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Pacific Counterblow - Air Force Historical Studies Office

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the aircraft. On 6 August, all available hands-and available hands<br />

included Colonel Saunders and Brig. Gen. William C. Rose, who commanded<br />

ground forces on Espiritu and Efate-worked a bucket line<br />

for 20 hours in a driving storm to put 25,000 gallons of gasoline aboard<br />

the bombers. But such labors were not enough, and strike missions<br />

were delayed for lack of service facilities.<br />

Espiritu's airdrome was no Randolph Field. A narrow strip cut<br />

partly from a coconut grove, partly from the encroaching jungle;<br />

revetments barely deep enough to keep a B-17's nose off the runway<br />

and so narrow a man had to stand at each wing tip to guide the pilots<br />

out to the short taxiway; no lights. Bottles of oil with paper wicks<br />

flickered along the runway and jeep headlights marked its end as the<br />

early morning missions took off.<br />

The squadrons of the iith were distributed as follows: The 42d<br />

at Plaines des Gaiacs; the 98th at Espiritu, where the 26th subsequently<br />

joined from Efate; and the 431st at Nandi. Headquarters was at<br />

Efate, but Colonel Saunders maintained a command post on Espiritu<br />

and flew part of his headquarters personnel there on io August.<br />

Nandi, the most rearward of the bases, was clean and quiet and served<br />

as a rest area and a convenient place for engine changes. Colonel<br />

Saunders regularly relieved his units after i week in the forward<br />

area.<br />

Operational control defied the field manuals. The wide dispersal<br />

of the units and unreliable radio communications made contact with<br />

the squadrons exceedingly difficult. Colonel Saunders could exercise<br />

direct control only over the 14 Fortresses at Espiritu, and even this<br />

was complicated by lack of field telephones and motor transport.<br />

He was running four search missions daily and holding six aircraft<br />

for a striking force. In an emergency he might supplement the latter<br />

with six B-i7's from Efate, but he strongly doubted that the Efate<br />

contingent could hit the target at such a distance. He advised General<br />

Harmon that additional fields were needed on Espiritu.<br />

By the I8th of August, the supply situation of the group had become<br />

critical. Six ball turret doors had already broken off and no<br />

spares were available. Turbosupercharger regulators were giving<br />

trouble, as were flight and engine instruments. The dusty fields<br />

necessitated constant engine changes; Nandi's 12 spares were already<br />

in service and the next change at Plaines des Gaiacs would exhaust<br />

13

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