Pacific Counterblow - Air Force Historical Studies Office

efore the departure of the Marines for Guadalcanal, strenuous efforts
were made to procure information on Japanese positions. Maj. Gen.
Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding the ist Marines, was experiencing
a woeful lack of photos, and Navy charts were badly out of
date. In an effort to remedy this situation the 43 5th Squadron of the
x9th Group during June and July had flown a number of reconnaissance
missions over the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area from Port Moresby.
General Vandegrift particularly desired recent photographs of the
north coast of Guadalcanal, the area he was called on to assault. He
received only two, a print of Tulagi and one of the Lunga Point-
Kukum area-both dropped on a carrier by light planes, developed,
and forwarded to the Marine commander by COMAIRSOPAC, and
constituting the first photos to reach General Vandegrift since 24 June.
At no time during 1942 were trained Army personnel or Army
photographic equipment available for photographic work. Cameras
came from the Navy, photographers from the Marines. Only the
xith's B-i7's represented the Army, and this condition remained
SOP until AAF photo and mapping units arrived in 1943. "Quackenbush's
Gypsies," as Lt. Comdr. Robert Quackenbush's naval photo
personnel were named, regularly flew with the heavies on photographic
coverage of the Solomons.
Colonel Saunders' bombardment directive from Admiral McCain
was both general and concise: to hit Tulagi and Guadalcanal with
maximum strength from 31 July to 6 August, inclusive. COMAIR-
SOPAC left the group commander free to carry out this task as he
saw fit, and the i mth forthwith inaugurated heavy bombardment
against the Japanese in the South Pacific. During the 7 days, in
addition to 22 sorties for purposes of search, the group flew 56 bombardment
sorties, a most creditable performance in view of the primitive
conditions under which operations labored.
Although the advanced field on Espiritu Santo was reported ready,
Colonel Saunders was skeptical as to its service facilities and decided
to open his attack from Efate, 71o nautical miles from the target at
Guadalcanal. For his first mission on 31 July, Colonel Saunders
mustered every plane possessing a radio compartment tank. Since
each of the nine aircraft thus equipped also carried a bomb-bay tank,
full bomb loads were impossible. But in spite of this considerable
reduction in striking power, the initial blow was a success. Led by
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