In the Supreme Court of the United States In the Supreme Court of ...

1. Terry’s officer safety logic encompasses non-arrest protective sweeps because
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard permits officers to take
reasonable safety measures.
In Terry, this Court held an officer’s need to perform a protective stop and frisk
outweighed the Fourth Amendment intrusion on the individual. Id. at 24. A stop and frisk occurs
when officers briefly search a suspect’s “outer clothing” for weapons to protect themselves or
“others nearby.” Id. at 30. This Court allows these limited searches, which are not subject to the
warrant requirement, as long as the officer has a reasonable suspicion of danger. Id.
Fifteen years later, this Court expanded Terry’s safety rationale. In Michigan v. Long,
this Court held that, under Terry, it is reasonable for an officer, without a warrant, to
protectively search the passenger compartment of a vehicle. 463 U.S. at 1049–50 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)
(“[I]nconvenience cannot prevail . . . against . . . concerns for the officer’s safety.”). In Long, as
in Terry, this Court found that protecting safety outweighed the Fourth Amendment intrusion.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1051. The Long Court, “[i]n a sense, . . . authorized a ‘frisk’ of an automobile
for weapons.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 332. Terry’s logic, therefore, is broader than the protective stop
and frisk, as interpreted in Long, and allows reasonable protective searches whenever officers
objectively believe they are in danger. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)
(“[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”).
In Maryland v. Buie, this Court expanded Terry one step further. Buie, 464 U.S. at 332–
33. Under Buie, an officer may perform a protective sweep, or “a quick and limited search of
[the] premises, incident to an arrest, and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or
others.” Id. at 327, 337. Relying on Terry and Long, this Court again held the Fourth
9