur<br />
needs to form a social network with other entrepreneurs or government officials.<br />
The newness of private enterprise is a problem with many Chinese due to lack of experience, the<br />
absence of routines and lack of business knowledge. In the time of the planned economy, technical<br />
skills were prized above all and schools and universities were even shut down between 1966 and<br />
1976. The generation that would otherwise have been educated during this period is now between<br />
forty and sixty years old. They would otherwise have provided a major source of middle and upper<br />
managers. The social network of the entrepreneur is the only option to gain information on the<br />
background of potential customers, suppliers, business partners and employees.<br />
Property rights are incomplete and badly enforced. There are solutions to avoid the need of protection<br />
of intellectual property but the problem still remains. The granting of property rights and the<br />
protection of intellectual property mainly depends on the ‘connection’ with local jurisdictions and<br />
local government officials.<br />
The problem of obtaining capital for Dutch entrepreneurs lies in the fact that it is not possible to<br />
obtain capital from China’s commercial banking system. It is possible to obtain capital from venture<br />
capitalists. But due to institutional instability venture capitalists place greater importance on<br />
employing personal network to carry out needed activities in order to select, monitor, add value, and<br />
someday exit from their invested firms. Therefore having a large network that can be used for due<br />
diligence is needed.<br />
The diversity of local business systems is the result of different local government regimes. Having an<br />
alliance with the local government makes it possible to gain scarce market and political information,<br />
making it easier to adapt to possible changes.<br />
Poorly functioning markets are the result of difficult to find or even missing information about the<br />
availably, price or location of resources. Information about the number of competitors and clients is<br />
also limited. State owned companies can have a negative effect on the market and it is therefore<br />
important to gain information about ownership. The network with government officials and other<br />
entrepreneurs can be used to gather the information.<br />
Institutional arrangements are poorly developed and there is a shortage of institutions like law and<br />
accountancy firms, insurance companies and chambers of commerce. Entrepreneurs must therefore<br />
rely on other entrepreneurs to gather information needed to start up.<br />
Boris Peters 36
Resource Dependancy can be a problem because Chinese government controls certain resources. The<br />
economy is state controlled and sometimes difficult to predict. It is therefore wise to reduce the<br />
dependency on Chinese resources as much as possible.<br />
Boris Peters 37
5 Solutions derived from the literature<br />
In the literature discussed in chapter 4 it is stated that in many cases having a social network with<br />
other international entrepreneurs, Chinese entrepreneurs and government officials can either solve the<br />
problem or decrease the influence of the problem on the company of the entrepreneur. Ducket (2004)<br />
describes why entrepreneurs in China use their social network:<br />
“Markets for capital, labor, and information are underdeveloped, liability laws, property rights, and<br />
contracts are weak, state regulation is negotiable, certain resources remain bureaucratically<br />
controlled, and private entrepreneurs are vulnerable to political persecution. Because the private<br />
sector emerged only in the 1980’s, after almost 30 years of state planning, would-be business people<br />
face the ‘liability of newness’: they ‘have few models of entrepreneurship to imitate or adopt and little<br />
understanding of how markets work. In this environment, it is rational for them to form two kinds of<br />
alliances. They ally with state officials to make the environment more predictable and reduce risk,<br />
and they ally with other entrepreneurs both to promote ‘a stable set of expectations of “good”<br />
business behavior’ and to learn about doing business in a market economy.”<br />
Although Ducket (2004) describes why it is beneficial for Chinese entrepreneurs to use their<br />
connections with government officials and other entrepreneurs in China, having a qualitative network<br />
is beneficial for all entrepreneurs. Dubini and Aldrich (1991) describe that the network makes it<br />
possible to explore and exploit opportunities and even go as far as stating: “entrepreneurship is thus<br />
inherently a networking activity.”<br />
The social network can also offer ‘resources’, in the early phase it is necessary to access, mobilize and<br />
deploy resources in order to pursue the opportunity. Networks facilitate the search for critical asset<br />
providers like investment, technology partners and key customers. The critical asset providers in the<br />
network can offer the startup access to financial resources, production know how, distribution<br />
channel, etc. Especially in a start-up, resources need to be secured at minimum costs because paying<br />
the market price for resources such as labor, materials, advise and commitment is often too expensive.<br />
Therefore the social transactions through the network especially for entrepreneurs play a critical role<br />
when starting up (Hulsink and Elfrink, 2003).<br />
Coviello and Munro (1997) underline in their article about the network relationships and<br />
internationalization process of small firms that the relationships abroad influence the decision to<br />
internationalize. It can be concluded that the social network of the Dutch entrepreneur is very<br />
important when coping with the problems encountered when starting up in China. The social network<br />
consisting of Chinese government officials, Chinese business contacts and other entrepreneurs can<br />
reduce risk resulting from underdeveloped regulation and bureaucratically controlled resources. It<br />
Boris Peters 38
offers the possibility to explore and exploit opportunities, it offers support for the liability of newness,<br />
and it gives access to resources in order to pursue the opportunity. The problem of this conclusion is<br />
however that Ellis (2000) states that: “It is self-evident that larger, diversified firms enjoy more<br />
opportunities to exploit network ties than smaller, less connected companies.” This means that it is<br />
difficult for entrepreneurs to access social networks in China because their companies are smaller.<br />
So if the solution to many problems encountered by entrepreneurs in China lies in having a good<br />
network; another question arises which apparently haunts this thesis: How?<br />
How can entrepreneurs access and exploit networks in China?<br />
Ellis (2000) describes the methods used by decision makers to identify potential exchange partners. In<br />
his article he states that smaller firms often have domestic business networks which are smaller and<br />
less international than the networks of large companies. Therefore smaller firms place a higher<br />
priority on attending trade fairs and using third parties to come into contact with foreign networks.<br />
Trade fairs are exhibitions organized so that companies in a specific industry can showcase and<br />
demonstrate their new products and services. A trade fair offers a platform to meet new contacts and<br />
makes it possible to establish new ties with foreign networks. Ellis (2000) concludes that trade fair<br />
participation generally results in exchange partnerships being formed. According to Ellis, third parties<br />
that are mutually related like government agencies or intermediary companies, can also be beneficial<br />
in meeting new contacts.<br />
Now we found the answer on how to meet new contacts in China we need to understand how to<br />
establish a tie with the contact. Establishing a tie and especially a strong tie is difficult in China<br />
because the Chinese lay a lot of emphasis on ‘Guanxi’. As explained earlier in this thesis Guanxi can<br />
loosely be translated as ‘social / business network’ but differs in the respect that they control and<br />
influence interactions and transactions between any social actors and in particular individuals.<br />
Business networks are concerned with relationships among organizations, therefore organizations do<br />
not have ‘Guanxi’, only the individuals within the organization can have ‘Guanxi’ (Bjorkman and<br />
Kock, 1995).<br />
When the Chinese speak of heaving ‘Guanxi’ it is very difficult to disturb the contact but once<br />
disturbed it is impossible to rebuild. Therefore in order to build ‘ Guanxi’ trust is needs to be built.<br />
Given the high marginal cost of cultivating new relationships for the Chinese, it makes sense to do<br />
business first with close family, then with extended family, then neighbors, then former classmates,<br />
and only then, reluctantly, with strangers. To build up a network with Chinese is therefore very<br />
helpful but also very difficult and time consuming (Gold et al., 2002).<br />
Bjorkman and Kock (1995) state in their research that building up ‘Guanxi’ with a Chinese is very<br />
difficult for a non-Chinese because one must speak the language and ‘Guanxi’ is frequently related to<br />
Boris Peters 39
common background. The solution to this is to employ a Chinese individual from the industry in<br />
question as he or she had some access to many social relationships ranging from competitor<br />
employees to government officials, he or she can speak Mandarin or Cantonese and sometimes even a<br />
dialect. Often the Chinese employee has a common background with the new contact and is therefore<br />
able to set up ‘Guanxi’ far more easy. Bjorkman and Kock (1995) concluded that local presence of the<br />
company before starting up in the form of a representative office in China makes it able to hire a<br />
Chinese employee and is the most effective way to gain access to social network in China.<br />
Boris Peters 40
6 Qualitative Research and Results<br />
6.1 Case selection<br />
As described in chapter 3.4 only wholly owned foreign enterprises are selected for the case study<br />
because the entrepreneur has the highest degree of control and the company is physically present in<br />
China.<br />
Shane (2008) indicates in his book that generally over 55% of all start-ups will not survive the first 5<br />
years and after surviving this period the survival rate will increase. The start-up stage has certainly<br />
ended for most companies after five years but the knowledge about the problems while starting up is<br />
still ‘fresh’ in the mind of the entrepreneur. Therefore case study subjects in this thesis are not older<br />
than 5 years.<br />
The company must be a SME in order to assure that the entrepreneur has an overview on all<br />
operations of the company and therefore can provide detailed information on all aspects of the<br />
company. Moreover, as stated earlier, there can be a difference in impact of the difficulties or<br />
problems encountered in China when starting up a SME compared to large company. Large firms<br />
often have many resources like capital, expertise and experience. An entrepreneur has less financial<br />
resources, must hire expertise and has often limited experience often making the effect of the<br />
problems larger. For these reasons I presume that an entrepreneur of a SME can provide more detailed<br />
answers to my questions.<br />
The number of cases depended on the theoretical saturation, in other words; when incremental<br />
learning is becoming minimal the number of cases are enough. Due to the limited time that I lived in<br />
China the cases selected are active in different market segments. I did not know (at that time) how<br />
much Dutch entrepreneurs were active in a certain segment and to avoid data shortage I interviewed<br />
as much as entrepreneurs as possible regardless of the industry in which the entrepreneur was active. I<br />
also interviewed entrepreneurs regardless whether the company was providing a service or producing<br />
a product. I know that this could distort my findings but my reasoning is that when a company is in a<br />
start-up phase, the activities to start up are the same, which implies that the problems encountered are<br />
the same too. Making service providing companies and production companies equal.<br />
Boris Peters 41
6.2 Validation<br />
In order to gain as much knowledge as possible about entrepreneurship in China it is evident that it is<br />
best to travel to China to collect information and study the cases. Therefore I travelled to China<br />
(Shanghai) and started to work for a big Dutch company (Hunter Douglas). In my spare time a tried to<br />
interview as much people as possible to fully understand which problems and challenges one<br />
encounters when starting up in China and which solutions can be used to overcome these problems<br />
and challenges. I also travelled to Beijing, Hong Kong and Shenzhen to interview entrepreneurs in<br />
order to discover possible regional differences in problems or solutions.<br />
Before choosing the cases and conducting the interviews I first started in the same way an<br />
entrepreneur would start when setting up a company in China because in doing this I came into<br />
contact with the right people to ask questions to. Because of this approach it is also possible to gain<br />
information from different sources and not only from entrepreneurs.<br />
The first interviewee was the Economic Consul at the Dutch Consulate in Shanghai because most<br />
entrepreneurs start here. I gained information about how the Dutch government supports Dutch<br />
entrepreneurs starting up in China and what problems most entrepreneurs encounter when starting up.<br />
The Dutch Consulate in Shanghai offers the same services as the Netherlands Business Support<br />
Offices (NBSO) in other developing countries. The Dutch Consulate can act as an intermediary<br />
between the Chinese government and the entrepreneur and it is also possible to come into contact with<br />
other entrepreneurs with the help of the Consulate. The consul advised me to interview consultants,<br />
lawyers, recruiters and accountants.<br />
During my interviews it became evident that most Dutch entrepreneurs use consultants to gain advice<br />
on legal, financial or human resource topics because in most cases the time and knowledge of the<br />
entrepreneur is limited. Therefore I had interviews in Shanghai with three law firms (Yunhe Lawfirm,<br />
CMS Legal and Holthuis Advocaten), a bank (Fortis), an accountancy firm (Deloitte & Touche), a<br />
recruiter (Randstad) and two housing/location agencies (DTZ and SIP) to gain as much as information<br />
possible.<br />
Because of the background information on how the mentioned institutions help entrepreneurs starting<br />
up in China I could verify if the research questions were the right questions in order to provide<br />
solutions to the problems and challenges encountered when starting up in China. Interviewed two<br />
well-known China consultants that specialize in advising entrepreneurs who are starting up in China;<br />
Sinova and Eastwingate. Both consultants were also the owner of the company, which makes them<br />
entrepreneurs too. The consultants were able to indicate what problems are encountered most and<br />
Boris Peters 42
what solutions they provide to these problems. Because of the valuable information I decided to add<br />
their responses into this theses in the form of two cases.<br />
Finally I interviewed seven Dutch entrepreneurs who started up in China and asked them about the<br />
problems they encountered when starting up in China and what solutions they came up with during<br />
the process. I used three companies as a case for this thesis.<br />
I gained access to he entrepreneurs through the tight network of Dutch expats and entrepreneurs in<br />
Shanghai.<br />
Boris Peters 43
6.3 interview set up and analysis<br />
Based on the literature study and interviews with the consultants I made a questionnaire with open<br />
questions as needed for qualitative research. I did not choose for closed ended questions as I am<br />
interested in exploring possible other solutions to the stated solutions in the literature. I am also<br />
interested in deepening my knowledge about the stated solutions which is difficult when choosing<br />
closed ended questions.<br />
The interviews were all conducted personally and face-to-face in order keep the interaction as<br />
spontaneous as possible. I kept the interference to a minimum while finding answers to my questions.<br />
The interviews all took more than two hours and sometimes even more therefore the reports of the<br />
interviews are summaries of the interviews. After finishing the summaries the respondents were given<br />
the opportunity to comment on the report to guaranty the quality of the results.<br />
6.4 Schematic overview of selected cases<br />
Company KOW<br />
Company<br />
type<br />
Architecten<br />
Industry Architectural<br />
Year of<br />
startup<br />
Employees<br />
in China<br />
Total<br />
employees<br />
Title / Name<br />
of<br />
entrepreneur<br />
Location of<br />
compay<br />
Lensvelt /<br />
Gispen<br />
Beumer<br />
Agritech<br />
Sinova Easwingate<br />
Service Production Production Service Service<br />
Interior design Flower<br />
Cultivation<br />
Business<br />
Consultancy<br />
Business<br />
2006 2004 2002 2002 2005<br />
14 90 20 22 5<br />
170 400 50 27 15<br />
Director<br />
Ron de Goeij<br />
Director<br />
Hans Lensvelt<br />
Director<br />
Rienk Hamstra<br />
Director<br />
Jennifer Chan<br />
Consultancy<br />
Director<br />
Ari van der<br />
Steenhoven<br />
Shanghai Taicang Shenyang Hong Kong Shanghai<br />
Boris Peters 44
6.5 Case studies<br />
Case #1: Kow Architecten<br />
Overview<br />
KOW architects started out of a merger between two architect firms in 1998. The expansion of the<br />
company was mainly done through mergers and acquisitions; from their start four more companies<br />
joined KOW.<br />
There are five disciplines in which KOW delivers services:<br />
Architecture (designing new buildings), Urban Planning (designing public space, landscape etc.),<br />
Urban Renewal (new construction, renovation, restoration), Interior Design (design of interior) and<br />
Communication (marketing concepts).<br />
The architect firm has about 170 employees and a turnover of 14 million euro.<br />
The entrepreneur<br />
Ron de Goeij (1967) started his own architect firm in in Den Bosch and he also had a company that<br />
was fabricating portable dressing rooms. The portable dressing rooms could, for instance, be used for<br />
sport events on location. Ron de Goeij was on a trading mission to China to explore the opportunities<br />
to sell or manufacture his portable dressing rooms when he met Arend Hilhorst who is the director of<br />
KOW.<br />
It turned out that KOW wanted to expand into the “achterhoek” in Holland and was also looking for<br />
someone who had an international orientation to help KOW expand internationally. Ron de Goeij had<br />
an interest in doing business abroad and looked for opportunities to grow his architect firm in Den<br />
Bosch. Therefore Ron de Goeij merged his firm with KOW and became director of ‘KOW<br />
International’ and was assigned to set up an office in Shanghai. Mr. de Goeij still sees himself as an<br />
entrepreneur because he exploring new possibilities and is involved in setting up new businesses for<br />
the company.<br />
Activities in China<br />
The main goal of KOW is to serve the Chinese market, and they already do so by realizing a huge<br />
project in ChengDu, the Chengdu Electrical Power Centre and a 5-star Hotel together with another<br />
Chinese architect company. Although the profit do not cover the expenses yet, Mr. de Goeij is already<br />
very optimistic because Chinese architects do not have as much knowledge about sustainable<br />
building. KOW can offer service to the Chinese government in advising about enhancing the<br />
Boris Peters 45
durability of a building. Isolation and double glass is still a novelty in new buildings but saving<br />
energy is slowly getting into the minds of the Chinese people as commodities prices rise.<br />
Increasingly more Chinese investors are also exploring the possibilities to build in Holland, by having<br />
an office in China it is possible to serve these clients but this is not he case yet. However, not having<br />
many Chinese clients yet does not form a problem to KOW as it uses the difference in time between<br />
Holland and China to continuously work on design projects. The cost of designing a project is<br />
therefore lower and projects are finished in a shorter time period.<br />
Starting up in China<br />
In 2006 ‘KOW international’ was founded. The reason for this decision lies in the fact that KOW is<br />
becoming quite large for an architect firm and there are not enough projects to grow the turnover as<br />
they want to. By serving more markets and attracting more foreign clients it is possible to grow their<br />
turnover in a healthy rate. Currently KOW is in the process of setting up an office in Istanbul (Turkey)<br />
and is orientating to set up an office in India, South-Africa and Great Britain.<br />
In 2006 KOW opened an representative office in Shanghai; China. The office was obtained with the<br />
help of ‘Science Alliance’, this intermediary organisation works closely together with universities,<br />
companies and governments to stimulate cooperation and knowledge transfer. As a part of the ‘South<br />
Holland-Shanghai Pudong Co-Innovation Program’, Chinese companies were stimulated to set up<br />
business in Holland and in return KOW was one of the Dutch companies that could start up their<br />
representative office in Shanghai for free for a certain period of time.<br />
Mr. de Goeij states that it is very difficult to understand which formalities are needed to fulfil in order<br />
to start up a business in China. It is possible to hire consultants that assist the start up but this is very<br />
expensive because most of them take advantage of the limited knowledge of the entrepreneur about<br />
legal formalities in China. Many business licences need to be written in the Chinese language and<br />
instructions for filling in the licence application forms are also mostly written in Chinese. The<br />
licences needed differ depending on the location in China. The licences not only differ depending on<br />
the county but can even differ across districts within cities. The fact that it is very difficult to estimate<br />
the quality of the consultant because of limited information makes choosing the right consultant even<br />
more difficult.<br />
The ‘incubator program’ was very helpful for KOW because ‘Science Alliance’ helped in providing<br />
an office location, business licences, financial and legal services. From their small representative<br />
office they could now focus on hiring new employees, search for a possible business partners and<br />
Boris Peters 46
setting up a wholly owned entity. The first months the only activity of Mr. de Goeij was to build up a<br />
network with other entrepreneurs and business people in order to gain information about starting up a<br />
business in China.<br />
KOW already had some contacts with the Tongji University because of the political past of Arend<br />
Hilhorst (director KOW) and through these contacts KOW placed advertisements with vacancies in on<br />
the internet site of the department of architecture of the university. Through the contacts with the<br />
members of Tongji university Mr. de Goeij met with a Chinese architect that just finished her study<br />
and worked as an architect for the university. She spoke fluently English and understood the goals of<br />
KOW and could provide a lot of expertise on the Chinese market and help in selecting new employees<br />
for KOW. They offered her a job to work as an architect for KOW and help setting up their business.<br />
From the start of setting up a business in China, KOW wanted to set up a wholly owned entity. Mr. de<br />
Goeij explains that it is difficult to cooperate with a Dutch architect office so it must be merely<br />
impossible to a joint venture with a Chinese architect office due to business culture problems,<br />
language problems, etc. The positive aspects of having a joint venture with a Chinese company do not<br />
outweigh the negative aspects for KOW.<br />
When KOW wanted to set up a wholly owned entity, they asked a Dutch law firm to arrange all the<br />
business licenses but this was far to costly as they charged 25.000 euros. Mr. de Goeij knew some<br />
other entrepreneurs that used a Chinese law firm to arrange the business licenses and other formalities<br />
that were needed to set up a business, so they used this law firm which charged only 10% of the price<br />
of the Dutch law firm.<br />
Eventually a location was found and through the network of the new Chinese employee they hired<br />
more employees, she even helped assessing the new employees. To use an new employee as a basis to<br />
attract and select other new employee is risky says Mr. de Goeij but if you have great deal of trust in<br />
the person, it is the best and cheapest solution. In the summer of 2007, only one year after the first<br />
visit to China, the office of KOW was opened by the Dutch minister of foreign trade; Frank<br />
Heemskerk. The KOW office in Shanghai now has 14 employees.<br />
Difficulties and solutions when starting up:<br />
-Weak regulatory regime<br />
The problem with the weak regulatory regime of China is the fact that it is also a totalitarian regime.<br />
This means that it is only possible to have influence on regulation if you organize in massive numbers<br />
and even then, your influence will be small. If the government decides to change the regulation, the<br />
Boris Peters 47
only thing KOW can do is react fast. A great deal of time is spend on interpreting government<br />
statements and press releases in order to forecast what will happen. There are regulations that are a<br />
barrier to non-Chinese firms; to design a structure that will be built in China, a Chinese architect<br />
certificate is needed. The certificate is only granted to Chinese citizens. Therefore the first employee<br />
that KOW hired was an architect with this certificate. In some cases the regulation forces KOW to<br />
work together with other Chinese architect firms. This is not a great obstacle because it is very<br />
common for architect firms to work together on a project. Hiring a Chinese employee was helpful to<br />
understand regulations and political situations.<br />
-Newness of private enterprise<br />
The generation that is finishing the university is the first generation that grew up with an<br />
understanding and education in private enterprise and open market economy. The interest in the<br />
western economy and way of living also makes the new generation a very valuable resource. Many<br />
Chinese students also followed an education abroad making them well educated in private enterprise<br />
and open market economy. Most of the employees at KOW Shanghai are under 30 years of age and<br />
recruited through the network of the Chinese employees. The first employees were selected with help<br />
from the first Chinese employee.<br />
-Incomplete property rights<br />
The design work of buildings is very specific so intellectual property theft is not an issue.<br />
-Obtaining capital<br />
KOW did not need to lend capital from Chinese institutions because KOW Holland had enough<br />
capital to fund the startup.<br />
-Diversity of local business systems in China<br />
Research on a local business system is an important activity for KOW. Before a project is accepted it<br />
is researched what kind of licences are needed in the area, what regulation apply to the project and<br />
how the local government interacts with the project. The local government is heavily involved in<br />
many projects in China and often it difficult to understand in what way the government is involved<br />
and who makes the decisions.<br />
In China government officials have great respect it is therefore very helpful that one of the directors of<br />
KOW; Arend Hilhorst, is the former city councilman of The Hague and advisor of the Dutch Prime<br />
Minister. Through his network it possible to get more information from local Chinese government<br />
personnel. A great portion of information can also be gathered through the network of the Chinese<br />
employees.<br />
Boris Peters 48
-Poorly functioning Chinese markets<br />
It can be difficult to find new projects for KOW due to the fact that projects are often communicated<br />
through Chinese networks. The network of the employees is mostly used in gathering market<br />
information.<br />
-Poorly developed institutional arrangements<br />
In Holland KOW uses the ABN-Amro to arrange all their financial operations and they also wanted to<br />
use the services of the ABN-Amro in China. KOW needed a bank account for their transactions but<br />
this turned out to be very difficult as foreign banks can not deliver the same services as Chinese banks<br />
due to Chinese regulations. It took many months only to open an account with the ABN-Amro. A<br />
business associate in China recommended a Chinese bank and KOW used this bank to open an<br />
account which took only 4 days. This example indicates that through the network of business<br />
associates it is possible to overcome poorly developed institutional arrangements.<br />
The exchange program offered a lot of help when KOW started as a representative office, the Chinese<br />
government assisted in appointing the right institutions and supplied information on the needed<br />
licenses.<br />
-Dependency on Chinese resources<br />
KOW is a service providing company so does not depend on physical resources. Although resources<br />
like market data is incomplete or difficult to obtain this is not a problem because this is the same for<br />
the competitors.<br />
-Additional problems and challenges<br />
It takes a long time to get all the necessary business licences and often you can not obtain certain<br />
licences before first obtaining other licences. KOW needed a letter from their landlord to obtain a tax<br />
certificate, the landlord was unreachable for a long period and this held up all other licences. When<br />
starting up in China it is important to be flexible in the time to start up. It is best to stay for a long time<br />
period in China while starting up so it is possible to deal with difficulties on site and on time.<br />
Solutions derived from the literature<br />
-networking with other, non-Chinese, business people<br />
When it was known that KOW had an office in Shanghai there was attention from the media in<br />
Holland and KOW tried to communicate as much as possible that they were operational in China.<br />
Business people that were also operational in China felt ‘connected’ with KOW and it is very easy to<br />
build up a network. In China many events are organised by the Dutch government, trade<br />
Boris Peters 49
organisations, other companies, etc. The main objective with these events is to meet new contacts and<br />
this is done much more enthusiastically compared to events in Holland.<br />
-setting up alliance/networks with Chinese government officials<br />
As stated before the Chinese have a deep-rooted respect for government officials therefore the<br />
network of Arend Hilhorst (director KOW and former city councilman of The Hague and advisor of<br />
the Prime Minister) is very useful. When KOW opened their office in Shanghai, the Dutch Minister<br />
for Foreign Trade, Frank Heemskerk, was asked to officially open their office. At the opening also<br />
Chinese government officials were present and through these officials KOW established their<br />
presence. In many activities KOW tries to involve Dutch government officials to attract Chinese<br />
government officials and trough this involvement a network with Chinese government officials can be<br />
build up. The Dutch government in Shanghai is not only very helpful in co-operating with Dutch<br />
companies in events nut also organises many events where it possible to meet Chinese government<br />
officials.<br />
-building a network with Chinese business people<br />
The network of the Chinese KOW employees can be very useful in meeting Chinese business people.<br />
Because of previous jobs in the design industry many KOW employees often already have contacts<br />
within the industry. According to Mr. de Goeij Expo’s and trade fairs are a way get into contact with<br />
Chinese industry insiders.<br />
Additional information<br />
Mr. de Goeij stresses the fact that an entrepreneur should keep in mind that setting up a company in<br />
China takes much more time than in Holland and also acquires a lot of devotion of the entrepreneur in<br />
the form that he needs to be physically present.<br />
Boris Peters 50
Case #2: Lensvelt Interieur<br />
Overview<br />
Lensvelt interior was founded in the 60’s and started with the sale of barber seats. Nowadays Lensvelt<br />
designs and produces project furniture for all purposes. Due to the modular construction it is possible<br />
to produce made-to-measure products. The company works closely together with leading designers,<br />
architects and artists. Lensvelt tries to produce high quality fashionable furniture for a reasonable<br />
price.<br />
In 2004 Mr. Lensvelt opened a wholly owned factory in Taicang (Suzhou Antriol Sheet Metal<br />
Production) to produce labour intensive components. In 2006 Lenvelt merged with furniture producer<br />
Gispen on the basis of a shares exchange in order to create synergy and to grow faster. Gispen wanted<br />
to produce and sell in China and Lensvelt wanted to grow faster. The companies are now lead by a<br />
single board of directors but the brand names and companies remained unchanged. Because of the<br />
combination of the two office furnishers, the new merger now has the second largest market share in<br />
the Benelux.<br />
The entrepreneur<br />
Hans Lensvelt (1959) started working in his father’s factory in 1985 after his graduation as an<br />
engineer. In 1990 he took over the shares of his father. Mr. Lensvelt owned a couple of metal working<br />
factories in Holland and later also in Taicang (China) after the merge with Gispen the factories were<br />
sold to the management. The factories had several clients and one of them was Lensvelt himself. After<br />
the merge the production of the Lensvelt furniture was brought over to Gispen’s production facility in<br />
Culemborg (Holland). This created a lack of capacity in Culemborg but this capacity was found in the<br />
Taicang Factory.<br />
The company grew from 40 fte’s to 400 fte’s. Lensvelt is the creative director bij Gispen, co-founder<br />
of Moooi, CEO of Lensvelt and founder of the Suzhou Antriol Sheet Metal Production in China. Mr.<br />
Lensvelt is now planning to permanently settle in Shanghai.<br />
Activities in China<br />
Mr. Lensvelt just started production of labor intensive components in Taicang that are shipped to<br />
Holland and used for the production of furniture. Beside that the company is already producing<br />
similar products for similar companies as Lensvelt and Gispen all over the world. Mr. Lensvelt<br />
explains that the focus is now on the start of producing complete products so the company can start<br />
serving the high end Chinese market. Currently there are 90 employees working in China and in order<br />
to scale up production, the goal is to grow to 200 employees within two years.<br />
Boris Peters 51
Starting up in China<br />
Mr. Lensvelt attended a European convention on interior design and heard about the increasing threat<br />
of Chinese furniture manufacturers who want to supply to the Western market. Not wanting to wait<br />
until his Chinese competitors were already selling in Holland, Mr. Lensvelt send ten business<br />
associates an email with the request for Chinese contacts to set up a manufacturing facility in China.<br />
He came into contact with three possible options and visited the sites together with a Chinese female<br />
interpreter. The contacts turned out to be not very reliable and in the last days of his stay in China he<br />
wanted to visit Taicang, a city that he heard about during his stay.<br />
Mr. Lensvelt came into contact with the local vice mayor of Taicang through a mutual business<br />
friend. The vice mayor offered Mr. Lensvelt a site of 20.000 square meters on the condition that Mr.<br />
Lensvelt would register as a Wholly Foreign Owned Company. In return the vice mayor asked: a<br />
registered capital of minimum 3 million euro, everything according the law. (Meaning no corruption),<br />
high technology, no pollution, certain substance/scale.<br />
Mr. Lensvelt accepted the offer and also hired his female translator (Xiongying) to set up the factory.<br />
Mr. Lensvelt was very impressed by the female translator because she was extremely intelligent,<br />
spoke excellent English and it turned out she had very good negotiation skills.<br />
The vice mayor also offered a temporary office space in his local government office and even brought<br />
Lensvelt in contact with suppliers, contractors, and even other government officials. Sometimes the<br />
vice mayor even supported in the negotiations, for instance when the landlord of a rented building<br />
charged too much for the electric power installation.<br />
Within months the factory was built and the translator is now the vice - general manager of the factory<br />
in Taicang.<br />
Difficulties and solutions when starting up:<br />
-Weak regulatory regime<br />
It is impossible to have any influence on the decision making in Beijing the only thing that can be<br />
influenced is the enforcement of the regulation on a local level. However according to Mr. Lensvelt<br />
this is exactly what can get entrepreneurs into trouble because a ‘special deal’, that is agreed upon<br />
with a local government official can be changed by his successor because government officials<br />
change post and positions frequently. When having a factory in China one must also keep in mind that<br />
the machinery, building, stock, etcetera are a very high investment and this is not something that an<br />
entrepreneur want to have seized by the Chinese government because of ‘playing with the rules’.<br />
Boris Peters 52
A good honest relation with local government officials is the key in getting help when, for instance,<br />
regulation changes. It is much more helpful if government officials can advice what to do when<br />
certain regulation changes and requirements must be met. In a less developed location it is much<br />
easier to get into contact with high ranking local government officials. Mr. Lensvelt states that if there<br />
is a problem he can arrange a dinner with the local mayor within a few days and the problem will<br />
probably be solved.<br />
-Newness of private enterprise<br />
Chinese employees that have studied abroad are most often very interested in the ‘western way of<br />
doing business’. Mr. Lensvelt is very impressed by the Chinese and he describes Chinese employees<br />
as very hard workers who are smart and well educated. Mr. Lensvelt states that he did not encounter<br />
the problem of newness of private enterprise with higher educated employees. Hiring the female<br />
translator made it possible to test the competence of new employees by her, she hired the first<br />
employees.<br />
Many factory employees are not used to work efficiently because they worked in state owned<br />
enterprises. Because state owned companies did not need to make profit, efficiency was not needed.<br />
The newness of private enterprise is only a problem with hiring low educated employees. However,<br />
labor is very cheap so it is not an issue that some activities are not done efficiently.<br />
-Incomplete property rights<br />
Fighting copying competitors is useless according to Lensvelt because the enforcement of intellectual<br />
property rights is very bad. Mr. Lensvelt states that, if even big companies like Hugo Boss and Prada<br />
can not protect their products from imitation, he will not be able to do so either.<br />
Lensvelt will produce complete products in China within 6 months from now and will serve the<br />
Chinese market. Mr. Lensvelt wants to serve a niche market with very high quality products for a<br />
reasonable price. Mr. Lensvelt is confident that he can compete with Chinese producers on price and<br />
quality which makes it less attractive for Chinese producers to copy his product. When the product is<br />
copied he will use his contacts with the local government of Taicang to enforce regulations on the<br />
infringer. He will probably not go to court to enforce the regulations due to high costs and possible<br />
limited outcome.<br />
-Obtaining capital<br />
Lensvelt had enough financial reserves to set up the factory in Taichang.<br />
Boris Peters 53
-Diversity of local business systems in China<br />
Mr Lensvelt states that he knows that there are many differences in the local business systems in<br />
China but due to the help of the local government in Taicang and the skills of their Chinese general<br />
manager they did not have any problems with the local business system. Because they knew exactly<br />
how to set up the company.<br />
-Poorly functioning Chinese markets<br />
Lensvelt does not yet supply to the Chinese market the knowledge about this problem is limited<br />
however Mr Lensvelt states that gaining market information is difficult due to the fact that regulations<br />
are badly enforced and information is not reliable. For instance in Holland almost every company has<br />
an internet site and information given on the internet site must be true.<br />
Information about the company can also be checked at the Chamber of Commerce. In China<br />
manufacturers can state anything they want on the internet site because the information can not be<br />
verified and if the information is wrong it can not be punished. Many manufacturers state they<br />
manufacture certain products while they actually buy the products from another manufacturer. The<br />
network of the employees and government officials can therefore offer the most reliable information<br />
about competitors, suppliers and buyers. Also other business people can offer information about<br />
markets.<br />
-Poorly developed institutional arrangements<br />
This was not a problem for Lensvelt because all the arrangements were done with help of the local<br />
government and the Chinese general manager; they knew which institutions to contact.<br />
-Dependency on Chinese resources<br />
Mr. Lensvelt states that all his competitors are mostly dependent on the same resources as he is and<br />
that he need to pay more or less the same for the resources.<br />
Oil, steel, plastics, electricity, etc can be bought in the Chinese market by him and his competitors.<br />
For instance; an increase in steel price has effect on the whole market so this does not only pose a<br />
problem for Lensvelt but also for his competitors.<br />
The only problem for Lensvelt regarding resources can be the infrastructure in which the resources are<br />
supplied. China can control the infrastructure and that can create a problem.<br />
It happened to Lensvelt that the road in front of the factory was under construction but nobody was<br />
working on it thereby stopping all transportation to the factory. Mr. Lensvelt told the vice mayor<br />
about his problem, the next day a hundred road workers were working on the road and within a day<br />
the road was accessible again.<br />
Boris Peters 54
-Additional problems and challenges<br />
It is very difficult to set up a company or factory in China without the help of a Chinese citizen. One<br />
needs someone to translate, help set up the business, and gather contacts. The biggest problem of all is<br />
to find someone to help set up the business and to trust that person to do so.<br />
Solutions derived from the literature<br />
-networking with other, non-Chinese, business people<br />
It is very easy to meet other business people on trade missions but trade fairs and fairs can be a very<br />
valuable way to meet new people. In China there are thousands of fairs and trade fairs every year.<br />
There are also special networking events organised by companies or entrepreneurs. Mr Lensvelt states<br />
that he was amazed about the amount of networking events held in Shanghai every day.<br />
-setting up alliance/networks with Chinese government officials<br />
As stated earlier it is very easy to come into contact with government officials in a smaller less<br />
developed region. It is also very beneficial to hire a Chinese employee to help set up the business,<br />
however to find someone who can perform such task is difficult. Meeting people who are in the same<br />
industry can lead to a contact with such a person.<br />
The fact that the company brings employment to the local area and is a showcase for foreign investors<br />
makes it very easy to come into contact with government officials.<br />
-building a network with Chinese business people<br />
For meeting Chinese business people trade fairs and network events are very helpful but the Chinese<br />
lay a lot of emphasis on trust. Mr lensvelt staes that Chinese are very cautious in trusting foreigners<br />
because they have difficulty to understand foreigners. When a Chinese employee is hired to help set<br />
up the business it is easy to build up a network with business people because it is much easier to<br />
communicate.<br />
Additional information<br />
When doing business in China it is needed to listen to the ‘gut feeling’ or ‘entrepreneurial instinct’.<br />
The Chinese are far more emotionally involved when doing business and are very focussed in getting<br />
to know who their business partner is and how he behaves. In a land where contracts are at best<br />
peaces of paper to remember what is agreed upon, knowing you partner is very important. Dutch<br />
entrepreneurs or business people tend to exclude their emotions as much as possible when doing<br />
business but when doing business with a Chinese this can have a negative effect.<br />
Boris Peters 55
Mr. Lensvelt stresses the fact that the local Chinese government makes it very easy for entrepreneurs<br />
when a foreign company is started that brings employment to the local area, is stimulating to the local<br />
economy, and is environmental friendly. The mentioned benefits to the Chinese economy are points<br />
that government officials want to achieve and thus are the intentions of the company in line with their<br />
political agenda. The company can be used as a showcase for other foreign investors and therefore the<br />
chance of failure is reduced.<br />
.<br />
Boris Peters 56
Case #3: Holland Beumer Agritech<br />
Overview<br />
In 1993 Gert-Jan Beumer starts a company that grows tries and specialises in horticultural architecture<br />
and paving. In 2002 Mr. Beumer also starts to export flower bulbs to China. Beumer Agritech was<br />
founded by Rienk Hamstra and Gert-Jan Beumer in 2002.<br />
The entrepreneur<br />
Mr. Hamstra started an employment agency together with a friend. Eventually he sold the<br />
employment agency and lived a large part of his life in Asia. From 1996 Mr. Hamstra and a<br />
Taiwanese friend started trading mostly in clothing and later in spare parts for power stations in<br />
China. In 2003 he began working for a subsidiary of Hunter Douglas in Holland but moved to China<br />
in 2007 to work for Hunter Douglas. He was actively involved in the start up of Beumer Agritech in<br />
2002 because of his experience in China he is still director of Beumer Agritech but the day to day<br />
activities are now ran by his Taiwanese friend.<br />
Starting up in China<br />
Mr. Hamstra was importing spare parts for power stations in China. During a business dinner<br />
somebody asked him what his nationality was and when Mr. Hamstra replied that he was Dutch, the<br />
Chinese man replied that he knew that Holland was famous for trading in flowers and asked if he<br />
could also import flower bulbs. Coincidentally, the father in law of Mr. Hamstra; Mr. Beumer, was in<br />
the horticultural business in Holland and therefore Mr. Hamstra replied that he could do so. Mr.<br />
Hamstra thought the man was joking but the next day the Chinese man called back and asked about<br />
the price. After consultation with his father in law he stated that the first shipment should be paid<br />
before delivery. Within a day the Chinese man called back and asked the number of the bank account.<br />
And from that day in 2000 Mr. Hamstra and Mr. Beumer were doing business in China.<br />
In 2001 Mr. Beumer and Mr. Hamstra wanted to investigate the horticultural market and the<br />
possibility of a joint venture with a Chinese state owned horticultural company. They decided not to<br />
form a joint venture with the Chinese company due to the limited control resulting from a joint<br />
venture.<br />
In 2005 Mr. Beumer and Mr. Hamstra supplied flower bulbs to a horticultural exposition in Shenyang<br />
and there they met with the son of the local mayor who offered them a low tax region and help in<br />
setting up their company. Due to their research they knew about the flower market in China and<br />
decided to start up a wholly foreign owned enterprise in Shenyang.<br />
Boris Peters 57
Activities in China<br />
The core activities of Holland Beumer Agritech is the trade of flower bulbs, cultivation of flower<br />
bulbs, technical support to the clients for cultivation, and organising flower festivals for product<br />
promotion.<br />
Difficulties and solutions when starting up:<br />
-Weak regulatory regime<br />
A weak regulatory regime can also be an advantage because, as stated before, the mayor wanted to<br />
stimulate the foreign investments in the area. The Chinese government wants to increase the income<br />
of the Chinese farmers and foreign investments like Beumer Agritech delivers knowledge, labour and<br />
economic impulse to the region. The company is also non polluting. The fact that a foreign company<br />
invests in the region also means status for the government officials. The local government is therefore<br />
very helpful in setting up the company and that is why all the required business licences were<br />
arranged by the son of the vice mayor.<br />
When Beumer Agritech was searching for a location the son of the mayor offered them a low tax<br />
location at a technology development area that he was managing. When Mr. Hamstra said that the rent<br />
for such a high tech location was too high and that Beumer Agritech was not meeting the<br />
requirements of a high tech company the son of the mayor replied that they didn’t need to worry about<br />
rent and that according to him Beumer Agritech was a high tech company. This deal worked both<br />
ways; the son of the mayor had a new opening of a foreign company on his development area and<br />
Beumer Agritech had a low taxation. In this case the diversity of the local business system is an<br />
advantage but one must be sure that the goals of the local government are in line with that of the<br />
company. If problems arise, the local mayor has the ability to influence enforcement of regulations.<br />
-Newness of private enterprise<br />
A Taiwanese general manager can offer a bridging function between the ’western way’ and ’Chinese<br />
way’ of doing business. The Taiwanese have traded with the West and with the Chinese for hundreds<br />
of years because they are an independent region. Taiwanese can speak Chinese and English and also<br />
have a good eductional system. Taiwan is a democratic republic and has a dynamic kapitalist market<br />
economy with gradually decreasing guidance of investment and foreign trade by the government. This<br />
means that the Taiwanese are not new to private enterprise but also understand how to do business in<br />
China because of their trading relations with China. Therefore the general maneger of Beumer<br />
Agritech is Taiwanese.<br />
Boris Peters 58
For production it is very important to set up very detailed regulations and procedures so the<br />
employees know exactly what to do and what not to do. Inspection is also very important because this<br />
is what the Chinese are used to.<br />
-Incomplete property rights<br />
In Holland there is a ‘cultivation right’ which means that the cultivator of a certain species has the<br />
sole right to trade the seed of that species. The cultivator can grant the user a licence and ask for a fee.<br />
In China this right does not exist so it is possible for a Chinese horticulturist to reproduce the species<br />
without paying a fee. This makes it important for the Dutch flower bulb growers that this ‘cultivation<br />
right’ is established by the Chinese government. However the Chinese government has a dilemma of<br />
granting the demand of the rich westerners or the interests of the poor farmers in China. The Chinese<br />
government has the goal to raise the income of the farmers high on the political agenda in order to<br />
keep social stability and development. This makes the Chinese government reluctant to do anything<br />
about the ‘cultivation right’ situation because half a billion unsatisfied Chinese farmers is not only bad<br />
for the country but also for the world economy.<br />
The solution is to export flowers instead of flower bulbs but this is less attractive because of the fact<br />
that the risk of damage to the flower is higher and the transportation time must be very short and thus<br />
increasing costs. The exporter has to decide if the risk of copying is worth the higher profit margin.<br />
-Obtaining capital<br />
Beumer Agritech had enough financial reserves to set up the company without obtaining capital<br />
externally.<br />
-Diversity of local business systems in China<br />
It can be difficult to understand who has the decision power when negotiating with government<br />
officials or business partners. Hierarchy is very important in China, small projects are done on a lower<br />
level with employees and the management does bigger projects. The difficulty in uncovering the<br />
decision power makes the diversity in business systems even more difficult to understand. As stated<br />
before Mr. Hamstra explains that an ‘expert’ was needed to bridge the gap between the Chinese and<br />
the management of Beumer Agritech. The Taiwanese friend of Mr. Hamstra could fill this gap and<br />
therefore is the general manager of Beumer Agritech.<br />
Boris Peters 59
As stated before the son of the local mayor was also very helpful in setting up the business. He<br />
supplied valuable information about certain individuals to contact and about the connections between<br />
individuals.<br />
-Poorly functioning Chinese markets<br />
Mr. Hamstra wanted to know more about the flower trade market and choose to investigate the area<br />
around the city Shenyang which is known for its horticulture. There is very little reliable data on<br />
about the local horticultural market because transactions are rarely computerised moreover only a few<br />
market research companies exist in the horticultural industry. Collecting market data had to be done<br />
by Beurmer Agritech themselves. Mr. Hamstra asked for a PESP (Programma Economische<br />
Samenwerkings Projecten) at the department of economic affairs in Holland. A PESP is a contribution<br />
made by the Dutch government to do a feasibility research for a joint venture. The PESP was granted<br />
and thereby it was possible to do cheap research. Due to this research local state owned horticultural<br />
companies and local flower farmers were identified. Not many entrepreneurs know about the<br />
possibility of government sponsorship. Although the joint venture between Beumer Agritech and the<br />
Chinese company was never completed, the study offered reliable information.<br />
Beumer Agritech cultivates flower bulbs in China to gain credibility from the Chinese buyers and to<br />
keep ‘feeling’ with the market. Flower bulbs of Beumer Agritech are also set out by Beumer Agritech<br />
themselves by the Chinese farmers for free but the profit of the sale of flowers is then shared. The<br />
farmer has less risk and Beumer Agritech knows how much is sold. Because Beumer Agritech works<br />
together with the farmers, they also know the prices and stocks of the competitors because the farmers<br />
supply this information.<br />
-Poorly developed institutional arrangements<br />
There is a shortage in institutional arrangements in less developed economic regions. This means that<br />
entrepreneurs must rely on government ties. As stated before; when the goals of the local government<br />
are compatible with the goals of the company, the local government will help the company to start up.<br />
In the case of Beumer Agritech the son of the local Chinese mayor arranged all the proceedings to<br />
start up the company.<br />
-Dependency on Chinese resources<br />
The limited infrastructure is the reason why the Chinese are very dependent on their network, the<br />
problem lies more in the infrastructure needed for the transportation of resources. For instance road<br />
construction is done by the local government and it is possible that a road in front of the company is<br />
broken open for weeks because of a dispute with the local government. The resources are there but<br />
can not be transported. Electricity can be cut of because certain ‘taxes’ are not paid. In China the<br />
Boris Peters 60
producers do not have any power, the power lies in the network of knowledge, market and rights. This<br />
stresses the need to cooperate with the buyers to get access to the network which can supply<br />
information. A lot of time must be invested in the strengthening of the network ties by inviting buyers<br />
or local government officials to dinners or trips. Before Beumer Agritech started up in China they<br />
attended many delegations to China and supported delegations from China that visited Holland.<br />
-Additional problems and challenges<br />
Corruption is still a huge deep-rooted problem in China. Building ‘Guanxi’ means that it is sometimes<br />
necessary to give presents to certain people. There is a thin line between ging a present and bribing<br />
and many times the line is crossed in China.<br />
Solutions derived from the literature<br />
-networking with other, non-Chinese, business people<br />
Mr. Hamstra states that because of their local presence in China it is possible to invite other exporters<br />
to the region. Before the start up of the company Mr. Beumer and Mr. Hamstra attended many ‘trade<br />
missions’ to China. Because of these trade missions it is possible to get into contact with other<br />
agricultural companies. The focus on building horticultural expositions in China is a choice to get into<br />
contact with various networks.<br />
-setting up alliance/networks with Chinese government officials<br />
Beumer Agritech attended many ‘trade missions’ before they started in China and due to these trade<br />
missions it was possible to meet government officials. By a mutual business relation they were<br />
introduced to the son of the local mayor of Shenyang and through his network it was possible to get<br />
into contact with other government officials.<br />
Because of the supply of flower bulbs and organisation of the horticultural exhibitions in China it was<br />
also possible to get into contact with many Chinese government officials. Mr. Beumer and Mr.<br />
Hamstra both knew that when they invited Dutch government officials to the opening of the<br />
exhibitions it would attract Chinese government officials because the Chinese government officials<br />
feel “important” when they can shake hands and literally be on the picture with the Dutch government<br />
official. Status is very important for Chinese government officals.<br />
In all the exhibitions the Dutch government was somehow involved, for instance because the ministry<br />
of agriculture sponsored a Dutch pavilion on the exhibition. When a horticultural exhibition was<br />
opened they always invited Dutch government officials to the opening.<br />
-building a network with Chinese business people<br />
Boris Peters 61
Because Beumer Agritech also grows the flower bulbs themselves they have a good presence in the<br />
region which makes ‘Chinese business people’ (in this case the farmers) come to them. Because they<br />
organise flower exhibitions for local governments it is possible to come into contact with government<br />
owned companies.<br />
Additional information<br />
When a company really adds value to the Chinese economy or region, it is very easy to start up<br />
because of the support of the local government because it is also in their interest that the company is<br />
successful.<br />
Boris Peters 62
Case #4: Eastwingate Consultancy<br />
Overview<br />
Eastwingate is a consulting company based in Shanghai which delivers services to entrepreneurs and<br />
companies that want to set up a company in China.<br />
Using their network of professionals, they deliver service and support on areas like sourcing of<br />
products, outsourcing of products, finding suppliers, creation of contracts, and intellectual property<br />
advice.<br />
Temporarily office space can be offered by Eastwingate and support can be offered in the decision<br />
making process about the internationalisation strategy (Joint venture, Wholly owned enterprise, etc.).<br />
Needed business licences can be dealt with and it is also possible to outsource the entire start-up<br />
process.<br />
Support with mergers and acquisitions is also offered in the form of advice and due diligence.<br />
The interviewee<br />
Ari van der Steenhoven joined DSM in 1980 in Holland and moved to Japan as Vice-President of the<br />
EPDM venture in 1988. In 1992 he was appointed in the function of ‘director Corporate and Sales<br />
China’ of DSM, set up sales offices and was involved in the establishment of a number of joint<br />
ventures and wholly foreign owned companies. In 2005 he retired from DSM and started a new<br />
company in management consulting, called Eastwingate, which supports a number of companies to<br />
set up their own organization in China. Mr. van der Steenhoven is also a member of the advisory<br />
board of the Benelux chamber of commerce in Shanghai. Mr. van der Steenhoven lives in Shanghai<br />
with his Chinese wife and 2 sons.<br />
Entrepreneurs starting in China<br />
-differences in the type of problems for an entrepreneur or a manager<br />
The difficulties that managers encounter when they start up a new venture for an existing company<br />
are the same as the problems that an entrepreneur encounters and the solutions to the difficulties are<br />
also often the same. There is however a difference in impact of the difficulties or problems<br />
encountered when starting up in China because a big firm has often many resources like capital and<br />
expertise. An entrepreneur has less financial resources and must hire expertise. For instance when<br />
DSM starts up a venture in China they can afford mistakes or even failures and this is not the case for<br />
entrepreneurs.<br />
Mr van der Steenhoven states that he considers people who start up a business in China for a small<br />
business in Holland as entrepreneurs too because often they do not only invest financially in the start<br />
up in China but they also invest a lot of time. They also take a risk in the form that when they fail<br />
Boris Peters 63
setting up the business they will probably have to search for another job because a small firm can not<br />
offer them another job within the company.<br />
Many of the people that Mr. van der Steenhoven knows, who start up a venture for a smaller<br />
company, have the intention to settle in China for good and often already have experience in living in<br />
China. A manager who is assigned to set up a venture in China for a big company or multinational<br />
often signed a 3 to 5 year contract, they are not starting up a business because they are interested in<br />
China but they are interested to work internationally and this has an effect in they way they operate.<br />
Managers will not learn the Chinese language because they do not have the time, they do not have any<br />
experience in doing business in China, they do not have experience in living in China, and they have a<br />
very short period of time to set up a business. All these limitations make the chance of failure very<br />
high but due to the abundance of financial resources and expertise of a big firm or multinational, this<br />
has less impact.<br />
-difference in problems encountered in different parts of China<br />
Depending on the location, there is a difference in the severity of the problems and challenges that<br />
one can encounter when one starts up a company in China but the solutions to the problems are the<br />
same independent of the location of the start up.<br />
When a company is started in or near a small city (most of them still have about several hundreds of<br />
thousands inhabitants) it is more likely that the entrepreneur will have easy access to local high<br />
ranking government officials or even people like the mayor of the city. Knowing high ranking<br />
government officials can be beneficial for the speed at which business licences are granted. Tax<br />
benefits can also be granted to stimulate the growth of the company because local governments are<br />
free to grant certain tax benefits and even regulation can be ‘bended’. In some cases ‘a weak<br />
regulatory regime’ can be an advantage. These benefits can also cause problems because corruption is<br />
much more present in remote areas and moreover, bended rules and taxations can be restored when<br />
the local government wants.<br />
The problems and challenges are an outcome of the still developing economic situation in China<br />
therefore the problems are the same but less in severity in the better developed parts of China. In a big<br />
city like Shanghai tax laws, business licences and other regulations are strictly regulated because<br />
business is better developed and the government sees cities like Shanghai as a role model.<br />
-Difference in problems encountered by legal entities<br />
Although the problems are the same to all legal entities, the problems can differ in impact on the<br />
company depending on the legal entity and even the type of business this entity is in.<br />
Boris Peters 64
For instance; a trading company that only has an office in China earning their money in connecting<br />
two parties and asking a certain fee, do not have to worry much about ‘incomplete property rights’. A<br />
trading company does not have complicated technological knowledge that they can spill-over which is<br />
a big problem for high tech manufacturers cooperating with Chinese companies. A trading company<br />
does need to find out that the products that they trade are not illegally copied products in order to meet<br />
the customer requirements but the trader can not held responsible. In both cases good due diligence is<br />
needed on the Chinese partner, making the problem and solution the same but the severity of the<br />
problem differs.<br />
Difficulties and solutions when starting up:<br />
-Weak regulatory regime<br />
Regulations in China change very fast due to a fast changing economy and it can happen that within a<br />
few weeks a new regulation is implemented. For instance; in May 2007 it became clear that China<br />
wanted to cut the tax rebate on the export of high energy consuming commodities and in July 2007<br />
they implemented the new tax rebates. The only option that many companies had was to change their<br />
prices as fast as possible. In China you must be able to react to change very fast. It is possible to<br />
anticipate on many changes because the Chinese government presents a guiding proposal every 5<br />
years. In the last proposal it was already evident that China wanted to cut back energy consumption<br />
and pollution.<br />
It is also possible to gain information about reforms or new regulation through your network because<br />
many new regulations are made in cooperation with mayor Chinese law firms. These law firms give<br />
indications on what is going to happen. The main solution is to be able to react to change very fast and<br />
to build up a network with Chinese business people.<br />
-Newness of private enterprise<br />
This problem is most evident in cooperation of foreign firms with Chinese firms. Many managers and<br />
owners of Chinese firms are now around 40 to 50 years of age and grew up in a government<br />
controlled planned economy. They have difficulty in adapting to free market economy because of<br />
their routines and education. Mr. van der Steenhoven strongly recommends that a partnership must<br />
only be engaged if it is absolutely necessary for the business because the failure rate is very high. In<br />
some industries it only possible to start up a business in the form of a joint venture. This condition is<br />
established in order to give sertain industries access to foreign knowledge because of local shortage.<br />
One must therefore be very cautious because no expertise means that it is difficult to cooperate.<br />
Young Chinese have had education on open market principles and grew up with a relatively open<br />
market economy and moreover many of this generation had the possibility to travel or study abroad.<br />
The generation that is in the age of 25 to 30 have also had education in the English language and are<br />
Boris Peters 65
able to understand foreign business practices. The solution for the ‘newness of private enterprise‘ is<br />
therefore quite simple; don’t hire anybody who is older than 30 years of age unless you need to and<br />
don’t cooperate with anybody who is older than 30 years of age unless you really need to. Never<br />
cooperate with somebody that works are have worked in a state owned company.<br />
-Incomplete property rights<br />
Mr. van der Steenhoven states that property rights are quite clear in China, it is possible to own for<br />
instance a building or house but it is not possible to own the land on which it is build. The owner of<br />
the private property is quite well protected with the new private property law that is accepted in<br />
March 2007 by the Chinese government.<br />
The land is often rented from the state for the time of 50 years. It is quite easy to find out who rents<br />
the land and thereby who owns the property because this information is public and can be found at the<br />
government offices. The information is however in Chinese and it takes quite some time before it is<br />
given. The government can withdraw the right to rent and seize the land but this is not likely to<br />
happen because this will have a very big negative effect on the popularity to invest or start up a<br />
company in China. The most likely reason for such action will be because a road or rail needs to be<br />
built through the property. In that case the government will compensate the owner of the property. If<br />
land is seized it is impossible to fight this decision and therefore it is necessary to get as much<br />
information as possible about the plans of the government in a certain area, these plans are published<br />
in Chinese but publicly accessible.<br />
The problem is not that the property rights are incomplete but the enforcement of the rights is very<br />
bad. One should therefore prevent the need to go to court.<br />
-Obtaining capital<br />
Chinese banks will only invest huge and globally active companies like DSM and Phillips to reduce<br />
their investment risk says Mr. van der Steenhoven. A small to medium sized foreign company will be<br />
to much risk for a Chinese bank because it is difficult and costly for them to obtain information about<br />
the business activities in the land of origin of the company.<br />
In many cases the entrepreneur already has a big financial reserve or a company in the land of his<br />
origin when he starts up a company in China and this makes obtaining capital in China unnecessary.<br />
The problem for these entrepreneurs but also for managers that start up a new venture is not really<br />
‘obtaining capital’ but ‘getting access to their capital’ as described later in the interview.<br />
-Diversity of local business systems in China<br />
Boris Peters 66
It is possible to obtain information about the local business systems at local government offices but all<br />
information is in Chinese so you need a Chinese who can gather the information. A Chinese lawyer<br />
who can speak English very well can offer this service. In more developed economic areas,<br />
information about the local business system can be found in English but is outdated in many cases<br />
because of the fast changing economy and legal regulations.<br />
In less developed areas it is easy to get into contact with local government officials. The local<br />
government of a low economic developed area will support the start up of a company because it will<br />
offer employment for the local citizens and stimulate the local economic growth. It is very common<br />
that the government officials will support the start up by supplying information about business<br />
licences, property ownership, local markets, etc. The mayor of the area will often give information<br />
and access to his network.<br />
-Poorly functioning Chinese markets<br />
In less developed economic areas it is difficult to gather reliable market information through official<br />
institutions but this information needs to be gathered through local government officials. Because of<br />
the lack of information about certain areas and shortage of supportive businesses the support of the<br />
local government is high and the cost of setting up and running a company is low. The risk of doing<br />
business is however higher due to uncertainty because of lack of information.<br />
In economic developed areas it is easier to find reliable market information but an entrepreneur or<br />
manager is still very dependent on his network. The Dutch government in the form of the NBSO<br />
(Netherlands Business Support Office), the Dutch Consulate and Dutch Chambers of commerce<br />
supports entrepreneurs by giving access to her network. Also the network with non-Chinese business<br />
people can be helpful in supplying information.<br />
-Poorly developed institutional arrangements<br />
There is a lack of high quality institutions like law firms, accountants and bank and therefore<br />
experience is needed to find out which institution delivers the best service. Many Dutch banks can not<br />
offer all the services that they offer in Holland due to restrictions. Many Dutch law firms are not<br />
licensed to offer legal defence in court, they can only give advice and are very expensive. A Chinese<br />
law firm can offer many services and is relatively cheap. A Chinese lawyer can offer financial<br />
information about potential business partners as only they can access the information at the Chinese<br />
department of commerce. The tax return of many Chinese companies can be acquired at Chinese<br />
banks as al this information is public.<br />
Boris Peters 67
Information can be gathered and institutions can be accessed but this costs a lot of time to find out. It<br />
is recommended to use the service of a consultant (like Eastwingate) to help gather information and<br />
support decision making.<br />
-Dependency on Chinese resources<br />
Except for the wages of local employees, many resources are more expensive in China because of<br />
shortage. Many commodities need to be imported and this often makes the local price higher<br />
compared to global prices and the availability is uncertain. The problem has however effect on all the<br />
companies in China. The only solution to the problem is fast reaction to developments.<br />
-Additional problems and challenges<br />
The turnover in personnel is a big problem for many companies. The Chinese are not very loyal to<br />
their employer and they easily switch jobs when they are offered just a small amount more compared<br />
to their current employer. Money is important for the Chinese because the government does not<br />
provide a healthy ‘safety net’ like the government in Holland. However, money is not the only<br />
important factor for the Chinese because clear opportunities to build a career are very important<br />
because eventually this also means getting an increase in income.<br />
Solutions derived from the literature<br />
-networking with other, non-Chinese, business people<br />
As stated before, the Dutch government gives access to her network and is actively organising<br />
network possibilities in the form of trade missions, social drinks, official banquets, etc. It is also very<br />
normal to offer somebody your business card in the beginning of the conversation. Mr van der Steen<br />
states that it is very normal if one returns from a social drink at the Dutch consulate with about 50<br />
business cards. Business people know the importance of the network in China and are therefore much<br />
more actively networking.<br />
-setting up alliance/networks with Chinese government officials<br />
In China it is very common to have official parties or ceremonies. Mr. van de Steenhoven therefore<br />
recommends that entrepreneurs or managers use as much as occasions as possible to organise a<br />
ceremony. For instance when opening a office or factory or when reaching a certain mile-stone.<br />
Inviting Dutch government officials seem to attract Chinese government officials because Chinese<br />
have deep respect for the government due to the fact that China had a totalitarian regime. When a<br />
Dutch company has Dutch high ranking government officials as a guest in China the Chinese are<br />
easily impressed because they think the entrepreneur has high reaching contacts within the Dutch<br />
government. The Chinese government officials feel honoured when they are invited and are then more<br />
easily contacted.<br />
Boris Peters 68
-building a network with Chinese business people<br />
To build up a network with Chinese business people is difficult and takes time because the network of<br />
Chinese business people is very closed. They are reluctant to give a foreigner access to their network<br />
and therefore it is best to use Chinese employees to build up a network with Chinese business people.<br />
Chinese business people can easily be met at trade fairs and trade missions.<br />
Additional information<br />
Information is not centralised as in Holland which makes it difficult to find. In many cases<br />
information can be gathered but one needs to know where to look and to speak Chinese as much<br />
information is in Chinese. Good preparation is needed when starting up a company in China but more<br />
important help from a Chinese is necessary in gathering information.<br />
Boris Peters 69
Case #5: Sinova<br />
Overview<br />
Sinova offers consultancy for European companies wishing to set up China or Hong Kong. Sinova<br />
also helps Chinese companies wishing to set up in Europe. Sinova also offers strategic business<br />
advice, legal advice, accountancy, financial consaltancy and matchmaking.<br />
The interviewee<br />
Born in Hong Kong, Ms. Jennifer Chan, spent most of her young life in the Netherlands following her<br />
university education on the before settling down in Hong Kong. Starting from 1991, Ms. Chan<br />
worked for 11 years with Dutch Banks Rabobank and ABN AMRO and Belgium-Dutch bank Fortis,<br />
with a portfolio covering both small and medium-sized enterprises and multinational companies.<br />
Entrusted with a couple of projects by several long-term European clients to assist them with large<br />
investments in China, Ms. Chan founded SINOVA in 2002. In 2005 Ms. Chan also opened an office<br />
in Shanghai. The last office opened in 2006 in Rotterdam. In total Sinova has 27 employees, most of<br />
them work in China.<br />
Entrepreneurs starting in China<br />
-differences in the type of problems for an entrepreneur or a manager<br />
Ms. Chan states that whether someone is a manager or an entrepreneur is matter of definition. A<br />
manager setting up a company in China for an existing company in Holland can be seen as an<br />
entrepreneur because he encounters the same problems as the entrepreneur, he has the same tasks as<br />
an entrepreneur and in many cases the same responsibilities. There are managers or so called ‘expats’<br />
that have the task to set up a new company in China for a large company in Europe. They have about<br />
3 years to set up the company and then have to leave China. The interesting thing about this task is<br />
that the failure rate is very high because 3 years is too short to successfully start up a company,<br />
Sinova can offer the best added value in these cases. The cases with a high success rate are the<br />
managers that have the intention to stay in China for many years or for the rest of their life and the<br />
managers that are assisted by a Chinese manager that helps them to start up. Ms. Chan further<br />
explains that the problems that are encountered by entrepreneurs or manager are the same but the<br />
impact of the problem can differ depending on the size of the company.<br />
A manager for a large company has access to a bigger financial reserve compared to an entrepreneur<br />
or manager of a small or medium sized company. This means that for instance the application for al<br />
the needed business licences for a large firm can be done by a well established international law firm<br />
which is to expensive for a small or medium sized enterprise. The problem is therefore greater for a<br />
SME compared to a large company, however it is a problem for all companies.<br />
Boris Peters 70
-difference in problems encountered in different parts of China<br />
In the mainland of China an entrepreneur will encounter the same problems but again they differ in<br />
the impact they will have on the start up. In well developed economic regions like Shanghai, Beijing<br />
or Shenzen the regulations are clear and properly enforced. Also institutional arrangements are well<br />
established and business systems are clear. The disadvantage of well developed economic regions is<br />
that labour, taxation and rent is far more expensive. The problems that are encountered when starting<br />
up in less developed economic regions can have more impact. However if the company adds value to<br />
the local economy, the local government often will help with the start up and offer all kinds of<br />
solutions to the problems. The encountered problems while starting up in China are the same in<br />
different parts of China but the impact differs depending also on the type of business. Ms. Chan<br />
explains that a company that offers business services must have a location in a city and will encounter<br />
minor problems while starting up. A manufacturing facility needs to be located in a low cost area but<br />
it depends on the product that is manufactured if the start up will be assisted by the local government.<br />
A manufacturing facility that is environmental friendly, high tech and offers employment to a large<br />
quantity of Chinese, will probably be assisted by the local government.<br />
-Difference in problems encountered by legal entities<br />
Incomplete private property rights are for instance a problem but the severity depends on the legal<br />
entity of the company. A joint venture with a Chinese partner has much more risk of knowledge<br />
leaking compared to a wholly owned company in China. In most cases the foreign company possesses<br />
the knowledge and the Chinese company possesses the distribution channels, clients and low cost<br />
production possibilities. The chance of leaking knowledge to the Chinese partner can therefore be<br />
very high because they want the knowledge and already have the other requirements. Having a wholly<br />
owned company in China reduces this problem but does not eliminate because the employees, clients<br />
and suppliers can also cause knowledge leakage.<br />
Difficulties and solutions when starting up:<br />
-Weak regulatory regime<br />
Local governments are free to enforce certain regulations and it depends on the type of business and<br />
location how or whether this enforcement will be executed. In all cases an entrepreneur should be able<br />
to act fast on a new or altered regulation because when the regulation is enforced it is impossible to<br />
change the decision because of the totalitarian regime.<br />
One must understand that the economy of China is interwoven with politics. Every 5 years a party<br />
congress is held and a 5 year plan is presented, it is possible to draw conclusions about the future<br />
Boris Peters 71
economic guidance of the government and the plans for the economy. Furthermore press conferences<br />
are held and local government plans are also often presented. There are also many events organized<br />
for instance by accountancy firms, law firms and chambers of commerce. These events address<br />
certain topics about doing business in China. Because regulations change fast, one must actively<br />
collect information about the changes and this can be very time consuming. The advice is to attend<br />
informational events or hire a consultant or a Chinese employee to stay updated on certain<br />
developments. Sinova has a research team that actively searches for information for their clients.<br />
-Newness of private enterprise<br />
Many young Chinese employees do not have any problem working for private enterprises, they have<br />
had education that taught them the basics of an open economy and they grew up in an economy that is<br />
opened up for private enterprises. This is different for the older generation that did not have education<br />
about open market economy and grew up in a totally government controlled economy. Although<br />
China is gradually decreasing the number of state owned companies, still half of China’s workers are<br />
employed by state owned companies. State owned companies define success in output and<br />
employment rather than profit or value creation and therefore the employees of a state owned<br />
company are not used to work efficiently and cost effective. According to Ms. Chan one should avoid<br />
hiring employees that worked for a state owned company.<br />
Ms. Chan states that one should be very cautious with cooperating with state owned companies or<br />
partially state owned companies because their goals can differ substantially. Performing due diligence<br />
is very important but also problematic because of limited information. Chinese lawyers can gather<br />
information on the business licenses, number of employees and financial status of a company at the<br />
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Chinese banks can also supply financial information on<br />
government controlled companies due to the fact that this information is publicly accessible. The due<br />
diligence can be performed by Chinese lawyers or certain consultancy companies, it is impossible for<br />
a Dutch entrepreneur to do this without help because all the information is in Chinese and widely<br />
spread. Due to lack of time and financial reserves, many entrepreneurs do not perform a well due<br />
diligence although it is vital for successful operation.<br />
-Incomplete private property rights<br />
The problem with intellectual property is not the fact that it is incomplete, the problem lies in the<br />
amount of violations and the limited capacity of the authorities to enforce the regulation. Ms. Chan<br />
advises that if a patent is violated it is best that the company takes matters in their own hands which<br />
means that evidence must be gathered by the company to prepare a legal action. To collect evidence it<br />
is possible to organize a raid but the local authorities need to support the raid, in most cases the<br />
company should pay for the raid.<br />
Boris Peters 72
To prevent leakage of intellectual property, knowledge should be protected by keeping strategic<br />
knowledge outside China if possible. Employee turnover should also be minimized to prevent<br />
employees in taking certain knowledge to the competitor. Employee turnover is very high in China<br />
because Chinese employees choose for another job quite easily if they are offered a higher wage.<br />
Social security does not exist in China and therefore wage is very important to the Chinese. Employee<br />
turnover can be minimized not only by offering a relatively high wage but also by emphasizing team<br />
spirit. Chinese are rather social people and therefore small trips to other cities or even karaoke are<br />
very beneficial for team spirit.<br />
Ms. Chan indicates that remarkably many companies that are operating in China simply forget to<br />
register their company name or trademark, making it possible for Chinese companies to use the<br />
trademark or company name especially because China has ‘first to file’ jurisdiction. Many Chinese<br />
companies already registered trademarks, logo’s and other intellectual property of companies that are<br />
not yet operating in China which makes it very important for companies to register in China. Because<br />
of this problem for instance Hunter Douglas, which is a big Dutch multinational famous for their<br />
Luxaflex products, can not use their logo in China because ‘Huang Ding Window Covering’ has<br />
registered their logo many years ago.<br />
-Obtaining capital<br />
In order to become a member of the WTO in 2001, China had to cancel many restrictions that were<br />
enforced on foreign banks. Although many restrictions are still maintained for foreign banks, it is<br />
possible for these banks to offer more services like granting loans and opening accounts but many<br />
services are still restricted. However obtaining capital in the form of a loan by a foreign bank is not<br />
likely because of the high risks involved in starting up in China. Chinese state owned banks only<br />
invest in large Chinese companies and state owned companies even if the company is not profitable.<br />
For a Dutch entrepreneur it is therefore unlikely to obtain capital in China often the entrepreneur<br />
already has a company in Holland to use as fund supplier.<br />
-Diversity of local business systems in China<br />
Before starting up in China it is advisable to map the local business environment, a consultancy firm<br />
like Sinova can offer this service. Business licences can be applied by a Chinese lawyer. It can also be<br />
very informative to visit the location in which the company will be started up and search for other<br />
foreign companies. In many cases the management will be very helpful in providing information<br />
about for instance networks, local law enforcement and competition.<br />
Boris Peters 73
-Poorly functioning Chinese markets<br />
As stated earlier state owned companies define success in output and employment rather than profit or<br />
value creation and therefore the employees of a state owned company are not used to work efficiently<br />
and cost effective. This can lead to problems when cooperating with a state owned company. It is also<br />
possible that a state owned company has an unfair competitive advantage because of tax advantages,<br />
financial support from the state and cheap resources like oil and electricity offered by the state.<br />
Due to these differences in state owned companies and private owned companies certain markets are<br />
functioning differently. A research on the local Chinese market is necessary to minimize this problem<br />
but this can be difficult because it is not always clear if certain companies are state owned, partly state<br />
owned or privately owned. Using the network of government officials, Chinese business people and<br />
international business people information can be gathered regarding markets and the working of the<br />
markets.<br />
-Poorly developed institutional arrangements<br />
The Chinese do not value contracts like Westerners do because the economy and therefore regulations<br />
are changing fast. As a result contracts are also often outdated fast. When drafting a contract it is very<br />
important to have trust in the Chinese partner because this is the basis on which Chinese do business.<br />
When a Chinese partner is distrusted one must contemplate if it is a good idea to do business with the<br />
partner in the first place.<br />
All contracts must be approved by the Mofcom (Ministry of Commerce) but in most cases the<br />
contracts are approved when the Chinese company is in the advantage. The contract can be drafted in<br />
English and Chinese but translation can cause problems when going to court because the court only<br />
passes judgement on the Chinese contract.<br />
As stated earlier, foreign banks can not offer the same services as they do in other countries and<br />
Chinese banks offer only a few services needed for doing business. Because of China‘s membership<br />
of the WTO the foreign banks are subject to less restrictions compared to a few years ago however<br />
most foreign banks are located in the big cities. The Chinese banks can offer slightly more services<br />
like leasing, insurance, commercial mortgage and pension plans.<br />
Ms. Chan states that there are many consultants in China but the quality of the offered services are<br />
very poor because consultancy is not a protected profession and as a result anyone can adopt the title;<br />
consultant. In many cases the lack of knowledge of the entrepreneur is misused and high fees are<br />
asked.<br />
Because China is still a developing economy it is not very surprising that business services are not<br />
developed well yet. Ms. Chan indicates that consultancy fees of respectable consultancy companies<br />
Boris Peters 74
are too high for SME’s but for these companies it is often sufficient to hire a Chinese lawyer,<br />
accountant and base their decisions on their own research.<br />
Many Chinese accountants and lawyers are particularly short on business skills because of lack of<br />
experience and education. For instance; those wishing to become certified accountants in China can<br />
only acquire the qualification at the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA). Like<br />
other stages in the Chinese education system the emphasis in CICPA exams tends to be on<br />
compliancy and not on giving advice to the management based on forecasting or budgeting.<br />
Moreover there is a shortage in lawyers and accountants and especially English speaking lawyers and<br />
accountants. The problem of poorly developed institutional arrangements is very hard to overcome<br />
because the shortage in numbers and low business skills of the lawyers and accountants can not be<br />
solved by the entrepreneur. According to Ms. Chan it is even more difficult for SME’s because of lack<br />
of financial reserve. Ms. Chan advices to gather as much information as possible before going to<br />
China for instance at the EVD (Economische Voorlichtingsdienst) and other Dutch institutions. In her<br />
opinion many entrepreneurs do not know about the shortage of lawyers and accountants in China and<br />
they also do not know that the business skills of the lawyers and accountants are very limited. Ms.<br />
Chan states that many entrepreneurs do not prepare their start up well before going to China.<br />
-Dependency on Chinese resources<br />
Ms. Chan explains that; if information is seen as a resource, the dependency on Chinese resources<br />
regarding information can be seen as a problem. Media and internet are government controlled in<br />
China which means that it is not likely that all information is reliable and some information is<br />
concealed. It is widely known in China that statistics on political stability, unemployment and income<br />
levels are not reliable. Although it is obvious that the source of the information should be checked, Ms<br />
Chan notices many foreign people drawing conclusions on unreliable information because they are<br />
simply not used to the fact that the government in China controls and alters information. Information<br />
must therefore always be checked by asking the available network of the employee for background<br />
information.<br />
-Additional problems and challenges<br />
For many foreign SME’s it is difficult to serve the domestic market in China because distributors are<br />
often limited to small areas. A company must therefore find many distributors and this is very time<br />
consuming. Advertisement is an activity that many Chinese companies do not understand yet and<br />
therefore finding distributors is even more difficult. Distributors can be found on the internet but<br />
many companies are pretending to be a distributor while being a intermediary. The most reliable way<br />
to meet distributors is through trade fairs because all information is at hand and Chinese companies<br />
Boris Peters 75
can only participate at a trade fair if all business licences are shown. It is possible to do some due<br />
diligence at the fair.<br />
Solutions derived from the literature<br />
-networking with other, non-Chinese, business people<br />
The expat communities in China form are networks characterized by very easy accessibility and large<br />
size. When signing up for a network sites for expats it is easy to come into contact with many<br />
international business people. The Dutch and Belgian chamber of commerce (BENCHAM) also<br />
organises many information seminars where mainly Dutch business people can be met.<br />
-setting up alliance/networks with Chinese government officials<br />
In many cases government officials do not want to form an alliance with entrepreneurs because of<br />
conflicting interest.<br />
-building a network with Chinese business people<br />
Meeting other business people and companies is time consuming because associations do not exist in<br />
China as they do in Holland. Advertisement is also very new to many Chinese companies which<br />
means that it is often difficult to find potential Chinese partners or clients. Trade fairs are still the best<br />
way to meet Chinese business people because, as stated earlier, it is possible to do some due<br />
diligence, participation is only possible with business licences and it shows the dedication of the<br />
Chinese company to cooperate with other international companies. The network of the Chinese<br />
employees can also be very helpful in meeting Chinese business people.<br />
Additional information<br />
Often the network of an entrepreneur or manager is limited to knowing other internationally operating<br />
business people except Chinese business people. The reason for this is the fact that they do not speak<br />
Chinese so in many cases they can not communicate because many Chinese can not speak English.<br />
The solution is therefore very simple; learn to speak Chinese!<br />
Boris Peters 76
6.5 Schematic overview<br />
Below a schematic overview is given derived from the case studies in order to detect whether the<br />
entrepreneur encountered the stated problem and what solution was given.<br />
Weak regulatory<br />
regime<br />
Beumer Agritech KOW Lensvelt Sinova Eastwingate<br />
* Help from son<br />
of local mayor<br />
Newness to * Taiwanese<br />
private enterprise manager<br />
* avoid state<br />
owned<br />
Incomplete<br />
property rights<br />
companies<br />
* Making<br />
copycat<br />
behaviour<br />
unattractive<br />
* bad<br />
enforcement<br />
Obtaining capital * Not needed<br />
(Dutch mother<br />
company)<br />
Diversity in local<br />
business systems<br />
Poorly<br />
functioning<br />
markets<br />
Poorly developed<br />
institutional<br />
arrangements<br />
Resource<br />
dependency<br />
* Help from son<br />
of local mayor<br />
* Taiwanese<br />
manager<br />
* Rep office<br />
* Local<br />
government<br />
support<br />
(exchange<br />
program)<br />
* Competent<br />
Chinese<br />
employee<br />
* Employees<br />
age:
In many cases the entrepreneur stated that the network of non-Chinese business people, government<br />
officials and Chinese business people could provide a solution to the problems encountered while<br />
starting up. The schematic overview below shows how they got access to the network.<br />
Network with<br />
non-Chinese<br />
business people<br />
Network with<br />
Chinese<br />
government<br />
officials<br />
Network with<br />
Chinese business<br />
people<br />
At the end of the interview the entrepreneur was asked to state an additional problem that were not<br />
mentioned in the questionnaire but was a problem for them while starting up. The given answers are<br />
given in the below diagram.<br />
Additional<br />
problems<br />
Beumer Agritech KOW Lensvelt Sinova Eastwingate<br />
* Local office<br />
* Trade missions<br />
* Expositions<br />
* Rep office<br />
* Network events<br />
* Media<br />
* Trade missions * Dutch<br />
* Son of local mayor government<br />
* Use Dutch events<br />
government * Dutch political<br />
contacts<br />
* Local office<br />
* Expositions<br />
* Trade mission<br />
* Trade fairs<br />
* Expositions<br />
* Rep office<br />
* Chinese<br />
employees<br />
* Trade fairs<br />
* Network events<br />
* Trade missions<br />
* Local vice<br />
mayor<br />
* Trade mission<br />
* Trade fairs<br />
* Chinese<br />
employees<br />
* Expat network<br />
easy accessible<br />
* Network events<br />
* Not possible<br />
due to conflicting<br />
interests of<br />
government<br />
offcials<br />
* Trade fairs<br />
* Chinese<br />
employees<br />
* Trade fairs<br />
* Network events<br />
* Use Dutch<br />
government<br />
* Ceremonies<br />
* Chinese<br />
employees<br />
* Trade fairs<br />
* Trade missions<br />
Beumer Agritech KOW Lensvelt Sinova Eastwingate<br />
* Bribing * Long procedure<br />
time<br />
* Finding the first * finding good<br />
competent product<br />
Chinese employee distributors<br />
that can help set<br />
up the company<br />
* employee<br />
turnover<br />
* Information is<br />
not centralized<br />
Boris Peters 78
6.6 Conclusion<br />
Based on the diagrams in chapter 6.5 a short conclusion is given based on the case studies, in chapter<br />
7 the solutions to the stated problems are explained more elaborately.<br />
To overcome the problem of weak regulatory regime, four out five entrepreneurs stated that help from<br />
the local government can overcome the problem. The two production companies located in less<br />
economic developed areas got help from high-ranking government officials in overcoming the<br />
problem of weak regulatory regime. Getting information in order to adapt fast to the regulatory<br />
regime can be gathered with help of the first Chinese employee(s).<br />
The newness to private enterprise can be overcome by hiring employees under the age of 30 years and<br />
not hiring ex-employees from state owned companies. Hiring a Taiwanese or English speaking well-<br />
educated Chinese manager to fulfil a bridging function between the Dutch entrepreneur and Chinese<br />
employees is also very beneficial. Working together with an state owned company should be avoided.<br />
Incomplete property rights seem not to be a problem for most of the entrepreneurs it seems that the<br />
property rights are complete but badly enforced. The entrepreneurs therefore state that the need to<br />
enforce the property rights should be prevented. In the case of intellectual property, knowledge should<br />
be prevented to leak reducing employee turnover can be a prevention but not a solution.<br />
Obtaining capital is not a problem encountered by the Dutch entrepreneurs because they all had a<br />
Dutch mother company providing the capital needed to start up in China, it is however recognised that<br />
it is very difficult to obtain capital in China.<br />
The diversity in local business can be overcome by accepting help from the local government<br />
according to four out of five entrepreneurs. The two production companies again stated that the high-<br />
ranking government officials helped them in giving information about the local business system. It is<br />
evident that an expert is needed to overcome this problem. Hiring a Taiwanese manager or English<br />
speaking well educated Chinese manager can also help in getting the company to comply to the local<br />
business system.<br />
The problem of poorly functioning markets seems to be the dispersion of information. Information can<br />
be overcome by gathering information from all networks available. The network of the Chinese<br />
employees can also provide information about markets. The Dutch NSBO and Consulate can also<br />
offer information about markets. The network with other non-Chinese business people can also be<br />
used as an information source.<br />
The problem of poorly developed institutional arrangements was in three cases overcome by the help<br />
of the local government. Dutch institutions can be used to gain information but Dutch institutions in<br />
China such as banks, accountants and legal expert should not be used as consultants due to their<br />
restrictions.<br />
Boris Peters 79
Four out of five entrepreneurs do not consider resource dependency a problem. Two entrepreneurs<br />
indicate that it is the dependence on the Chinese infrastructure is the problem in gaining access to<br />
resources. Two entrepreneurs state that the resource dependency is the same for all competitors in the<br />
Chinese market making the problem not a particular problem for Dutch entrepreneurs. One<br />
entrepreneur states that, if information is regarded as a resource, that information should always be<br />
checked with available networks because information is often unreliable.<br />
Having a network with non-Chinese business people, Chinese government officials and Chinese<br />
business people was stated as being the solution to all of the listed problems encountered by the Dutch<br />
entrepreneurs except for the problem of newness to private enterprise. Therefore the entrepreneurs<br />
were asked how they build up the network or gained access to these networks.<br />
Gaining access to a network with non-Chinese business people can be done at trade missions and<br />
network events. Having a representative office or other physical presence in China seems to be<br />
beneficial. Trade fairs are also helpful in gaining access to a network with non-Chinese business<br />
people.<br />
Gaining access or building up a network with government officials is regarded as difficult but<br />
possible. In less developed areas it is easy to form an alliance with high-ranking government officials.<br />
Dutch government officials seem to attract Chinese government officials making it easier to form an<br />
alliance. The owner of Sinova states that it is impossible to form an alliance with government officials<br />
due to conflicting interests. Other cases seem to contradict her statement. This explains why Sinova<br />
did not stated ‘having a network with government officials’ as a solution to the listed problems.<br />
A network with Chinese business people can be build up at trade fairs and expositions. Having a local<br />
presence can offer an advantage because the Chinese employee(s) can also give access to Chinese<br />
business people.<br />
Boris Peters 80
7 Solutions to the Problems Encountered by entrepreneurs<br />
It is evident that the main solution to the listed problems encountered by the entrepreneurs is to build<br />
up social networks.<br />
Because all Dutch entrepreneurs recognize the importance of building up a network, it is therefore<br />
very easy to build up a network with other non-Chinese business people. The Dutch government,<br />
companies and social clubs organize many networking events. Business cards are exchanged more<br />
easily because everyone harvests as many contacts as possible. It is not unusual to leave a social event<br />
with a big stack of business cards.<br />
Trading missions make it possible to make new contacts but building up a social network is time<br />
consuming therefore it is very beneficial to have a local presence in the form of a representative<br />
office.<br />
Trade missions are often used as a vehicle to meet Chinese government officials. Dutch government<br />
officials always attend trade missions to China because it seems that Chinese government officials are<br />
attracted to Dutch government officials. The Chinese have a deep-rooted respect for the government<br />
due to the former totalitarian regime and contemporary interference of the Chinese government in<br />
their everyday life. It is very helpful to use Dutch government officials to contact Chinese government<br />
officials.<br />
It much easier to come into contact with high-ranking Chinese government officials in less economic<br />
developed areas because the Dutch company can bring employment to the region and stimulate the<br />
local economy. If the company is also high tech and environmental friendly, it can be the case that the<br />
entrepreneur is assisted in setting up his company because the local Chinese government and Dutch<br />
entrepreneur have the same objectives. The existence of the Dutch company is often protected<br />
because the company can serve as a showcase for other international investors. All the listed problems<br />
are reduced or solved if the local Chinese government actively supports the Dutch entrepreneur by<br />
supplying information, help negotiate with other parties and arrange needed licenses and procedures<br />
to start up. In one case the entrepreneur could even use the local government office as his office<br />
showing the devotion of the local government to help set up the company.<br />
To build up a network with Chinese business people is difficult for the entrepreneur if he does not<br />
speak the Chinese language. It is also very time consuming as the Chinese lay a lot of emphasis on<br />
building up a contact. Hiring a competent experienced English speaking Chinese employee can help<br />
the entrepreneur to make contact with other business people because Chinese, similar to all other<br />
people in the world, make easier contact with the same language and background.<br />
Boris Peters 81
The Chinese employee can also help set up the company and help in hiring the first employees. In<br />
three cases used in this thesis this competent Chinese came from within the network of the<br />
entrepreneur. In one case a Taiwanese employee was hired because educated Taiwanese speak<br />
Chinese and English, are used to trade with China and the West, which means that they know how to<br />
deal with both cultures and they are used to capitalism as Taiwan has a capitalist market economy.<br />
Hiring an employee in China is only possible if one has a local presence in China further stressing the<br />
need for starting up a representative office prior to the start up of a company in China.<br />
It is recommended only to hire employees under the age of 30 years old because these young Chinese<br />
had good education and grew up with the understandings of capitalism. It is not recommended to hire<br />
ex employees of state owned companies as they have difficulties to understand the workings of a<br />
private enterprise. Working together with government enterprises should also be avoided for the same<br />
reason.<br />
According to all entrepreneurs interviewed for this thesis, visiting trade shows is the best way to gain<br />
access to a network of Chinese business people. Daily there are a huge amount of trade shows held in<br />
China, indicating a preference of the Chinese to use trade shows to make new contacts and gain<br />
information. This is not surprising because as stated earlier; information is dispersed and unreliable.<br />
The Chinese government only approves a trade fair if al the participants have a business license,<br />
making a participant of a trade fair more reliable. Again using a Chinese employee to make contacts<br />
at the trade fair is recommended.<br />
Boris Peters 82
8 Conclusion and Recommendations<br />
8.1 Conclusion<br />
It is confirmed by the empirical results that the main solution to many problems encountered in China<br />
while starting up is to build up social networks (Ducket, 2004; Krug, 2007; Oi, 1996; Krug and<br />
Hendrischke, 2006). Although I could not identify substantial number of other solutions to the<br />
mentioned problems, I was able to provide further insights into the solutions mentioned by the<br />
internationalization literature. I rejected ‘incomplete private property rights’, ‘obtaining capital’ and<br />
‘resource dependency’ as being a problem while starting up in China.<br />
Hiring a competent, well educated, English speaking Chinese or Taiwanese employee seems to play<br />
an important role in helping the entrepreneur to start up the company by acquiring needed<br />
information, applying for business licenses, establishing contacts, hiring the first employees and<br />
gaining access to Chinese networks. Remarkably three out of five of the respondents had help from<br />
this kind of employee and the employee was found within the network of non-Chinese business<br />
people. The other two respondents mentioned the importance of hiring such an employee. From now<br />
on I will refer to the competent, high educated, English speaking Chinese or Taiwanese as; the first<br />
employee.<br />
In order to hire a Chinese employee the company is obliged to have a local presence confirming the<br />
advantage of having a local presence such as a representative office mentioned in the<br />
internationalization literature (Bjorkman and Kock, 1995; Gold er al., 2002).<br />
Hiring a ‘first employee’ can be beneficial in gathering information about the regulative regime at the<br />
country level in order to act fast upon changing regulations. The ‘first employee’ can also help solve<br />
the problem of ‘the diversity in local business systems’ by making the company compliant to the<br />
regulations of the local business system.<br />
Hiring employees under the age of 30 years old and avoid hiring ex-government employees or<br />
employees of state owned companies can solve the problem of newness to private enterprise regarding<br />
employees. The ‘first employee’ can also be very helpful in overcoming the problem of newness to<br />
private enterprise by help selecting new employees, buyers, suppliers and business partners.<br />
Working together with state owned companies should be avoided due to the fact that state owned<br />
companies define success in output and employment rather than profit or value creation and therefore<br />
the employees of a state owned company are not used to work efficiently and cost effective.<br />
Boris Peters 83
A network of Chinese government officials can help solve the problems of ‘a weak regulatory<br />
regime’, ‘diversity in local business systems’, ‘poorly functioning markets’ and ‘poorly developed<br />
institutional arrangements’. The network of local Chinese government officials seems to be the most<br />
helpful in comparison to all other networks. Although Chinese government officials can easily be<br />
contacted at trade missions and with the help of Dutch government officials, it is regarded as difficult<br />
to build up a network with the officials. It seems that local Chinese government officials are only<br />
willing to form a network with the Dutch entrepreneur and help the entrepreneur to start up if the<br />
start-up can stimulate the local economy, brings employment to the region, is high-tech and is<br />
environmental friendly, or at least meets one of the criteria.<br />
This implies that locality is an important factor for gaining access to a network of government<br />
officials.<br />
The dispersion and unreliability of information seems to be the main reason for ‘the problem of<br />
poorly functioning markets’. Although obvious, gathering information from all available networks<br />
seems to be the solution to this problem.<br />
Gathering information as a whole is difficult as information is often ‘intangible’ and stored within the<br />
Chinese networks. The Chinese network can offer valuable information about local business systems,<br />
regulations, and markets but are difficult to access by Dutch entrepreneurs because of language<br />
problems and due to the fact that a Chinese social network is often based on similar backgrounds.<br />
Again the help of the ‘first employee’ can make access to Chinese networks possible.<br />
Meeting Chinese business people in order to form a network seems rather easy when attending trade<br />
fairs, confirming the importance of trade fairs mentioned in the literature (Ellis, 2000). As stated<br />
earlier information is dispersed and often unreliable, making trade fairs a valuable source of<br />
information due to the fact that the Chinese government only approves a trade fair if all the<br />
participants have a business license . This explains the popularity and the enormous amount of trade<br />
fairs organized in China.<br />
It is striking that although the non-Chinese network can be valuable in finding ‘the first employee’ it<br />
is not used by the Dutch entrepreneurs to solve any of the mentioned problems.<br />
Boris Peters 84
8.2 Limitations<br />
I am aware of the fact that by not including the influence of culture I could have potentially left out an<br />
important effect on the mentioned problems. But due to the limited time available to write the thesis I<br />
could not include the role of culture in my thesis. Moreover, during my research I was surprised about<br />
the misuse of cultural differences to explain encountered problems. A good example is the<br />
explanation used by many people that the bad enforcement of regulation is the result of the Chinese<br />
wanting to make more money because money is important in their culture. I am more willing to<br />
believe that the bad enforcement of regulation is the result of the fast changing economy and the<br />
government not being able to keep up.<br />
Regardless whether the company was providing a service or producing a product I selected the cases<br />
for my research. I had to make this decision due to the limited time I stayed in China and wanting to<br />
prevent data shortage. Although I am aware that this could have distorted my findings I believe that<br />
the problems encountered while starting up are the same due to the fact that the company is not<br />
producing or providing the service yet. Not being selective turned out to be an advantage because this<br />
lead to the results that location is of great influence in order to establish a social network with local<br />
Chinese government officials. Production companies are often situated in less economic developed<br />
areas in order to achieve cost advantages. The local government officials in these regions are more<br />
willing to form a network in order help set up the company and thus stimulate the local economy.<br />
The entrepreneurs did not consider incomplete property rights a problem but the enforcement and<br />
protection of the property rights is considered a problem. This indicates that I could have more<br />
valuable results when I used the term: ‘enforcement and protection of private property’ as a problem<br />
while starting up in China. It is however interesting that some entrepreneurs understood my mistake<br />
and gave a solution. They stated that the only solution to this problem is to prevent knowledge<br />
leakage by keeping knowledge dispersed. One entrepreneur stated that employee turnover should be<br />
kept to a minimum in order to reduce the chance of knowledge leaking. One of the entrepreneurs also<br />
stated that the high employee turnover rate in China is also an additional problem indicating an<br />
interesting topic for further research.<br />
Obtaining capital in China is recognized as a problem when starting up in China it is probably only a<br />
problem for Chinese entrepreneurs as Dutch entrepreneurs obtain capital in Holland and not in China.<br />
The interviewed Dutch entrepreneurs are all supported by a Dutch mother company supplying needed<br />
capital. Selecting Dutch entrepreneurs starting up in China without the support of a mother company<br />
could have provided insight into this problem.<br />
Boris Peters 85
The Dutch entrepreneurs do not see resource dependency as a problem as this is a problem for all<br />
actors in the Chinese market. The infrastructure such as roads, electricity networks and the internet are<br />
needed to gain access to the resources. The infrastructure is seen as a problem because that is often<br />
government controlled or badly maintained which implies that this can form a problem to some<br />
entrepreneurs, also indicating a mistake in the formulation of problems encountered while starting up.<br />
While doing research I discovered many more flaws in my approach, which I was unable to correct.<br />
The mentioned problems often overlap which means that I was unable to provide a single solution to a<br />
single problem. I did not include companies that failed to set up a company in China in order to verify<br />
if the solutions are really the key to success. I did not find an indication but it could be possible that<br />
the problems encountered while setting up can also be dependent on the industry in which the<br />
company operates. While writing my literature study I even questioned whether the use of network is<br />
unique to China.<br />
Although I am well aware of the limitations of my study I can state that the learning experience of<br />
living and working in China in combination with doing this research is tremendous and if possible I<br />
would do it all over again in a heartbeat.<br />
Boris Peters 86
8.3 Managerial implications<br />
For my own amusement I made a 10 step plan which can greatly improve the success when wanting<br />
to start up a company in China:<br />
1. Only continue to the next step if you have already a healthy Dutch company.<br />
2. Go to meetings for entrepreneurs wanting to start up organized by the Dutch government and<br />
other institutions.<br />
3. Ask other entrepreneurs if they have a contact who can help you with finding a suitable<br />
Chinese employee to help set up the company in China and hire him.<br />
4. Look for a location in China where the company can offer added value to the region.<br />
5. Invite Dutch government officials to attend your business trip.<br />
6. Use your Chinese employee and the Dutch government officials to come into contact with the<br />
Chinese government officials.<br />
7. Make sure you are supported bu the local Chinese government while starting up.<br />
8. With help of your Chinese employee hire other Chinese employees who are younger that 30<br />
years old and never worked for a government owned company or the government.<br />
9. Reduce employee turnover by organizing many social events.<br />
10. Visit many trade fairs together with your Chinese employees to gather information and new<br />
contacts.<br />
Boris Peters 87
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Boris Peters 94
10 Appendixes<br />
10.1 Questionnaire for interviews with entrepreneurs<br />
1. Company<br />
• What are activities of the company?<br />
• Is the company only located in China? (If not, which countries?; Head office?)<br />
• What is the entity of the company? (Why this choice?)<br />
• How many employees does the company have? (How many Chinese employees?)<br />
• Does the company serve the Chinese market?<br />
2. Entrepreneur<br />
• How did you start as an entrepreneur?<br />
• Why did you choose China as a location for the company?<br />
• What are your goals in China?<br />
• How did you start up the company / which steps did you take?<br />
• Do you think there is a difference in the type of problems encountered when a manager starts up<br />
a new venture in China for an existing company compared with an entrepreneur starting up a<br />
company in China?<br />
3. Problems / Challenges when starting up the company<br />
Do/Did you have any problems or challenges;<br />
• Because of a weak regulatory regime?<br />
Due to the newness of private enterprise for Chinese employees/business partners?<br />
• Due to the incomplete private property rights in China?<br />
• With obtaining capital in China?<br />
• Due the diversity of local business systems in China?<br />
• Due to poorly functioning Chinese markets?<br />
• Due to poorly developed institutional arrangements?<br />
• With the dependency on Chinese resources?<br />
• That are additional to the mentioned problems and challenges?<br />
4. Solutions of the entrepreneur<br />
• How did you solve the mentioned problems and challenges? (if there were any)<br />
• What would you do differently in starting up in China knowing what you know now?<br />
5. Solutions in the literature<br />
• How did you start networking with other, non Chinese, business people?<br />
• How did you start business networking (Guanxi) with other Chinese business people?<br />
• How did you form alliances with government officials?<br />
6. Tips<br />
• Do you have tips or additional information for entrepreneurs that want to start-up their business in<br />
China?<br />
Boris Peters 95
10.2 Questionnaire for interviews with service providers (accountants, lawyers, consultants and<br />
governmental institutions)<br />
1. Company / institution<br />
• What are activities of the company/institution?<br />
• Does the company / institution serve the Chinese / foreign market?<br />
2. The interviewee<br />
• What is your function?<br />
• What is your background?<br />
3. Entrepreneurs starting in China<br />
• Do you think there is a difference in the type of problems encountered when a manager starts<br />
up a new venture in China for an existing company compared with an entrepreneur starting up a<br />
company in China?<br />
• Is there a difference in the problems encountered in different parts of China?<br />
• Is there a difference in the encountered problems when starting as a JV, WOEFIE, Rep.<br />
Office, etc?<br />
4. What can an entrepreneur do to solve the following problems / challenges?<br />
• Newness of private enterprise for Chinese employees/business partners?<br />
• Incomplete private property rights in China?<br />
• Obtaining capital in China?<br />
• Diversity of local business systems in China?<br />
• Poorly functioning Chinese markets?<br />
• Poorly developed institutional arrangements?<br />
• Dependency on Chinese resources?<br />
• Are there additional to the mentioned problems and challenges?<br />
5. Solutions in the literature<br />
• How can an entrepreneur start networking with other, non Chinese, business people?<br />
• How can an entrepreneur start business networking (Guanxi) with other Chinese business<br />
people?<br />
• How can an entrepreneur start form alliances with government officials?<br />
6. Tips<br />
• Do you have tips or additional information for entrepreneurs that want to start-up their<br />
business in China?<br />
Boris Peters 96
11 People that attributed to the thesis<br />
I express my deepest thanks to the following people who attributed to my thesis by giving their time<br />
and effort.<br />
Derek Swan, Project Coordinator, Sip Project Management<br />
Bart Berende, Marketing Executive, SIP Project Management<br />
Marco Hoekstra, Vice President Asia Partner, Talent & Pro<br />
Griet A.A. Hautekeete, Manager, Deloitte<br />
Matteo Coradini, Director Italian Desk, Deloitte<br />
Zach I. Lichtblau, Lawyer, Holthuis International Lawyers<br />
Choy Yiu Chan, Lawyer, Holthuis International Lawyers<br />
Abram Bruijs, Chief Representative, Promolding<br />
Annemarieke Beekman, Operations Manager, Randstad<br />
Tina Chen, Chief Representative, Science Alliance<br />
Olivier Dubois, Manager Business Advisory, Sinova<br />
Karolien Verhaert, Event & Marketing Manager, Benelux Chamber of Commerce<br />
Maarten Roos, Senior Consultant, Wang Jing & Co. Law Firm<br />
Hugo Muller, Lawyer, HIL International Lawyers & Advisers<br />
Jan van Weijen, Consul, Consulate General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands<br />
Eric Verwaal, Consul-General, Consulate General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands<br />
Siem Bierman, Assistant Manager, DTZ<br />
Onno Schreurs, General Manager, The Collection<br />
Mascha ten Bruggencate, Head of Commercial Banking, Fortis<br />
Emile Mac Gillavry, Managing Director, Maximum<br />
Chunyang Shao, Attorney at Law, Jun He Law Offices<br />
Hans Lensvelt, Founder, Lensvelt<br />
Ron de Goeij, Director, KOW<br />
Jennifer Chan, Managing Director, Sinova<br />
Rienk Hamstra, Owner, Beumer Agritech<br />
Ari van der Steenhoven, Director, Eastwingate<br />
Boris Peters 97