The International Scholar - DCU

The International Scholar
Dublin City university
sChool of law anD Government
2010/2011

Welcome to the third edition of the International Scholar. The journal
represents a selection of the best work of the students of Dublin City
University’s School of Law and Government over the 2010/11 term.
The essays were chosen by a team of student editors in collaboration with lecturers
from the School. This is the first edition of the journal after a two year
hiatus and we hope that future students will help continue the International
Scholar as an annual publication. This year is also the first in which the journal
is available online, which has allowed us to include a larger number of essays
which it was not possible to include in the print edition.
The editing team would like to thank the staff of the School of Law and government
who took time to nominate essays and advise on the format of the journal,
particularly Duncan Smith for his help in advice and encouragement. Also we
would like to thank Dominic Smith for his assistance in creating the online
version of the journal and David Molloy who designed the print edition of the
journal. Thanks also goes to Ruth Connolly for helping to secure finance for
the print edition.
Finally we would like to thank the many students whose work fills these pages.
Anne Marie Butler & Ronan Cooney
Editor’s Note
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3

Contents
regional studies
Throwing Them All Out! The Rise of the Contemporary Left in Latin America
Nessa Kennedy
Grievance and Greed: The Resurgence of Political Islam
Ciaran Price
Colonialism, Collective Identity and State Formation in South Asia
Aishling Mc Morrow
international security studies
Should the European Union develop an autonomous defence capability?
Ronan Sweeney
A Critique in Liberal Peacebuilding: The Case of Kosovo
Kyle Krieger
Should the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine be Preserved?
Thomas Murphy
Considering the Use of Force within Peacekeeping Operations
Elba Yanett Coria Márquez
international relations theory
Pre-twentieth century thinkers considered as International Relations Scholars:
The case of Kant
Erika Biagini
Realism and its View of World Politics
4

Geneveive Lynch
Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies
Conflict: causes, resolution policies and practices and degrees of success. The
case of the Lord’s Resistance Army and conflict in Northern Uganda
Catherine Roche
UN Resolutions 1325and 1820: Conceptions of Gender in Post Conflict States
Yvonne Entenmann
International Political Economy
Are the growing criticisms of the International Monetary Fund justified?
Beryl Bömer
Financial Flows and Capital Crises
Michael Megrelis
Political Leadership
French Foreign Policy from Mitterrand to Sarkozy: A Continuity of Grandeur
Laura Grealish
Explaining the Consistent Popularity of Vladimir Putin in Russia
Liam Clarke
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Regional Studies

Throwing Them All Out!
The Rise of the Contemporary
Left in Latin America
8 Regional Studies
nessa Kennedy
Final year BA International Relations
In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected President of Venezuela. Over the next
decade Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay would all elect leftist leaders of
varying degrees. This event is known as Latin America’s ‘leftwing turn’. In
this essay, Nessa endeavours to explain why such a seismic shift towards the
left occurred. She demonstrates that the leftwing turn was facilitated by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the process of democratisation that resulted
in rightwing parties dominating Latin American governments by the close of
the 20th Century. Economic conditions, partially created by neoliberalism, led
to widespread discontent which in turn resulted in a mass overthrow of incumbents,
who were replaced by their leftwing counterparts.
‘Throw them all out! Not a single one stays!’
introduction
These were the calls of protestors in Argentina attempting to ‘oust’ their leaders
in 2001 (Boidi, 2007, p. 53). They, along with many other Latin Americans,
would succeed in removing their rightwing governments who were nearly uni-

formly replaced with leftist governments. This event, known as the ‘leftwing
turn’, began in 1998 when Hugo Chavez was elected President of Venezuela. In
the next few years Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay would all elect leftist leaders
of varying degrees (Seligson, 2007). This essay will endeavour to explain why
such a seismic shift towards the left occurred.
model of analysis
The essay has four parts. The first examines the structural factors that facilitated
the left’s rise. The second discusses a series of factors related to the
economy, including neoliberal reforms; a changing workforce; and a dramatic
economic downturn in the late 1990s that produced mass discontent. The third
demonstrates how this discontent manifested itself in the widespread ousting
of incumbents, and thus the ascendency of the left. The fourth surveys the
literature of competing arguments for the leftwing turn, and illustrates the fallacies
and virtues in their work.
structural factors
soviet union
Under the banner of defeating Communism, into which all leftist movements
of any degree were grouped, the US actively worked against every leftist Latin
American government from the 1950s onwards. This created a deeply negative
perception of leftist governance amongst Latin Americans, who were thus
disinclined to support leftwing parties. Additionally, the excuse of ending
Communism gave justification to rightwing government’s efforts to crush their
competition, through the repression or banning of leftwing movements (Castañda,
2006). This repression resulted in the chronic organisational and political
weakness of leftwing parties, who had little political presence for decades.
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 ended US efforts to supposedly stop Communism
in Latin America and the stigma attached to leftist governance faded,
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emoving this block to leftwing success. Furthermore, rightwing governments,
devoid of anti- Communist justifications, were forced to loosen leftist repression,
which enabled the left organise itself sufficiently and thus it was only during
the mid-1990s that they first became a part of mainstream political life
(Castañda, 2006; Levitsky & Roberts, 2010).
The collapse of the Soviet Union also had an internal effect on leftwing parties
themselves. Many early leftwing movements had genuinely supported extremist
Communist ideals which entailed the non-democratic overthrow of
governments- elections were seen to be of little importance and as relatively
weak efforts were made to contest them, this resulted in few electoral victories.
However, the Soviet Union’s end led to the ideological victory of democracy and
Communism was discredited as a viable option for governance (Cleary, 2006).
Thus the only way for the left to attain power- the chief goal of most political
movements- was to accept democracy. As a result the left re-orientated its efforts
to sincerely wining power through elections. This lengthy re-orientation,
which entailed numerous electioneering efforts, including the moderation of
the lefts stance, meant that the newly organised left only became a viable option
for most voters, in the mid-1990s (Levitsky & Roberts, 2010).
Democratisation
A wave of democratisation swept through Latin America in the early 1980s that
led to the ousting of mostly rightwing autocrats (Kirby, 2003, p. 77). However
many of these leaders did not leave office until they were sure of a rightwing
successor being chosen, and the explicit marginalisation of the left was
often a requirement of their departure (Cleary, 2006). Consequently, in the
early 1990s most Latin American governments were of the right. Due to the
aforementioned structural factors, these governments faced little competition
from leftist parties (Blanco & Grier, 2010). As a result, following two or three
elections, many of these rightwing governments remained in power in the late
1990s (Cleary, 2006). This had major implications for the left, as shall be explored
later.
10 Regional Studies

The Economy
the washington Consensus
In the 1930s Latin American countries collectively adopted a policy of Import
Substitution Industrialisation which entailed the local production of industrialised
goods, and thus minimising imports. To fund this process, huge sums
of money had to be borrowed from international creditors. Following a global
economic crisis in the late- 1970s, the interests on such borrowings soared,
and states were simply unable to keep up with now exponential loan repayments
(Naim, 1993). As a result the 1980s were dominated by a region-wide
debt crisis. In response to this crisis, virtually all Latin American governments
turned towards a package of neoliberal reforms known as the Washington Consensus,
which they assured citizens would solve many of the region’s economic
problems (Murillo, Oliveros, & Vaishnav, 2008). This economic policy entailed
trade liberalisation, Foreign Direct Investment, privatisation and deregulation 1
(Kirby, 2003, pp. 41-55).
Precisely what economic impact the Washington Consensus had on Latin
America is unclear, and the subject of contentious debate (Lora & Panizza,
2002; Huber E. , 2004; Walton, 2004; Weyland, 2004). However most agree
however that as a result of its effects, by the mid-1990s fiscal responsibility improved,
and poverty reduced. However, economic growth, as promised by the
incumbent governments, remained relatively weak (Kirby, 2002, p. 108-109;
Lora & Olivera, 2005; Boidi, 2007, p. 121). These middling economic effects
undoubtedly did little to build support for incumbent governments (Gélineau,
2007). However the Washington Consensus’ main consequences for such governments
were in other areas, which shall be explored in the following section.
A Changing Workforce and Decreased Social Spending
1 The extent and time at which the reforms were implemented varied across the region. Brazil,
for example, did not seriously implement market reform until 1995 (Kirby, 2003, pp. 54-55).
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Neoliberalism led to very slightly improved employment levels 2 ; however its
effect on employment was as whole negative due to its consequences for the
nature of jobs in which people worked. Much of the employment gains were
seen in the service sector, which entailed mostly informal low paying work,
such as cleaning, that was deeply unsecure. Increased numbers were employed
on short-term contracts if at all, which could be ended with ease, and entailed
no social security benefits. The conglomeration of agriculture led the marginalisation
of small farmers, whilst many small and medium sized family firms
collapsed due to corporate competition. This led to a trend of upwards social
mobility being reversed as a once emerging middle class undertook urban, low
paying work (Kirby, 2003, pp. 56-57; Buono & Lara, 2006, p. 312). As a consequence
of these developments, the quality of employment worsened, whilst the
real industrial wage and the minimum wage both fell from their 1980 levels.
This left people far worse off and more likely to fall into poverty, than they had
been in decades 3 (Roberts K. M., 2002). Social vulnerability, not easily captured
in statistics, increased massively (Kirby, 2003, p. 111).
Compounding these difficulties was the declining government expenditure
which had accompanied the Washington Consensus. This decline was particularly
strong in the area of social spending, which typically provides cushioning
in the form of welfare payments that would soften the blow of devastating economic
alterations (Alesina, et al, 2008; Stokes, 2009). The state’s withdrawal
from the public sphere meant it was simply unable or unwilling to meet what
were now desperate public needs for economic support. As a result social inequality
and poverty were further increased, whilst there were few supporting
mechanisms in place in the event of additional economic strain (Stokes, 2009;
Levitsky & Roberts, 2010). And additional economic strain was precisely what
happened.
Economic Downturn
2 Employment grew from 39% of the population in 1990, to 42% in 1999 (Kirby, 2003, p. 112).
3 The 1996 average industrial wage was 5% lower than it had been in 1980. Average minimum
wage fell by 30% between 1980 and 1997 (Roberts K. M., 2002).
12 Regional Studies

Combined, the effect of a demoralised workforce, and nonexistent state was
enough to produce discontent with government. However both of these factors
were exacerbated massively by a sudden economic downturn that took
place from 1998 to 2002, known as the ‘lost-half decade’. This crisis was chiefly
caused by the Asian financial crisis which tore throughout the region, its rapidness
undoubtedly strengthened by the trade liberalisation which had weakened
economic borders (Roberts K. M., 2008). Due to this crisis, poverty shot up
instantly, as did unemployment and inequality 4 , whilst economic growth declined
by .3% a year (Levitsky & Roberts, 2010; Cornia & Martorano, 2010).
However whilst figures paint a grim picture, the massive vulnerability that neoliberalism
produced led to the downturn having a more devastating effect than
such statistics can illustrate. This vulnerability was enhanced by the lack of
government support, which due to further spending cuts, increased yet further
(Singh, 2005, p. 14; Ocampo, 2004). As a result people from all areas of society,
including the very wealthy, grew concerned with the actions of their governments
(Graham & Sukhtankar, 2004).
electoral success
324Blame, directed toward these governments for such economic problems was
enhanced by the fact that they had been in office for so many years, and Murillo,
et al (2008) found strong evidence indicating that the left’s success was heavily
the result of discontent produced by the length of these governments time in
office. Debs and Helmke (2008) find no empirical support for this proposition.
However their study is flawed because it focuses only on the rise of the ‘pure’
left candidates who ran on redistribution platforms, when the significance of
leftwing leaders was in their being an alternative to the incumbent government.
Their policies were largely irrelevant, although not surprisingly given the deep
dislike people had for it, leftwing leaders did enable anti- neoliberal rhetoric to
take centre stage in many of their campaigns (Lora, Panizza, & Agnoli, 2004;
Levitsky & Roberts, 2010).
4 This caused a further 200 million people to drop below the poverty line (Indart et al, 2004,
pp. 54-55).
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The power of the lefts ability to act as an alternative was enhanced by the structural
factors noted previously, which meant most of the leftwing parties had
never held office before, and thus shared no blame in the economic problems 5
(Bruhn, 2006; Queirolo, 2007, p. 124). In almost every case these parties were
opposing traditional parties or incumbents that appeared to be part of the system
that caused the economic devastation (Arditi, 2008). From 1998 to 2004
fourteen incumbent parties lost in eighteen Latin American states. Most of the
parties that won were of the left (Levitsky & Roberts, 2010).
An incredible number of these leftwing parties were re-elected 6 due to a commodities
boom which took place from 2003 onwards, just as many of these
parties began governing. This boom resulted in soaring employment and economic
growth, which enabled the extension of once curtailed government services.
Despite most of these governments continuing to implement neoliberal
policies, leftist parties were re-elected throughout the region (Levitsky & Roberts,
2010). This provides further evidence to suggest that the lefts success was
based on the economic factors noted previously.
Alternative Explanations
A number of other theories have been posited to explain the lefts success. Often
cited as being crucial to the leftwing turn is inequality, both positive and negative
(Castañda, 2006; Debs & Helmke, 2008). However, numerous studies find
no relation between increasing or decreasing inequality and a swing towards
the opposition (Lora & Olivera, 2005; Murillo, Oliveros, & Vaishnav, 2008;
Blanco & Grier, 2010). An alternative suggestion is that low economic growth,
itself partially caused by inequality, was the reason for the shift (Birdsall, 1998;
Rodrik, 1999; Weisbrot, 2006). However this has found little empirical support
(Lora & Olivera, 2005; Stokes, 2009).
5 Of 16 Latin American Presidential elections from 2000-2005, 11 were won by parties that had
never held office before (Bruhn, 2006).
6 Leftwing incumbents were re-elected n Brazil (2006), Chile (2006), Venezuela (2006), Argentina
(2007), Bolivia (2009), Uruguay (2009), and Ecuador (2009).
14 Regional Studies

Cleary (2006) argues that the leftwing surge is explained by the ability of labour
based movements to launch political challenges 7 . However leftwing parties
in Chile and Uruguay attained most of their support from the middle class
who would have no connection to such labour movements- thus although interesting,
this theory is not a sufficient explanatory variable by itself (Kaufman R.
R., 2009).
A collective ideological swing to the left too is often cited (Castañda, 2006;
Lupu, 2009). Although Latin Americans’ electoral preferences have become
slightly more leftist, there has been no significant alteration in ideology, and
indeed the majority of Latin Americans are of the right. Thus this cannot be a
significant factor (Seligson, 2008; Murillo, Oliveros, & Vaishnav, 2008).
Others state that the shift represented disappointment with democracy (Roberts
K. M., 2002; Schamis, 2006; Cardoso, 2006; Mainwaring, 2006). However
whilst Latin Americans undeniably became unhappy with how democratic
government was run, increasing numbers support democracy as a form of government
during the lefts ascension, so this cannot constitute a full explanation
(Chu, Bratton, & Lagos, 2008).
It has been argued that voters were initially reluctant to vote for a leftwing candidate
due to fear of a coup, which had typically been instigated by rightwing
leaders. As democracy matured this fear withered, and Latin America’s poverty
and inequality provided the left with a natural advantage that it could mobilise
(Cleary, 2006; Cameron, 2009). However Stokes (2009) found no empirical
evidence for this argument.
The most prominent of all explanations for the leftwing turn is that dislike for
the Washington Consensus, as advocated by rightwing governments, led to the
shift (Lora & Olivera; Hammond, 2006; Lynch, 2007; Weyland, 2010, p. 2; Baker
& Green, 2011). This argument posits that such dislike functions independently
of economic circumstances. However the two are inextricably linked.
7 Madrid (2004) too found that the level of unionisation was a strong determinant of the lefts
vote from 1978-2002.
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15

Dissatisfaction with privatisation, for example is largely dependent on people’s
evaluation of the current economic situation (Panizza & Yañez, 2005; Bonnet
et al, 2006). Furthermore where neoliberalism appeared to lead to economic
gains, incumbents were re-elected 8 (Levitsky & Roberts, 2010). Thus dislike for
neoliberalism as a policy, did not impact the lefts success 9 , although as outlined
above, it had major ramifications for the governments that implemented it.
Conclusion
This essay has only focused on the major reasons for the lefts’ success. It is
undeniable however that individual factors played a role in the election of certain
leaders, such as Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, who benefited greatly from
sharp cleavages amongst the right (Kaufman R. , 2010). However the broad
trend that swept across Latin America was facilitated by the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and the process of democratisation that resulted in rightwing parties
dominating Latin American governments by the close of the 20th Century.
Economic conditions, partially created by neoliberalism, led to widespread discontent
which in turn resulted in a mass overthrow of incumbents, who were
replaced with their leftwing counterparts. Studies of the lefts success too often
focus on individual factors such as inequality, or poor growth. However as
this essay has illustrated, the emphasis should be on the wider picture: it is not
one factor that caused the leftwing turn, but rather a combination of many that
produced an unprecedented level of discontent with incumbent governments.
What then is the future for Latin America’s leftwing governments, now that
they too have been in power for several terms? With the election of several
rightwing leaders, it has been suggested the tide may be turning away from
the left and towards the right once again (Guerrero, 2010; Thomson, 2010). It
is unlikely though, that such a range of factors will simultaneously converge to
produce a similar rightwing wave. As Latin American states age, political ties
deepen, and paths diverge, the leftwing turn should be remembered as a semi-
8 This occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru (Levitsky & Roberts, 2010).
9 This is linked to the broader trend of weak issue voting in Latin America due to generally to
low information levels (Htun, 2003, p. 129; Johnson & Ryu, 2010)
16 Regional Studies

nal but temporal moment in the history of the region.
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20 Regional Studies
Ciaran Price
Final Year BA International Relations
The resurgence of political Islam reshaped politics in the Middle-East
and North Africa and redefined the relationship between Islam and the
wider world. This essay seeks to identify the root causes of the revival of
political Islam after the 1950’s through a study of existing literature on Middle-
Eastern and North-African politics and society. Economic stagnation across
the region owing to irresponsible economic policies led to rising unemployment
especially amongst the new middle-class and in turn antipathy towards the entire
concept of the secular nation state. This feeling of neglect was compounded
by the genesis and close proximity of modern, alien consumerist culture which
they were excluded from and the disintegration of Arab nationalism following
Israel’s victory in the Six Day War. The alienation and betrayal felt by large segments
of the population turned people away from the nation-state and traditional
religious authorities and towards a political movement adhering strictly
to fundamental teachings of Islam.
introduction
Grievance and Greed
The Resurgence of Political Islam
The resurgence of political Islam has caught many academics off-guard and has
necessitated a complete reassessment of our understanding of political, social
and economic relations. The advent of industrialisation in the Middle-East and
North-Africa (MENA) had indeed conformed to the academic model whereby

increasing wealth would encourage the growth of liberal and secular government
and society in the form of the Muslim nation-state (Cavelho, 2009). However,
the growth of movements after the 1950s which professed the return to a
political and social code derived from the Islamic doctrine, and the accession
to power of such movements in countries such as Iran in 1979, represents something
of a backlash against modernity, or at least against Western modernity
(Stark, 1999).
This essay seeks an explanation of the rise of political Islam in the latter half
of the twentieth century and the corresponding decline of the secular nationstate.
The first section shall briefly explain the political background against
which Islamic movements mobilised. The nature of these movements, their
membership and their grievances shall be discussed to identify the key areas
of grievance for analysis in this paper. The second, third and forth sections
will discuss grievances in relation to economic, social and political failures of
the state in that order. Each of these three sections will be further sub-divided
into three parts discussing, first, the conduct of state policy as a background to
grievance, second, why it was the middle class which was mobilised most, and
lastly, why Islamic movements gained support.
It is the hypothesis of this essay that the failure of the secular nation-state’s
project of modernisation failed to deliver equitable economic growth and opportunities
caused wide-spread dissatisfaction among the urban middle class
and educated youth who felt economically, socially and politically excluded
from the nation-state, their allegiance to which eroded. Strict adherence to the
Sharia offered a solution to all their grievances most importantly by relieving
them of their material inferiority by replacing it with a unified sense of moral
superiority. Islamic organisations were favourable because they were well established,
indigenous grass-roots organisations with which people from the
disenchanted sections of society identified.
The Nation-State and Political
Islam
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The end of the Second World War marked the end of direct European control
in the MENA region and the rise of the nation-state in its place. However the
nation-state came about because of the desire for sovereignty and not from a
shared culture and heritage (Nahas, 1985; Kelidar, 1993). Independence movements
cultivated a sense of national identity among people as the best means
unifying a fragmented population against colonial occupation (Geertz, 1973,
p. 302; Ayoob, 2004). When independence was achieved it was this broadly
appealing secular movement which would take over, forming a unified nationstate,
however largely conforming to the system of boarders drawn by colonial
powers which had artificially segmented the region (Barnett, 1999). What
emerged was the result of a compromise between elites and religious leaders
whereby the latter agreed to support the leadership of the former which meant
the political marginalisation of religion. The growth of religious fundamentalism
can therefore be considered a movement against this secular state which
is seen as causing hardship and against the spiritual leaders who are seen as
propping up the state. The answer was a new religious movement which would
address the failures of secularism.
The secular nation-state maintained its broad base of support by its promises
of radical economic, social and political reforms. Economically the state promised
industrial development to compete with Western markets, higher incomes
for all classes in society, the alleviation of poverty and job security and advancement
opportunities for all citizens. Socially the nation-state promised the
transformation of society which would reflect peoples increased wealth in the
age of modernity (Lapidus, 1997). Politically the nation state promised greatness
with a military capable of protecting national sovereignty, crushing national
enemies of the state and projecting its interests onto the international
system (Barnett, 1999).
It will be shown in the proceeding paragraphs how the failure of these promises
in these three key areas resulted in massive support for Islamic groups
(Cavelho, 2009). Huge differences are found between these groups. Hamas in
Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, are highly socially orientated
and are heavily involved in providing services to the community and use violence
against perceived ‘occupiers’. Many Salafi groups such as Al Qaeda on the
22 Regional Studies

other hand are exclusively violent and just religion as a justification for killing,
while the brotherhood movements act largely within the democratic system.
These groups are described using many terms 1 , generally they offer a critique of
the secular nation-state, they challenge it, and they aim to change it (Denoeux,
2002). They do so through the use of religious symbolism. Consistent with rising
support for these groups a measurable increase in religiosity is noted with a
massive increase in the number of Mosques, of people attending Mosques and
in displays of religious symbolism such as the veil and the Hijab (Bayat, 2007,
p. 147). 2
Through numerous demographic studies it has been shown that the membership
of these movements is found mainly in the urbanised lower-middle-class.
Accounting for the largest part of membership are civil servants and university
educated students who had migrated from rural areas (Ayubi, 1980). This demographic
stratum is the focal group of this essay and the proceeding sections
are designed to explain the reasons this class person joined such movements.
Economic Grievance
The new nation-state embarked on a programme of modernisation, borrowed
largely from their former colonial masters, which would gear the economy towards
industrialisation. Between 1961 and 1985 considerable economic growth
was achieved by most countries in the region, owing almost exclusively to
exploitation the regions massive oil resources and the increasing price of oil
(Askari, 2006, p. 83). Oil benefitted the entire region including non-oil rich
countries which availed of loans for economic stimulation. Also non-oil rich
countries benefitted from the remittances of workers who had migrated to oilrich
countries in search of work to sustain their families back home (Koc &
Onan, 2004).
1 Such terms include: Islamists, Jihadists, Fundamentalists, Radicals and Revivalists.
2 As opposed to being a sign of devout faith, many academics argue that the wearing of
the veil was a symbol of protest against the state (Williams, 1979)
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The prospective rents that could be achieved determined that the state would
take a high stake in the economy and therefore dominate all areas of life. Economic
policy was highly protectionist with import substitution its main principle.
By the 1950s national surpluses obtained from oil rents, either directly or
indirectly, were sufficient to allow countries to spend considerable amounts of
money on public services (Issawi, 2006). Money was pumped into job creation
which was mainly in the state civil service in keeping with the states’ monopoly
over the generation of wealth. The result was mass migration of people to urban
centres and the expansion of the middle class. The prospect of jobs and the
opportunity to do better in life saw a massive increase in the number of young
people attending university (Butko, 2004).
By the mid 1980s great institutional inefficiencies associated with state control
over the economy became visible. The reliance on oil meant that volatility in
the oil market would have far reaching implications for the entire region. Consequentially
the fall in oil prices in the mid 1980s meant that the state could
no longer afford to provide public services and could not afford to continue
arbitrarily creating public sector jobs. Whereas before massive oil rents allowed
countries to liquidise their failing economies and disguise severe underlying
problems, the steep decline in oil prices caused economies to stagnate, unemployment
to rise and the average wage to decrease (Owen & Pamuk, 1998).
Economic policy and the lower-middle class
Is it economic grievances which mobilised the middle class against the nationstate?
The main difference between this social group and others is the level of
expectation they had of the state’s attempt at modernisation. The introduction
of free education saw a massive increase in the number of young people from
lower-middle class backgrounds attending college. The higher educational attainment
of the younger generation, related to the new age of modernisation
in which they found themselves, meant that people‟s aspirations in life were
considerably higher (Owen & Pamuk, 1998, p. 97). People in the lower-middle
class wanted to move up the social ladder will better jobs and higher pay. The
state encouraged third level educational attainment by the tacit promise of job
availability which reflects their standard of education.
24 Regional Studies

As discussed, the level of state control in the economy which was based largely
on oil rates meant that the only way it could guarantee jobs was largely through
the creation of positions in the civil service. The civil service became a major
source of employment and a position in it was the aspiration of many students.
The inevitable downsizing of the civil service during the oil crisis of the 1980s
therefore was particularly devastating for the lower-middle class, more so than
any other section of society. The scaling back of services and of any kind of social
security, such as food subsidies, forced many to move downwards in social
standing towards lower-class impoverishment (Cavelho, 2009).
While the economic policies of the state initially facilitated a marked improvement
in the quality of public services and of life in general, it had the effect
of accumulating more wealth in the hands of the upper-class elite and hence
inequality rose considerably in this period. Corruption among the elites allowed
them to subsidise their own lifestyles which were heavily consumerist.
The economic downturn however did not have the same effect on the elite as
it did on the middle-class. Elite control over nationalised industries ensured
that the middle-class would bear the brunt of declining revenues in the form
of joblessness, lower wages and fewer services, thus insulating the upper-class
(Owen & Pamuk, 1998). The elite continued accumulating money while people
became alienated from the consumerist lifestyle (Cavelho, 2009). Furthering
their sense of alienation, the middle-class lived in close proximity with the
elites in the urban centres. Meanwhile, conditions in these centres deteriorated
with increased poverty and overcrowding (Richards, 2003).
Economic grievance and religious revival
It is an anomaly, as mentioned by Carvelho (2009),that in the face of economic
hardship people turned to a strict adherence to religion taking on further material
sacrifices which it calls for. Increasing religiosity as a response to material
deprivation may be considered an antidote to this in a number of ways.
Firstly Islam offered a solution to income inequality by emphasising the importance
of spiritual strength above material wealth. Islam could relieve the
disenfranchised of their feeling of alienation. The teachings of Islam, to an extent,
provided for an escape in other ways than just spiritual or psychological.
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In response to corruption and rentierism, which channelled profits from the
extraction of oil to the elite, Islamic teachings would dictate that the natural
endowment of resources in a country is the property of society at-large and not
of a few politicians (Askari, 2006, p. 12).
Where the state was failing, Islamic movements intervened and provided
strong social support networks for people facing economic hardship. Islamic
groups provided education, healthcare and financial aid and therefore had the
confidence of much of the lower-middle class (Wickham, 2002). Islamic groups
proved that they are a viable solution and won much favour with non-Muslims
for their pro-active approach to the shortcomings of the state. Many of these
services required their users to adhere to Islamic customs, for example movements
in Egypt provided a bus service for university students which were segregated
and required women to wear the veil. . Thus the Islamic way of life,
with all its sacrifices, became the only viable way of life, and one of reasonable
popularity in the absence of the state (Shukrallah, 1994).
social Grievance
Attempts to modernise the economy had significant implications for society
which underwent dramatic changes during this period. Society in the MENA
region was organised largely around tribal and family ties and had a rather
traditional conservative ideology. This way of life was, of course, founded upon
an Islamic sense of morality. As discussed earlier the secular system to emerge
from independence required that the religious leaders and therefore the religious
way of life be confined to the private sphere. However this became increasingly
difficult as the modern lifestyle was found to often be in conflict with
peoples sense of personal morality. People believed that the secular nation-state
was not representative of their views and thus dissatisfaction with the ruling
elite, as well as the spiritual leaders, grew stronger (Richards, 2003).
Social Change and the lower-middle-class
Did social change impact the lower-middle-class more thus mobilising them in
26 Regional Studies

an Islamic anti-system movement? The most significant product of the state‟s
attempt at modernisation was the mass migration of people from rural areas to
towns and cities (Issawi, 2006, p. 102). Many of these people were from lower-middle
class, educated backgrounds who were in search of the job opportunities
the state had promised. This urbanisation of society had far reaching
consequences for people‟s way of life, culture and identity. The bias towards industrial
development came at a huge loss to agriculture and farmers who were
thus forced to the cities in search of jobs. The new emphasis on higher level
education, and the promise of employment, saw many young people move to
urban centres to attend college mainly in the fields of engineering and science,
in keeping with industrialisation (Cavelho, 2009).
This changed the demographic structure dramatically over a very short period
of time. Whereas before people lived in close-knit communities with shared
values, people found themselves in highly populated centres where they lived
in close proximity with people of different tribes and cultures with which they
were not familiar. These urban centres were the focal points of modernisation
(Cavelho, 2009). In these centres the lifestyle of modernity, that is commercialism
and Western and social norms, came into conflict with the traditionally
conservative values of the rural migrants. As discussed earlier, people did not
have the money to partake in the culture of commercialism but equally salient
was people’s sense of social alienation against a dominating culture which to
them was foreign and amoral. In particular the consumption of alcohol and
liberal sexual practices, which are acceptable in Western society and a product
of modernity, irrevocably contradicted peoples conservative moral values,
fundamentally Islamic, which stressed the virtues of modesty, abstinence, and
privacy in terms of sexual conduct strictly within marriage (Richards, 2003).
social grievance and religious revival
The state pursued modernisation to the detriment of cultural and religious values.
Adherence to a fundamentalist Islamic code provided a remedy for peoples
need for morality in the face of the perceived immorality which accompanies
modern living. Perceived as a western import, the movements, often heavily
anti-western, offered cultural security. Religious groups were an important
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part of social life and provided for many social activities in the urban centres.
Mosques were important meeting places for people and one of the few places
they could engage with other Muslims in the absence of foreign, modern influences
(Woltering, 2002).
Political Grievance
The absolute control over the economy exercised by the state required it to
maintain an absolute control over political affairs. These states were necessarily
authoritarian. Political opposition of any form was banned and often violently
oppressed (Sivan, 1990). Personal freedoms including freedom of speech
and of association were moderated to maintain state control. Organisations
seen as encouraging political dissention were banned and again often violently
oppressed. In order to maintain authoritarian control, these states channelled
large resources into the authority apparatus- the military and the police and
usually a specialised police force. The judiciary was brought under state control
and emergency powers were arbitrarily used to reinforce authority (Woltering,
2002).
The nation-state rallied support for its authority by promising greatness. It has
been shown how the state aimed at economic and social greatness however it
aimed for political greatness as well. Huge spending on the military and impressive
military rallies provided people with a sense that the state was invincible
and therefore the best system for the protection of citizens against their
enemies. However this turned out to be a sham. In 1967, in a significant event
in Islamic history which Muslims call “the Setback”, Israel obliterated the combined
forces of three Arab states during a six day war. The myth of military
greatness and the idea of pan-Arabism seemed to dissolve (Milton-Edwards,
2006, p. 135).
Political grievance and the lower-middle class
The age of modernity promised the aspiring middle-class a new era of inclusion.
People were better educated and aspired to greater things. In reality however
28 Regional Studies

it resulted only in alienation from society and the sources of wealth. Further
exclusion from the power state structure meant that the alienated classes had
no way of improving their situation. The failure of the state to increase the standard
of living, the continued accumulation of wealth by the upper-class and the
inability of the middle-class to interact with the system which was supposed to
represent them caused wide-spread frustration with the political elite and the
state system (Rahnema, 2008).
The disastrous war with Israel served to completely disintegrate the sense of
nationhood fostered by the nation-state. It proved that the state was weak and
people would not identify with weakness. The idea of pan-Arabism was crushed
with it and an identity vacuum developed as people became evermore disenfranchised
with the political order (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 135).
Political grievance and political Islam
Political Islamic organisations provided people with a realistic and legitimate
vehicle with which to oppose the corrupted authoritarian regime. In spite of
their contestation with the oppressive state, religious movements were able
to establish strong grass-roots support. While religious movements were put
down, the state could not completely obliterate the religion with which so many
people identified. The state had to compromise which meant mosques had to
have some independence. These mosques became centres for political association
and political Islamic groups flourished out of reach of the state authority.
Furthermore Islamic movements were not seen as the main threat. Communist
movements were prioritised and more resources we put into crushing these organisations
leaving Islamic movements free to expand (Schwedler, 2001).
The connection between these movements and people‟s cultural identity was
infinite and therefore people were quite receptive to Islamic groups. People
were educated in the same tradition and therefore were able to readily understand
the ideas behind Islamic movements. This made them preferable above
any other movement. People needed a sense of identity which would be provided
in the form of Islamic fraternity. Strict adherence to Islam promised to
revive the greatness which had been thrown away by the secular leaders. By di-
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verging from Islam, it has been argued, the state has angered God who allowed
them to be defeated against Israel. The Jewish nation meanwhile, were believed
to remain true to their faith and in turn they seemed to see great successes as
a result (Ayubi, 1980).
Conclusion
The resurgence of political Islam is explained by a number of converging factors.
The state failed to deliver on its promises of wealth and greatness. Economically
the state was hugely inefficient, with an absolute reliance on oil,
which led ultimately to unemployment and decreased social mobility among
the middle-class. The well educated youth were particularly disenfranchised as
they failed to get jobs which reflected their educational attainment. Meanwhile,
the elite continued accumulating wealth an thus the relative standing of the
middle class declined towards lower-class. Increased urbanisation furthered
disillusionment as people lived in close proximity to modern commercialism
yet had not the wealth to participate in it.
Modernisation was pursued to the detriment of traditional social values held by
much of the population. Modern practises conflicted with these values and thus
people became alienated from the state. Furthermore the chances of changing
the system from within were unlikely as the state oppressed any voice of
discontent. This social, economic and political alienation, coupled with the realisation
that the state was weak in the face of its enemies resulted in a crisis of
nationalism. Citizens had to take back the country for themselves.
Not only were people mobilised against the nation-state system but they also
largely rejected the religious leaders who were seen as propping up the secular
regimes. This necessitated not only an overthrow of the state but also an
overhaul of the relationship between politics and Islam. The result was a political
movement which adhered strictly to the teachings of Islam. Owing to their
indigenous nature and the fact that they were largely protected from the full
force of state oppression, these organisations were favourable alternatives to
the failed nation-state.
30 Regional Studies

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Edward Elgar Publishing.
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Middle East Studies , 12 (4), 481-499.
• Barnett, M. N. (1999). Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System.
International Organization , 49 (3), 479-510.
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Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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(2), 56-81.
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Columbia University Press: New York.
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1143.
32 Regional Studies

Colonialism, Collective
Identity and State
Formation in South Asia
Aishling Mc Morrow
Final Year BA International Relations
This essay focuses on the creation of collective identities and state formation
in South Asia at the hands of colonial powers, in particular India
and Pakistan. Aishling’s primary aim is to delineate that the imposition
of colonial rule and law in a region so diverse and disparate to that of the British
Empire has subsequently wrought a history of continuous antagonism and
destruction. She argues that the incessant primacy that was heaped upon the
majority religion was completely alien to the politics that previously operated
in the South Asian region and as a result ignited new feuds and tensions. In
conclusion, Aishling examines the future of both of these states and how it is
imperative that colonial imposition, although an indelible mark in their histories,
does not come to define either state.
introduction
The impact that colonialism has had on the region of South Asia is multi-faceted
and has deeply coloured the tapestry of Asian history, politics and culture.
In particular, the occupation of India and Pakistan has resulted in diverse and
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conflicting collective identities. Indeed it is fair to say that these particular sets
of collective identities would simply have not materialised were it not for the
imposition of colonial rule and law. Furthermore the impact of colonialism on
the formation of each particular country has left a tangible and indelible mark
upon the emergent state. In this essay, I shall follow the constructivist approach
to the creation of collective identities to highlight my argument. This theory
interprets “human identities as inherently malleable” and that “powerful elements
in society construct social identity.” (Ludden, 2002, p. 2). The main
thrust of my essay shall centre on this school of thought that the construction
of national identities by the colonial powers in South Asia generated the collective
identities and state form of modern day. Furthermore, the fractured and
splintered states that we study in the present day spawn from the imposed and
artificial representations of character and nationality fostered under colonial
rule. In my essay I shall focus primarily on the impact of colonialism on the
formation of collective identities in India and to a lesser extent the creation
of this phenomenon in Pakistan also. To address the issue of state formation
in South Asia, the state of Pakistan shall be in the spotlight, as this very state
was conceived and wrought at the hands of the colonisers in 1947 following an
independence movement led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah.
Colonialism in India
The eighteenth century bore witness to a glut of colonial imposition in South
Asia. It represented an epoch whereby certain European powers conquered and
exploited diverse and unique regions. However, South Asia presented an unprecedented
hurdle to the imposition of colonial rule as, by and large, it was
defined by dynastic politics. Under this system of rule, diverse language and
religious groups existed co-habitually in various kingdoms ruled by their own
monarchy. At this time the notion of citizenship and ethnicity had not evolved,
the people of an area pledged their allegiance to the dynastic power instead.
This dynamic that defined South Asian politics in the pre-modern phase jarred
greatly with the status quo that the colonisers used to rule in Europe. What
they encountered in this region was not politics of election but rather politics of
succession. To the further consternation of the various colonial powers many
kingdoms would overlap their borders which created dual allegiances for the
34

peoples living in these areas. However, an important and crucial facet of South
Asia, particularly India, during this period was the fact that although there was
huge cultural and political heterogeneity, the communal and religious tensions
that explode from the region currently had yet to be ignited.
As the British colonisers encroached further into Indian territory and society
simultaneously, they inflicted upon the many kingdoms a new and novel form
of governance. The introduction of a religious element into politics and society
was a radical departure from the cultural norm that had abounded during
the pre-modern phase in Indian history. Suddenly the state was defined
by a majority religion, with the diverse and various inhabitants expected to
abruptly merge into one peaceful and coherent unit. When the British ruling
class were confronted with a society that was comprised of such an assorted
array of cultures that still managed to emanate harmony and solidarity, they
were perplexed to say the least. The utilisation of the caste system as a tool of
segregation was a direct response to this phenomenon that any colonial power
would see as a challenge to their governance. The caste system based on religious
identities was subsequently imposed to contain indigenous resistance.
By keeping the native Indian population in a cycle of continuous antagonism,
the British colonisers greatly reduced the prospect of revolt. The infection of
religion into politics and the state of India reinforced the divisions in society
and was another form of ammunition in the arsenal of oppression. In this line
of thought, many scholars have argued that, “the caste (again, as we know it
today) is a modern phenomenon, that it is, specifically, the product of an historical
encounter between India and Western colonial rule... suggesting that it
was under the British that ‘caste’ became a single term capable of expressing,
organizing, and above all ‘systematizing’ India’s diverse forms of social identity,
community, and organization.” (Dirks, 2001, p. 5). Although in our haste
to condemn the colonial oppressor and demerit the caste system, one must not
forget that the caste system was not an inherent source of violence. Instead
it was wrought into a fountain of contention as this religious practice was racialised
and communalised under colonial organisation. Religions in India had
survived in a harmonious cycle under dynastic rule, but suddenly confronted
by colonialism and crudely lumped together under a proxy national identity, the
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enowned diversity of the region began to chafe, splinter and eventually ignite.
Violence turned inwards
In India the formation of this collective identity based on the caste system
worked on a bilateral level for the British Empire. Initially it organised the inhabitants
of the country into social groups that could be controlled on separate
levels. The Brahmin caste formed the peak of the hierarchy and the Dalits occupied
the lowest sphere; they were the ‘untouchables’. But it also engendered
an aura of continued antagonism as inequality and discrimination abounded
resulting in an emergent source of friction that triggered the civil conflicts
that we bear witness to today in India. The words of Frantz Fanon can be aptly
applied to this period of Indian history, “colonialism is violence in its natural
state...and will only yield when confronted with greater violence.” (Fanon,
2001). The enforced creation of collective identities and manipulation of the Indian
state was destined to espouse a violent reaction. Yet, for the majority this
violence was channelled inwards towards the Indian population themselves,
instead of being directed at the colonial oppressors, most significantly between
Hindus and Muslims. This was the second and perhaps most important level
that the Empire managed to exert control over India, while there was civilian
conflicts and clashes, the population could never amalgamate and solidify
to revolt against the British. The national movement for independence, while
ultimately successful, “failed to intermingle the currents of national and social
discontent into a single anti-colonial, anti-feudal revolution-a lapse which was
described as ‘tragic’.” (Nag, 1993, p. 1521).
Pakistan: Tyranny of the elite:
In the case of Pakistan, this territory was carved out of the British controlled
India in the partition in 1947. However the foundations for the collective identities
that permeate the society today can be sourced back to colonial rule as
the partition of British India hinged upon religious separation. Pakistan was
constructed in the name of Muslim identity and, akin to India, became dominated
by an elite majority, Punjabi Muslims. These Punjabi Muslims were extremely
powerful landowners and dictated Pakistani society which resulted in
36 Regional Studies

the minority ethnicities of Pakistan being perpetually deprived economically
and socially. Colonial imposition and the tyranny of the ‘elite Pakistani’s’ led
to the formation of a distinct collective identity in these rural areas based on
poverty, deprivation and oppression. Subsequently there was a heightened corollary
between religion and politics under colonial imposition. “Conflict if not
violence was its likely outcome in the circumstances of competition for scarce
resources and political patronage from the colonial rulers.” (Talbot, 2007, p.
155). In fact, there are innate similarities between Pakistan and India in terms
of the formation of collective identities, as both were imposed under British colonial
rule. “Multiple identities and fluid boundaries were reduced to religious
categories which were easily understandable to the British outsiders,” a process
initiated in India and carried through to Pakistan. (Talbot, 2007, p. 155). The
amalgamation of many diverse and disparate cultures is best epitomised by the
census of 1881 in the Punjab region (which became Pakistan) where, “every native
who was unable to define his creed or described it by any name other than
that of some recognised religion, was held to be classified as Hindu.” (Ibbetson,
1881, p. 19).
State Formation: The Puzzle of Pakistan
The formation of the state of Pakistan was profoundly manipulated by colonial
imposition, an undoubted phenomenon as the very territory was whittled
from the British India at the time in 1947. The inhabitants of Pakistan became
increasingly aware of cultural and social divides as the state apparatus, controlled
by the Punjabi Muslims, was facilitated to quash dissent. The formation
of the Pakistani state, still to this day bears the hallmarks, one could even say
scars, of colonialism. “Pakistan still remains a misunderstood country whose
establishment was achieved by worldly and reformist elites largely banking
on a Muslim identity yet disclaiming any ideas of a theocracy.” (Malik, 1996,
p. 676). The basis even on which Pakistan was formed, the establishment of
a territorial Muslim state, accentuates the feeling of bewilderment in the international
arena. In relative terms, Pakistan is only an emergent dot on the
map of consolidated states, a fact that has not escaped the public consciousness.
“Pakistan, it is possible to suggest, is a ‘minority nation’: one that has never
quite overcome the belief that it is ‘the nation of the Indian Muslims’. Pakistani
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37

spokespersons have struggled to define it in more positive and self-contained
terms.” (Pandey, 2002, p. 1029). Furthermore, Pakistan is a state that finds it
roots in a bloody history and it is sometimes conveyed that as the state grows
and expands in global politics, these ancestral roots continue to drink from and
spawn the same bloody history. Baptised from blood and fire, the formation of
the Pakistani state has perpetuated this narration, especially in its continued
enmity with India. “On August 15, 1947, India celebrated with joy its first day
of freedom. The sacrifices of generations of patriots and the blood of countless
martyrs had borne fruit... But the sense of joy... was mixed with pain and sadness.
.. (For) even at the very moment of freedom a communal orgy, accompanied
by indescribable brutalities, was consuming thousands of lives in India
and Pakistan.” (Chandra, 1971, p. 305).
Colonialism has left an indelible brand on Pakistan, by segregating these two
nations through the creation of a false but continual struggle between Muslims
and Hindus, the conflict seeps steadily into modern society and politics.
Of course, while India and Pakistan are not involved in war, at present, there
still remains fire under the ashes between the two states. Indeed the Mumbai
terrorist attacks of 2008 are a tragic example of this antagonism, “Delhi says
all ten terrorists in Mumbai were Pakistani, and had received training there
for a terrorist plot controlled from Pakistan that subjected India to a four-day
national nightmare.” (Dodd, 2008).
the future
India and Pakistan are now both, “developing distinct identities...They have attempted
to draw greater support from society by invoking and linking indigenous
moral and social norms with the formal political institutional structure...
Each state has adopted some of the values, norms and organisational principles
of its society – a process inevitably dominated by those of the majority community
in each state.” (Shastri, 2001, p. 3). While concrete efforts to move away
from the forms of government impressed upon the countries of South Asia are
to be applauded in bringing the state back to its roots and to the people it is
created to serve, there lies contention in the majority approach. By adopting
those norms and values most deeply associated with the dominant sector of
38 Regional Studies

the community, the new indigenous government is simply perpetuating history.
The majority segments of both Indian and Pakistan society were wrought
at the hands of the colonial powers, these people were handed their status and
power in contemporary society by the very oppressors that they are now trying
to eradicate from political institutions. Of course this development is a highly
contentious issue and it seems to only serve to propagate the isolation and ostracising
of the minorities in societies that commenced in the colonial era.
A blaring example of this phenomenon can be found in India’s reaction to the
conflict in Kashmir. “India’s policy towards the conflict in Kashmir has been
narrowly focused in terms of addressing the political issues of Kashmir Valley,
winning the Kashmiris politically and psychologically and integrating them
emotionally into the Indian mainstream.” (Chandran, 2007, p. 4). It appears
that in the quest to reclaim the Kashmir region, India is keeping alive the colonial
legacy of rule. Under the British regime, the Indian populace were forced
to become one amalgamated and homologous entity, a policy that India, rather
surprisingly, seems to be adopting in relation to this conflict. It would be a
major failing of this relatively emergent, distinctly vibrant and diverse state to
collectively overlook the past that shaped its own identity. To seek to impose a
predetermined identity on a region for the purposes of control and assimilation
is only a minute step away from the repetition of British colonial rule.
Conclusion
The instability and hostilities that abound in South Asia appear to be part of
a self-fulfilling prophecy. “Issues of identity in these complex plural societies
continue to beleaguer each state. Majority nationalism remains as much an effect
as a cause of bad, often opportunistic governance...Reactive mobilisation
by minority communities often takes extreme, even secessionist forms as it did
in Sri Lanka and the states of north-eastern India. The use of coercion by the
state to suppress such movements gives impetus to the spiral of hostile rhetoric
and violent conflict.” (Shastri, 2001, p. 12). One of the defining features of colonialism
can be sourced in the fact that, although decades removed from the
region of South Asia, its impact and consequences are still igniting conflicts,
shaping identities and manipulating states and their rule. South Asia at pres-
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39

ent is wrapped in the tryst of two struggles, the first of which the continent has
already won.
All of these countries have gained independence from the colonial power and
should righteously garner confidence from this fact, but perhaps the next battle
is their greatest challenge. Now, these states, India and Pakistan in particular,
must seek to shake the manacles of colonial rule and move to create their own
identities and form of government and rule. The alternative of incessant hatred
and the splintering of states will only prove to be destructive and caustic for
the region. “In a country where capitalism is slowly reaching new areas and
awakening new cultural groups to life, the stream of sub-nationalistic uprisings
seems to be unending. New demands and aspirations continue to surface,
some of which are demanding complete independence, not just self-rule.” (Nag,
1993, p. 1521). Therefore, the impact of colonialism, while representing a major
contributing factor, must not be the defining feature of collective identities and
state formation in South Asia.
Bibliography:
• Chandra, B. (1971). Modern India. New Delhi: National Council for Educational Research and
Training.
• Chandran, D. S. (2007). Swords and Ploughshares: The Future of Kashmir. Bulletin in the
Programme of Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security Vol. 16 Issue 1 , 4 - 7.
• Dirks, N. B. (2001). Castes of Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Dodd, V. (2008). Pakistan snubs India over terrorist ‘suspects’. The Guardian.
• Fanon, F. (2001). The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin.
• Ibbetson, D. (1881). Census of India Report Vol 1.
• Ludden, D. (2002). India and South Asia: A Short History. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
• Malik, I. H. (1996). The State and Civil Society in Pakistan: From Crisis to Crisis. Asian Survey
Vol 36 No. 7 July , 673 - 690.
• Nag, S. (1993). Multiplication of Nations? Political Economy of Sub-Nationalism in India.
Economic and Political Weekly Vol 28 No 29/30 , 1521 - 1532.
• Pandey, G. (2002). India and Pakistan 1947 - 2002. Economic and Political Weekly Vol 37 No
11 , 1027 - 1033.
• Shastri, A. (2001). The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Democracy, Identity, Development
and Security. In A. Shastri, W. Jeyaratnam, & A, The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Democracy,
Development and Identity (pp. 3 - 13). New York: Palgrave.
• Talbot, I. (2007). Religion and Violence: The Historical Context for Conflict in Pakistan. In J.
R. Hinnels, & R. King, Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice (pp. 154 - 169).
New York: Routledge.
40 Regional Studies

International Security
Studies

Should the European
Union develop an
autonomous defence
capability?
Ronan Sweeney
MA in International Security and Conflict Studies
As political and economic integration has progressed across the continent,
calls for deeper military cohesion pose significant and troubling
issues for the future of the Union and Europe as a whole. Ronan’s essay
aims to counter the militarisation of the EU by proposing an alternative
position within international relations, one of a normative and civilian actor.
By tracing historical integration processes since the beginning of continental
organizations, a deeper analysis was enabled of the various roles that the EU
appears to be competing for; military, normative and civilian. The results of
this show, however, that the crevices of cooperation and difficulty of continental
unanimity easily beset the possibility of a functioning autonomous defence
capability, all the while damaging its normative power. The EU appears to be
burdened with an identity crisis as continental cohesion has proven militarily
difficult in the past. He concludes that a scaling back of militarisation can only
enhance the EU’s role as a normative/civilian actor in international relations.
42 International Security Studies

The different existence, the different norms, and the different policies
which the EU pursues are really part of redefining what can be
‘normal’ in international relations...the ability to define what passes
for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of
all – Ian Manners, 2002: 253
introduction
Any notion of contemporary European integration would have been dogged
in absurdity as little as 70 to 80 years ago. To ask a student of international
politics during the interwar years, whether an autonomous European defence
capability should become a reality would have resulted in a very different essay
from today. The internal changes in Europe after the Second World War have
had such profound external effects, that seismic shifts in international relations
have coursed the world we live in today (EUROPA, 2010: 1). But this change,
however, ‘has not been a straightforward glide from war and destruction to
peace and construction’ (Archer, C, 2008: 1).
The question of European security comes at a time of great debate. This debate
is not only focused on European militarisation and the continued relevance of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but also about the very nature
of the European Union’s (EU) role in the world. Following on from Ian Manners’
notion of ‘normative power Europe’ (2002: 235-258) this paper argues
that Europe should not develop an autonomous defence capability, as its unique
composition allows for a different role in a different world of power politics, one
of a civilian power, projectable throughout the world.
Starting from an historical background of the EU’s inception to its present reality,
this paper will critically analyses the concept of European power; normative,
civilian and military. This is followed by an examination of civilian/
normative rhetoric in practice, as well as highlighting the EU’s role in contemporary
power politics to highlight why it should not develop an autonomous
defence capability, before concluding comments are given.
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Inception to contemporary status
In the wake of the Second World War, Europe was again confronted with an
arduous task; reconstruction. The need for security, not just military but also
societal and economic security took precedence on the agenda of European
leaders (Bretherton, C and Volger, J, 2004: 3). Spurred on to avoid retraction to
the recently witnessed devastation, the Council of Europe (CoE) was founded in
1949. Winston Churchill, speaking in Strasbourg in 1949 said:
There is no reason why we should not succeed in achieving our
aims and establishing the structure of this united Europe whose
moral concepts will be able to win the respect and recognition of
mankind, and whose physical strength will be such that no one
will dare to hold up its peaceful journey towards the future (CoE,
2010: 1)
This early imagery of an integrated Europe echoes the contemporary debate
over Europe’s power in the international system. Following the creation of the
CoE, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951
and that in turn was preceded by the Schuman Plan the previous year, which
was ‘the first impetus to supranational integration’ (Staab, A, 2008: 8). The
European Economic Community (EEC), formally established under the Treaty
of Rome in 1957, ‘was an exclusively civilian body’ (Bretherton, C and Volger, J,
2004: 4) with six major Western European signatories formally ‘pooling their
resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the
other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts’ (Treaty of
Rome, 1957: Preamble: 2).
integration and cohesion
Further treaties and conventions were formally set up in conjunction with
the enlargement of the EEC. An early debate of integration emerged between
Churchill’s ‘minimalist’ focus on purely economic integration and Spinelli’s
‘maximalist’ focus on a sphere of economic and political integration (Staab,
44 International Security Studies

A, 2008: 5). The 1960’s were a period of intensified economic integration and
growth, with further enlargement in the following decade of the EEC and importantly,
further political integration; by 1979 each EEC citizen could elect
delegates to the European Parliament (EUROPA, 2010a: 1). This process has
lacked a formal ‘blueprint’ and consequently, the EU has maintained a staggered
process of integration since its inception (Richardson, J J, 2006:32).
The end of the Cold War produced a fundamental shift in the direction of the
Union. The removal of superpower borders allowed for the concept of an increasingly
integrated Europe that could involve former Soviet states (Bretherton,
C and Volger, J, 2004: 6). In 1992, the adoption of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) moved beyond the traditional remit of an economic integrated
community to one which included a Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) as one of its three ‘pillars’ (EUROPA, 2007: 1). It turned the Union into
a functioning entity resembling that of a state but with pivotal differences in
terms of security.
The question of militarisation
From similar connotations of security advocacy by Western European leaders,
there were many moves to define a new era of European security. The origins
of the concept of integrated European security can be found in the ‘Western
Union, the failed construction of a European Defence Community, the Western
European Union, and, of course, NATO (Hauser, G and Kernic, F, 2006: 1). The
quest for integrated European militarisation had always proven futile in the
face of NATO’s prevalence during the Cold War. States conceded some level of
sovereign control over issues such as labour rights, but the traditional norm of
state control over military issues has always remained outside of the Union’s
jurisdiction.
The most recent attempt at further military integration comes in the form of
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for further military cooperation
and joint military exercises. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was
established in 2004 as a practical means to implement the ESDP through military
cooperation and crisis-management planning (EDA, 2009: 1). In practice,
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the EU has established many policing and peacekeeping mission overseas,
some entirely comprised of European uniformed personnel, such as the recent
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission to Chad. These recent developments, although
championed by many throughout the Union and beyond, have also been met
with heavy criticism, as seen in the works of Jan Zielonka and Richard Whitman,
both of whom remain sceptical of European militarisation (in Stavridis,
S, 2001: 46).
A continuation of militarisation?
With these historical trends in the concept of European military integration
and only six EU member states not members of NATO will European military
integration be a topic of historical failure within the near future? Inadequacy
in cohesive decision-making may dispute the realisation of an autonomous defence
capability. Although the European Union has integrated far beyond its
founding visions, there is much incompatibility that hampers its performance
as a cohesive entity, particularly when issues of foreign policy or military action
is concerned, such as in the Balkans where American intervention was needed
in Bosnia and Kosovo when the EU were unable to act (Stavridis, S, 2001: 43).
Should the EU halt the quest for a traditional European power, focusing instead
on its normative and civilian capabilities?
What Power Should the EU Be?
A muddled reality
Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, projects Europe’s
role on the world stage to be a coalition of normative, civilian and military power;
‘We have the reputation on the global stage of being good at talking of high
principles...the EU will have soldiers, policeman and judges on 12 military and
civilian crisis-management operations on three continents’ (The Economist,
2010a: 40). The debate surrounding what power Europe projects in its external
relations predominantly focuses on whether it is a normative power, a civilian
power or a military power.
46 International Security Studies

Using Barnett and Duvall’s power taxonomy, the EU can be described as an
‘institutional power’ in international politics, as no single actor dominates it’s
power projection and because the EU’s ‘institutional arrangements can shape
the agenda-setting process in ways that eliminate those very issues that are
points of conflict’ (Barnett, M and Duvall, R, 2005: 51-52). Different actors
within the EU thus cooperate within the institution to reduce fractious outcomes.
Different EU states have different perceptions of this power, such as
Ireland’s civilian emphasis peacekeeping and France’s emphasis on integrated
European militarisation. Within these states disagreement similarly permeates
this debate. The widespread disagreement over the Iraq war for example, supports
the obvious problems with European militarisation, as there is a lack of
political cohesion.
Normative Power
Europe as a normative power is an example of Europe projecting its common
moral characteristics both internally and externally, representing a model entity
for which the basic liberal tenets of democracy are to be found and should
be adhered to. These principles, such as human rights and social equality are
projected by the EU in international relations (Lucarelle, S and Manners, I,
2006: 41). Manners does not disregard the notion of a civilian or military power
Europe but argues for a ‘refocusing away’ from this concentration by focusing
on an alternative perception of Europe as a normative power through the ‘ideational
impact of the EU’s international identity/role’ (Manners, I, 2002: 238).
This idea provides a welcome alternative to the debate that has taken place in
Europe since its inception, whether Europe represents a civilian or military
power in international politics. The concept of a normative power Europe does
not disregard the militarisation of the EU nor the possibility of an autonomous
defence capability, rather a focus on what the EU represents in its global role,
due to its normative nature of human rights promotion and the ‘pooling of sovereignty’
(Manners, I, 2002: 253). This concept, however, can be applied to
the notion of civilian power Europe to then support the argument that the EU
should not develop an autonomous defence capability because amongst other
variables, its role in world politics can be one of spreading norms through civil-
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ian means.
Civilian Power
The notion of a civilian power Europe is one that has been at the core of EU
rhetoric since its beginning. Although challenged by the increasing advocacy
by some for further military integration, the notion of social solidarity, economic
and political cooperation and the promotion of liberal democratic values
through integrated policy-making are still highly relevant today. The unique
influence of EU politics on the global stage and its ‘distinctive form of diplomacy...in
the absence of the ability to use military force’ (Whitman, R, 2002:
4) supports the view of a reversal of military integration as Europe retains its
position as a powerful civilian power. The EU, however, is in no doubt that security
threats do exist. ‘It would be short-sighted and potentially risky, however,
to not also properly prepare steadily over time for the unavoidable military dimension...diplomacy
not backed by force can cause disaster’ (Becher, K, 2004:
352), referring to the Srebrenica massacre on European soil and the breakdown
of any ability of the EU to act accordingly to stop it.
Does a civilian power Europe, one comprised of influential international diplomacy;
crisis-management and election observer missions overseas; international
trade agreements; and human rights promotion, inevitably become
plagued by the same lack of political cohesion that hampers military integration?
Should the EU stress to build upon this civilian power Europe in the face
of militarisation to create a separate entity to that of the US? Becher mentions
how the attainment of a separate identity to that of the US is ‘utterly incompatible
with the strategic analysis of the international system’ (Becher, K, 2004:
356). However, the EU represents a unique identity in international politics,
one that is very different to the US, the EU being the ‘realization of Kant’s perpetual
peace...the United States meanwhile...exercising power in the anarchic
Hobbesian world (Kagan, R, 2003: 1).
Military Power
As mentioned above, the US acts under a more realist behavioural model than
48 International Security Studies

the EU, the latter striving to act upon the foundation of commonalities and cooperation.
Outlined in the post 9/11 European Security Strategy, however, was
the ‘need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary,
robust intervention’ (European Union, 2003: 12). This pre-crisis contingency
planning has proven very difficult to achieve, from the membership of
neutral states to the division over NATO activity and the transatlantic relationship,
to the lack of a single voice out of twenty seven states. Although neutrality
is a key obstacle to an autonomous defence capability, twenty five EU member
states have contributed troops to the mission in Afghanistan, under the NATOled
European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EUROPA, 2010b: 1).
The pivotal point of contention for a traditional European military power is the
transatlantic security relationship which has defined European security since
1945. Although Britain retains the need for US security over Europe, France
have pushed for a more Euro-centric approach of a more independent European
security entity. This is echoed by the Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorksi
who predicts that the US will be too focused elsewhere in the world and that the
time is ripe for European militarisation to come to fruition (Economist, 2010b:
50). This point is further echoed by academics such as Fraser Cameron, who
views a growing ‘erosion’ of the transatlantic relationship as well as the need for
a new European security regime, though not in complete defiance of US/NATO
security objectives (in Ganzle, S and Sens, A G, 2007: 22-23).
The militarisation of Europe need not reflect a push for a large-scale army to
rival that of the US, but instead a move for a more cohesive collective response
for national forces. With EU defence expenditure for 2008 totalling €201 billion
(EUROPA, 2008: 1) and with the European Security Strategy in 2003 declaring
that ‘large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’
(European Union, 2003: 3), a deeper examination of an alternative to an
autonomous defence capability is needed. The militarisation of the EU, could
theoretically serve to strengthen the EU’s traditional power, however it would
more profusely damage its normative power, of which the latter has more ability
for adaption with changing international politics. Militarisation in Japan,
according to Nye, would ‘reduce rather than increase Japan’s ability to achieve
its goals’ due to the domestic and international pressure it would receive if it
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49

changed its course as a trade power to a traditional military power (Nye, J.S,
1990: 159-160). The same can be applied to Europe as a normative power.
EU Rhetoric in Practice
the viable alternative
Is there a viable security alternative to an autonomous defence capability in
Europe? A normative EU, with a more civilian crisis-management propensity
need not replace the notion of collective national military forces, but instead
retain this traditional form of security in a smaller scale, whilst increasing its
civilian capabilities and cohesion in order to maintain ‘the perceived legitimacy
of the Union’s actions in the eyes of its partners’ (Huakkala, H, 2008: 1603).
The EU is a unique entity in international politics and this leverage should be
enhanced by further promoting its unique civilian properties. There is room for
the EU to act, not entirely independent (security cooperation with the US), but
alone on many issues due to its civilian power. Christopher Hill highlights some
of these characteristics; being a unique voice of the North when in talks with
the South, as well ‘providing a second western voice in international diplomacy’
(1993: 310-312 in Whitman, R, 2002: 6), one which, in following the normative
power concept, could hold more clout than that of the US.
Following the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE)
mandate for human rights promotion above military action in practice, the EU
should further its civilian capabilities by following suit. By enhancing cooperation
through the OSCE it can gain more access for cooperation with the OSCE’s
central Asian states, unlike formally acting under NATO auspices. Promotion
of a civilian EU increases its unique role in international politics which is ‘reinforced
by examples of foreign policy that seem to point in the direction of a
novel international actor’ (Lucarelli, S and Manners, I, 2006: 2). It should focus
primarily when possible on purely crisis-management mission with a civilian
composition. Manners highlights the dangers of combining civilian and military
missions, which the EU has undertaken overseas in recent years, as damaging
the normative power of its ‘traditional reliance on long-term structural
50 International Security Studies

conflict prevention and transformation’ (2006: 194).
In practice: the ENP
The EU can enhance democracy promotion through its normative power over
its military capability, thus reducing the need for an autonomous defence capability.
Hume (1998) said that ‘it is now clear that the European Union is the
best example in the history of the world of conflict resolution’ (in Lucarelli, S
and Manners, I, 2006: 201). The application of these norms to states through
instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, is a civilian form
of democracy promotion without the need for military coercion. The enlargement
policy of the EU was its original normative instrument, now the European
Neighbourhood Policy replicates this dialogue of inclusion for the promotion
of European ideals (Huakkala, H, 2008: 1603). This civilian approach to enhanced
security derives from the EU’s dialogue and cooperation and has ‘greatly
improved Europe’s overall security situation’ through reduction in possible
situations of a reversion to conflict and the promotion of stability in Europe’s
neighbouring regions (Cameron, F, 2006: 24). Would the EU, focused on enhanced
civilian capabilities to project itself as a global normative entity, be too
weak to deal with power politics in the anarchic international system?
Power Politics
the eu’s changing role
The EU is difficult to place in the traditional system of power politics; an anarchic
international system of state-centric contention for the balance of power
where military and economic might are the pivotal bargaining tools. However,
power itself is also changing from traditional power politics to multi-faceted
conceptions of power, in which the EU, as Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’, can project
its liberal ideology to cement a place in the contemporary international system
(Nye, J.S, 1990: 166-167). Through European norms, the EU can project itself as
this non-traditional power actor, reducing the need for militarisation.
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51

It is unlikely that the US would perceive European militarisation as a potential
real threat of the future. It is equally unlikely that NATO or indeed the US’s
security influence over Europe would be wholly reduced to the level of a consequential
need for an autonomous European defence capability. If the normative
power of Europe is increased through enhanced civilianisation, the cohesion of
values and principles would cement collective self-defence without the need for
collective security.
US and EU power perceptions are very different. As mentioned above, there is
little likelihood of increased US paranoia over EU plans for rivalry, as Kagan
remarks, ‘Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans’
(2003: 20). The chance for a re-imagination of the EU’s role in power politics
should come from this realisation, that the US will remain the principle security
actor in the world and while NATO remains powerful, also in Europe. Kagan’s
call for a marginal increase in Europe’s military capabilities (2003: 20) should
be replaced with an increase in its civilianisation, as Europe is adequately protected
militarily, hence a need for increasing the rule of law and policing are
more suitable projects to deal with the contemporary “soft security” which the
EU faces. The EU must advocate this form of contemporary security to be dealt
with by law enforcement institutions over traditional forms of military in order
to escape European militarisation and the weakening of the EU’s unique position
as a normative global power. Manners discusses the consequences of such
militarisation;
Militarizing the EU does not implicitly increase its power in interstate
politics, and... [it] is increasingly risking its normative
power... .Without such fundamental reflection on militarization it
is likely that, like Arendt’s ‘lost treasures’, the normative power of
the EU will be lost (Manners, I, 2006: 195)
Conclusion
In conclusion, the contemporary debate surrounding the future of European
defence is a reflection of the founding questions that beset the early Western
leaders who led the first steps toward European unity. From economic to po-
52 International Security Studies

litical integration, the EU has expanded to include some of the world’s newest
states, all the while maintaining a profound level of peace amongst its members.
With NATO and the US’s historical influence over security in Europe, it is
both a fear of being left behind in the world and a thirst for deeper integration
that has spurred on the contentious issue of an autonomous defence capability
between the EU member states. However, the militarised dialogue and calls for
further integration are not only futile in a militarily secure environment, they
are consequentially damaging to the EU’s progression as a unique civilian and
normative power through its actions.
This paper has presented a brief history of the civilian and military integration
processes that have historically taken place across Europe. This was required
before deeply examining the civilian and normative concept in order
to describe how the EU’s power role in international politics is preferable to
militarised power with an autonomous defence capability. Finally, assessing
the strengths of this civilian and normative EU against the backdrop of international
power politics supported the view that the EU has a unique role to play
in international politics, one that is currently militarily secure, whilst having
the contemporary prowess to expand its civilian action to become the most significant
model for democratic peace in the world.
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54 International Security Studies

A Critique in Liberal
Peacebuilding
The Case of Kosovo
Kyle Krieger
MA in International Security and Conflict Studies
The war in Kosovo and its subsequent UN mission present an interesting
insight into the challenges of liberal peacebuilding and its foundational
theory. While it is quite possible that the Operation Allied Force saved
numerous Kosovars from death at the hands of Serbian troops, the aftermath of
the bombing campaign leaves much to be desired. UNMIK had a difficult experience
in implementing the goal of a liberal democracy in Kosovo. Nevertheless,
the goal of liberal democracy is good for post-conflict societies, but, as can be
seen in case of Kosovo, forcing democracy through an external authority can be
debilitating for the development of sustainable peace. Kyle’s essay will present
the theoretical foundation of liberal peacebuilding, how it worked in Kosovo,
and a critique of both the theory and implementation.
brief list of abbreviations
ana Albanian National Army
eu The European Union
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Jias Joint Interim Administration Structure
Kfor Kosovo Force (of NATO)
Kla Kosovo Liberation Army
oas Organization of American States
osCe Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
un The United Nations
unsC The United Nations Security Council
unsG The United Nations Secretary General
srsG The Special Representative of the Secretary General
us The United States of America
Theory of Liberal Peacebuilding
In order to understand the foundation which underpins peacebuilding, the ideals
of liberal internationalism must be understood as these ideals guide the
work of the agents involved in peacebuilding (Paris, 1997, p. 56). The pillars
of liberal internationalism are the “Wilsonian Triad” of peace, democracy, and
free markets (Mandelbaum, 2002, p. 6). Classical Wilsonian liberal peacebuilding
is based on the promotion of democracy and market economics as a means
of building peace and stability (Newman, 2002, p. 49). Liberal internationalism
implies an activist foreign policy that promotes liberal principles abroad. This
is often done through international institutions and multilateral cooperation
(Paris, 1997, p. 59). A separate pillar of liberal internationalism is the demo-
56 International Security Studies

cratic peace theory which claims that democracies rarely go to war against each
other; in essence - freedom promotes peace (Doyle, 1986, p. 1151). Furthermore,
there exists the idea that democracies experience less internal strife because social
conflicts can be expressed through peaceful processes rather than violence
(Paris, 1997, p. 60). In liberal democracies, citizens are encouraged to resolve
their differences peacefully. They are also encouraged to fulfill their aspirations
and allow governments to be accountable rather than pick up a Kalashnikov
and resort to war (Newman, 2002, p. 49). Liberal internationalism guides the
work of the international agencies engaged in peacebuilding (Paris, 1997, p. 56).
However, it is important to recognize that this form of peacebuilding is new to
the international stage as of the 1990’s.
Tensions of the Cold War prevented international organizations from taking an
ideological stance on issues such as the promotion of democracy (Paris, 1997,
p. 60). First generation peacekeeping involved positioning UN forces on the
ground to monitor ceasefires and act as a buffer between countries in volatile
situations (Ed. Newman, 2009, p. 5). Their core mission was to contain
conflicts not to resolve them (Ed. Newman, 2009, p. 6). On the other hand,
contemporary peacebuilding has a different agenda. This agenda is embodied
by the words of Boutros Boutros Ghali who emphasized that peace is needed
for development and that without development, the basis for democracy is
weak (Boutros-Ghali, 2008, p. 600). Furthermore, the lack of democracy can
lead to conflict which ends any sort of sustainable development, let alone peace
(Boutros-Ghali, 2008, p. 600). Democracy, development, and peace are not
mutually exclusive and must occur together. Modern peacekeeping reflects a
post-Westphalian approach to conflict resolution (Ed. Newman, 2009, p. 7).
It is a broad based approach that reflects a liberal project of building peace on
the basis of liberal democracy (Ed. Newman, 2009, p. 7). Contemporary peacebuilding
exists in a globalized era, and an important aspect of globalization is
deterritorialization (Richmond, 2004, p. 133). This loss of sovereignty pertains
to the peacekeeping force that enters the territory with the end goal of establishing
a stable democratic state.
Recognizing a foundation of liberal internationalism and the evolution of
peacekeeping to its modern form, today’s peacebuilding is a risky experiment
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in social engineering that involves transplanting Western models into war-torn
societies in order to control and end conflict (Paris, 1997, p. 56). Liberal peacebuilding
reflects the belief that individuals are relevant to peace. Moreover, it
is not based on coercion because international liberalism assumes that people
everywhere, given the correct conditions will embrace liberal ideas (Newman,
2002, p. 49). Another assumption of liberal peacebuilding is that “all good
things go together” in that popular support for government structures are
based on rights protection, electoral schemes and justice reform (Call, 2003,
p. 5). Peacebuilding becomes a comprehensive effort aimed at developing and
implementing the aforementioned ideas. Yet, no single authority guides peacebuilding
for the OAS, EU, NATO, and UN, but in practice they all work towards
the goal of political liberalization (Paris, 1997, p. 63). In reality, what tends to
happen veers from the tenets of Wilsonian liberalism towards “hegemonic neoliberal
peacebuilding” (Newman, 2002, p. 49). This involves the top-down imposition
of political values which conform to the interests of international actors,
such as the UN. This approach also moves away from the liberal emphasis
on the individual and focuses more on the system being imposed; therefore it
is not truly liberal. Given these theoretical difficulties in creating a liberal in a
post conflict society the international community continues to maintain a focus
on developing democratic principles.
A significant aspect of contemporary peacekeeping is the overwhelming emphasis
on democracy assistance through electoral commissions, party regulations,
and the development of a civil society (Ed. Newman, 2009, p. 9). All
major contemporary peacebuilding operations have involved democracy assistance
activities such as elections. In liberal theory, free and fair elections
matter in the democratization of a post-conflict society in that they provide
an impulse for developing democratic principles and conferring legitimacy
upon the new system of governance. This emphasis on democratic principles
has led to the institutionalization of new forms of governance, i.e. “peace-asgovernance”(Richmond,
2004, p. 141). Peace-as-governance in practice means
a heavy reliance on international institutions to ‘export’ peace through mechanisms
such as proxy governments and conditionality of economic assistance.
These international organizations all tend to focus around a standard reconstruction
package that involves forming constitutions, and having elections
58 International Security Studies

within two years of the end of conflict (Call, 2003, p. 1). Furthermore, organizations
working to implement peace have focused more on local-level electoral
events, even to the point of having local elections well before national elections
(Call, 2003, p. 5). The basis for the development of a liberal democracy through
peacekeeping efforts is steeped in liberal international theory and in post conflict
Kosovo the ideals of liberal peacebuilding were tested.
Liberal Peacebuilding in Practice:
Kosovo
Operation Allied Force achieved its objectives without launching a ground invasion
or altering its demands in that all Serbian forces left Kosovo after a 78 day
long NATO bombing campaign (Daalder, 199, p. 128). The United Nations was
tasked with providing Kosovo an interim government (UNMIK, p. 1). The mandate
given to UNMIK was one of the broadest in UN history and tasked them
with building a “transitional administration while establishing and overseeing
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNSC
Res 1244, para 10). The UN administration was tasked with guiding Kosovo towards
an ill-defined final status in that there were no definitive benchmarks for
the international community to meet in order for UNMIK to be completed (Hehir,
2009, p. 135). The mission was an enormous undertaking in scope and size.
This is evidenced by the fact that the SRSG, through UNMIK, was tasked with
all legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the country (Greicevci, p. 195).
As a part of this mandate the UN worked to establish democratic principles in
the ethnically tense state of Kosovo. The OSCE was delegated the mission of
developing democracy and from 2001 they supported and organized four elections
in Kosovo (UNMIK p. 13). Two elections occurred at the central level, in
2001 and 2004, and two elections occurred at the municipal level, in 2000 and
2002. These elections have been assessed as free and fair (Greicevci, p.197). The
government of Kosovo was set up with an Assembly who elects a president for
a five year term. The president had the power to dissolve the Assembly with the
agreement of the SRSG (UNMIK, p. 13-14). The Assembly was composed of 120
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seats: one hundred were for directly elected delegates, ten were reserved for the
Serb community, and ten seats were set aside for members of the other communities.
While UNMIK was in power the SRSG had nearly omnipotent power.
He controlled law and order, appointed the judiciary, protected the rights of
minorities, made monetary policy, and controlled external relations. Nevertheless,
this power did not stop the internal tensions within Kosovo from coming
to the surface.
As in any country, Kosovo maintained complex internal politics. One political
lens saw Kosovo as a split between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians, but
this is not accurate. On the Kosovo-Albanian side major parties combined to
form the ‘Unity Team’; these parties included the Democratic League, the Alliance
for Kosovo, the Democratic Party, and the Ora (Narten, 2008, p. 376).
On the Kosovo-Serb side there were differences between the agendas of the
northern Serbs, who were close to Belgrade, and the Serb enclaves in the rest
of Kosovo who usually had a moderate position on development a multi-ethnic
future for Kosovo. These differing political realities led to challenges on the
ground. It is important to recognize that the local Kosovar officials and international
peacekeepers had differing goals. External peacekeepers desired to
achieve quick results with scarce resources. They were interested in the end of
conflict, cooperation with and between local officials, and political liberalization
(Narten, 2008, p. 370). If the local officials agreed with these goals then
cooperative peacekeeping would occur.
The UN mandate to develop Kosovo had several issues that led to problems in
Kosovo. In the UNSC resolution the international community made broad yet
contradictory promises to satisfy the interests of both parties in the conflict
(Narten, 2008, p. 377). On the one hand, it gave security guarantees to refugees,
ensured public security, and the protection of human rights. Meanwhile,
it emphasized Kosovo’s autonomy by holding elections and developing institutions.
The UNMIK mandate appeared to promise too much to all of the people
of Kosovo. Bernard Kouchner explains that UNMIK was tasked with building
a government but was unprepared to do so (Kouchner, p. 139). Serbs in Kosovo
had even less reason to work with the UN because the goal of local ownership
proposed by resolution 1244 did not correspond too Kosovo-Serbian interests
60 International Security Studies

of returning Serbian rule to Kosovo (Narten, 2008, p. 378). In addition to issues
arising from the specific details of the mandate, there were also issues with the
implementation of the mandate through mission on the ground.
Immediately after the issuance of UNSC resolution 1244, local KLA commanders
claimed control over many municipalities in Kosovo. During this phase they
tolerated, if not participated in, retaliatory violence against Serbian minorities
in Kosovo (Narten, 2008, p. 377-378). This obviously challenged the fragile
peace and led to a significant expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo, therefore undermining
the legitimacy of UNMIK. Serbians in Kosovo maintained a wide
distrust for the UN peacekeepers because they proved unable to maintain Serb
security which was guaranteed in resolution 1244. On the other hand, when
Bernard Kouchner pursued the Joint-Interim Administration Structure (JIAS)
in 1999 to split control between the UNMIK and local officials, he received
strong Kosovo-Albanian cooperation. This consultative input from Kosovo-Albanian
communities allowed democratic elections and institutions to be built
which further consolidated the legitimacy of the interim government (Narten,
2008, p. 379). Yet the Kosovo-Serb community had no desire to participate in
this process and refused to send any delegates to the JIAS and attempted to
remain under the authority of Serbia. Nevertheless, UNMIK was successful in
finding ways to appoint Kosovo-Serb representatives to the executive power in
municipalities with Serbian majorities.
Even then, the tension between Serb and Albanian was palpable. They might
have worked in the same place but would refuse to refer to each other as colleagues
and often would not address each other by name (Kouchner, p. 139). The
eventual minimal cooperation of Kosovo-Serb parties with UNMIK is a result
of political pressure from the new Djindjic government in Serbia as well as dual
salaries received by Kosovo-Serbians from UNMIK and the Serbian government.
Another important factor is the promise from UNMIK that the Kosovo-
Serb community would have the right to determine its own municipal affairs
(Narten, 2008, p. 379). By 2002 the Kosovo-Serb coalition won 22 seats in the
Assembly and was involved in its committee’s workings. Although the government
technically composed minorities, local ownership was difficult to attain.
The governmental system was completely imposed by UNMIK though a UN
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egulation and had little prior local involvement and no public referendum to
give it a legitimate mandate. According to a UN administrator, the UNMIK rule
in Vushtrri was essentially undemocratic (Magalachvili, 2005, p. 118). There is
a dissonance here in that the UNMIK was highly intrusive into sensitive issues
such as domestic constitutional law, but UNMIK was also a step forward in
implementing local ownership by building institutions and transferring powers
to elected officials (Narten, 2008, p. 380). There was a growth of local parties
and information campaigns, but this progress in local ownership was achieved
according to international objectives and programs – not grassroots initiatives
developed by Kosovars.
UNMIK’s intrusiveness, originally needed to consolidate authority, thwarted
local ownership by Kosovars. On the Albanian side the locals persistently
advocated independence which was increasingly hostile to the Kosovo-Serbs
(Narten, 2008, p. 380). As a result UNMIK ended up vetoing much of the Assembly’s
draft legislation and forcefully shaped the Kosovar polity through its
imposed Constitutional Framework. When the authority was transferred completely
to the Kosovars the Assembly was prevented from accepting or investigating
complaints against UNMIK or KFOR. The tension is further evidenced
by the international community’s proclaimed “Standards-before-Status” with
loosely defined standards to be in made before independence was granted, yet
the Kosovo Assembly challenged UNMIK by declaring independence through
the Assembly and holding a referendum (Narten, 2008, p. 381). The aforementioned
evidence shows that the authority of the UNMIK’s top-down approach
to governance building eroded in the first few years of their mission. Over time
Kosovo-Serb members of the Assembly boycotted the sessions and delayed political
growth. The Albanian community repulsed “Standards-before-Status”
and demanded standards in parallel with status. Furthermore, a new paramilitary
group emerged in the form of the ANA which began to launch bomb attacks
and set up roadblocks at night.
The culmination of this tension was in mid-March 2004 when masses of frustrated
Kosovo-Albanians assaulted Kosovo-Serbs which resulted in nineteen
deaths (Narten, 2008, p. 382). These riots made clear the growing resentment
towards UNMIK’s intrusive and veto-based governance. These riots are de-
62 International Security Studies

scribed as a time machine which brought Kosovo back to before the UNMIK
mission began (Magalachvili, 2005, p. 118). A critical review of the UN mission
came through the work of Ambassador Kai Eide who described a difficult
situation in Kosovo and recommended talks between Belgrade and the PISG
(Narten, 2008, p. 383). Martin Ahtisaari convened fifteen rounds of talks between
Belgrade and Pristina which resulted in no agreement. Throughout the
years after the March riots there was increased tension between all parties involved
in Kosovo’s governance (Narten, 2008, p. 384-385). In 2007 when Ahtisaari
submitted his proposal to the UNSC nearly all domestic legitimacy for the
UNMIK’s peacebuilding agenda was lost on both the Kosovo-Albanians and
Kosovo-Serbs. When the UNSC could not agree on a final resolution for Kosovo,
Pristina decided to unilaterally declare independence from Serbia (Fawkes
BBC).
The Problems of Liberal
Peacebuilding: Kosovo
The peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo were not as successful as the ideals of liberal
peacebuilding intended. In some respects, international administration of
a country such as Kosovo is illegitimate. Sovereignty is understood to come
from the will of the people, and an outside administration goes against their
concept of sovereignty (Harland, 2004, p. 15). Moreover, it goes against a major
undercurrent of the twentieth century which emphasizes self-determination
over imposed rule. This problem is evidenced by the fact that of the eighteen
countries which experienced UN peacebuilding missions with a governance
construction aspect to them between 1988 and 2002, thirteen were classified
as some form of an authoritarian regime as of 2002 (Call, 2003, p. 1-2). In addition
to issues surrounding sovereignty and foreign dominance, there are fundamental
issues with the development of democracy.
One of the main problems with the liberal international approach to peacekeeping
is that it prescribes market democracy as a solution for post conflict
societies without thoroughly anticipating, or taking action to limit, the poten-
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tially destabilizing effects of a country’s liberalization (Paris, 1997, p. 56-57).
Peacebuilding exposes the conflictual nature of democratic processes such as
elections and the conflictual nature of competitive capitalism. States that have
just experienced a war are poorly equipped, due to a lack of institutions, to
peacefully resolve the tensions which arise due to competitive elections and
capitalism. Often the efforts to transform a war torn society into a market democracy
can serve to exacerbate the tensions existing within the country. The
attempts at implementing democracy in Kosovo serve as a core example of this
problem. An additional problematic aspect of the theoretical underpinning of
modern peacebuilding is modernization theory which assumes that the “magic
of the market and the ballot box can be achieved by changing economic policy
and allowing more political participation.”(Callaghy, 1993, p. 244). This flawed
logic of the 1950’s and 60’s modernization theory does not take into account the
tumultuous nature of this evolution in post-conflict societies. Third world nations
did not instantaneously evolve into stable market democracies, and there
is no reason why post conflict societies should as well (Paris, 1997, p. 79). In its
worst light, peacebuilding can be seen as “riot control against the unruly parts
of the world to uphold the liberal peace”(Pugh, p. 41). The difficulties of building
a sustainable peace lead to this cynical and realist definition of peacekeeping,
meanwhile the aforementioned challenges of Kosovo only emphasize the
problem.
The creation of peacebuilding as a liberal ideology, i.e. placing democracy at the
top of its priority list, is a construct of powerful Western ideas of humanitarianism.
These ideas are driven by the predominant Western state, which is the
US. Sadly, the US has been unwilling to foot the bill for, or take a major role in,
the multilateral projection of peacebuilding in places like Kosovo (Richmond,
2004, p. 132). When analyzing Kosovo’s reconstruction as of 2001, a Congressional
report claims that Kosovo has “made much progress” towards development
because elections have provided a government (Tarnoff, 2001, p. 6). On
the other hand this same report comments that even though elections have occurred
violence is still taking place and much infrastructure still needs work.
Another significant issue with the implementation of governance through a
top-down approach such as UNMIK is the idea that not all societies are meant
64 International Security Studies

to be democracies. The foundation of liberal peacebuilding: democracy, human
rights, market values, and the integration of societies into globalization
through a secularized state – are potentially not universally accepted, or universally
applicable values (Ed. Newman, 2009, p. 12-13). Kosovo is a country
that lacks a Western and liberal history that could lead it to democracy by itself.
An argument may exist that Kosovo may never be a country that is meant to
have democracy. Kosovo may be a country where the implementation of a peace
based on liberal theory is fundamentally inappropriate for social or cultural
reasons. A pillar of liberal democracies is the social contract and this is all but
absent in post conflict states like Kosovo. There is no such thing as a social contract
in states that are held together by external actors such as UNMIK. For a
democracy to function there must be wide spread adherence to the rule of law
and a recognition that those charged with government tasks have a responsibility
to the community as a whole (Magalachvili, 2005, p.131). In order for
there to be a basic respect for the rule of law a post conflict society should focus
on the rapid production of basic services while concerns about democracy and
constitutions may need to wait until the rule of law exists. The March riots in
Kosovo where angered Albanians took to the streets in furor against the Serbs
display the results of the previously mentioned lack of obedience to the rule of
law (Lynch BBC). Holding elections are moments of intense political activity
and can serve to polarize communities (Paris, 1997, p. 75). This works against
the goals of building a stable democracy because elections tend to separate the
communities which the peacebuilders are trying to reconcile. Kosovo’s story is
evidence of this as Kosovo’s Serbian leaders in 2001 pushed for Kosovo’s Serbs
not to vote in the elections (LA Times). It is important to recognize that democracy
in itself is not violent but that the adversarial politics of democracy serve
to sharpen the confrontations in divided societies, such as Kosovo (Paris, 1997,
p. 76). In conflicts not torn by war democracy can lead to greater tolerance and
a lively civil society. Unfortunately this is not easily transferable to post conflict
societies as evidenced by the situation in Kosovo.
Conclusion
The problems shown in the development of a stable democratic society through
the UN mission in Kosovo display significant the flaws of liberal peacekeeping
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uilt on the foundation of liberal internationalism. The nearly failed attempt at
imposing a liberal democracy through UNMIK shows the difficult theoretical
underpinnings of imposing a liberal democracy in a war torn society.
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to the Forty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly. New York: United Nations.
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9,2.
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and Steven R. Dorr, ed. Global Transformation and the Third World. Boulder.
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Should the Responsibility
to Protect Doctrine be
preserved?
Thomas Murphy
MA International Security and Conflict Studies
Thomas argues that the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine tries to create
a consensus for the responsible use of civilian and military forces to prevent
genocide and other crimes against humanity in the 21st Century.
His essay highlights the strengths of the doctrine whilst also exposing a caveat
concerning its development into an instrument which could be utilised for the
benefit of those who would intervene in the affairs of other States purely for
their own financial or political benefit. He concludes that preserving its essence
is necessary as a tool for developing appropriate responses to crimes against
humanity.
introduction
During the course of this essay I will be discussing the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine and the application it has to issues of international security. I want to
establish if the doctrine is needed as a tool to prevent the occurrence of genocide
in the future. I will discuss the doctrines potential as a legal framework
for armed intervention; the political issues surrounding the doctrine and if the
doctrine is the solution the International Community needs to tackle Genocide
68 International Security Studies

and Crimes against Humanity.
The Origins and Development of the Doctrine.
Firstly, we need to establish what the Responsibility to Protect entails. At the
moment it is recognised as a legal norm as it was accepted by the International
Community following the UN’s 60th anniversary summit in 2005. The doctrine
has been in existence in essence since 2001. It was the product of a year’s work
by a panel of experts, the ICISS, which was commissioned by the Canadian
Government to provide an answer to the following question, “if humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of
human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”(Kofi Anan
2000). The question was posed by the Secretary General of the UN in 2000 as
he reflected on the international community’s failings to counter the occurrence
of genocide and crimes against humanity which occurred throughout the 1990’s
on an alarming scale. The concept of international security and what constituted
a threat to the peace began to take a different shape during this time. The
UN and regional organisations such as NATO were used to deal with intra-state
conflicts and it was reasoned that prevention of conflicts in this traditional
sense would result in Security for the residents involved. A prime example of
this would be the traditional missions which the UN had become involved with
during the 1970’s and 1980’s. This would be in stark contrast to the concept
of Human Security which developed from the UNDP Report of 1994. Human
security seeks to outline the benefit to international security by tackling the following
issues: economic security, food security, environmental security, health
security, personal security, communal and political security (United Nations
Human Development Report 1994). In all of these circumstances the security
of people is paramount and it is argued that States can only be secure if their
citizens are too.
Traditionally the UN had relied upon diplomacy and conflict mediation
measures before sending in troops to observe and report on the progress
of agreed ceasefire arrangements (Irish Defence Forces 2010). The missions
themselves were successful in the main as those involved were present on
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the invitation of both warring factions. The missions were a world apart
from modern day peace enforcement operations which have mandates to
use force in ways which were seldom used before (Security Council resolution
143 1960).
The majority of conflicts during the 1990’s were internal affairs involving state
and non-state actors. The UN did not have the precedence to act in this regard
and members of the General Assembly were cautious of the concept of “Humanitarian
Intervention”(Chamey 1999) as it challenged traditional norms of
State Sovereignty and it had the potential to be abused by powerful States for
their own national interests (Chomsky 1994). In regard to sovereignty it was a
simple fact that many states held the view that sovereignty was a right as opposed
to a responsibility. It was suggested that it would be inappropriate to
intervene unless regional stability was threatened (Bannon 2006). But as internal
conflicts developed it became obvious that they were in fact threatening
regional stability. Conflicts began to spill over into surrounding countries and
the mass exodus of people fleeing such conflicts began to cause problems for
surrounding nations (Seal 2008). It was also apparent that genocide and human
rights violations were rife during these conflicts which made a mockery of
the UN charter and its responsibility to act in prevention of such crimes (Akhavan
1995). Favier Solona and Frederik Harhoff have written excellent articles
concerning the use of armed violence in the name of Humanity and have used
Kosovo as an example of success in this regard. It can be seen from their writing
that intervention was necessary to preserve regional security and to prevent
a possible occurrence of Genocide. What must also be noted is the need to address
the lack of appropriate legal precedence to act in this regard and to ensure
the legitimacy of such action in the future.
The International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which was
chaired by Gareth Evans and other noted academics such as Ramesh Thakur
released The Responsibility to Protect document in 2001. This occurred just a
short period after the terrorist attacks in the USA. The commission considered
70 International Security Studies

the attacks in context but were careful not to allow their findings to be used as
a tool which could be put to the use of vengeance by any coalition of the willing.
The document focused on the following key areas: genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It proposed measures on how
to prevent the occurrence of these crimes and also proposed possible means of
intervention by the International community to bring such situations to an end.
Their proposals involving intervention were bound to cause much controversy
as they threatened traditional norms of State Sovereignty. The Commission
drew on the concept of popular sovereignty as sovereignty arising from the will
of people as opposed to the express right of the Government (Yack 2001). This
resulted in the express view of sovereignty as a responsibility. The responsibility
includes an onus on states to act in accordance with good international procedure
and a responsibility to abide by international humanitarian and human
rights law (Bellamy 2009).
From an external point of view, the commission was of the opinion that there is
a responsibility for the international community to intervene in circumstances
where states have expressly failed in their duties towards their own citizens
(Bellamy 2009). This put the doctrine firmly in favour of referring to citizens
as opposed to the state as the referent object in the concept of security. It was in
complement to the concept of human security which addressed internal issues
such as economic and personal security in an effort to understand situations
which in themselves represent a threat to the peace. It also addressed the fact
that human rights are enshrined in the UN Charter as well as a responsibility
on behalf of the UN to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity (Akhavan
1995). It argued that international law, human rights law, national law and international
humanitarian rights law are all best served by establishing a means
by which the international community can address crimes against humanity
without being prevented by doing so by issues of sovereignty or by the inefficiencies
of the Security Council.
The findings of the ICISS and their possible future application
This section will look at the suggestions made by the ICISS and examine how
they can be best applied to prevent the occurrence of genocide and crimes
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against humanity. The Commission decided to propose a duty to prevent, react
and rebuild. The commission also realised that the doctrine had the potential
to be used to justify intervention in a variety of circumstances and hence chose
to restrict the doctrine to the four criteria of Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic
cleansing and Crimes against Humanity. Anything else could dilute it is purpose
and result in it being used for intervention in a host of circumstances which
could be quite inappropriate. This is referred to as the dilemma of comprehensiveness
and as Edward Luck says: “it appears as if the advocates of prevention
have tried to make it be all things to all people; but in the process it could end
up meaning very little to anybody” (Bellamy 2009). The proceeding section will
examine the proposed duties in more detail and establish their benefits to the
prevention of crimes against humanity.
Bellamy argues that if prevention is to be a success then it must encompass the
following: early warning, preventative diplomacy, ending impunity and preventive
deployments (Bellamy 2009). The ICISS also placed an emphasis on prevention
in its report and concluded that preventative measures should be used
to thwart the occurrence of Crimes against Humanity (Thakur 2006).
Early warning is key as it allows intervention in a political capacity before situations
reach a crescendo. There were a plethora of organisations working to this
effect when the doctrine was published in 2001. There was the International
Crisis Groups Crisis Watch Programme and Swiss peace’s FAST early warning
system which excellent empirical data on impending crises. Unfortunately the
issue was not the lack of information but the way in which it was used. There
was not a co-ordinated approach to its accumulation or to its circulation to key
policy makers in the UN. It is important that they work in harmony and develop
a culture of prevention as per Security Council Resolution 1366 (United
Nations 2001). The R2P as a document highlighted these facts. Since 2001 the
UN has addressed these concerns to some extent by the creation of the Office
of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and has co-ordinated UN
organisations in their assessment of prevailing Humanitarian Crises. This is
an attempt to centralise the current defused model of early warning and to get
the information to the appropriate decision makers who can ensure that appropriate
action is taken when necessary. Therefore the doctrine is serving a very
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good purpose in this regard.
When it comes to preventative diplomacy we have to note that the UN has developed
this capacity quite well over the last number of years. The doctrine
calls for measures to be taken which create ripe moments such as the use of
embargoes and other forms of coercive diplomacy (Shavell 1985). The ending of
impunity on grounds of sovereignty is an area which will have to be addressed
in the coming years. The development of the International Criminal Court will
be key in this respect but it will require the support of all member states of the
General Assembly if it is to be truly successful. So far, the Americans have been
quite unsupportive of the court and have fought against the prospect of their
troops losing their immunity from prosecution while on missions with the UN
(Bellamy 2009). The Court will have to have the authority to bring cases against
citizens from all Countries on an equal basis if it is to be seen as effective. The
ICC also has a potential to enforce humanitarian and human rights law. Its
position as a court of justice affords it the potential to develop international
law via precedent. Ultimately, it will only be allowed to thrive in this respect
if it hears an abundance of cases, something which has not happened to date
(Tallgren 2002).
Finally, let us look to the use of troop deployments as a means of conflict prevention.
The Australians have deployed troops to their advantage in the Solomon
Islands and in East Timor. They argued, especially in the case of the Solomon
Islands that their actions were carried out on Humanitarian grounds for
the securing of regional security. Thus we can see that the doctrine, or at least
the principles contained within it, has been used for humanitarian purposes. If
developed appropriately, as per the R2P doctrine, then this could provide the
international community with a blueprint for the successful use of intervention
forces and may give forces such as the EU Battle groups another reason d’être
(Hauser 2006).
Thus as per the concept of prevention and its prevalence in the doctrine of R2P
it can be argued that the continuation of development in this area would only
benefit the International Community. It has the potential to prevent large scale
human rights abuses via diplomatic means whilst also encouraging an efficient
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economy of effort in early warning systems. The doctrine also leaves the door
open for the development of a legal norm which addresses the topic of early
intervention. This gives foreign policy a robust edge if the need requires and
can address crises situations in a timely manner before the need arises to have
an expensive, large and well equipped force deployed to an area for a prolonged
period in order to restore the peace. Is this regard the essence of the R2P document
should be preserved.
The Issues concerning Intervention and State Building.
The most controversial element of the Responsibility to Protect is the recommendation
to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign State in order to bring incidences
of genocide or the gross violation of human rights to an end. It has
been the point of much debate as its development may lead to the creation of
a standardised protocol for intervention in cases of humanitarian crises. This
would in fact hasten previous processes whereby the Security Council would
deliberate on intervention on a case by case basis which would of course allow
for the traditional veto to be used by the permanent members of said council.
If the doctrine is adapted to its full potential then the Security Council may be
forced to address inter-state issues much more frequently. Whether or not the
political will to do so exists is another issue.
The ICISS argues that all interventions as a reaction to Genocide should only
take place if they can be justified; are proportional to the crises to which they
address; and are conducted with the right authority. Justification for any action
must be in response to actual or immanent loss of life or ethnic cleansing
(McClean 2008). The actions must also be proportional. The use of force should
not be to such a scale that would endanger a large number of civilians and it
must not be wholly disproportionate to the threats posed on the ground. This
instils a responsibility on those who plan to intervene to use appropriate force
which will limit civilian casualties (Joint War Fighting Centre 1997) and will
also instil a responsibility on interventionists to plan for success and not have
their forces deploying to a conflict zone in an unprepared manner which would
lead to the failure of the mission and discredit the UN (Crocker 1995). All forces
must also have the right authority which must come in the form of approval
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from the Security Council (UN Charter 1945).
The doctrine also States that the Security Council should be notified by all
regional organisations of their intent to use force before they actually deploy
troops to troubled areas. This in itself may prove to be a check against States
who would intervene in a crisis for national interests alone as opposed for the
benefit of international security (Thakur 2006). As we can see, reaction is a
major part of the concept of the R2P and it causes much controversy amongst
members of the General Assembly. It was welcomed by member states of the
African Union in that it could lead to more humanitarian inspired intervention
from the west in African affairs. This, they believed had been largely neglected
by the West who they deemed as having a duty of care to the region arising
from their Colonial past (Wheeler 2005). The doctrine also has the potential
to empower regional organisations such as the African Union to take a lead in
African affairs. In the same vain it was attacked by Americans as they viewed it
as an attempt to limit their ability to act unilaterally and in whatever way they
wished in what they viewed to be humanitarian crises (Bellamy 2009). A prime
example of this would be the American lead invasion of Iraq in 2003 on dubious
Humanitarian grounds (Chomsky 1994).
As we can see the R2P has the potential to limit Intervention, with armed forces,
in what would be anything other than an attempt to prevent the committal
of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity with
properly prepared forces armed with an appropriate mandate (United Nations
New Horizon Programme 2009). At this moment in time the International
Community has not been able to reach a permanent consensus on the above
and the document released after the 2005 UN summit deliberately left out
reference to Intervention. The General Assembly was not able to reach agreement
on these issues and there was still the fear that any express mention of
intervention would make it easier for powerful states to intervene for their own
national interests and to neglect in their other duties as per the doctrine. The
doctrine has served a very good purpose in that it has focused attention on the
necessity to develop a legal framework which can be used to prevent the reoccurrence
of another Rwanda or Kosovo from happening under the noses of the
International Community. This will no doubt take a long time to develop but it
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is a worthwhile process.
The ICISS also speaks of the responsibility to rebuild. Herein lies the opportunity
to build stable societies from the ground up. This requires commitment
and support for states who have struggled to protect their citizens in the past.
It also ensures that those who would intervene on humanitarian ground would
not leave before a stable society is established with respect for human rights
and proper governance. The responsibility to rebuild has a lot of potential from
an international security point of view, in that it can limit the potential for the
reoccurrence of catastrophes and it can provide stability to regions affected by
humanitarian disaster. We have seen the benefits of such operations in the European
Neighbourhood with the continued success of the Missions in Kosovo
and Macedonia. The force composition of these missions includes a large contingent
of police and civil servants who are working to establish proper policing
methods and functioning Governmental departments. The Brahimi report has
recommended such a composition for future UN missions when it was published
as they have the most potential for long term success (United Nations
New Horizon Programme 2009).
Having a responsibility to rebuild as an essential element of all intervention
would be a healthy step forward for international security. State building in
itself, in a democratic way, is essential for creating peaceful society out of the
ruins of genocide. It also ties in with concepts of human security and allows
those involved in the state building process to address economic or political
issues etc in a fashion which will prevent conflict in the future (Kerr 2010). As
such I would argue that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has served a very
useful purpose in establishing a responsibility to rebuild. I think the essence of
the doctrine needs to be preserved if we are to prevent states from an indefinite
instability (McGeehan 1980).
Conclusion
To conclude I would like to ask if we need to preserve the R2P doctrine as a War
cry in the face of Genocide. I think it would be more logical to say that we need
to preserve the essence of the document as a tool for developing appropriate
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esponses to crimes against humanity. I can sense the frustration felt by Evans,
Bellamy and others who felt disheartened by slow progress on the issues of intervention.
However, I can also sense the need to allow the doctrine to develop
more depth and practical application. I would fear that a hurried and forced
doctrine would lack universal acceptance in the international community and
would therefore be a term of reference more so then a term of governance for intervention
in inter-state relations. If conflicts of an inter-state dynamic continue
to dominate on an international setting then I would hope that any doctrine
developed to address them would be thorough and appropriate. The essence
of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine must be preserved but preserved and
developed in a way that is thoughtful and Responsible. Otherwise it will fade
into insignificance as a doctrine which was seen as a mere tool by the West to
interfere in the sovereignty of smaller nations under the banner of a “Just War”.
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78 International Security Studies

Considering the Use of
Force within Peacekeeping
Operations
Elba Yanett Coria Márquez.
M.A. in International Security and Conflict Studies
Since its inception one of the primary functions of the UN has been to
maintain international peace and security. However, over the past decades
the implementation of peacekeeping operations has dangerously
evolved to incorporate increasing levels of coercion in what is known as robust
operations. In this paper, Elba reviews this evolution and examines (1.) the relationship
of coercion to the original mandates of the peacekeeping mission
and (2.) the effects and likely consequences that use of coercion entails, paying
particular attention to developments in gender theory. She concludes that
allowing peacekeepers the use of force reduces the states’ incentive to secure
peace according to the Charter. Also, the military culture poses a contradiction
to the means of negotiation and cooperation as a peace mechanism. Although
sometimes effective in the short run, robust UN peacekeeping operations jeopardize
the integrity of the UN and its credibility as the international guarantor
of world peace.
introduction
At the end of the Second War World, the United Nations, inspired by the lib-
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eral ideas of the time, emerged with the objectives of maintaining and settling
the freedom, security and peace in a global order through the pacific resolution
of conflicts, the cooperation among the states and the observance of the
international laws. Thereafter, the Security Council is the rightful authority
in mediating among states for the pacific resolution of their conflicts, making
recommendations and taking measures for the maintenance or restoration of
peace, even through the use of force, which is understood as ‘the use of coercive
measures to constrain an actor to do something it would not otherwise do
or to prevent and actor from doing something’ (Tardy 2007, 4). While the use
of force is considered the last and least desirable resort, peace operations are
the most frequent and effective mechanism for settling or maintaining peace.
Thus, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building have become indispensable
activities within the functioning of the United Nations, and lately the peace
enforcement under Chapter VII is increasingly considered a more relevant part
of its performance.
It is over peacekeeping operations where the principal challenges in terms of
the use of force are laid down and where its appropriateness is called into question
or at least becomes unclear. The Brahimi Report, the Capstone Doctrine
and most recently the New Horizon Report have responded at length to the necessity
of clarifying the use of force within peacekeeping missions. Even though
there is no clear evidence that the so-called robust peacekeeping will be more
effective and successful, these documents assume the use of force as a settled
fact for conflict resolution within certain circumstances and seek to establish
guidelines and a framework for its improvement.
Looking at the difficulties that the use of force or its absence have signified for
the safety and success of peacekeeping missions as well as for the improvements
made in the area, it seems relevant to examine the impact and implications
of robust peacekeeping in the overall system of the United Nations and
in the accomplishment of their mandate. The task assigned to peacekeepers is
unquestionably a difficult and dangerous one, but in considering the objectives
and repercussions of robust peacekeeping missions, it is unclear if the ends
justify the means.
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Through a revision of the literature that depicts the various challenges that
peacekeeping missions face when they incorporate use of force, the present
essay formulates a reflection of robust peacekeeping in connection with the
original objectives and principles of peacekeeping operations and the nature of
the United Nations in order to sustain the argument that robust mandates are
unfavorable for peacekeeping operations and astray the Universal System from
the pursuit of compliance with the Charter and the realization of the United
Nations in a more comprehensive and less contradictory way with its, albeit
hybrid, theoretical origin. Therefore, the essay will firstly provide a review of
the development of peacekeeping operations with specific reference to those aspects
linked with the second section, which is dedicated to outlining scenarios
where robust mandates may negatively affect the United Nations and peacekeeping
operations.
Overview of the Development of Peacekeeping Operations
Since the formation of the United Nations, peacekeeping operations were installed
in terms of article 33 of the Charter that states the use of ‘peaceful
means’ for conflict resolution. They were also deployed upon the principles of
impartiality, consent and cooperation of the parties concerned as well as the
non use of force, except in cases of self defense (Butros Ghali 1996; Capstone
Doctrine 2008). Those principles of traditional peacekeeping resulted compatible
not just with the principles of sovereignty and non intervention but also
with the liberal nature of the United Nations and the values that sustain it.
In traditional peacekeeping the consent of the parties for its deployment preserves
the sovereignty of the host state (Doyle 2001) and does not imply an act
of aggression, as peacekeepers cannot form part of the hostilities since the impartiality
guarantees a non intervention in internal affairs as well as the United
Nations unprejudiced standpoint in the conflict. Therefore, peacekeeping operations
were originally authorized unarmed or slightly armed and for carrying
out concrete tasks: observing and monitoring prevailed situations, or acting as
buffer between adversarial forces for keeping the peace when a truce, ceasefired
or open negotiations were settled (Cotty 2008; Bialke 2001; Wedgwood
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2001). In other words, peacekeeping operated where ‘there was a peace to keep’
(Murphy 1995, 562).
During the Cold War peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security
Council were often successful (Wedgwood 1995; Murphy 1994-1995). Most of
them operated in accordance with the principles and under the command and
control of the United Nations. Nevertheless, some peacekeeping operations
showed a progressive change in the peacekeeping activities, objectives and operation.
The missions became more complex, and there were differences in the
conception of self-defense and an extension of the use of force as in the case of
the United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUC (July 1960 – June 1964). Although
the extension of coercive measure is ascribed to the nature of each case,
it also responds to the experience in the global context.
In the 1990’s, the greatest practical and doctrinal developments in peacekeeping
started with frequent, albeit unclear, mandates of coercive measures in peacekeeping
missions. The end of a bipolar system and the decrease of inter-state
conflicts facilitated a more active role of the United Nations in the maintenance
of international peace and security (Cox 1998-1999), posing a great challenge
for the United Nations in its peacekeeping incursion on intra-state conflicts.
In such a new era, the number of peacekeeping missions did not just increase
significantly but they were also undergoing significant transformations. They
were often integrated with military and civil personnel, were deployed before
a ceasefire, attempted to scale back a conflict or demobilize combating forces
and were asked to carry out complex tasks such as: collecting arms, delivering
food, organizing democratic elections, providing security for a host or assisting
refugees and internally displaced persons (Wedgwood 1995).
The use of force was not clearly determined in all the cases authorized by the
Security Council. The broader the activities in the mandate were, the more unclear
the use of force became. It responded to an extended and artificial construction
of self defense, which encompassed the use of force in defense of the
peacekeeping operation itself, in case of an armed attack as well as in defense
of the mandate, in support of other peacekeepers in the zone (collective self defense)
and in defense of the objects and purposes of the peacekeeping operation
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(Cox 1998-1999), including civilians.
The Peacekeeping operations were confronted with domestic contexts where
peacekeepers slightly armed or unarmed were killed or taken hostage as in Somalia
and Sierra Leone or were incapable of acting in violent environments and
circumstances of grave violations of human rights, such as in Serbia and Rwanda,
where they were authorized to use all means necessary for accomplishing
their mandate. Those experiences are framed with several complaints of neglect,
misconduct, abusive practices and other illicit behaviors of peacekeepers
over civilians in countries where a mission was deployed, such as the Congo,
Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia or Sierra Leona (Vojdik 2007). The overall situation
provoked a temporary retreat to traditional peacekeeping models in the latter
half of the 1990’s (Cotty 2008).
The United Nations has striven to address the failures of peacekeeping operations
within which the Brahimi Report is a relevant outcome. It acknowledges
that the principles of traditional peacekeeping must remain a backdrop. At the
same time in relation to the use of force within peacekeeping operations the
Report asserts that ‘once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able
to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of
defending themselves, other mission components, and the mission’s mandate,
with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments
to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence’ (Brahimi
Report 2000). This leads to specify in the mandates an authority of the operation
to use force, and provide bigger forces and better equipment in order to
pose a credible deterrent threat because those operations must be capable of
confronting lingering forces with the ability and determination to defeat them
(Brahimi Report 2000, ss 1). When related to the use of force, the objective will
be to ‘deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities
in maintaining law and order’. (Capstone Doctrine 2008, 34)
As the Capstone doctrine says, robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at
the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of
the host nation and/or the main parties in the conflict and it is always guided
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y the principles of proportionality and the appropriate manner and the use of
a minimum of force to achieve its objective (Capstone Doctrine 2008). Thus,
robust peacekeeping operations have regularly been authorized by the Security
Council to use force, moving them from traditional operations to more complex
missions that engaged a mix of non-forceful and forceful activities (Cottey
2010), and incorporated personnel of regional organizations or private security
companies.
The alloy of peacekeeping operations and use force: Disadvantages
Although peacekeeping operations and its guiding principles are not explicitly
mentioned by the Charter, traditional peacekeeping preserved its spirit, purposes
and principles. Nevertheless, the Security Council’s mandate allowing
peacekeeping missions ‘to use all necessary means’ moves the principles, nature
and operability of peacekeeping missions into a different level and understanding
that seems to create more problems than solutions within the specific
conflict situation and for the credibility of peacekeeping, and may also contribute
more to the weaknesses of the United Nations than to long-term strengthening.
In order to explore some possible undesirable effects in the terms previously
pointed out, it is convenient to highlight the fact that the legal and practical
framework of enforcement measures in the Charter does not correspond with
the one of peacekeeping operations. In order to ‘maintain or restore international
peace and security’ under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
the Security Council has the authority for authorizing the use of force or taking
coercive measures whilst under article 33 of the Charter, its broader interpretation
and the purpose of the United Nations, the Security Council is allowed to
adopt peaceful measures such as the deployment of peacekeeping missions for
the same purpose. Thus peacekeeping operations born in the so-called Chapter
VI ½ alludes to the fact that peacekeeping lies in the middle of the Security
Council’s conciliation and its enforcement procedures (Wedgwood 2001). In robust
peacekeeping operations the Security Council incorporates forceful means
for accomplishing the mandate, instead of developing Chapter VII in order to
take or create the adequate enforcement measures for the different situations
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with which it has to deal. Thus, the path is misled, and it is possible to compromise
the role and credibility of the United Nations as the independent guarantor
of the peace.
Assuming the idea that since its creation the United Nations was meant to be
a ‘robust organization,’ the use of force is a function lying fundamentally under
articles 42, within which the Security Council has the authority to take
military action; and 43, which ‘endows the Security Council with designated
military forces under agreements with member states pursuant’ (Wedgwood
2001, 70). These forces will be available whenever the Security Council decides
to use them (Murphy 1994-1995). Keeping this in mind, Boutros Ghali
addresses in Agenda for Peace the relevance of creating the conditions for the
use of enforcement measures in terms of article 42 and 43 and appeals to the
creation of peace-enforcement units as provisional measures under article 40
of the Charter, which would be better equipped and trained than peacekeeping
forces (Ghali 1992).
Until now, enforcement measures have consisted in coalitions of willing States,
authorized by the Security Council to intervene militarily in a conflict. The lack
of political will for adopting the coercive measures by the United Nations in
the terms that it was agreed on by the states in the Charter, which might have
included Boutros Ghali’s proposal, and reduced the United Nations dependence
on states (Tardy 2007), has led the organization to find robust operations as a
solution to the difficulties and challenges that peacekeeping missions face in
violent contexts. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report is that
‘the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what
it wants to hear, when formulating or changing [peacekeeping] mission mandates’
(2000, ss 52). Similarly it can be argued that robust peacekeeping is not
necessarily the development and implementation of the mechanism adequate
or needed to preserve a fragile peace or create spaces for it but the result of what
the Security Council allows the Secretary-General to implement.
The previous paragraph tried to point out that the absence of compliance with
Chapter VII, where different levels of enforcement measures can evolve and be
implemented with a clear framework of reference and transparency, a gap is
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created that is currently trying to be filled by robust peacekeeping operations,
minimizing that part of the success of these operations have been in its non
use of force character and part of their greatest failures in their permissibility
for using force, as in the Congo. For the Brahimi Report and the Capstone
Doctrine the loss of credibility of the United Nations is connected with its lack
of clarity, ability and capabilities for dealing with certain conflict situations in
places where peacekeeping operations have been deployed. Although there are
relevant contributions in both documents, the credibility may also be affected
by the role of robust peacekeeping operations for a desperate seeking of problem
solutions.
The deployment of peacekeeping operations authorized to use force has an effect
on the United Nations system, as it is not contributing to make states assume
their commitments, and thus on the development of enforcement measures.
It also transforms the nature of peacekeeping operations through a construction
of an extended self-defense concept that raises a variety of legal difficulties,
such as transparency and accountability of the mission, as well as practical
complexities with several financial, logistical and strategic red points. Besides
the ‘defense’ of the mandate of peacekeeping, it should be part of enforcement
mechanisms, instead of ‘allowing’ the use of all means to peacekeeping missions
and ergo, placing them in a grey zone. The blurry boundaries between
robust peacekeeping and military intervention constitute a risk and danger
zone not just for the impact that an armed action from peacekeepers can likely
produce in the conflicts but also in terms of accomplishment of the mandate on
a local level.
In addition, Richmond refers to the existence of a ‘tension between the use of
force and the creation of peace’ (2004, 84). This tension is important for several
reasons; one of them is related to the association of peace and humanitarian
goals with its defense through forcible means and which is opposed to United
Nations’ culture of peace and peacekeeping’s association as a peaceful presence.
The General Assembly defines culture of peace as ‘a set of values, attitudes,
modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by
tackling their root causes, to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation
among individuals, groups and nations’ (1997, ss 2). This cognition of a pacific
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world order is embodied by the United Nations and is also observable in peacekeeping
operations (Woodhouse 2010). The role of peacekeeping operations as
a promoter of human rights, international peace and security, solidarity and
humanitarian assistance sustain an overall positive perception of the labor of
peacekeeping operations compatible with the liberal culture of peace.
A robust peacekeeping action implies an affectation of the culture of peace embodied
by the United Nations and the deconstruction of the positive symbol
of peacekeeping. As Rubinstein notes, the credibility of this cultural symbol is
eroded ‘when peacekeeping became muddled with peace enforcement, damaging
the consensual and unarmed nature of classical peacekeeping’ (Rubinstein
2005 cited in Woodhouse 2010, 490). Moreover, robust peacekeeping can impact
in a global construction of peace that does not correspond with the liberal
culture embodied by the United Nations, being more related with an imposition
of forceful means.
Feminist theories also provide relevant elements to consider in this topic, as
robust peacekeeping may also deepen a masculine military identity within the
peacekeepers, creating a negative impact on their performance (Patel & Tripodi
2007) and the culture of peace. According to these theories, a military culture,
present in peacekeeping personnel, implies an enforcement of some of the most
aggressive elements of masculinity such as the promotion of violence (Whitworth
2004). This military culture is considered, without the existence of robust
mandates, contradictory to peacekeeping labor, and it has already shown
pervasive effects over local populations.
The several cases of misconduct and abuses committed by peacekeepers against
local communities have not affected the culture of peace and the general image
of peacekeeping operations on a general scale. This can be related to the
fact that those cases constitute improper behaviors out of a United Nations approval.
Nevertheless, routinely robust peacekeeping operations may likely increase
the cases of misconduct, provoke damage in the culture of peace and
the image of peacekeepers, as well as revert what progress has been made in
modifying the core features of military culture related to peacekeepers’ abuses.
Duncanson writes that through peacekeeping operations there is a construc-
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tion of masculinity linked, in a worthy form, to the core principles of peacekeeping:
impartiality and the ability to control the use of force. She adds that
‘control and impartiality have traditionally been linked to masculinity, but they
have not always been linked to the model of warrior masculinity, hegemonic in
the Army, which has more commonly been linked to aggression and a desire
to defeat the enemy’ (2009, 70). Robust peacekeeping operations as a common
practice may separate peacekeepers from a more positive identity as what was
impacting their behavior was a prime role in negotiation, interaction and cooperation.
The latter, plus a permissible active peacekeepers’ use of force may
contribute to create frictions with the role of the United Nations in conflict situations
that increase questions of credibility.
Even though, enforcement measures are per se in conflict with the overall assessment
of the United Nations and peacekeeping operations, the use of force
in missions under the peace task that are considerably relevant for the role
of the United Nations as an independent guarantor of the peace and also as a
promoter of human rights, seems more harmful than beneficial, at least when
those enforcement measures are taken in mechanisms, the nature of which is
peaceful and humanitarian.
Conclusion
In the article What ever happened to the New World order? Murphy remarks
that ‘is important to avoid confusing peacekeeping with peace enforcement.
Both conceptually and operationally, the two terms should be kept separate and
distinct’ (Murphy 1994-1995, 563). The present essay adds to Murphy’s words
that the mixture of peacekeeping and use of force constitute an unfortunate
alloy. The reticence of states and the unsuccessful efforts of United Nations
in implementing the law and enforcement mechanism in compliance with the
Charter plus the United Nations’ necessity of resolving the problems that it
faces in its activities within armed conflicts have lead to a modification of the
nature and components of peacekeeping operations in order to deal with difficulties
that are beyond their traditional role, abilities and expertise, within
which peacekeeping missions have proved to be a valuable mechanism.
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Although the mix between peacekeeping operations and the use of force is already
underway, a review of the characteristics of this alloy suggest that robust peacekeeping
tends to create more uncertainties and disadvantages than to guarantee effective and
efficient results or benefits. Furthermore, robust peacekeeping may affect the core notion
and utility of peacekeeping operations, making them become a contradictory referent
of valuable peace and an unjust and illegitimate use of force. It is this combination of
carrot and stick, somehow patriarchal and dangerous, which results conflicting. Within it
any mistake, feature or unsatisfactory performance in the role of ‘robust’ peacekeeping
will potentially jeopardize their own credibility, and the strength and credibility of the
United Nations as the rightful promoter and guarantor of the peace and human values.
Bibliography
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and beyond, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 183 -212.
• Bellamy, A.2004. The ‘next stage’ in peace operations theory?, International Peacekeeping,
Vol. 11 (1), pp. 17 — 38.
• Bialke, J. 2001. United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of
the Law of Armed Conflict, Air Force Law Review, Vol. 50, pp.1-64.
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intervention, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 14 (4), pp. 429 — 446.
• Cox, K. 1998-1999. Beyond self-defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Use
of Force, Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, Vol. 27, pp.239-274.
• Doyle, M. and Sambanis, N. 2007. The UN record on peacekeeping operations, International
Journal, Vol. 62, pp. 495-518
• Duncanson, C. 2009. Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping
Operations, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11: 1, 63 — 80.
• Fink, J. 1995. From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the Mandate for the
Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security, Journal of International Law and
Trade, Vol. 1, pp. 1-46.
• Ghali, B. 1992. An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping.
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• Hadden, T. 2010. Battling for Human Rights?, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17 (3), pp. 309
— 326.
• Murphy, J. 1994-1995. Whatever happened to the New World Order?, Southern Illinois University
Law Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 561-566.
• Patel, P. and Tripodi, P. 2007. Peacekeepers, HIV and the Role of Masculinity in Military
Behaviour, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14 (5), pp. 584 — 598.
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International Peacekeeping, Vol.11 (1) , pp.83–101.
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• Schweizer, B. 2004. Moral dilemmas for humanitarianism in the era of “humanitarian” military
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System, Global Governance, Vol. 16, pp. 209-218.
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Doctrine) pp. 1-100. United Nations (Last acceded 11/01/2011)
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90 International Security Studies

Pre-twentieth century
thinkers considered as
International Relations
scholars
The case of Kant
erika biagini
MA in International Relations
Even though Kant’s thoughts have been object of wide critiques, his ideas
are gaining new vitality trough works of current international relations
academics of fame. This might be due to the fact that his writings,
whether political or not, highlight the universality of his thoughts which largely
reflect part of the current academic literature. International relations, world
peace and state sovereignty are questioned as a consequence of the principles
of morality that should lead decision makers in charge of states governance
who seek to guarantee individual’s external freedom and respect of political
rights. From the analysis of Kant’s political writings and critical theory derives
that world peace will be realized through a natural process of history which
final outcome will be a world organized over principles of good will; a theory
comparatively close to the reality observable in branches of the international
system where international relations among states have led to positive coopera-
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tion.
the universality of the liberal Kantian discourse
Philosophy is the history of thought questioning the very intimate angles of human
condition and, as humans, ours is a history of continuity. Certainly, thinkers
of all times have been influenced by the specificity of their centuries when
answering questions concerned with societies, politics and the nature of man.
However, among all the attributes they had observed, we can recognize some
specific characteristics of humankind which are timeless, and affect the way
we behave and decide when is regarding issues concerning our existence as
social beings. For this reason, international relations scholars share essential
thoughts with historians such as Thucydides and philosophers such as Machiavelli
and Kant; we are, fundamentally, observing similar processes. As we refer
to thinkers of the past when theorizing on international relations, those thinkers
did the same with their predecessors, and ‘good answers to important questions
tend to be repeated over time’ (Jackson 2005, p.7).
While writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli have been associated with pure
realism, Kant’s thoughts have been object of wider critiques. Cited among
scholars of several disciplines and influences, it seems that Kant’s ideas are
acquiring new vitality trough works of current international relations academics
of fame. This might be due to the fact that reading his writings, whether
political or not, we are able to discover that ‘the contemporary world is neither
as new, nor as exceptional, as we might believe’ (Jackson 2005, p.13). Differently
from who has been defined as realist thinkers, he carried in his ideas a
vein of optimism which cost him dear over the centuries. Criticized at times
by realists such as Waltz, hailed by current liberalist such as Rawls and Doyle,
‘regarded as the inventor and patentee of morality or duty’ (Wight 2005, p.63)
while discredited among postcolonial thinkers, what lasts about Kant is a great
esteem for his three critiques and misleading confusion regarding his political
writings. He did not write a masterpiece in international politics and his political
thinking cannot be fully understood read separately from his critical theory,
which lays down the basic principles of his ontology. However, a brave reader
would be rewarded by the universality of his thoughts. With no doubt nowadays
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we could claim that he reasonably foresaw the course of western societies and,
in all probability, he influenced it. Even though it would be misleading granting
Kant the label of international relations scholar, because he was a philosopher
and one of the most remarkable of the last centuries, his contributions to our
discipline can difficultly be disregarded, being more valid today that they were
in the past.
External freedom through principles of morality
Revolutionary for the eighteenth century and believer of the process of the Enlightenment
as the achievement of men’s autonomous thinking, his thoughts
were clearly liberal. International relations and world peace were not Kant’s
main concerns, but they became for him fundamental issues to guarantee individuals’
external freedom and respect of political rights, the standpoint of his
theory. ‘Our freedom implies that we have a hypothetical right to acquire anything
in the world of a nature which we are potentially capable of acquiring…
provided that this pursuit leaves the same kind of freedom to all others’ (Reiss,
1970, p.22); hence universal principles of right, based on universal principle
of morality, should govern organized human relations and guide states on the
establishment of just policies which could guarantee the extreme expression of
external freedom. In doing so, Kant abandoned the realm of experience, which
‘teaches us that a thing is so and so but not that it cannot be otherwise’ (Kant
in Williams 1992, p.103), to explore our mind, because theory, differently from
experience, is always applicable to reality. ‘He wanted to arrive at philosophical
principles on which a just and lasting internal order and a world peace could
be based.’(Reiss, 1970, p.4) As a consequence, he questioned forms of government
and relations between states from the standpoint of the individual. State
sovereignty in particular became the cornerstone of his idea of reform, which,
according to Kant, was necessary for world peace. Its origins were to be found
in domestic politics.
Reform towards the republican constitution for internal peace
For internal reform, Kant alludes that sovereignty should be vested in people.
Despotic governments use men as means and not as ends: they employ their
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citizens to defend the state in case of war, they do not have regrets on using
resources for armament rather than for people’s welfare and, more importantly,
despots are under nobody’s control to ensure that their decisions are taken
upon universal principles of morality. As Kant wrote in the First Definitive Article
of Perpetual Peace, ‘a constitution where the subject is not a citizen…..it is
the simplest thing in the world to go to war.’ (Kant ed. in Reiss 1970, p.100) It
could be argued that those thoughts are simply influenced by the French and
the American revolutions but Kant did not completely justify non-observance
to the sovereign. What can be observed as recurrent in his theory is a form of
morality which is indivisible from politics.
Any law which is not deliberately chosen by people does not comply with principles
of morality because it violates freedom illegitimately and coerces citizens
despotically. Affirming this does not mean that sovereignty has to be abolished
and men should live in a state of anarchy. Conversely, Kant considered sovereignty
as a necessary means to achieve external freedom and guarantee the
respect of a civil constitution among people, because ‘if he lives among others
of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master’ (Kant, Idea for a
Universal History, ed. in Reiss 1970, p.46). Constitutions, accordingly to his
principles, should conform to morality. Kant stated clearly in the First Definitive
Article of Perpetual Peace that ‘The Civil Constitution of Every State shall
be Republican’
A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle
of freedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of
the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and
thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens). It is the only
constitution which can be derived from the idea of an original contract, upon
which all rightful legislation of a people must be founded. Thus, as far as right
is concerned, republicanism is in itself the original basis of every kind of civil
constitution…’ (Kant ed. in Reiss 1970, p 99)
Republicanism, as he intended, was a more modern form of government in
which the legislative power was divided from the executive, the only form that
could guarantee the abstention of states from war. Reading further, Kant af-
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firms that a republican constitution ‘offers a prospect of attaining the desired
result […] perpetual peace [because if] the consent of the citizens is required to
decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have
great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous enterprise’ (Kant, Perpetual
Peace, ed. in Reiss 1970, p.100).
It could be argued that Kant already believed that liberal states are more peaceful
than others. Nevertheless, nobody could guarantee that individuals would
not decide, in some cases and for any reason, to go to war. If we want to extend
the concept further, a study conducted by Doyle in 1983, demonstrated that
liberal states tend to solve their disputes with diplomatic means rather than
war and that the break out of conflicts is more likely to happen between a liberal
and a non liberal state. In this case war would be legitimated for liberal
states by the lack of morality present in non liberal constitutions (Doyle, 1983,
p. 204-235 and p. 323-353). Despite this study could seems encouraging for
democratic societies we should not forget that the process of democratization
has in many cases been reached paying a high price in human lives and, what
is more, achievements of liberal societies during the last two centuries are far
behind their potential. The accentuated interventionism of democratic societies
is one of the criticized outcomes of their foreign policy. In addition, the fact that
a state is not liberal should not justify the right to go to war with them under the
same principle of morality.
The paradox between internal order and international anarchy: a
reciprocal systemic approach
Kant recognized that state sovereignty, which leads to internal peace but international
anarchy, creates a dualistic mechanism between inside and outside
states. Anarchy still threats the freedom of individuals, and particularly, freedom
from the threat of war: ‘people who have grouped themselves into nation
states may be judge in the same way as individual men living in a state of nature’
(Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. in Reiss 1970, p102). For analogy a sort of
world state that could reign over all others, working similarly to a world republic
and bringing international peace, should be achieved. But Kant was aware
that states would not renounce to their sovereignty; this was ‘not the will of the
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nations, [which] according to their present conception of international right…..
the positive idea of a world republic cannot be realized’ (Kant, Perpetual Peace,
ed. in Reiss, p.105). For this reason he agrees that anarchy in the international
system is the best solution and he proposes what he calls a Federation of Free
States were the firsts liberal nations could involve and affect the others through
processes of international relations: ‘for if by good fortune one powerful and
enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by its nature inclined to seek
perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among
other states’ (Kant ed. in Reiss 1970, p104). Hence, according to Kant, there is
no remedy to international anarchy, the mechanism for the reform is merely
spontaneous and its origin has to be found in domestic politics.
A vein of utopianism could be misunderstood in Kant’s theory particularly because
‘it is the aim of his political philosophy to establish the hope that states
may improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and devastation of
war to make possible a rule of law among them that is not backed by power but
is voluntarily observed’ (Waltz, 1962, p 337). What is more, ‘this peace is created
and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry’
(Kant, Perpetual Peace, ed. in Reiss, 1970, p.114). What Waltz was criticizing
was the absence of a balance of power which emerges from Kant’s Federation of
States. As he argues, Kant ‘has held out a hope for perpetual peace, which, upon
closer scrutiny seems to disappear’ (Waltz, 1962, p 338).
Kant’s balance of power is a theological mechanism of nature which he uses
to correct what appears to be a paradox between positivism and negativism
on the spontaneous process of the dual reform. It is very improbable that such
a reform would originate from the sole will of nations, but it became less improbable
if understood in a systemic approach where national and international
realm could reform reciprocally through a continuous process dictated by nature
and history:
‘Individual, men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing
their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others,
they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature’
(Kant, Idea for a Universal History, ed. in Reiss, 1970, p.41)
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History and Nature lead man into a process which tends to peace. The engine
of the system is what Kant called social unsociability, which pushed man ‘to
come together in societies’ (Kant, Idea of a Universal History, ed. in Reiss,
1970, p44). Social unsociability, by which men have a natural instinct to live
in groups but to pursue their own ends, can be considered as competition for
material possessions. ‘Competition and socialization continuously shape and
reshape the basic identity of the units populating the system, thereby promoting
the liberal state form and the expansion of the democratic peace’ (Harrison,
2002, p. 151). Interdependence between states, which transpired in Kant’s Cosmopolitan
Right of Universal Hospitality, is the mechanism through which the
encounter between different cultures could bring to merged universal liberal
principles. Wars are initially necessary because they are ‘attempts (not indeed
by the intention of man, but by the intention of nature) to bring about new relations
between states’ and are in themselves the mechanism that will bring the
world to peace: ‘these new bodies [states after the war], will in turn be unable
to survive, and will….undergo further revolutions of similar sort, till…civil constitution,
and….external agreement and legislation….can maintain itself automatically’
(Kant, Idea of a Universal History, ed. in Reiss, 1970, p 48).
Conclusions: International Cooperation towards the balance of
power
Similarly to the way in which Waltz theorized a systemic approach to international
relations, Kant’s dualism already suggested something very similar but
far more articulated:
‘A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the
world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil
union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable
of furthering the purpose of nature….amidst the arbitrary
plan of human freedom…..this idea may yet serve as a guide to us
…at least when considered as a whole, to a system.’ (Kant, Idea of a
Universal History, ed. in Reiss, 1970, p.51-52)
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He vindicated the role that history, culture and economic competition, play
within the system in linking international and national realm. Rather than
the national realm to be constrained by internationally formed rules, their reciprocal
transformation leads to a process of human history towards peace. A
complicate application of this system to reality is suggested because it becomes
rather difficult to recognize when a change is due to the international system or
to the domestic politics.
It could be claimed that Kant did not really provide a solution for peace, but a
hope for it, which is going to realize sometimes far in the future
‘Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations,…are the
means by which nature drives nations, [which]…after many devastations,
upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their
powers, to take the step…of abandoning a lawless state of savagery
and entering a federation of peoples in which every state….could
expect to derive security and rights not from its own power or its
own legal judgment, but solely from this great federation …from
a united power and the law-governed decision of a united will’
(Kant, Idea of a Universal History, ed . in Reiss, 1970, p.47)
Were we should look for a realization for peace is in the deep nature of man
which through the process of history should enlighten himself towards a world
organized over principles of good will; wars are a necessary process in the direction
of a global peace which, to be reached, entails the breach of the same
morality praised by Kant. It could then be argued that this is a philosophical
theological belief that, applied to reality, leaves reasonable space for the same
realism from which Kant has been detached. Joining together all the main concepts
deriving from the writings analyzed, wars seem in fact a necessary step
for future peace where peace implies a balance of power which is still evolving
and is depending on the good will of internal politics of states and the way they
relate to the others.
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Due to the fact that wars are a necessary step to peace, according to Kant and
his theory in Idea of a Universal History, it should be asked why his political
writings have been considered closer to liberalism than realism and have
been strongly criticized by some part of the literature to be contradictory. The
answer could be found comparing Kant’s optimism for a self human enlightenment
considered as the key for the international balance of power, and the
current international legal system mechanisms which is based on the voluntary
participation of states. Because the higher achievements in the international
world order can be observed where states have been willing to cooperate spontaneously,
liberalism could be considered as a more advanced stage of realism
regarding to politics and international relations.
Bibliography
• Bull, Hedley. 2002. The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke:
Palgrave.
• Doyle, Michael W. 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy and Public
Affairs (Vol. 12, No. 3), pp. 205-235.
• Doyle, Michael W. 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2. Philosophy and
Public Affairs (Vol. 12, No. 4), pp. 323-353.
• Franceschet, Antonio. 2002. Kant and liberal internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and
Global Reform. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Harrison, Ewan. 2002. Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations.
Review of International Studies (Vol. 28, No. 1), pp. 143-162.
• Jackson, Robert H. 2005. Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: from
Anarchy to Cosmopolis. New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Reiss, Hans. 1970. Kant’s political writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Waltz, Kenneth N. 1962. Kant, Liberalism, and War. The American Science Review (Vol. 56,
No. 2), pp. 331-340.
• Wight, Martin. 2005. Four Seminal Thinkers in International Relations Theory. Oxford:
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Realism and its View of
World Politics
100 International Security Studies
Genevieve lynch
MA in International Relations
Realism has earned a bad reputation in International Relations theory.
For a theory that boasts such a historical lineage and sense of legitimacy
mainly through the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes,
it is remarkably open to attack about its very fundamental nature. Realism is
a theory, more than any other, which is misunderstood and misconstrued. In
this essay, I hope to show the realism is not as bleak as one would think and
that there is plenty of room within the theory for issues of morality and other
interests. I will be focusing mainly on E.H Carr and Hans Morgenthau as they
more than any other theorists have managed to shape the theory in many ways
to fit their own values and beliefs.
introduction
Michael C. Williams (2004: 635) remarks that while the majority of realism’s
critics disagree about its larger purpose within International Relations theory,
they are mostly in unison regarding realism’s apparent lack of attention towards
other interests and ideas beside power. One of the main reasons realism enjoys
such a desperate reputation; pithily summed up by John J. Mearsheimar (2001:
23) as being “a hard-sell” is the widespread and mistaken belief that realism is
a single, unified and coherent theory. On closer investigation, it becomes clear
the sheer diversity and definition within the theory itself. The differing read-

ings that realism affords from classical to neoclassical to neorealism indicate a
theory that is more diverse and flexible than acknowledged. It also questions
the validity of the accusation that it is out of touch, anachronistic and unnecessarily
bleak. William Wohlforth (2010: 131) argues that the concept of realism
has become too broad and vague as a term. He writes how realism has come
define not only the theory itself but sub-schools such as classical realism and
neorealism, and specific realist theories such as the security dilemma, balance
of power and offensive and defensive balance.
Realism, unlike other theories, especially critical theories uses the existing international
political framework as its starting point. It does not strive to alter
the current framework but rather, works within. Critics perceive this as being
ultimately defeatist and counter-productive and realists are consistently
charged with perpetuating and intimating the very structures and divergent
dynamics they describe (Buzan 1996: 53-54). Yet, realism tends to look upon
its realistic portrayal of world politics as a badge of honour rather than as a
theoretical defect. As John J. Mearsheimar (2001: 2) points out, international
politics is and has always been a duplicitous and callous environment and there
is nothing to indicate that this state of affairs will be modified any time soon.
Mearsheimar’s sentiment is symbolic of the realist’s general acceptance that
historical realities makes the current political situation and it is realism’s prerogative
to reflect these values, which is not the same as endorsing them. As
E.H Carr (1995: 12) who borrows a quote from Sorel argues “It is the eternal
dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those
who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world”.
Power and Realism
Power is the most important interest in realism. Realists are accused of giving
power too much credence, which in turn has a negative impact on other interests.
Williams (2004: 636) posits that realism’s preoccupation stems from its
modern origins in the aftermath of World War II where the influence of military
power was understandably one-sided. It also encouraged many of its modern
proponents most notably Carr and Morgenthau to assume a crushing critique
of liberalism, so concerned were they that the lessons of the shortcomings of
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liberalism would be forgotten and the mistakes of the inter-war period would
reoccur. They passionately believed that if liberal views were pursued by states
it could only lead to failure (Mearsheimar 2001: 15). The repercussions are still
felt today, realism is perceived as a bleak and rigid doctrine, unable to engage
with any other theory and obsessed with power politics. Yet, considering its
elevated status, power is in fact vaguely and broadly defined by realists. Most
realist use Morgenthau’s famous assertion that “when we speak of power, we
mean man’s control over the minds of other men” (Morgenthau 2006: 30) as a
starting point. Power to Morgenthau was not something fixed and concrete but
a fluid concept that could be transformed by both internal and external factors.
Morgenthau also distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate power and
perceived legitimate power as having far more weight than illegitimate. “Legitimate
power, which can invoke a moral or legal justification for its exercise,
is likely to be more effective than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot
be justified” (32).
John Mearsheimar (2001) outlines how there is two types of power, latent and
military but regarding international politics he perceives that a nation’s power
can only be measured by its comparison with its rivals’ forces. Jack Donnelly
(2009: 47) insists that power alone can only reveal so much about the rights
and privileges a state actually benefits from. Morgenthau (cited in Lebow 2003:
231) had a far more subtle reading of a nation’s power, he advocated other factors
such as a nation’s morale and how effective leadership within the state was.
Carr shared Morgenthau’s view that a strong and good leader played an instrumental
role in shaping a country’s destiny but makes a notable diversion from
Morgenthau in his belief that the masses are what truly shape a country in the
long term. They provided not only a moral anchor for the state but the long
term destiny of a society and its societal structures was largely, he believed,
fixed and formed by its people (cited in Howe 1994: 283-284).
Maintaining the Balance of Power
The balance of power is one the most well-known of realist theories and enjoys
a long, historical lineage within the theory. While the structuralist realist Kenneth
Waltz (cited in Buzan 1996: 50) believes that it occurs naturally without
102 International Security Studies

the conscious effort of its proponents, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (1999:
72) assert that it is an intentional construction. “Makers of foreign policy
do not act as automatons, prisoners of the balance of power and severely constrained
by it. They are free to exercise their judgment and their will as agents
for their states in the conduct of foreign policy”. Morgenthau wrote extensively
about the balance of power. He argued that while it existed both domestically
and internationally, it was far more stable in the domestic yet of pivotal importance
in the international sphere
Morgenthau admitted the impossibility of calculating the relative power of one
state against another in the balance of power, a practice much harder when
trying to factor in several players and alliances between states. The result is a
desperate attempt by states to ascertain each other’s relative power while trying
to maximise their own power and leave enough space for them to manoeuvre
(2006: 215-219). The balance of power, as Morgenthau assesses it, has unfortunately
only two results, war and peace. Not only has the balance of power
indirectly led to war but Morgenthau believes that most of the wars fought in
the modern era can be directly traced to the balance of power. He also is convinced
that throughout history, ruthless leaders have used the balance of power
to further their own designs and ambitions under the guise of “guardianship”
(2006: 221-223).
The cold heart of Realism
Realists have been attacked for their lack of humanitarian concern. Their
argument is that it a matter of perspective, what one country may deem
as human rights is another country’s oppressive dictate. Realists do not
agree with one or a few nations’ perception of moral law being upheld as the
dictate of moral law. By doing so, realists reason they are behaving fairly to
all (Morgenthau: 12-13). Morgenthau does not believe that there can be an
application of abstract universal moral principles; instead, they have to be
modified by time and place (12). This idea also impacts his reasoning that
there is a distinction regarding moral principles has to be made between
“what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the
concrete circumstances of time and place” (6).
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The realist belief that there exists a dual moral standard that what may appear
to be improper and dishonest conduct to an individual within a state is
acceptable for statesmen in their dealings with other states (Dunne 2001: 143).
Dunne freely admits that states have to sometimes behave in a distasteful way
but this immoral behaviour is overruled by the simple fact that “the state itself
represents a moral force, for it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility
of an ethical political community to exist domestically” (143). He adds
how it is a core moral duty of a statesman to ensure a state’s survival, a claim
made by other notable realists including Hans Morgenthau (Morgenthau: 12)
and Henry Kissinger (Dunne: 152). This seems to offer unethical statesmen
the opportunity to pursue questionable action under the guise of ensuring their
state’s survival. The other argument that Morgenthau is concerned with is that
while an individual cannot fight for a higher ideal, the state can never, as the
statesman has to take into account what is best for the common good (Gellman
1988: 259).
Carr makes an interesting argument regarding morality and realism. He questions
the legitimacy of the concept in light of differences in diverse societies’
morals, historical timeframe and subjective opinion. He also sees how principles
can be exploited by those who advocate them to reflect their own interests.
As an example he looks upon the failure of the inter-war statesmen, Aristide
Briand, Anthony Eden and Woodrow Wilson and notes how each failed to enforce
their principles of peace, collective security and moral right respectively.
Yet, for Carr the point is not how each issue was foregone but “that these supposedly
absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious
reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of
national interests at a particular time” (Carr: 80).
Analysing morality in International Relations was tricky for Morgenthau as he
believed that it was equally futile and counter-productive to over-emphasise
or underrate its role. He comes up with a similar suggestion but approaches it
from a different angle in his question of whether moral motives are humanitarian
aspiration for a common good or just subterfuge to mask the real motive of
statesmen that ultimately serve their own ends. He also queries how objective
statesmen can be. Morgenthau like Carr uses the historical example of states-
104 International Security Studies

men during the interwar years, this time Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement
regarding the Sudetenland. Morgenthau (2006: 228) wonders if Chamberlain
was behaving “under the mistaken assumption that the moral, intellectual, and
potential unity of Europe still existed and that Nazi Germany formed an integral
part of it”. The Cold War was an ideological battlefield between the USA
and the USSR. While Morgenthau perceived how ideology could be used as a
tool by those in power to cynically cloak and rationalize power, Carr sincerely
believed that both groups were earnest supporter of the doctrine they advocated.
In this way, Carr (cited in Howe 1994: 291) returns to the point Morgenthau
makes, that moral principles are entirely subjective and constrained by time
and space.
The International System
John Mearsheimar (2001: 3) attains that the international system is principally
to blame for states having to behave in such ruthless fashion. This creates a
level of fear amongst states that while never remaining at the same level, never
becomes insignificant due principally to the very nature of international politics
(2001: 80). Many realists (Howe 1994) advocate that the international system
has fundamentally remained the same since 1648 with the lack of an overriding
authority ensuring that states remain fixed in competitive interaction
with each other. Mearsheimar (2001: 49) believes that “the particular order
that obtains at any time is mainly a by-product of the self-interested behaviour
of the system’s great powers. The configuration of the system, in other words,
is the unintended consequence of great-power security competition, not the result
of states acting together to organise peace.” For Morgenthau (2006: 241),
the overarching message is not as pessimistic as one would expect. He believes
that statesmen in many ways, behaves far more honestly in the modern era
than they did so in other periods of history and that given the latitude they are
afforded, they do far less than they actually could. He illustrates his point with
an analysis of political life in the Italian city states, especially the Republic of
Venice that arranged for two hundred assassinations attempts between 1415-
1525 (ibid). Although, this is a valid point, Morgenthau appears to be rather
naive of the duplicitous nature of many modern regimes. Lebow (2003: 16)
does not directly take issue with Morgenthau’s point but indirectly critiques it
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with his analysis of the modern legacy of realism. “Realism is not just another
arcane academic doctrine. As currently formulated, it offers an intellectual
justification for a range of policies at odds with core democracies and humanitarian
values”. He outlines these policies as illegal coups, interventions and
support of oppressive dictatorships (ibid).
A tragic view of world politics is one where all emphasis rests on military power.
It is a bleak proposition where states are reduced to the amount of nuclear warheads
and their arsenal capability. For John J. Mearsheimar (2001: 78), power
is simply the military capabilities a country possesses. While Richard Lebow
(2001: 62) admits that neorealists believe military capabilities and alliances as
the very rock of security, he sees the long-term implications of such a narrow
outlook. Citing Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, he posits how a weak civil
society in both these cases allowed military capabilities to override any other
concern and how alliances and military capabilities worked against providing
security. “In the absence of community, military capability and alliances were
no guarantee of security, and could provoke wars they were intended to prevent”
(63-64). Another example would be post-Revolutionary France whereby
a fragmented civil society enabled both internal unrest with the Terror and external
dispute with the Napoleonic Wars. Lebow also looks at the other side of
this argument with his analysis of how a strong civil society in the United States
and the United Kingdom post World War II counterbalanced their respective
military aspirations (62). Morgenthau (2006: 230) makes a similar argument
believing that a common culture and moral code fostered amongst states can
lead to stability. He believed this occurred twice in European history, most
recently after the Congress of Vienna where Europe enjoyed relative peace and
prosperity between 1815 and 1914. Europe’s collective identity during this period
helped keep individual’s desire for power as potential and not as reality.
When this collective identity began to splinter, the conflict became real.
Conclusion
While, it can be argued that realism is ultimately a bleak doctrine, this is only
in its “pure” form, something very few people would admit to. As Carr pithily
asserts (1995: 84) “The impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going
106 International Security Studies

ealist is one of the most certain and curious lessons of political science” . Carr
later elaborates this point with his assertion that realists can no more ignore
elements of morality than liberals can disregard the aspect of power (216). Realism
is a theory that can be hugely beneficial and can accommodate a far more
diverse range of views and opinions than would be presumed. It takes into
account and arguably exaggerates certain aspects of international politics such
as anarchy, security dilemma but because it is working within a framework, its
conclusions can be far more effective than a lot of other theories. Realism is a
helpful theory if one bears in mind, that is just a theory and as Kenneth Waltz
(1979: 9) so elegantly argues in his Theory of International Politics, “theories
do construct a reality, but no one can ever say that is the reality”.
Bibliography
• Buzan, Barry. “The timeless wisdom of realism?” International theory: positivism and beyond.
Ed Steve Smith et als. Cambridge 1993: 47-65.
• Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis London 1939 rpt 1995.
• Donnelly, Jack . “Realism” Theories of International Relations 4 th edition. Ed Scott Burchill et
als London 2009: 31-57.
• Dunne, Tim and Brian C. Schmidt. “Realism” The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction
to International Relations 2 nd Edition. Ed John Baylis. Oxford 2001: 141-161.
• Gellman, Peter. (1988) “Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism” Review of
International Studies 14.(4): 247-266.
• Howe, Paul. (1994) “The Utopian Realism of E.H. Carr” Review of International Studies
20.(3): 277-297.
• Lebow, Richard Ned. “Classical Realism” International Relations Theories: Discipline and
Diversity. 2 nd Edition. Ed Dunne et als. Oxford 2010: 58-76.
• Lebow, Richard Ned. The tragic vision of politics- Ethics, Interests and Orders Cambridge
2003.
• Mearsheimar, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics London 2001.
• Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 7 th e. Revised
by Kenneth W. Thompson, W. David Clinton. Boston 2006.
• Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory. Realism, Pluralism,
Globalism and Beyond. Boston 1999.
• Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics Boston 1979.
• Williams, Michael C. (2004) “Why ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau,
Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics” International Organization
58(4): 633-665.
• Wohlforth, William C. “Realism” The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Eds
Christian Reus-Smith et al. Oxford 2010: 131-149.
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108 International Security Studies

Conflict Resolution and
Post-Conflict Studies

Conflict: causes,
resolution policies and
practices and degrees of
success
The case of the Lord’s Resistance Army
and conflict in Northern Uganda
Catherine roche
MA in Development Studies
‘Internal wars are a complex phenomenon. If they were simple, they would
doubtless have been ‘solved’ long ago’. (Maitre 2009 p65)
Taking the conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government as a case study, this paper
seeks to evaluate the causes of conflict, explore conflict resolution practices
and appraise their level of success. Demonstrative of the complexity in
establishing the causes of conflict, this case illustrates the importance of a contextual
approach in order to penetrate the intricate interplay of causal factors.
Regarding conflict resolution policies, the case study reveals that the perceived
110 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

dichotomy between international and traditional approaches is a false one. This
conflict is also reflective of the multiple obstacles to achieving peace: the paper
raises questions around the behaviour of the Ugandan Government and its
commitment to peace, the resettlement of child combatants and the role of the
international community. Thus, while there is now relative calm in northern
Uganda, the assignation of causality to any actor or policy remains problematic.
introduction
Uganda, rife with violence almost incessantly since independence, unfortunately
presents many examples of conflict. Taking the case of conflict in northern
Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government,
this research paper briefly examines the causes of conflict, delineates
conflict resolution practices and policies utilised and analyses their degree of
success/failure. This case study provides a valuable lens through which to explore
the complex interplay of causal factors; the perceived dichotomy between
international and traditional approaches to conflict resolution and the myriad
difficulties in restoring any lasting peace, not least due to the position of the
Government, the role of the international community and the vital issue of the
resettlement of child combatants.
Since the mid 1980s, when President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and his National
Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) assumed power by force, Joseph Kony,
his followers and the LRA ‘have brought his vision of the Ten Commandments
to northern Ugandans through systemic abductions, torture, mutilation, rape,
and murder’ resulting in ‘psychological havoc’ in the region and the displacement
of over a million and a half people (Prendergast 2005 p3). With most
victims from the Acholi population of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts (Allen
2006 p1) the virulence of Kony’s approach is evident in the atrocities perpetrated
and the use of child combatants recruited through abduction. Desirous
of creating a theocracy, Kony was clearly influenced by Alice Lakwena and the
Holy Spirit Movement resulting in a conflict with a spiritual/supernatural dimension
as Kony, believing he is channelling several spirits, exhorts his followers
to engage in ritual practices of protection. Throughout this conflict, both the
LRA and the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) have committed serious
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crimes and violations of human rights.
Conflict in Northern Uganda: Causes
Applying the literature on conflict in Africa to the case of northern Uganda
raises some important questions about context and causality, specifically
monocausal analysis. Collier and Hoeffler, applying their econometric model
to Sub-Saharan Africa assert unequivocally that the causes of conflict here are
purely economic: indeed Africa’s more frequent experience of conflict recently
is because ‘its economies have performed so poorly both absolutely and relative
to other regions’ (2002 p14). Simply put, the root cause of conflict in Africa
is greed not grievance. However, economic factors do not fully explain the
northern Ugandan conflict; while there is an economic dimension in unequal
distribution of resources favouring the south; it is not the only or indeed major
determinant of conflict in this instance. Thus, while the Collier and Hoeffler
model is attractive to policy-makers; it only reveals general trends and may
give ‘a static, culturally blind and profoundly ahistorical picture of civil wars’
(Berdal 2005 p690). Such large-scale studies may overlook ‘local violence in
rural areas’ (Green 2007 p720): thereby helping to explain war rather than local
conflict.
Are issues of ethnicity and identity at the core of the northern Ugandan conflict?
As noted by Young, cultural pluralism ‘alone is not the prime determinant’ of
armed conflict; however, in a culturally plural society where conflict is interwoven
with politics ‘identity is virtually certain to become part of the larger patterns
of confrontation’ (2002 p540). Certainly the identity of the Acholi people
is central in this conflict but in a way that challenges traditional explanations
of inter-ethnic rivalry. The LRA violence was perpetrated not just against the
Ugandan government but their own people. While, in his case study of Kibaale
district, Green found that along with population growth, claims to indigeneity
at local level were causal factors of conflict in the region, rather than ethnic
diversity per se (2007), this still does not explain the particular nature of the
northern Ugandan conflict.
Much can be explained by the specific historical context: (briefly) Amin’s mas-
112 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

sacre of Acholi and Langi soldiers and the resultant flight of escapees to Tanzania
and Kenya served as catalysts for action; their integration in Tanzania ‘into
a loyalist Obote force’ (Decalo 1989 p147) who committed atrocities during the
ensuing civil war and finally their return to the north (fearing reprisals) on Museveni’s
assumption of power. However, while this linear model explains much
of the conflict it is not complete in itself.
If one looks to religion as a cause of conflict, one can discern a long history of
religio-political strife in Uganda: wherein ‘issues of religion have dominated
public life’ (Karugire 1980 p62) from the arrival of the first missionaries in
the 1870s. The peculiar blend of Christianity and traditional beliefs in Acholi
certainly contributed to the syncretism of militia practices (Young 2002 p547)
in northern Uganda.
While socio-political reasons could be proffered i.e. the sense of isolation of
northern Ugandans and though many factors leading to conflict are endemic to
Uganda; one must also take cognisance of the geographic and regional context:
specifically the fluid boundaries and evolving conflicts affecting South Sudan,
Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic
(CAR). Museveni’s support for Rwandan and Sudanese conflicts in particular
and the corresponding reciprocated support for the LRA demonstrate vividly
‘the connection between the regional and the local’ (Oloka-Onyango 2004 p41).
Finally, one must consider Museveni’s ‘unflagging belief in the efficacy of military
action’ to solve political problems (Oloka-Onyango 2004 p36) which underscores
his paramount concern with security and resulting creation and perpetuation
of a strong military machine.
This brief overview demonstrates that monocausal explanations fail to explain
the root causes of conflict in this case study: rather it is a nexus of factors, involving
the ‘reciprocal dynamics of state crisis, civil disorder, and identity politics’
(Young 2002 p557) attended by religious, regional and historical factors. It
is important to note also that initial causes may not be what sustains a conflict
(Maitre 2009 p53): fear has proved an important factor in the perpetuation of
this conflict.
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Policies and Practice
Within this context of ‘messianic insurgency, chronic mistrust, and meddlesome
neighbors (sic)’ (Prendergast 2005 p4), one could well ask how possible it
is to build peace in northern Uganda. In this case study, one can discern three
approaches: military response; international jurisprudence and traditional justice
mechanisms.
Post-civil war in Uganda, Museveni’s rule shows that despite problems ‘guerrilla
governments …undertake sincere efforts to mitigate and ameliorate’ conditions
(McDonough 2008 p371). However, the military origins of government
rule meant a military response to resistance was probably inevitable. For many
years therefore, Museveni focussed on ensuring the eradication of resistance
in northern Uganda through the use of force. Military activity overlapped (and
juxtaposed with) attempted peace-building responses such as the 2000 Amnesty
Act which offered amnesty for activity in conflict in the period 1986-2000.
Finding this amnesty process unsatisfactory, in 2003 Museveni requested the
International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate the LRA actions in northern
Uganda, signalling a move to international justice approaches. In 2005 arrest
warrants issued for five leaders of the LRA for crimes against humanity
and war crimes, including sexual enslavement, rape, inducing of rape, attack
against the civilian population and enlisting of children (ICC 2005). While in
2007, the peace process seemed to gather momentum at the Juba peace talks,
the spectre of the ICC arrest warrants remained a block to progress; resulting
in various agreements to enable the establishment of a special division of
the Ugandan High Court, thereby attempting to provide an alternative to ICC
proceedings. However, Kony’s refusal to sign the peace agreement effectively
ended the peace process. Perhaps convinced of the unlikelihood of a credible
alternative trial in Uganda, Kony’s resistance also reinforced questions regarding
the government’s intent in pursuing international remedy.
The situation also increased unease about international concepts of justice as
Western or liberalist views not necessarily suited to this context. Jackson, examining
the ICC and the concept of universal human rights at the core of ‘lib-
114 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

eral peace theories of post-conflict reconstruction’ (2009 p320) finds a focus
on constructing liberal states rather than on negotiating solutions (2009 p321).
Further, the international system in which war is seen as an ‘aberration’ and
a problem for which there is a solution leads to compartmentalisation of state
interaction within a framework ‘that is far from universally applicable’ (Maitre
2009 p53). In this regard, fears of a new form of cultural imperialism were easily
exploited by Kony and the LRA.
Traditional mechanisms often combine various forms of justice ‘retributive, restorative,
or reparative’ (Quinn 2007 p394) in contrast to formal Western models
which generally rely on one form. While there are several examples from
other African countries, the primary approach pursued here was Matu Oput
(bitter root) involving a murderer admitting his crime before the victim’s relatives
and both parties drinking a bitter ‘brew made from a tree root mixed with
sheep’s blood’ (Bangura 2008 p143). Albeit concerned with interpersonal conflict,
Jabs’ study reveals remarkable levels of reconciliation, despite ‘the level
of aggression and the nature of the injuries’ inflicted during the conflict (2005
p366).
In 2008, Museveni rejected a Hague trial for the three surviving LRA leaders
facing prosecution by ICC. Stating his intention that the LRA leaders should
face traditional justice ‘which is more compensatory than a retributive system’,
Museveni explicitly identifies the people of northern Uganda as the source of
this request: ‘it is that community which asked us to use traditional justice’
(McGreal 2008).
Success or Failure?
Several factors militated against the success of the approaches pursued: the
role of the state and political will; the international community and the issue of
child combatants.
Peace building efforts must ‘successfully deal with the political and socioeconomic
preconditions for the conflict’ (McDonough 2008 p357). However, the
government’s initial purely military response brought further murder and dis-
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placement. Indeed the overall combination of mechanisms adopted by the government
can be seen as ‘hindering the process of peacemaking and transition’
in Uganda (Quinn 2007 p393).
The political motivation of the Ugandan government’s utilisation of international
mechanisms is subject to question. Ugandan self-referral to the ICC, given
the complementarity role of the Court, while accepted as legitimate, raises
concerns about the central role of the Ugandan government in this conflict. Was
this an effort to distance itself from responsibility? The timing of arrest warrants
similarly entails inquiry: Traylor observes that when a conflict is ongoing,
indictments ‘provide a strong disincentive for the resolution of the conflict’
(2009 p35). Thirdly, legal reservations around Uganda’s establishment of its
own accountability mechanism while the case is before the ICC begs the question
of commitment to this process at all.
The international community is also culpable in persistently ignoring the conflict:
Allen notes that the war between the Ugandan government and the LRA
‘has rarely been covered in the national media’ (2006 p3). Even when media
attention was focussed, donor governments remained accepting of war in the
north while development progressed in the south. In exploring how liberal
peace can tolerate war and dislocation adjacent to ‘success’, Shaw and Mbabazi
declare that ‘thus, the liberal peace, as experienced by Ugandans, is characterised
by a moral agnosticism’ (2007 p577). While Uganda’s endorsement of freemarket
reform was lauded by the West, it could be asserted that ‘Western powers
and the IFIs bear considerable responsibility for nurturing the new breed’
such as Museveni (Oloka-Onyango 2004 p47) and therefore in promoting and
supporting conflict.
Of vital importance in transitional justice and post-conflict resolution is the
repairing of ‘social interactions and institutions of a particular society’ (Quinn
2007 p389). Resettling child combatants poses many difficulties but is pivotal
to the rebuilding and lasting stability of society. In her study of the resettlement
experiences of formerly abducted children (FAC) in northern Uganda, Corbin
concludes that the ‘resettlement of FAC into families and communities requires
massive efforts and resources by all social systems in war affected areas’ (2008
116 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

p332). These involve addressing family support for psycho-emotional wellbeing
and for cultural acceptance; the particular experience of girls and the harassment
by others in the community, especially of those forced to kill relatives or
other community members during abduction. Post-conflict, the real fear of arrest
and prosecution of these children must be tackled.
Is the current ‘peace’ in northern Uganda due to any or all of the conflict resolution
policies adopted? One could argue that the Mato Oput approach has been
useful in reconciling communities especially with their abducted child combatants.
However, while the arrest warrants forced Kony and supporters into
hiding, effectively ending much of the conflict in northern Uganda, the ICC did
not bring meaningful peace.
Conclusion
The northern Ugandan example demonstrates the complexity of divining the
causes of conflict and the importance of a contextual approach. It is also reflective
of a false dichotomy between international and traditional approaches to
conflict resolution. In terms of legitimacy the need for both is paramount; if
peace is to last it must have the confidence of the people concerned. Policies
therefore must pursue peace and justice.
Questions remain about the role of the Ugandan government and its commitment
to peace and assisting the Acholi population. Museveni’s recent statement
on successful government refers to former ‘insecure’ areas such as ‘Northern
Uganda [are] now peaceful and people can engage in productive enterprise’
(2011). While it is true that ‘relative calm continued to prevail in northern Uganda’
in 2010, the LRA continued killings and abductions across CAR, southern
Sudan and northern DRC (Human Rights Watch 2011 p190). The site of conflict
has moved but the LRA’s capacity to attack civilians is undiminished and Kony
et al remain un-apprehended.
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UN Resolutions 1325
and 1820: Conceptions of
Gender in Post Conflict
States.
Yvonne Entenmann
Final Year in International Relations
Yvonne’s essay compares UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (SC RES
1325) and 1820 (SC RES 1820) and its impact on women during and
after armed conflict. Both resolutions are considered a benchmark and
stand for a change to the perception of women and their role in armed conflict
by the international community. Whereas SC RES 1325 seeks to empower
women through its three pillars: protection, participation and prevention, SC
RES 1820 solely focuses on sexual violence committed against women and girls
during armed conflict. Thus, SC RES 1820 is considered by some scholars as
annihilating the achievement of SC RES 1325 as women are again identified as
victims of armed conflict, and not as active actors. The essay concludes that the
empowerment and the active participation of women is as, if not more, important
than the sole protection of them, during and after armed conflict.
introduction
Over the past decades the international community has acknowledge the need
of taking gender into consideration when discussing war, peace and securi-
120 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

ty. From the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) to the Beijing Platform of Action (BPFA), the international
community acknowledged women’s rights, but also the impact of armed
conflict on women and girls. The horrific experiences of women and girls during
the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda raised international
concern and intensified the necessity to act, but it also showed that women as
affected civilians need to be included during peace negotiations and conflict
resolution (IANWGE).
Eventually, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (SC RES 1325). The
main goal of this resolution is the participation and protection of women during
and after armed conflict, but also the prevention of further outbreak of violence.
As the Swedish diplomat Pierre Schori argued, war is one of the most
gendered activities in which women and girls face the highest risks, but are
rarely involved in the peace process itself, therefore these constructed roles
need to be deconstructed (cited in Black, 2009, p. 8). As the paper will argue
in the first part, SC RES 1325 was adopted to empower women, to ensure their
participation during peace negotiating and that their rights are respected during
and after conflict. Most importantly, this resolution “goes beyond the historical
perspectives of women as victims” and seeks to involve women based on
their different experiences during war (ibid.).
Security Council Resolution 1820 (SC RES 1820) was adopted in June 2008, as
the international community saw the further need to protect women and girls
from sexual violence during armed conflict (OHCHR, 2011). In the second part,
the paper will analyse why this resolution is controversial. Some scholars argue
that it may dilute previous SC RES 1325 and be a setback for the empowerment
of women (Barrow, 2010, p. 234). It may be that it is the earlier resolution that
may provide for a better legal protection for affected women (ibid.), while also
condemning sexual violence in all forms, thus widening the scope of international
humanitarian law.
Both resolutions provide a guideline for states involved in peacekeeping operations
(PKO), but also for warring parties. These impacts will be examined in
the final part of the paper, and whether the international community has done
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enough to fully implement these resolutions.
Security Resolution 1325: Empowering women?
As briefly outlined above, SC RES 1325 was adopted to acknowledge the impact
war has on women, to guarantee their protection, but also to involve women in
conflict resolution. Further, with the adoption of this resolution the UN and its
member states acknowledged the importance of gender equality for achieving
global peace and development (IANWGE, op. cit.). The resolution is divided
into three main pillars, which Bunch categorizes as the following: Participation
of women on the formal and informal decision-making; the inclusion of gender
perspectives to prevent and moderate the severity of conflicts on women; and
the protection of women from all forms of violence at the time of conflict and
after (cited in Black, op. cit., p. 1).
Following this analyses and the acknowledgement of the UN of the importance
of gender equality, SC RES 1325 does empower women, but also acknowledges
the need of special protection. Women and girls suffer the most from the consequences
of war; they are also the main survivors. However, men are disproportionately
represented on the decision-making level (Carey, 2001, p. 50). SC
RES 1325 has the base to challenge patriarchal structures that regard women
as passive victims of war as the resolution focuses on participation, protection
and prevention (Black, op. cit., p. 3).
Indeed, these three pillars are needed during and after conflict as the report by
the Independent Expert Assessment, mandated by UNIFEM, has shown. The
report shows that women and girls not only deal with the imminent danger for
their own lives during war, but also with laws and policies that are discriminating
based on gender. Women and girls face difficulties when they became the
sole household-head, have no access to landowning rights, their resettlement
as internally displaced people (IDP), continuous sexual and domestic violence,
and more. SC RES 1325 seeks to address these issues and to improve domestic
and international policies regarding women and conflict (Rehn and Johnson
Sirleaf, 2002, p. 3).
122 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

Another crucial point for the adoption of SC RES 1325 was the assumption that
women are the caretakers of communities and sacrifice much more than men to
reduce sufferance within their close environment (Black, op. cit., p. 7).
Nonetheless, women also engage actively in armed conflict, and may not be
interested in peace or the protection of people within or outside of their community.
In this regard SC RES 1325 may fail to acknowledge that women can be
active combatants or commanders of war. One example is the case of Prosecutor
v. Nyiramasuhuko during the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda
(ICTR), where the former Minister of Women and Family Affairs was charged
for crimes against humanity for inciting, encouraging, ordering and instigating
rape crimes (Askin, 2003, p. 513).
However, the resolution does acknowledge the importance of including women
in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) measures. Article
13 deals with female combatants, and calls upon its members to support women
and men and their dependants during disarmament measures:
„Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of
female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs
of their dependants (SC RES 1325, 2000)“
To conclude, SC RES 1325 certainly empowers women and emphasises the importance
of including women on all levels of decision-making during and after
conflict, but it also does not neglect the special protection civilian women and
girls need during armed conflict. It also provides a good base for gender mainstreaming
within the UN and its peacekeeping operations (PKO), but as a latter
chapter will show, there is still much to be done to fully implement SC RES
1325.
Security Resolution 1820: Victimizing women?
As much as SC RES 1325 can be regarded as empowering women and acknowledging
their active role in war and peace, SC RES 1820 may be a step back-
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wards for this empowerment and dilute SC RES 1325 (Barrow, op. cit., p. 234).
Indeed, sexual and gender based violence remains a serious issue in conflict
and post-conflict countries, which must be strongly addressed by the international
community. The UN and its member states sought to address the continuous
use of rape as a weapon of war through this resolution and to show
that any forms of sexual violence are a crime against humanity. Further, the
resolution should clarify the link between the use of rape as a weapon of war
and its disastrous effects on communities (OHCHR, op. cit.). On a wider perspective,
the use of sexual violence threatens peace, security and stability of a
state. Therefore, it is important to raise awareness of the use of sexual violence
and to condemn it vigorously in order to guarantee international peace (ibid.).
In addition to SC RES 1325 are calls upon states to train their military staff that
all forms of sexual violence are prohibited by international humanitarian law
and that a breach can lead to serious consequences (Henckaerts, 2008).
The resolution is also a result of the changed perception of war and conflict.
Whereas before war, peace and security was rather seen as affecting the state
as a unit, the end of the Cold War and the rise of intra-state conflicts made security
a more individualized issue (Willett, 2010, p. 146). As women and children
are more affected by this ‘new’ kind of conflict, some scholars argue that they
are the new frontlines and therefore, special protection is necessary and according
to international norms (Anderson, cited in Willet, ibid.).
Considering the above, the UN SC 1820 has the positive effect of taking armed
parties involved in conflict into responsibility to protect women and girls from
all kinds of sexual violence. Further, rape is no longer considered as a by-product
of war, but as a serious crime against humanity (OHCHR, op. cit.). Through
the acknowledgement of the sufferings women and girls face through the use
of sexual violence in conflict, one could argue that women and girls are more
respected and their importance for the international community is confirmed.
Despite its positive impact SC RES 1820 may also have negative impacts for
women and girls. When comparing with SC RES 1325, this resolution re-categorizes
women and girls as victims of war, but not as active participants or op-
124 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

ponents of armed conflict. With the focus on sexual violence during and after
conflict, the impact of war and conflict may be only regarded in form of sexual
violence, but not issues women and girls face, such as land-owning rights, internal
displacement or women or girl-headed households (Rehn and Sirfeaf, op.
cit.). These issues can cause immense grievances for women and girls, especially
in patriarchal societies where women’s rights are not considered important.
UNSCR 1325 addresses these issues, as it seeks to empower women generally,
but SC RES 1820 does only consider the consequences of sexual violence but
not the wider cultural and traditional circumstances.
Another critical analysis is that sexual violence on men and boys is not considered
or explicit named in this resolution, which in turn emphasizes the male
role in war as the predator, and women as victims. Willett also criticises that
the UN itself is a highly masculine and militarized organisation that seeks to
maintain the masculine-dominated notion of security that sees the male as the
protector/ warrior/ policymaker and the female as the subordinate and passive
victim (op. cit., p. 145). As SC RES 1325 was adopted before 1820 and has yet
to be truly enforced by the international community, SC RES 1820 seems a setback
for the empowerment of women (Barrow, op. cit., p. 232).
How effective can these resolutions be in post-conflict states?
With the adoption of SC RES 1325 the international community acknowledged
the importance of women’s involvement in the reconstruction of post-conflict
states. Further, it started to mainstream women’s experience of war and armed
conflict, thus PKO should include women’s input and use them as a base for
policy-making (Barrow, op. cit., p. 229). In some examples the implementation
of SC RES 1325 has sparked hope for women as the resolution gives their grass
root organisations legitimacy and hope to have an impact on the peace process
in their countries (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, op. cit., p. 3). Indeed, in some
countries SC RES 1325 has helped to improve the involvement of women in
the political decision-making process, such as Liberia. Despite the low numbers
of women in the national security forces the government has implemented
several policies to protect women from sexual and gender based violence and
discrimination based on gender (Stubblefield, 2010, p. 2-3). Further, the Li-
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erian government has also addressed issues such as land-owning rights and
the lack of education, providing free and obligatory primary school education
(ibid.). Hence, the idea of empowerment through SC RES 1325 has had some
impact on policies of post-conflict states and should increase the empowerment
of women on national and international levels. The guide of action should be to
further involve women in peace-keeping and conflict resolution, with further
active involvement in the political decision-making of the post-conflict state. It
is important to note that also laws and policies need to be addressed that discriminate
women, but within the culture of a state (Black, op. cit., p. 9)
Nonetheless, as already mentioned earlier, it seems as if the empowerment of
women during and after conflict is not necessarily deemed important for UN
member states. Many have failed to implement national policies that empower
women, whereas policies that define women as victims were adopted (Black,
ibid., p. 20).
Additionally to Willett’s analyses that the UN is a highly masculine and militarized
hierarchy one can argue that for the member states and the UN it is easier
to continue to see women as victims in the need of male protection, instead of
acknowledging that women are activists.
The SC RES 1820 can be supportive of this claim, because it solely focuses on
the sexual violence that women and girls experience during armed conflict. As
outlined above, women and girls are in the need of special protection as they
are more likely to suffer from war. On the other side, if women are empowered,
they may be less in the need of special protection as norms and values within
societies change and women are more likely to be respected as equal.
Nonetheless, SC RES 1820 is a major benchmark in the international system
and it should help women to seek justice for the crimes that have happened to
them and end impunity for sexual violence; however, empowerment and female
personnel is important for women to speak about their experiences (Willett,
op. cit., p. 154).
Hence, the implementation of both resolutions is crucial for a serious commit-
126 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

ment of gender-mainstreaming, protection, participation and prevention of
women and girls during and after conflict.
Conclusion
Both SC RES 1325 and SC RES 1820 were called landmark resolutions by the
UN and its member states upon their adoption. As the above analysis has shown,
they are indeed crucial on dealing with conflicts and the effect on women and
girls, but from a different perspective.
SC RES 1325 is a very significant resolution, as it is the first that acknowledges
the different impact war has on women, girls and men. It uses this knowledge
and seeks to empower women through its three main pillars participation, protection
and prevention. All three pillars are crucial; however the call upon UN
member states to include women on all levels in the peace process and conflict
resolution is significant, as the area of security is traditionally associated with
men as Willett has shown. Empowerment of women in conflict resolution could
also help them to change domestic policies that discriminate them based on
their gender and change how gender is perceived in society.
Nonetheless, the stigmatization of women and girls as victims may be re-enforced
through SC RES 1820. The resolution also excludes men and boys as
victims of sexual violence.
This is not to say that sexual violence as a weapon of war is not a serious issue.
Indeed, the use of rape in conflict regions is used to harm women and their
communities, thus destabilizing social structures. One must also not forget the
personal sufferings of the victims and the need to ensure justice.
To conclude, empowerment is as crucial to stop sexual violence as is the protection
of it and the prosecution. Unfortunately, the international community
seems to focus more on the protection of sexual crimes as of the empowerment
of women.
Bibliography
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• Askin, K. D. 2003. The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice. Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law [Online]. Vol. 41(), pp. 509-521. Available from: http://heinonline.org.remote.library.
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• Barrow, A. 2010. UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in
armed conflict and international and humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross
[Online]. Vol. 92(877), pp. 221-234. Available from: http://journals.cambridge.org.remote.
library.dcu.ie/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7808792&fulltextType=RA&fileId
=S1816383110000081 [Accessed on 26/12/2010].
• Black, R. 2009. Mainstreaming Resolution 1325? Evaluating the Impact on Security Council
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[Accessed on 23/01/2011]
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[Accessed 04/01/2010]
• IANWGE: Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality. Available from: http://
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• Stubblefield, R. 2010. Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Liberia [Online].
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128 Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Studies

International Political
Economy

Are the growing criticisms
of the International
Monetary Fund justified?
Beryl Bömer
First year BA International Relations
Nowadays the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is mainly known for
facilitating long-term loans connected with structural adjustment programs,
to help develop sustainable and stable economies. The effects
these loans have had on some countries have led to heavy criticism. This essay
presents the criticism of the IMF and offers reasonable examples and explanations
to show that the criticism is justified. The criticism of the IMF is directed
at three different areas. IMF governance and unequal representation from
within, the effects of loans and how they are seen in isolation of economic recovery
and the mismatch of aims and effectiveness. One can conclude that the
criticism is not only justified but necessary for further development of the IMF.
introduction
In July 1944 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called into existence
for the purpose of monitoring member states’ exchange rates and offer financial
assistance on request (Vreeland 2007, p.5). Nearly 53 years later to the day,
in July 1997, the Thai baht collapsed, sparking off the Asian economic crisis.
Within a short period of time the crisis spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, South
130 International Political Economy

Korea and the Philippines affecting further countries. By 1998 unemployment
rates in these countries had sky-rocketed and the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) had fallen by 6.7 percent in South Korea, 10.8 percent in Thailand and
13.1 percent in Indonesia. Despite the IMF solemnly existing for the purposes
of preventing and handling exchange rate crises, its procedures in the context
of the Asian economic crisis are seen as highly controversial. Consultations in
the run-up appeared to stimulate the crisis while conditionality for the bail-out
rather impeded recovery (Stieglitz 2002, pp.89-104). Economic exacerbations
as well as socioeconomic and environmental problems as a result of IMF programs
have led to increased criticism of the IMF. This essay will briefly illustrate
the history and purpose of the IMF. It will then move forward to elaborate
the denunciation of the IMF and its programs, providing evidence to justify the
criticism as prior to presenting a summarized analysis of why increased criticism
of the IMF is justified.
IMF, its history and its development
After a devastating period of two world wars and the Great Depression in the
first half of the 20 th century, a group of countries found it necessary to find a
way to widely promote economic growth. By 1945, 29 of these countries had
ratified the “Bretton Woods Agreement” of which the IMF was originally part.
The task of the IMF was to monitor exchange rates and balance-of-payments
(BOP) and facilitate loans to countries. These loans should enable countries
to maintain a fixed exchange rate and slowly implement austerity measures to
reduce the current account deficit. From the very start though, the IMF lacked
resources to finance its agenda as well as authority, mainly due to U.S. politics.
This together with the depreciation of the US dollar eventually led to the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System (Vreeland 2007, pp.5-9). By 1974 the
“adjustable pegged exchange rates of the industrialised world were abandoned
forever [and with it] the original raison d’être of the IMF” (ibid p.9).
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System the IMF shifted towards
assisting developing countries and with this its scope shifted too. Firstly, the
reason for the participation of members and secondly the type of assistance
the IMF has engaged in have changed. Studies have shown that some countries
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participate in IMF programs simply to send out signals to foreign investors.
Another reason for participation is political. Countries sometimes participate
in programs to have an excuse for pushing through austerity measures, blaming
their actions on IMF conditionality (ibid, pp.62-67). Secondly the type of
loans the IMF gives out has changed. The lending facilities of the IMF have
become more and more similar to those of the World Bank, with some programs
lasting up to 4 years. In the 1980s the IMF introduced the Structural
Adjustment Facility (SAF) as well as Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) now called Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). These loans
target developing and poor countries and aim to change the structure of domestic
economies to avoid a repetition of economic crises in these countries (ibid,
p.31). Generally IMF policy is associated with neoliberalism. A concept promoting
free-trade, privatization and deregulation in the belief that it will promote
economic growth and therewith improve the welfare of the nation. The policies
have also evoked profuse criticism.
Criticism of the IMF
The IMF has repeatedly been criticised for several aspects, with some of the
criticism being successfully considered. Some of the criticism is directed at
IMF governance. The main criticism of the IMF is due to the conditionality of
its loans and their macroeconomic, socioeconomic and environmental effects
especially on developing countries. Additional criticism is directed at the effectiveness
of IMF programs.
imf governance
The prevailing aspect the IMF has been criticised for in the context of governance
is its distribution of ownership. At date the IMF consist of 187 members.
The voting power of each member state is given to it in accordance to its
quota, the amount of its own currency each state provides to the IMF to give
out in loans. The six states with the highest voting share in declining order
are USA, Japan, Germany France, UK and China. While the USA is the only
member with enough votes for a veto, altogether these countries account to
roughly 41% of the vote share (IMF 2011). Studies have shown though, that 40%
132 International Political Economy

of the vote share amounts to about 60% of effective voting power, which leaves
these five countries with the majority of the voting power (Vreeland 2007, p.17).
Furthermore, scholars suggest the IMF is used as a political tool by its biggest
shareholders, eminently the USA. This is primarily shown in countries being
favoured when they support USA’s UN votes.
Financial institutions are also found to have some influence on IMF policies
since they are often needed to provide additional loans (Vreeland 2007, p.37-
49). All this leads to the perception that even though the IMF mainly lends to
developing countries, the latter have the smallest input. Many have called for
reform in this relation. What might speak against this is the possibility that a
more even distribution of ownership might lead to an increased autonomy of
the IMF itself. This could be a drawback in itself as it decreases the representation
of any interest group (ibid, pp.114-120). Nevertheless, it should be realized
that development in any sphere, including the economic one, is always best
achieved with the participation of the concerned.
Macroeconomic/socioeconomic/environmental effects of IMF
programs
Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF that every
member state signs goes as follows:
To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance
of high levels of employment and real income and to the development
of the productive resources of all members as primary
objectives of economic policy [emphasis added] (IMF).
As the article states, one of the IMF’s objectives is to promote or at least maintain
employment rates as well as real income and encourage an even growth,
which means encourage equality within a country and balanced growth among
countries. Contrary to this, several studies have proven that IMF programs
have opposite effects on participating countries (Vreeland 2007, pp.91-94). One
reason, as Sarah Babb (2005) established is that while many developing coun-
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tries adopt a capitalist economic model, they often fail to establish social and
welfare institutions (due to neoliberal policies). In addition Babb mentions the
“lower race to the bottom”, where developing countries are forced to deregulate
labour and environmental standards to compete with each other.
The biggest problems encountered in participating countries are an increase in
unemployment rates, decrease of wages, widening of income gaps, increase of
living costs expansion and deepening of poverty, increases of burdens for children
and women, decrease of education standards, worsening of health care
system as well as preventions of diseases, growing environmental degradation
and the displacement of small-scale business’ (The People vs. Global Capital
1993, pp.144-148). While one might argue the accountability here lies with the
countries governments, these often don’t have a choice, as austerity measures
and fiscal policy are either part of the loan or as mentioned above necessary to
compete. Arguably though, even if it is not the responsibility of the IMF to handle
these issues, it should be taken into consideration, that the general wellbeing
of a nation will have long-term effects on the economy and therefore should
be part of any economic recovery plan.
IMF programs and their effects on the economy:
Leaving out the actual economic effectiveness of IMF programs, one general
observation can be made. Whereas developing countries are advised to adopt
austerity measures in the case of a taking up a loan, this is rarely adopted in developed
country (Vreeland 2007, p.115). Neoliberal economic theory of as little
governmental intervention as possible is not as strictly and strongly applied in
developed countries as it is in developing countries (Babb 2005). Consequently,
one could argue that double-standards seem controversial.
When it actually comes to the effectiveness of the programs, conclusions are
more difficult to make. Despite a great number of studies conducted on the economic
effects of IMF programs, one has to evaluate their results carefully, as
these can vary greatly because of elements as effectiveness versus non-compliance,
outside factors, counterfactual statements, different methodology, objectivity
etc. Taking into account several different studies from varying sources,
134 International Political Economy

some broad conclusions can be made though. Foremost, studies have shown
that participation in IMF programs does help the BOP. Hereby, the IMF does
successfully fulfil its main objective, assuming that it is the loan and the conditionality
that has this effect. Beyond this, effectiveness is rather disputable.
No consensus exists about the effects on budget deficits or inflation (Vreeland
2007, pp.84-94).
When it comes to economic growth, consensus does exist about non-effectiveness,
but whether economic growth falls under IMF responsibility is contended.
Looking at the data, it is questionable why half of all outstanding loans are
owed by ‘prolonged members’ who have repetitively taken up loans, with some
participants having taken up to 30 loans. In addition William Easterly’s finding
show no significant correlation between the numbers of adjustment loans a
country has received and its economic performance (Easterly 2005). Research
conducted by Przeworski and Vreeland has shown that the economic growth
rate of countries is generally lower when they are participating in IMF programs
then if they had not done so. The research also claims to prove that the
economic growth rate of countries succeeding the program tends to stay lower
than if they country had not participated in the program, therefore never compensating
for the loss created through the participation in the first place (Przeworski
& Vreeland 2000).
Finally, a study conducted by N. Jensen in 2004 found that countries taking up
a loan because of an economic crisis have lower levels of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) during the participation, even after the crisis (Jensen, 2004, p.206).
Some scholars argue that the IMF is only responsible for helping the current
account deficit, a role that it fulfils. On the other hand the above mentioned
studies show that IMF programs often do not lead to an overall improvement of
the macroeconomic situation. This after all, is most shocking since it defies the
existence of the IMF as the results of their programs mismatch their objectives
stated in the articles of agreement.
Conclusion
Recent years have shown increased criticism of the IMF. In summary, criti-
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cism is mostly directed at the distribution of voting shares and influence within
the IMF, the horrendous social, environmental and microeconomic effects IMF
programs have had on nations and the poor success of these programs. While
the IMF might simply be trying to retroactively ensure its own existence by
creating continuous needs for loans, these criticisms are very justified, as they
contradict not only IMF objectives. Unequal distribution has to be recognised
as a factor of unequal presentation of interests. The lack of economic success
of IMF programs should be corrected accordingly to the IMF’s objective stated
in the articles of agreement. In addition, it is important that the IMF adopts a
more interdisciplinary approach towards its policies as macroeconomic, socioeconomic
and environmental effects cannot be seen in isolation from sustainable
economic recovery. In conclusion, while the IMF might have already taken
up considerations for reform, it stays an ongoing process with the above criticism
not only justified, but crucial for further improvement of the fund and its
lending facilities.
references
• Babb, S. (2005). The Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and
Current Debates. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol.31 pp.199-222.
• Easterly, W. (2005).What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and
growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans. Journal of Development Economics.
Vol.76 pp.1-21.
• IMFArticles of Agreement [Online]. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.html [accessed
2nd April, 2011].
• IMF (2011). IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power [Online]. www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/memdir/eds.aspx [accessed 12th July 2011].
• Jensen, N.M. (2004). Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary
Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows. The Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Vol.48 (2) pp.194-210.
• Przeworski, A. & Vreeland, J.R. (2000) The effect of IMF programs on economic growth. Journal
of Development Economics. Vol.62 pp.385-421.
• Stiglitz, J.E. (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Penguin Press.
• The People vs. Global Capital, (1994).Report of the International People’s Tribunal to judge the
G7, Tokyo, 1993. Hong Kong: Arena.
• van Houtven, L. (2002). Governance of the IMF: Decision Making, Institutional Oversight,
Transparency, and Accountability. Washington: International Monetary Fund, Publication
Services.
• Vreeland, J.R. (2007). The International Monetary Fund, Politics of conditional lending.
Abingdon: Routledge.
136 International Political Economy

Capital Flows & Financial
Crisis
michaël mégrelis
MA in International Relations
In this essay, Michaël looks, contrasts and assesses three models which attempt
to gauge the likeliness of currency crises from a politico-economic
perspective by looking at the causal linkage between institutions, expectations
and crises. These are then contrasted in order to assess their validity. He
finds that these models, by limiting themselves to partisanship, the dispersal or
concentration of decision-making and veto, as well as focal points for transparent
information or policy flexibility, only paint a partial picture. Market participants,
the author argues, are also swayed by crucial factors such as systemic
risk, credibility, the (un)sustainability of a currency peg or lobbying by various
groups.
Introduction:
In light of the spectacular currency crises the world has witnessed over the past
20 years - Mexico in 1994, South Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Argentina
between 1999 and 2002 - understanding which factors influences the likeliness
of currency crises is crucial. Whilst economists focus on the macroeconomic
causes, political scientists have been attempting to incorporate a political perspective
with the aim of explaining and forecasting such crises. This essay will
look at three models which attempt to solve this conundrum by examining the
causal linkage between institutions, expectations, and crises. These will then
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e contrasted in order to assess their validity.
leblang and bernhard
Our first model was designed by David Leblang and William Bernhard in the
essay entitled: “The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies”
(2000). Looking at industrial democracies, the authors attempt to establish a
relationship between cabinet duration, partisanship and exchange-rate expectation.
Market actors, they contend, form and constantly review their expectations
as regards a government’s commitment to maintaining a stable exchange
rate. Consequently, these market participants use information about political
processes and shape opinions on the timing of political developments such as
elections or cabinet change and the political convictions of the different players
in order to assess the risk of policy change (p 292-3).
Sets of political convictions are categorised as Left and Right with the Left perceived
to be more dovish when it comes to a commitment to exchange right
stability. Hence the risk of market actors launching a speculative attack on a
currency is more likely when a snap election or a cabinet collapse occurs and
when a new government of leftist convictions takes office (p 295). In multiparty
systems, they note, confusion is even greater as coalition members can have diverging
sets of priorities. Furthermore, an incumbent cabinet is more likely to
be less concerned about exchange rate than short term political gain (p 296-7).
Hence, the author hypothesises that the risk of a speculative attack increases
with the probability of a cabinet ending. If this dissolution is expected, the risk
is lower than if it is not, and expectations of a leftward shift will increase the
risk of an attack (p 297-8).
This model incorporates coalition bargaining, cabinet duration and partisanship
and finds evidence that they impact on the risk of attacks on the currency
which entails that market agents do look at the institutional set-up (p 321).
Whilst this model rightly highlights how market agents form opinions about
the propensity of governments to sacrifice long-term exchange rate stability for
short-term political gains, especially prior to elections, it does not explain how
partisanship impacts investors’ expectations. Moreover, it only mentions the
138 International Political Economy

‘Left’ and ‘leftward’ as leading to increased perceived risk for the market. There
seems to be a hazy, pre-supposed causality between leftwing partisanship and
dovish exchange-rate policy. Whether or not this is true (Lula da Silva’s Brazil
pursued a hawkish policy on inflation and, hence, exchange rates whilst pursuing
left-of-centre policies), this causal mechanism needs to be articulated. It
also, as noted by the authors (p 321), remains silent on the process by which economic
agents incorporate this information. Furthermore, as this model solely
looks at industrial and, hence, electoral democracies, it is fails to be universal.
macintyre
By contrast, the model developed by Andrew MacIntyre in “Institutions and Investors:
The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia.” (2001) attempts
to provide a simple methodology for institutional policy-setting and its impact
on crisis response, regardless of the regime in place. The author looks at the
South Asian economic crisis of 1997, focusing on political institutions to assess
why the investment reversal was greater in some countries than in others.
The answer, for MacIntyre lies in the distribution of veto authority. He attempts
to gauge how, in this case, this distribution shaped the nature of the policy environment
and, in turn, affected investors. He therefore identifies two policy
characteristics directly linked to the institutional framework of government,
rigidity and volatility. These sit at opposite ends of a spectrum (p 81). In the
case of policy rigidity, governments have extreme difficulty making policy adjustments
to respond to exogenous factors, whilst under policy volatility, they
dither uncontrollably from one position to another. Either of these extremes,
according to the author, is perceived as highly undesirable by market agents
(p 86-7). MacIntyre then argues that the more diffused the veto authority, the
greater the risk of rigidity and, conversely, the more concentrated the veto authority,
the greater the risk of volatility (p 88).
Investors, to him, require a balance: stability and predictability in areas such as
macroeconomic objectives but flexibility in areas where, for example, business
is impeded. According to the author, there is an optimal level on the spectrum
where investors are exposed to a minimal amount of risk in a U-shaped curve
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scenario (p 88-9). Lastly, MacIntyre observes that a model may look at how this
applies to an authoritarian or a democratic regime (p 118).
Whilst not purporting to cover all factors which make some governments less
likely to be impacted than others by the severity of crises (p 117), this model has
the great merit of remaining an extremely simple and universal way to understand
how the institutional framework impacts investors.
leblang and satyanath
This gets picked up by David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath in “Institutions,
Expectations, and Currency Crises.” (2006), who build up on Leblang and Bernhard’s
and MacIntyre’s previous models. Here, the authors focus on how the
institutional structure impacts market agents’ perceptions highlighting how
they incorporate information (p 246). This model, therefore, puts the onus on
the latter’s decision making. This decision-making process is based, mostly, on
their understanding of economic fundamentals as well as their perception of
others’ interpretation of these (p 248).
This entails that if reliable information is scarce or unreliable (as is often the
case with developing countries) there is an increased propensity for crisis to
occur, even if the fundamentals are sound. A focal point for the dispersal of
reliable data to market participants, in turn, lowers this risk. Whether or not
such a focal point is present depends on political conditions, for instance, a
newly elected government may take time to establish credibility in its forecasts
(p 248-9). Here, the authors entertain the idea that investors may find information
emanating from democracies more readily available and reliable than that
emanating from authoritarian regimes, because of the latter’s characteristic
openness and its separation of powers (p 249).
This, however, becomes mitigated where, in democracies, policy-making involves
a variety of actors, depriving investors of a focal point. At the same time,
authoritarian regimes, whilst lacking transparency, do have central decisionmaking
and if the policy direction is readily communicated, this makes for
decreased uncertainty for investors (p 250). This model therefore resembles
140 International Political Economy

MacIntyre’s in that instead of diffusion/concentration of veto, it puts forward
diffusion/concentration of decision-making and informational focal points. It
implies, according to the authors, that countries with divided government and
those that have experienced recent turnover in government have an exceptional
need for producing transparent forecasts (they prescribe using independent
bureaucracies subject to intense public scrutiny) (p 260). This model develops
strongly the causality between institutions, investors and crises. It also incorporates
good policy prescriptions but, along with the previous two models, it
misses out on several factors.
The need for a more comprehensive approach
Whilst these three models build on each other to give us a good understanding
of the causal link between institutions, the expectations of market agents and
crises, they tend to ignore several factors which, to this reviewer, form part of
the picture. One such overlooked risk impacting on investors is systemic risk.
In fact, it seems that looking at country specific institutional frameworks risks
leaving out the regional and international settings in which currency crises are
likely to occur. As pointed out by Lawrence and Frieden (2001, p 334), the run
on the Mexican peso in 1994 impacted on other Latin American economies,
leading to distrust of these from investors. Equally, the 1997 South Asian Crisis
started in Thailand and spread to the rest of the region due to financial contagion.
In fact, in the days of so-called ‘globalisation’ and the internationalisation
of finance, solely looking at institutional setups seems to be missing the bigger
picture by a long shot.
The concept of credibility is also sparsely mentioned yet it is of crucial relevance
and should take centre stage. A government may sacrifice a commitment
to a stable exchange rate to short-term political gains, for instance, holding its
currency artificially high before an election to boost its electors’ buying power,
incurring a more drastic adjustment thereafter. Again the attack against the
Mexican peso in 1994 is a textbook example of such a situation leading to a
protracted crisis (Lawrence and Frieden, 2001, p 334). Credibility is slow to establish
but erodes extremely quickly and market participants use an historical
perspective to form their expectations, in short a government or nation which
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has failed to hold its exchange rate in the past is perceived to be more likely
to do so in the future. A better model should centre on credibility, can it be
measured? Which institutional factors contribute to its establishment? How do
you weigh history or the name of a country and the perception that goes with
it i.e. what is the perception towards Argentina Plc?This credibility issue is the
reason so many nations have, over the past twenty or so years, opted to delegate
monetary policy to politically independent central banks.
What these models also fail to take into account is that most currency crises
occur where a nation has pegged its exchange rate to another currency, often
the US Dollar and, the reason for this is to import credibility as regards future
macroeconomic stability. Unfortunately, the pairing often is incompatible
or the government not committing (enacting the policies necessary to sustain
the peg) to the exchange rate system and the currency ends up being over- or
undervalued, which, in the long run is unsustainable (Lawrence and Frieden,
2001, p 323-4). This applies to the 1994 Mexican crisis as well as in South Asia
in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Argentina between 1999 and 2002.
Further models could, lastly, expand from a sole look at institutions to incorporate
the relative weight of lobby groups, for instance, the relative weight of
the tradable goods over that of the non-tradable goods sector in a particular
economy and its influence on exchange rate policy. This is assuming that the
former prefers flexible exchange rates to stay competitive on international markets.
Equally, trade unions tend to favour a more dovish exchange rate policy
and an efficient model should attempt to quantify their clout over institutions
and policy setting (Lawrence and Frieden, 2001, p 321 & 325). Societal and
lobby groups are what sustains regimes and political parties, ignoring their influence
on macroeconomic policy can only lead to a partial understanding of
the dynamics at play.
Conclusion:
Whilst political institutions help us explain currency crises it is doubtful that
they paint anything that resembles the full picture. Whilst understanding partisanship,
the dispersal or concentration of decision-making and veto, as well
142 International Political Economy

as focal points for transparent information or policy flexibility, surely shape
the views of market participants, several other factors do too. The risk of a systemic
crisis, the lack of a credible commitment to macroeconomic stability, an
unsustainable imbalance within a currency peg or the influence of lobby groups
championing flexibility on a nation’s policy choices are all crucial elements
which influence market agents’ perceptions of risk. When that risk is perceived
to overwhelm potential returns, these agents get out of their long or enter short
positions and a currency crisis occurs. Further research could seek to incorporate
all these factors into a model which develops on the institutions-centric
models developed by Leblang, Bernhard, MacIntyre and Satyanath.
Lastly, one may actually ponder as whether or not, in the age of algorithmic
trading, market agents have developed trading systems which measure, weigh
and take into account the different political variables, along with the macroeconomic
ones, in order to trade currencies. Whether or not they forecast or simply
accelerate crises is another question.
references
• Broz, J. L. & Frieden J. A., (2001) The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations.
Annual Review of Political Science, 4, p 317-43.
• Leblang, D. & Bernhard W., (2000) The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies.
International Organization, 54(2), p 291-324.
• Leblang, D, & Satyanath S. (2006) Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises.” International
Organization, 60(1), p 245–62.
• MacIntyre, A. (2001). Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast
Asia. International Organization, 55(1), p 81-122.
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144 International Political Economy

Political Leadership

French Foreign Policy from
Mitterrand to Sarkozy
146 Political Leadership
laura Grealish
Final Year BA International Relations
This essay argues that, since 1981, French foreign policy has displayed
a remarkable level of continuity despite it being the domaine reserve
of three ideologically diverse presidents. While Presidents Mitterrand,
Chirac and Sarkozy have appeared to pursue different approaches to relations
with Africa, the Middle East, the United States and the European Union, an
overriding theme has been their continued attempts to preserve the grandeur
of France. Grandeur, the Gaullist narrative of an idealised French importance
in the world, is pervasive in the political and national psyche, and has informed
the cultivation a distinctly French brand of realism in reaction to an evolving
global order in which the Fifth Republic’s status as an influential global power
is at risk.
introduction
A Continuity of Grandeur
A notable feature of French foreign policy since 1981 is the continuity that
has been exercised in this policy domain by Presidents François Mitterrand,
Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. Although each of these leaders has placed
his own distinctive signature on this presidential domaine résérve of French

politics, the Gaullist concept of grandeur has remained a constant presence
in the international relations of the Fifth Republic. The notion of grandeur,
a perception of an exceptionalist French greatness, was instilled by President
Charles de Gaulle as a response to the demise of France’s colonial empire and
its continued pursuit may be understood as a fervent desire to remain an influential
global power in a changing world (Cerny, 1980: 270). Traditionally,
it has been manifested through France’s post-colonial relationships with Africa
and the Middle East, an independent stance toward the United States and
a sometimes difficult approach to European integration. Although the three
presidents of the post 1981 era may be observed to have initiated some changes
in these issue areas, with Sarkozy providing a notable example, it may be argued
that such changes have been affected in the interests of grandeur. For
example, Sarkozy’s perceived Atlanticism may be construed as an attempt to
increase French influence on the United States, while France’s uneven, yet ultimately
supportive, stance on the European Union suggests that she views that
project as a vehicle for her ambitions as a world power. In order to demonstrate
this further, this paper shall analyse these matters, focussing upon continuity
and change in the four aforementioned issue areas. As grandeur emerged in
the wake of the humiliating Algerian war, it is appropriate that Franco-African
relations are examined first. French relations with the Arab world shall then be
assessed, due to both the postcolonial relationships there and the implications
of an essentially pro-Arab policy for her relationship with the United States,
the third focus of analysis here. Finally, France’s attitude toward the European
Union shall be explored.
the african Pré Carré
The prospect of losing her African colonies was so traumatic for France that
it was a key factor in the collapse of the Fourth Republic. It is therefore unsurprising
that de Gaulle’s grandeur became ingrained in the French imagination,
alongside notions of françafrique and pré carré, concepts that emphasise
an exclusive political, economic and cultural influence in her former colonial
domain, or her “backyard” (Chafer, 2002: 346). From this perspective, independent
francophone Africa may be regarded as a natural twin of the Fifth
Republic, for these entities were born of the same circumstances and their fates
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are thus inextricably interconnected. On a more tangible level, France’s ‘special
relationship’ with Africa has traditionally assured reliable access to raw materials
such as the minerals that are essential for her high-technology industries,
while also providing market opportunities for French manufactured goods and
outlets for capital investment (Martin, 1995: 9).
Such factors have proven potent enough to transcend political ideology, as is
evident in the African policies of the Fifth Republic’s first Socialist president,
François Mitterrand. The election of Mitterrand in 1981 was greeted with optimism
in France’s former African colonies, as he appeared to proffer a refreshing
change in the wake of his predecessor, Valerie Giscard D’Estaing’s sordid relationships
with African despots (Whiteman, 1983: 329). However, despite early
idealistic rhetoric espousing a change of direction in policy, the philosophical
and realist constraints of Franco-African relations rapidly took priority (1983:
341). For France, her jealously guarded close ties with francophone Africa ensured
a prominent role on the world stage, particularly in the context of the
Cold War, and she essentially acted as a gendarme, protecting both her own
interests, and those of the West against Soviet influence in the region (Martin,
1995: 8). In order to protect such interests, a key tool of France’s African policy
has been the provision of aid, particularly in the form of military and technical
assistance to often questionable, yet friendly regimes (Cumming, 2000: 361). In
1990, buoyed by the triumph of democracy in Europe, Mitterrand used the La
Baule Franco-African Summit to outline a new approach tying aid to democratisation
(Chafer, 2002: 359). However, although the demise of the Soviet Union
removed the need to support pro-Western autocrats in Africa, the primacy of
françafrique overshadowed this apparent change of approach. For example,
Mitterrand’s administration continued to provide aid to authoritarian regimes
in Cameroon and Togo, while simultaneously reducing assistance to states that
were attempting to democratise such as Mali and Benin (Martin, 1995: 15). Furthermore,
by the end of Mitterrand’s second term in office, France had continuing
military agreements with 23 African states (Gregory, 2000: 438), while
his fourteen year presidency had overseen nine African military interventions
(Martin, 1995: 13), the most notorious being in Rwanda.
148 Political Leadership

From Grandeur to Genocide in Françafrique
Between April and July of 1994, over 800, 000 members of the Tutsi ethnic
group were murdered by their Hutu compatriots in the tiny African state of
Rwanda. The genocide was orchestrated by the extremist regime of President
Juvenal Habyarimana, a close ally of Mitterrand’s, and commenced when the
President’s aeroplane was shot down as he returned to the capital, Kigali, from
peace talks in Tanzania with the Ugandan supported Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF). In 1990, France had deployed troops in the country in order to protect
both her nationals there and the Habyarimana government as the RPF put increasing
pressure on the regime (Utley, 2002: 132). She continued to supply
arms to Rwanda despite, as is alleged (BBC News, 2008), being aware that mass
violence against Tutsis was being planned. Mitterrand was vehemently opposed
to the victory of an encroaching RPF in 1994, and authorised Opération Turquoise,
a ‘humanitarian’ intervention that appears to have consisted mostly of
the evacuation of French citizens and members of the Hutu regime, while also
creating safe havens for Hutus, including those directly involved in the killings
(Utley, 2002: 132).
Although Rwanda was a Belgian colony, France nevertheless considered the
country to be an integral part of françafrique, and it has been suggested that
Mitterrand viewed the Ugandan backed RPF as a direct Anglophone threat to
French influence in the central Africa (Meredith, 2006: 493). Ironically, it was
France’s actions that would lead to the loss of Rwanda from the pré carré, while
also leading to increased debate in France over the future direction of Franco-African
relations. Despite such concerns however, Mitterrand’s successor,
Jacques Chirac, continued to conduct France’s African policy in the traditional
manner, fostering close relationships with various African heads of state to the
extent that he continued to support the kleptocratic Zairian tyrant, President
Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, a position that resulted in French diplomatic isolation
(Chafer, 2005: 16). Realising the impracticalities of such policies, Chirac
and his cohabitant Socialist government began to implement changes in aid
policy while also improving ties with countries that lay outside of the pré carré
(Chafer, 2005: 17). However, as one of the ‘old guard’, Chirac remained attached
to traditional Franco-African relations despite the external and internal pres-
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sures that demanded change (2005: 20). When Nicolas Sarkozy assumed office,
a further break from the African policy of the past was expected (Charbonneau,
2008: 288).However, despite the continued associations with countries outside
of the ‘backyard’ and a thawing of relations with Rwanda, little appears to have
changed as Sarkozy courts friendly regimes, renegotiates defence treaties and
promotes France as an alternative to Chinese involvement in the region.
France and the Middle East: an alternative sphere of influence
Much of France’s African empire encompassed chiefly Islamic countries, while
she also controlled Syria and Lebanon in the Middle East. It is therefore unsurprising
that she is generally considered to be more pro-Arab than some of
her other Western counterparts. As in Africa, a continuity of both idealist and
pragmatic concerns can explain France’s Middle Eastern policies since 1981.
The Middle East, as a centre of geopolitical turmoil, represents an ideal vehicle
for France to assert herself on the global stage, presenting herself as a benign
alternative to American hegemony. On a practical level, France is a major importer
of Middle Eastern oil (Energy Information Administration, 2010), while
the region is also a key importer of French arms (Hepher, 2009).
Regarding Israel, France was a close ally from the country’s founding in 1948
until the Six Day War in 1967 led to a schism with De Gaulle, from whence
France pursued an overtly more Arabist approach. However, in 1982, Mitterrand
became the first President of the Fifth Republic to officially visit Israel,
appearing to signal a thaw in Franco-Israeli relations. The Parti Socialiste had
traditionally supported Israel and Mitterrand enjoyed cordial relations with his
Israeli counterpart, the Labour Party leader, Shimon Peres. Nevertheless, Mitterrand
maintained a sympathetic position towards Palestine and Lebanon, and
the tentative entente was compromised in June of that year when Israel invaded
the latter (Marcus, 1986: 28). Relations were further soured in 1989 when Mitterrand
welcomed the Palestinian Liberation Organisation leader Yasser Arafat,
whom Israel considered a terrorist, on an official trip to Paris (Wood, 1993:
33). Jacques Chirac also enjoyed a close friendship with Arafat and relations
with Israel remained cool during his presidency. Chirac frequently condemned
Israeli actions in the Palestinian Territories while France often opposed UN
150 Political Leadership

esolutions condemning terrorism against the Jewish state. For example, out
of eighteen UN resolutions condemning Israel in 2004, France voted in favour
thirteen times, and abstained on the other five (Guitta, 2005). While such actions
served to strengthen French relations in the Arab world, such discord
with Israel also had the counterproductive effect of isolating France as a prospective
participant in Middle Eastern peace negotiations, a role that Chirac
actively sought (Wood, 1998: 579). In contrast, Nicolas Sarkozy has employed
a more conciliatory tone with Israel, suggesting a distinct departure from established
practice. However, it would appear that Sarkozy is simply employing
a different tactic as opposed to implementing a major policy shift. Indeed, despite
rhetorical differences, French Middle Eastern policies since 1981 remain
essentially consistent.
Like his predecessors, Sarkozy enjoys good relations with numerous Arab leaders,
even forging dialogue in 2008 with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad with whom
Chirac had broken ties (Crumley, 2008), while he is also prepared to criticize
Israeli actions when deemed necessary. It is therefore reasonable to concur
that Sarkozy’s cautious overtures to Israel are intended to achieve what Chirac
could not – an increasingly influential role in the American dominated arena
of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Another noteworthy facet of French policy in the
Middle East concerns France’s relationship with Iraq. France had a history of
allegiance with Saddam Hussein’s regime, and provided weapons and other aid
to the country during the Iran-Iraq War (Styan, 2004: 372). Following Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Mitterrand attempted to avoid the outbreak of an
American led war through diplomatic measures. However, following an Iraqi
assault on the French embassy in Kuwait, France adopted a firmer line against
Iraq and deployed troops to the Gulf (Styan, 2006: 180). Twelve years later, as
the United States again prepared for war in Iraq, President Chirac made a firm
stance against the ensuing conflict. As this episode engendered much debate
concerning a perceived French anti-Americanism, it is appropriate to address
it in the wider context of Franco-US relations.
France and the United States: a “fickle and tempestuous relationship”
Although France is America’s oldest ally, the two countries have “shared a
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fickle and often tempestuous relationship” (Davis, 2003: 14). Anti-American
sentiment has a long history in France (Wall, 2007: 19), yet it is debatable as to
whether this is genuinely translated into contemporary French foreign policy.
One approach to Franco-American relations is to recognise a cleavage between
Nationalism, or Gaullism, and Atlanticism (Vaisse, 2008: 5). The former, as
espoused by De Gaulle, refers to a desire to maintain a strictly autonomous
European foreign policy, while the latter denotes the acceptance of a “subordinate
position within the US-directed world order while seeking, or in return
for, a privileged secondary role.” (Petras and Morley, 2000: 54). As such, neither
should be viewed as a measure of pro or anti American leanings as each
position concerns a view of France’s role in the world. Furthermore, such categorisation
is simplistic, and ignores the complexities of foreign policy decision
making.
Mitterrand is described as being closer to an Atlanticist position, due to his
responses to the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s and the 1991 Gulf War
(Cole, 1994: 138), while also displaying elements of Gaullist nationalism in his
attachment to grandeur (1994: 142). In contrast, Chirac is of the Gaullist tradition,
a position that became increasingly associated with anti-Americanism
when he opposed the 2003 Iraq War. However, France had supported the Bush
administration’s earlier war effort in Afghanistan, while Chirac also bore the
distinction of having been the first world leader to visit the United States after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks that initiated America’s War on Terror (Sopel, 2001).
Although, the two countries had experienced differences in the past, Chirac’s
stance does not appear to have been born of an anti-American ideology. Indeed,
it is argued that he had a higher regard for the United States than his predecessor
(Serfaty, 2008: 61).
Opposition to the Iraqi conflict was influenced by a number of factors, ranging
from a French respect for the authority of the United Nations Security Council
(Styan, 2004: 380) to concern at the impact of the war on relations with the
Middle East (2004: 383). Franco-American rivalry, again to be distinguished
from anti-Americanism, may also be contributory to France’s position as the
French preoccupation with grandeur provides a source of some envy “towards
a nation that has usurped France’s reserved role as a generator of universal
152 Political Leadership

values” (Vedrine, 2004: 119). Nevertheless, from 2004 Chirac worked to foster
improved relations with the US once again (Vaisse, 2008: 7). Nicolas Sarkozy’s
relationship with America is more overtly Atlanticist than that of any of his predecessors.
The United States values him as a close ally, while he has seemingly
stepped away from Gaullist tradition by leading the reintegration of France into
NATO’s integrated military command structure. However, it ought to be noted
that both Mitterrand and Chirac also considered this initiative and that France
has long had a strong presence in NATO, thus rendering the move symbolically
rather than practically significant (Vaisse, 2008: 6). On the Iraq matter,
Sarkozy was also opposed to military intervention, if not to Chirac’s style of diplomacy
(Howorth, 2010: 206), while he does not hesitate to criticise the United
States if he deems it necessary (2010: 210).
The European Union as a vehicle for the pursuit of grandeur
Although the European Union may be regarded as being as relevant to domestic
policy as it is to foreign, it is for this very reason that it provides an interesting
case to consider. The nature of the European project wherein control of certain
policy areas are delegated to a supranational structure may appear to be the
antithesis of a state that seeks to maintain her grandeur. However, France has
been a key architect of the European Union since the project was initiated as
the 1951 Treaty of Paris that established the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). The ECSC was a French initiative, and was intended to unite six
European countries (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands) economically in a common market for coal and steel, and to
achieve a political objective of strengthening Franco-German relations in order
to prevent a return to war (EU, 2005).
Throughout the evolution of the European project, France has both supported
and rejected various integrationist policies, based upon their perceived impacts
on her national self interest. President Mitterrand pursued a strongly pro-integrationist
policy, in part due to his decision in 1983 to abandon leftist economic
policies in order to remain a competitive member of the European Monetary
System. The pursuit of European ideals thus became the ideal cover for his
change of direction (Bell, 2005: 106). However, despite supporting the 1986
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153

accession of Spain and Europe to the European Community and insisting that
France’s future lay with Europe, Mitterrand took a cautious approach to further
EC expansion. He was reluctant to accept both the reunification of Germany
and the potential accession of former Soviet Bloc countries to the EC following
the collapse of communism, a stance that led some Eastern European countries
to accuse him and his counterparts in Western Europe of excluding them “in
order not to risk the rich, privileged situation of the European Community”
(Tiersky, 2003: 189). Such charges were not entirely inaccurate. France was
indeed concerned about the prospect of a strong Germany, and pursued the
Maastricht Treaty in order to effect deeper integration, thus mitigating the German
economic threat (Bell, 2005, 141).
Jacques Chirac’s attempts to promote deeper European integration were stifled
when French voters rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
in an unnecessary 2005 referendum. Nicolas Sarkozy subsequently assisted in
the drafting of the successor to the ill fated Constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon.
After this document was rejected by Irish voters in 2008, Sarkozy played
a proactive role in ensuring Irish ratification in a successful second referendum
(Irish Independent, 2008). Like his predecessors, Sarkozy is strongly integrationist,
although he advocates a deepening rather than a widening of the
European Union as is evident in his opposition to Turkish membership. In the
context of French self interest, the integrationist stance is highly compatible
with the pursuit of grandeur, particularly if it strengthens France’s role as a
leader of a powerful regional bloc. Regarding Turkey, Sarkozy considers her
(unlikely) accession as a threat to European, or namely French, culture. He has
however proposed an alternative Mediterranean Union comprising of Southern
European, North African and Middle Eastern states. Ostensibly a vehicle
to promote peace in the Middle East, the project was met with disapproval by
European leaders who suspected it to be a French attempt to pursue her own
grandeur, and has since being incorporated into an existing EU-Mediterranean
framework (The Economist, 2008).
Conclusion
Although a number of changes have occurred in French foreign policy since
154 Political Leadership

1981, Gaullist ideals remain entrenched in the French polity. Africa remains
important strategically, hence the nurturing of friendlier relations with a number
of states there. France’s Middle Eastern policy has been largely consistent
over the years while the oft changing dynamic between France and the United
States represents a form of consistency in itself, Regarding Europe, France continues
to promote an increasingly integrated system, while also seeking to ensure
that the EU will not evolve at her expense. The various policy changes that
have occurred have been effected in response to a changing world, and France
is aware that in order to maintain continuity in her foreign affairs, and protect
her position in the global order, some minor changes are necessary.
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157

Explaining the Consistent
Popularity of Vladimir
Putin in Russia
158 Political Leadership
Liam Clarke
MA in International Relations
Vladimir Putin enjoys popularity that most other politicians can only
dream of. Yet what makes him so well liked? The first reason given
by this paper is that Putin himself has involuntarily generated adoration
through his background, personality and general aura. The second and
most transparent justification for his popularity is that he has presided over
numerous successful political actions. A third theory argues that Putin’s high
approval ratings have been facilitated by Russia’s unique culture and history.
Furthermore, Liam surmises how Putin’s legacy could be spoiled; however the
latter point is only an aspersion on whether the ‘Putinomania’ will ever end.
introduction
Under the direction of Vladimir Putin’s predecessor Boris Yeltsin, post-Soviet
Russia was a country in notable decline. Humiliated, the Russian people witnessed
their homeland lose its world-leader status; and become an economy
smaller than South Korea, with the average citizen earning less than their Malaysian,
Botswanan and South African counterparts (White and McAllister,
2003: 383). However in the first eight years of Putin’s presidency, Russians

witnessed their living standards double. Russia’s GDP increased by 70% and
the nation jumped from being the world’s twentieth largest economy to the seventh.
Moreover nearly all foreign debts were settled and Russia accumulated
over $400 billion in foreign currency reserves (Rutland, 2008: 1051). Lanin
(2005: 75-77) describes the politician’s popularity as ‘Putinomania’; justifying
his terminology with reference to a culture whereby Putin’s image can be seen
on posters, calendars and even carpets. Most interestingly the Russian leader
has infected his nation’s pop charts: with girl-group ‘Singing Together’ releasing
the song, ‘If only I could find a man like Putin’. Yet how did he achieve such
success?
Putin’s initial rise in the opinion polls and his presidential career
During August of 1999, Putin first came to political fame when he was appointed
acting Prime Minister by Boris Yeltsin, whom announced his intentions to see
Putin become his presidential successor. When Putin became Prime Minister,
his ascent up the political ladder was too quick for the Russian public to know
who he was. Putin ‘was unknown, unrecognised and unloved’ (Felshtinsky and
Pribylarsky, 2008: 103). Yet this soon changed.
On September the 4 th 1999, Chechen rebels detonated a car bomb in proximity
to a military complex’s residential building—killing sixty-four people (Ibid:
105). Putin’s subsequent television appearances introduced the Russian public
to their new straight-talking leader. Referring to Chechen terrorists, Putin
said ‘we’ll blast them out, even in the shit-house’ (Truscott, 2004: 169). Such
distasteful and vulgar language would undoubtedly horrify the Western politician’s
electorate—yet this and similar outbursts appealed to Russia. If one
looks at opinion polls following the car bomb, Putin’s approval rating went from
31% to 80% (Sudakov, 2008). In a very short time, the Russian people came to
highly regard their leader for his reputation of standing for law and order. This
perception is only strengthened by Putin’s background of having studied law
and worked as a KGB spy (Shlapentokh, 2001: 374).
Initially associated with Yeltsin, Putin managed to shake-off this image. Yeltsin
symbolised poverty and poor leadership; Putin on the other hand was very
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159

different. Even his physical attributes of being strong, fit and able-bodied completely
contrast against Yeltsin. Thus when Yeltsin resigned, Putin took over
as acting President before triumphantly winning the forthcoming presidential
election. However in August 2000, Putin’s escalating popularity temporarily
stalled following the Kursk disaster—when Russia’s new nuclear missile submarine
sank in the Arctic Barrents Sea, killing all 118 men onboard. Putin faced
a backlash for acting belatedly and dealing with the situation unsatisfactorily
(Truscott, 2004: 154-155).
Nonetheless, the public’s hostility soon dissipated: a poll by Russian broadcaster
NTV disclosed that Putin was perceived not to be directly involved (White and
McAllister, 2003: 386). Furthermore what is most remarkable is that Putin’s
popularity never suffered long-term; even when it was revealed that had the
Kremlin permitted the Norwegian, British and American Governments to
intervene quicker, some of the sailors may have survived (Kramer, 2000).
In the aftermath of 9/11, Putin quickly established the once previously unthinkable
partnership between Moscow and Washington to defeat al-Qaeda.
However the alliance was short-lived. The US invaded Iraq, undermining Russia’s
veto and equal status within the UN Security Council. America further
annoyed Russia when it welcomed the Baltic States into NATO, and encouraged
the colour revolutions in post-Soviet nations. US plans to bypass Russia in the
exportation of Central Asian oil and gas additionally become a point of contention
between the two States (Stent, 2008: 1094-1096).
Putin has announced his fears of American unilateralism and accused Western
nations of exploiting Russian resources (Ibid: 1090). Apart from creating hostile
foreign relations, Putin has earned his reputation of fighting for his country’s
interests—much to the pleasure of his adoring electorate. Stent (2008:
1094) believes Putin reinstated Russia’s ability to threaten the rest of the world;
although the Soviet risk of nuclear weapons has been replaced by fuel withdrawals
to the West. Challenging the world order and has shown Putin to be
a decisive leader, whom is unafraid to confront Western powers. Putin’s fearlessness
against the US and West is undoubtedly due to his popularity within
Russia (Black, 2004: 116). Anti-American sentiment can be gauged from a 2008
160 Political Leadership

poll that revealed Russians fear the US invasion of Iraq to be a greater threat to
Middle East stability than Iran. In context, 80% of Americans believed Russia’s
actions of supplying Iran with uranium to be dangerous; whereas 72% of Russian’s
believed Iran would only ever use nuclear weapons in self-defence (Morin
and Samaranayake, 2005).
A further policy that aided Putin’s popularity was his anti-oligarch political
stance. Due to policy reform of the 1990s, the former Soviet industrial ministry
privatised its holdings in petroleum, natural gas and metal. However the
privatisation process was flawed and created an unstable and unfair market.
The oligarchs’ success depended on their political connections, the bribes they
paid, and their ability to overpower rivals. This inevitably threatened Yeltsin’s
administration; therefore the privatisation process was hastened to prevent a
public backlash. Consequently, state enterprises were sold off under their true
value. Notwithstanding the unfairness cast upon the ordinary citizen, this elite
group paid little or even no tax (Goldman, 2004: 34-42).
Although Putin’s politics remained committed to the market, he made clear
that oligarch connections to government were to be severed, whilst liable oligarchs
were arrested. Those not sent to jail had their assets stripped and returned
to the state (Ibid).
Despite fluctuation, Putin’s popularity remained high throughout his presidency.
He won almost unanimous support following his response to the October
2002 hostage crisis and Belsan school massacre in 2004. Putin stepped down
in 2008, with an approval rating of 85%. Having concluded his presidency, 70%
‘completely trusted’ him; whilst a further 19% ‘partly trusted’ his leadership
(White and McAllister, 2008: 613-615). It seems unassuming to conclude that
Putin’s actions have created a virtuous cycle, whereby his decisions reinforce
his appeal and his electorate automatically disassociates him from any misconduct.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and United Russia
During the 1990s, Russian political parties suffered from a lack of identity and
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161

clear policy. However under Putin, they became major actors in the electoral
and parliamentary process. Initially Putin was anti-political: it was unknown
whether he belonged to the political right, centre or left (Gel’man, 2008: 913-
915). Nonetheless whilst nearing the end of his second presidential term, Putin
agreed to become the party leader of United Russia—despite not being a member.
In the first week of Putin’s confirmed political support for United Russia,
the party improved by 6%. Moreover when United Russia adopted a programme
known as ‘Putin’s Plan’, although only 6% surveyed understood the plan—65%
of voters approved it (McAllister and White, 2008: 938-942).
Putin announced his candidacy for Prime Minister on the premise that he could
find a ‘decent, capable, effective and modern-thinking person with whom it
would be possible to work’ with (McAllister and White, 2008: 939). He did so:
and thus his relationship with current United Russia President Dimitri Medvedev
was born. However it is widely believed that Medvedev is really Putin’s
puppet for presidential control. Whilst it is highly speculated that Putin will
run for president in 2012, at the end of Medvedev’s term. Indeed some Russians
never realised the official president had changed (White & McAllister, 2008:
619). Thus Putin’s popularity has spurned three remarkable outcomes: one, his
appeal carried on directly into another political role; two, he transferred his
popularity through association to both President Medvedev and United Russia;
and three, he reinvigorated the role of political parties in the parliamentary and
electoral process.
Russian love for a politician versus Western hate
Very few political leaders gain fans after being elected. Not Putin though: in
January of 2001 his popularity was 76%, a remarkably high scoring to begin
with—yet seven years later he increased this to 87% (Ibid: 950). To contrast
these figures against other world leaders: US President Barack Obama is approved
of by 51% of Americans; 49% of Italians wish their Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi would resign; whilst French President Nicolas Sarkozy has a meager
34% support (Kulikov, 2011).
Russian adoration for Putin can be highlighted through the nation’s distinc-
162 Political Leadership

tive humour. Although the primary function of a joke is to make people laugh,
political comedy can insightfully illuminate how the majority views their politicians.
An online joke by Chubarov (2007) tells the story of how Stalin advises
Putin within a dream, to ‘shoot all the democrats, and then paint the inside
of the Kremlin blue’. The punch line is when Putin asks why blue, and Stalin’s
response is that he knew Putin would not question the first task. Humour aside,
the joke shows a perception of Putin staying in control no matter how gruesome
the responsibility becomes.
A very peculiar trend within Russia has been Putin’s ability to engage with the
nation’s youth. ‘Born between 1976 and 1991, they have been labelled the “the
Putin generation”’ (Mendelson and Gerber, 2008: 131.). By utilizing the youth
group Nashi, Putin has been able to unite the nation’s juvenescence against
those whom brought down the Soviet Union—the West. ‘The Putin Generation’
cannot remember the Soviet Union being a self-sufficient world power; thus
Putin is almost fulfilling a generation’s yearning for Great Russia to be restored.
Putin’s phenomenon is so widespread that a 2007 survey recorded a staggering
82% of young Russians being not only interested in politics, but also having
confidence in their leader (Ibid: 131-135).
It is noted by White and McAllister (2003: 388) that Putin enjoys a significant
popularity amongst Russian women—despite being heralded as having a ‘lack
of sexuality’. Putin is portrayed as the ideal man—who won’t drink, hurt or
betray his lover. Putin’s devotion to sports has increased the perception of him
being the politician with an admirable physique (White and McAllister, 2008:
618). This was particularly evident when female magazine Secrets of the Stars
quickly sold-out when it ran a special edition devoted to Putin—and revelations
of his boyhood romances (Ibid: 609). Strangely, increasing the female
population’s romantic obsession with Putin seems to be an active policy of the
Kremlin: as official photographs include him riding a horse bareback, barechested.
The Sunday Times reported that these photos ‘will inevitably trigger
mass swooning by women all over Russia’—and furthermore—’confirm the
Russian Prime Minister’s status as a gay icon’ (Halpin, 2009). Putin might be
an unlikely and involuntary figurehead for the gay community, but his topless
photos spurned online discussions that he was endorsing more tolerance of
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163

homosexuality (White and McAllister, 2008: 618). Although analysing Putin’s
charm, fitness-levels, attractiveness and ambassadorship for gay rights could
be deemed inconsequential—literature upon Putin’s appeal considers this a
worthy explanatory factor for his popularity. Therefore to keep within an academic
context, these points support the theory that Putin’s appeal has been
aided by a romanticised vision of him as a potential life-partner.
Putin’s humble beginnings may have aided his popularity too: growing up in St
Petersburg, his family all lived in one room (Truscott, 2004: 26). This unprivileged
background appeals to Russian’s having experienced severe economic
hardship themselves. Although Putin is unquestionably wealthier nowadays,
his appeal of emerging from amongst the people remains. It has been found
that Putin draws support from all sections of society; irrelevant of constituency,
age, sex, levels of education and personal income (White and McAllister,
2003: 384). Putin’s policies are open to critique, but when dealt the challenge
of reconciling a broken society, he has shown himself to be a highly flexible and
gifted politician.
Past mistakes and future threats
Russia approves of Putin for turning their economy around and restoring national
pride. Yet how did Putin reverse the direction of Russia’s economy? The
answer is by exporting oil and gas to fossil fuel dependent economies. Between
1999 and 2005, Russia’s exports increased by $165 billion—with oil and gas
exports accounting for over 60% of those earnings (Rutland, 2008: 1053). Thus
Russia has boomed with oil prices rising by $103 a barrel during Putin’s presidency
(Stent, 2008: 1092). Thus Putin’s popularity is dependent upon maintaining
levels of growth that the populace finds appeasing; however the Russian
economy remains highly volatile and dependent on energy demand and world
price stability.
A further threat to Putin’s popularity could come from his closest ally: Medvedev.
Intriguingly, both Putin and Medvedev could announce their candidacy in
the forthcoming presidential elections—and it could be a close victory. A 2011
poll showed public anger for the slow-down in the economy following the global
164 Political Leadership

financial crisis. In January of this year, Putin’s popularity slipped to 72% from
an average of 78% in 2010; whilst Medvedev dropped to 69% from an average
of 75% in the previous year (Kulikov, 2011). Although Medvedev’s popularity
is slightly below Putin’s, they share supporters through their common bond of
United Russia. Therefore if both competed in an election—whatever the outcome—Putin
would suffer if the electorate had to choose their preference.
Putin’s association with United Russia allowed them to become the largest and
most successful political party in the Russian Federation. However the party
blatantly committed what has been described as ‘electoral authoritarianism’
(Gel’man, 2008: 913-915). Despite the ‘Putinomania’, the opposition had to gain
a 7% threshold for representation in the state Duma, meet excessive entry requirements,
and was prevented from forming party alliances. Most worryingly,
allegations exist that voters were intimidated (Stuermer, 2008: 158-159).
Gelman (2008: 917) believes that ‘party-based authoritarian regimes are usually
the longest-lived’; thus the Kremlin could be following a potentially rational
policy to secure long-term stability. Rationality notwithstanding, Putin has
never hid his discomfort with the election process. Whilst discussing Romanov
Tsars, he praised that they could rule their peoples’ destiny without being distracted
by the issues of maintaining popularity and winning elections (Truscott,
2004: 121). Russia is accustomed to centuries of authoritarian rule; its voters
don’t appear to have serious objections to the electoral corruption. In fact
nearly half of the populace supported only one candidate being available on
the ballot sheet, whilst ‘a similar number’ of Russians wished to postpone the
presidential elections to save money (Shlapentokh, 2001: 379). Yet in a forever
changing and revolutionary world, Putin and the Kremlin’s interventions in the
electoral process remains a liability to his support.
Regarding Putin’s involvement in Chechnya, the leader may have gained support
from his people as Russians are perceived to be merciless to the Chechen race
(Gerber and Mendelson, 2002: 299-300). This would be supported by the previously
discussed jump of 50% in Putin’s popularity following his strong stance
against Chechen extremists. However, Putin and his army have come under the
Western political spotlight for human rights violations against Chechens. Thus
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165

this could prove a political scandal that Putin cannot hide away from forever.
Putin’s control is in need of political checks and balances. However it remains
to be seen whether Russia will ever demand them.
Putin’s unique political direction and Russian approval
One explanation for Putin’s enduring popularity is his reinvention of Russia’s
national identity. Once famous symbols of the Tsarist and Soviet past have been
restored—albeit with a modern twist. For instance the former Soviet national
anthem was reinstated, yet with new lyrics. The Tsarist double-headed eagle is
now again the state emblem, whilst full-scale military parades have resumed in
Red Square for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By exploiting
the nostalgia associated with Russia’s vanished white and red past, Putin
has won the hearts of both Tsarist and Soviet voters (Stent, 2008: 1091).
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted semipresidentialism as
its political model—much like the rest of the post-communist world. Semipresidentialism
combines having an elected president as head of state, with a prime
minister directing the nation’s legislature; thus giving the flexibility of parliamentary
democracies and the strong leadership of the American presidential
system. Initially Russia embraced democracy under Yeltsin, however this trajectory
was reversed nearing the end of his presidency. Thus Putin led Russia
towards authoritarian rule by re-centralising power in Moscow, overseeing
brutality in Chechnya, limiting the freedom of the press, employing thousands
of previous KGB officers in senior positions of government and tackling the
wealth of the oligarchs. This unique model is what Putin views as appropriate
for Russia—given its distinctive culture and historic tradition (Evans Jr, 2008:
905).
What is most intriguing about Putin’s ‘superpresidentialism’ is its popularity
with Russians whom advocate the benefits of being a democracy. An opinion
poll conducted in April 2006 recorded that amongst the 29% whom believed
in democratic discourse, 81% held confidence in Putin’s ability to handle world
affairs. Although a Western perspective will consider the typical Russian’s
standard of what constitutes a democracy to be warped, ‘superpresidentialism’
166 Political Leadership

has only served Putin’s consistent popularity. In 2005, over 60% of Russians
wanted a strong leader—whilst less than 30% wished for them to be democratically
elected. Whereas in 1991, only 39% wanted an authoritative president and
51% wished for democracy. The demand for strong leadership and rejection of
democracy peaked in 2002, when 70% wanted strong leadership whilst only
20% wanted the president to be democratically elected (Morin and Samaranayake,
2006).
These figures indicate that the Russian people have become disenchanted with
the concept of a democracy. Western ideology is associated with the turmoil
and untrustworthy politics of the 1990s. Having experimented with democracy,
Russia disliked its poverty and concentrated wealth. When Putin first became
President, 78% of Russians thought the differences in personal income
throughout Russia were too large, whilst 59% wanted Moscow to amend the
situation. The cultural legacy of a communist past is clearly evident when a
similar poll in the US recorded only 23% of respondents perceiving the poverty
gap to be too wide, and only 10% of that polled wishing for Washington to intervene
(Shlapentokh, 2011: 37).
Thus Putin did interfere and changed the direction of Russian politics—much
to the general approval of Russia. The restoration of Great Russia in wealth and
status has been acquired by Putin’s maintenance of adequate relations with the
West, whilst pandering to domestic anti-Western political sentiment. This new
direction—which is undeniably economically successful—has made it almost an
act of treachery to reject Putin’s policies. If one does object, you are subscribing
to Western political ideology. Thus not loving one’s own country is justification
in itself for Putin’s appeal. As concluded by Hill (2008: 479), many Russians see
no reason to follow the West; the nation’s vast territory and resources, the talent
and knowledge amongst its population, has enabled Russia to believe that
it is capable of constructing a unique society that can provide for every citizen’s
needs.
Conclusions
What is most astonishing about Putin’s popularity is its longevity despite mis-
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167

takes in his leadership. Even after the Kursk sank, although the public held his
administration responsible—they disassociated Putin from any direct involvement.
Thus an expected lack of accountability has insulated and protected Putin
from committing any error of judgment. Therefore a combination of three
explanations have been deduced to explain Putin’s appeal: the first being that
Putin himself has generated his own popularity through an uncontrollable personal
appeal; the second justification is that he increased his appeal through
successful political actions; and the third hypothesis is that Russia’s unique
history and culture have facilitated the scenario of a politician achieving Putin’s
level of success.
Regarding what Putin has involuntarily done to win the favour of his electorate
is retrospective of his personality and ancestry. Russia can identify with his
modest and unprivileged background, whilst his education in law and previous
career in espionage has created a public impression that he will stand for order.
His popularity has been significantly high following instances when Russia has
mourned terrorist attacks by Chechen extremists, or when the Beslan school
massacre occurred. As already discussed, Putin enjoys a widespread perception
that he is a devoted politician from the back streets of St Petersburg whom
would make the ideal life partner.
Putin’s most successful political action has, inarguably, been the creation of a
booming economy. A common thread to Putin’s victorious political actions has
been uniting Russia against the enemy: poverty, the West, the oligarchs, Chechen
terrorists and so on. When under attack, as human beings we naturally want
to pull together with those whom we share a common bond. Thus Russia has
unified behind Putin and overlooks its societal problems. The third theoretical
justification for Putin’s popularity is that it has been aided by the Russian
peoples unique viewpoint upon good leadership. National identity, past experiences
and the society we belong to shape our outlook upon politics. An undemocratic
perspective and requirement of government in Russian politics has
been created by a heritage of Tsarist and Communist rule, and the economic
and political upheaval Russia experienced following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The Russian public is not accustomed to true democracy, and their brief
flirtation with it is a sour memory. Thus they are following their own trajectory,
168 Political Leadership

which Putin has successfully created and that is why he is adored.
However these three theoretical categorisations cannot be entirely excluded
from each other: segregation helps to understand Putin’s popularity, yet these
points are all intricately intertwined. For instance, Putin moved Russia in a
direction that is neither capitalism nor communism, and instilled ‘superpresidential’
leadership. This example embodies all three theories: one, Putin’s personality
that resonates strong leadership was necessary to do this; two, it was
a successful political action; and three, it fulfils what the Russian public want.
The popularity Putin has experienced is a mirror of the era in which he rules:
as Russia becomes economically stronger and reasserts itself within the world
order, Putin’s appeal becomes reinforced too. Like any politician, Putin will
only remain popular whilst his administration is successful; however, predicting
whether Putin will continue to have enduring appeal is only something time
can disclose.
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