Pacific Counterblow - Air Force Historical Studies Office

the supply in New Caledonia. But in spite of such operational aches
and twinges, the iith was prepared to take part in the series of
actions known as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the first
Japanese attempt to retake Guadalcanal.
Battle of the Eastern Solomons
Following the disastrous Savo Island drama, there had been a lull
on Guadalcanal. The Navy ran in small reinforcement convoys,
but operated its task forces well to the southward of the island, out
of range of Japanese search planes; and the enemy seized the opportunity
to reinforce Guadalcanal on his own account. Nightly, his
destroyers and cruisers shelled the Marines, for the most part without
let or hindrance. The beginnings of the "Tokyo Express" were
discernible.
However, on 19 August a light cruiser venturing on such a reinforcement
mission was unwisely left exposed in Sealark Channel by
day. A searching Fort spotted her, banked for a bombing run. The
delighted Marines saw columns of dark brown smoke pour from abaft
the warship's mainmast. She made for the open sea beyond Savo,
her fantail afire, and later sank.
On the 23 d the Navy received warning that the Japanese were
moving on the Solomons from the north. Carrier task forces, including
the Saratoga, the Enterprise, and the new North Carolina were
readied to meet the threat. On the 24th the Saratoga's torpedo and
dive bombers, engaging the Jap carrier Ryujo, sent her into an evasive
turn, dived in a coordinated attack, and hammered their bombs the
length of her deck. Fierce air battles during the day all but stripped
the enemy carriers of their aircraft and by nightfall the enemy fleet,
badly hurt, retired. The damaged Enterprise returned to Pearl
Harbor for repair.
In relation to its striking power the iith Group played an important
role in this action. On 24 August at 1215 Colonel Saunders was
advised of a contact with an enemy carrier force 720 miles from
Espiritu. Admiral McCain, aware that a B-i7 strike would involve
hazardous night landings, left the attack decision to Colonel Saunders.
The risk was accepted. Two flights of heavies were dispatched separately,
three Forts under Maj. Ernest R. Mannierre and four led by
Major Sewart.
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