In the Supreme Court of the United States In the Supreme Court of ...

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edroom, but the officers performed a protective sweep of the room to ensure their safety. Id. at 589–90 (holding a sweep is reasonable even when “initial entry to the home [is] pursuant to consent” and the “consent does not of itself legally authorize the entry into the area swept”). The Fifth Circuit understood that if the officers had waited to obtain a warrant before sweeping the room, the suspect could have harmed another individual. Id. at 590. The First Circuit has similarly upheld non-arrest protective sweeps when officers are pursuing a dangerous suspect. For example, the First Circuit held a protective sweep was reasonable when an officer entered an apartment while investigating a shooting. Martins, 413 F.3d at 144–45, 150 (“[The] inference of danger was much more real and immediate than a generic fear.”). The shooting took place only one hundred yards from the apartment in a gang- populated area. Id. at 144. Additionally, one of the suspects ran into the apartment complex, although the suspect did not live in the apartment. Id. Here, the Officer was also legally on the premises for a legitimate reason. Just like the officer in Gould, the Officer entered the home only after an occupant allowed him inside. R. at 6. While the Officer did not have the authority to fully search the kitchen, R. at 6, performing a protective sweep was an imperative safety measure, as it was in Gould. A violent neighborhood burglary had just occurred. R. at 5. Because of this burglary, the Officer was searching for a dangerous suspect, just like the officers in Gould and Martins. R. at 5–6. The threat the burglary suspect posed, as in Martins, was “real and immediate.” 413 F.3d at 150. The burglar matched the description of the burglar who murdered the Convict’s neighbor, and witnesses had seen the suspect fleeing towards the Convict’s home. R. at 5. As in Martins, where the officer pursued a dangerous criminal into an apartment complex, the Officer was assisting in the systematic pursuit of this dangerous burglary suspect. R. at 5. If the Officer 13
had waited for a search warrant to perform the protective sweep, the burglary suspect may have harmed the Convict. Thus, the Officer was legally on the premises pursuant to consent while protecting the neighborhood from a dangerous criminal suspect. 2. The Officer had reasonable suspicion that a dangerous individual was on the premises because witnesses had seen the burglar fleeing in the direction of the Convict’s house and the Convict had a known criminal past. This Court applies Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard to protective sweeps. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. An officer has reasonable suspicion if he reasonably believes his safety or that of others is in danger, particularly, in a protective sweep, if that danger is unseen. Buie, 494 U.S. at 328, 334 (holding there was reasonable suspicion of an unknown danger after the suspect surrendered himself and an officer searched the basement “in case there was someone else down there”); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (defining reasonable suspicion of danger in general). While reasonable suspicion is more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), it is “considerably less than . . . a preponderance of the evidence,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 5 (finding a veteran officer of 39 years had reasonable suspicion, even though the officer had never seen the two suspects before and could not articulate why he suspected them). Finally, reasonable suspicion is an objective standard, meaning this Court does not consider an officer’s subjective motives. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). The First Circuit further explained that courts give deference to the “street-wise judgments of experienced . . . officers” and reasonable suspicion has a “commonsense” aspect. United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 7–8 (2000) (noting in dicta that an officer may have reasonable suspicion because a person was “slouching” in the back seat of a vehicle). 14
Page 1 and 2: No. 13-201 ________________________
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS ii Page Questions
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued iv Page
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued vi P
Page 9 and 10: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued B. F
Page 11 and 12: investigators quickly determined th
Page 13 and 14: Procedural History On October 1, 20
Page 15 and 16: eckless conduct. Other felony offen
Page 17 and 18: The three seminal rulings governing
Page 19 and 20: Amendment intrusion was outweighed
Page 21: go on unlimited fishing expeditions
Page 25 and 26: The First Circuit found a protectiv
Page 27 and 28: determine whether an offense qualif
Page 29 and 30: eexamined the same issue in light o
Page 31 and 32: F.3d at 7 (commenting that Congress
Page 33 and 34: Subcommittee on Crime of the House
Page 35 and 36: only other listed offenses involvin
Page 37 and 38: The possession of an unregistered s
Page 39 and 40: U.S. Const. amend. IV APPENDIX Rele
Page 41 and 42: (h) to receive or possess a firearm
Page 43 and 44: term applies regardless of whether
Page 45: U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

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