Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)World ...

Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) 

World Model United Nations 2013 

Study Guide

Contact Us 

World Model united Nations 2013 

info@worldmun.org 

www.worldmun.org 

Letters 

Letter from the Secretary General 04 

Letter from the Under-Secretary General 05 

Letter from the Chair 06 

CONteNtS 

Introduction 07 

History of the Committee 07 

08 

Topic Area A 

Statement of the Problem 

08 History and Discussion of the Problem 

18 Past UN Action 

19 Proposed Solutions 

19 QARMA 

19 Key Actors and Positions 

20 Suggestions for Further Research 

21 

Topic Area B 


21 History and Discussion of the Problem 

30 Key Actors: 

37 Past UN Actions 

38 QARMA 

38 Suggestions for Further Research 

Conclusion 

38 Position Papers 

38 Closing Remarks 

39 Bibliography 

40 Endnotes 

Melbourne Host Directorate PTY LTD | Office of Media and Design

Letters 


Letter from the Secretary-General 

dear delegates, 

it is my pleasure and honor to welcome you to the 22nd session of World Model united 

Nations! My name is Charlene Wong, and i am the Secretary-General of WorldMuN 2013. 

Within this document you will find the study guide for your committee. The conference 

staff for WorldMUN 2013 has been working tirelessly over the past months to provide 

you with an unparalleled conference experience, beginning with this guide. Each Head 

Chair has researched extensively to provide you with a foundation for each committee’s 

topic areas. 

We encourage you to use this study guide as the starting point for your exploration of 

your committee’s topics, and your country or character’s policies. The WorldMUN Spirit 

invites you to step into the shoes of your country or character, and to immerse yourself in 

the committee by researching and developing a full understanding of the issues, perspectives, 

and possible solutions on the table. We offer several additional resources online, 

including our WorldMuN 101 Guide and Rules of Procedure, updated for this year. Both 

are available at www.worldmun.org. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to 

contact your Head Chair or Under-Secretary-General. 

WorldMUN believes that the impact of delegates over the four days of conference goes 

far beyond the walls of the committee room. Therefore we are pleased to announce that 

resolutions passed at the 2013 conference in this committee will be sent on to the relevant 

body in the United Nations. Please enjoy reading this study guide, and I look forward 

to meeting you in Melbourne in March! 

Sincerely, 

Charlene S. Wong 

Secretary-General 


secretarygeneral@worldmun.org 

Melbourne Host Directorate PTY LTD | Office of Media and Design 

4

Letter from the Under-Secretary-General 


It is with the greatest pleasure that I welcome you to the General Assembly of the 22nd 

World Model United Nations. Over the last few months, we have been earnestly preparing 

for your rapidly approaching arrival in Melbourne. Your chairs have tirelessly labored 

to produce substantive material of the highest quality, which has and, I believe, will continue 

to distinguish the WorldMuN committee experience as foremost in the world for 

rich debate and fecund collaboration. 

I am overjoyed and humbled to be your Under-Secretary-General for this year’s GA, for it 

is certainly not one to be missed. For this session, the organ features a compelling mix 

of traditional GA mainstays as well as innovative committee experiences that our chairs 

have produced to tackle challenging world problems in novel ways. From endangered 

languages to urban crowding, a wide spectrum of committee topics has something to 

offer for every delegate, and our seven passionate chairs are excited to share their interests 

with you. These chairs have also dedicated themselves to creating a GA experience 

that transcends both the limitations and promises of the large committee sizes, pursuing 

a vision in which GA delegates enjoy all the fluid, intimate debate of smaller committees 

while gaining the caucusing potential and expansive representation of the GA. 

This study guide provides you with an excellent first step to prepare yourself for the first 

day of committee. the material here represents what your chair feels are the most important 

aspects of the topic areas and serves as both an introduction as well as a bridge 

to more in-depth research. If ever at a loss for where to start, always turn to the study 

guide first. Additionally, there are resources online at our website – including our World- 

MUN 101 guide and updated Rules of Procedure – to prepare you for committee. 

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or your chair. As a former 

WorldMUN chair, I know how much effort is invested into the committee experience by 

delegates and chairs alike, and we are all available to help make this conference the best 

WorldMuN yet! 

Sincerely, 

Scott yu 

under-Secretary-General of the General 

Assembly 


ga@worldmun.org 


5

Letter from the Chair 


it is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to the disarmament and international Security 

Committee at World Model united Nations 2013! My name is damon Meng, and i am 

thrilled to be your director. I am a senior at Harvard University, majoring in Economics 

with a secondary in Government. Aside from WorldMUN, I also participate in Harvard 

National Model United Nations, several investment funds on campus, and the Harvard 

Crimson, the university daily newspaper. 

In the past few years, DISECs around the world have tended to focus almost exclusively 

on a few select topics that include cyber-security, security of the Arctic Circle, small-arms 

trade, and nuclear proliferation. This year, we will explore two often overlooked but increasingly 

important issues: Territorial Disputes Over Underwater Resources and Foreign 

Military Bases. With the melting of the ice caps and depletion of the world’s currently accessible 

natural resources, countries are venturing farther from their coasts and deeper 

into the ocean to acquire raw materials. As recent tensions in the South China Sea and 

other areas show, the world needs a proper framework for discovering, developing, and 

using these underwater resources. For the second issue, you will examine the legality and 

morality of establishing offshore military bases. Foreign military bases create political, 

social, and economic problems where they are established, and delegates of DISEC will 

need to create a framework that governs the establishment, operation, and closing of 

foreign military bases. 

I hope that this will be an engaging and stimulating committee for everyone. If you have 

any questions, or just want to say hi, please feel free to email me. I cannot wait to meet 

all of you in March! 

Sincerely, 

damon Meng 

Chair, diSeC 


disec@worldmun.org 


6

Introduction 

the disarmament and international Security 

Committee, officially known as the First Committee of 

the General Assembly of the United Nations, is one of 

the six main committees of the united Nations General 

Assembly. The purview of the Committee ranges 

from disarmament to international law, making the 

First Committee one of the most important organs of 

the united Nations. 

In recent years, DISEC agendas have tended to 

focus almost exclusively on a few select topics that 

include cyber-security, security of the Arctic Circle, 

small-arms trade, and nuclear proliferation. this 

year, we will explore two often overlooked but 

increasingly important issues: territorial disputes 

Over Underwater Resources and Foreign Military 

Bases. With the melting of the ice caps and depletion 

of the world’s currently accessible natural resources, 

countries are venturing farther from their coasts 

and deeper into the ocean to acquire raw materials. 

As recent tensions in the South China Sea and other 

areas show, the world needs a proper framework for 

discovering, developing, and using these underwater 

resources. For the second issue, you will examine 

the legality and morality of establishing offshore 

military bases. Foreign military bases create political, 

social, and economic problems where they are 

established, and delegates of DISEC will need to 

create a framework that governs the establishment, 

operation, and closing of foreign military bases. 

As delegates of the First Committee, you will have 

the opportunity to discuss these issues of paramount 

importance and work together to put forth a 

consensus recommendation on how the nations of 

the world will approach and resolve these issues. 

History of the Committee 

On 24 October 1945, the United Nations officially 

came into existence with the ratification of the United 

Nations Charter by the Permanent Five nations— 

China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 

and the United States—and 46 other signatories. 1 

Under the Charter, the General Assembly acts as the 

chief deliberative, policymaking, and representative 

organ of the united Nations. each of the General 

Assembly’s six committees consists of 192 member 

nations and serves as forums for multilateral 

discussion for a whole spectrum of international 

issues. 2 

In addition to the 192 member nations, the UN 

also grants observer status to various international 

organizations including the African Union, European 

Commission, Interpol, League of Arab States, Asian 

Development Bank, Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 

many other political, social, legal, and economic 

organizations. The respective expertise of these 

organizations provides invaluable resources for 

member nations and ensures a comprehensive, 

intelligent, and lively debate within each committee. 

In the General Assembly, each member state has 

one vote and a simple majority vote usually suffices 

to decide the fate of a resolution. in recent years, 

member states have strived to achieve consensus on 

issues, rather than deciding the outcome of a debate 

solely on a formal vote. This development is meant to 

build stronger support for the Assembly’s decisions 

and legitimize its resolutions. 3 Resolutions are the 

most important product of the General Assembly. 

These resolutions stem from the committees’ power 

to make non-binding recommendations to Members 

States and the Security Council. Since the General 

Assembly cannot enforce its recommendations, 

the General Assembly, and by extension the United 

Nations, is not a legislator of laws for the international 

committee. Instead, the Assembly’s main goal is to 

help formulate policies and act as a barometer of 


7

world opinion. 

All General Assembly committees have an array of 

supporting subsidiaries, programs, and institutes that 

report to the General Assembly. The subsidiary bodies 

and programs run the gamut covering nearly all major 

economic, social, and political issues. they include 

the United Nations Environment Program, United 

Nations Children Fund, UN Women, International 

Trade Center, Permanent Forum on Indigenous 

issues, Commission on Narcotic drugs, united 

Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 

and United Nations World Food Program. 

the disarmament and international Security 

Committee is the First Committee of the General 

Assembly of the United Nations. The committee deals 

with disarmament, global challenges, and threats 

to peace that affect the international community 

and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the 

international security regime. 4 Furthermore, the 

Committee collaborates with the United Nations 

Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based 

Conference on disarmament to further its goals. 

The First Committee provides a forum in which 

member states can voice their positions and opinions 

on disarmament and security related matters and 

provides a platform through which nations can reach 

common understandings and agree on universal 

norms of behavior. 

Significant past achievements of the Committee 

include the passage of the treaty on the Non- 

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical 

Weapons, Convention the Biological Weapons 

Convention, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 

Topic A: Territorial Disputes and 

Underwater Resources 


As the world depletes its easily accessible natural 

resources, nations are venturing farther and deeper 

into the ocean than ever before to acquire the raw 

materials that drive economic growth. Economic and 

technological factors facilitate the exploration and 

drilling for these underwater resources. As prices of 

accessible natural resources rise, both state-owned 

and private energy companies become more willing 

to make expenditures on research and development 

to explore the ocean bed for resources. Furthermore, 

better technology and equipment allow these 

companies to drill deeper and in more innovative 

ways. These firms often act under either direct or 

subtle encouragement by their national governments, 

as governments are eager to maintain access to 

resources that power their economies. The scramble 

over underwater resources has inevitably led to 

conflicts due, in part, to the current legal framework. 

While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gives 

countries sovereign claim over the seabed within a 

certain distance of their shoreline, countries often 

have overlapping and competing claims to the same 

territory. Consequently, military and political conflicts 

have risen over territorial claims in places like the 

South China Sea and the Arctic Circle. It will be your 

responsibility to craft the framework within which 

countries can work together to discover, develop, 

and use natural resources that lie beneath the ocean. 

While recent territorial conflicts have centered on the 

South China Sea and the Arctic Circle, there are still 

vast amounts of the ocean whose sovereign claims 

are being debated. Consequently, the discussion 

will focus on creating an international framework to 

resolve current crises and provide guidance for future 

ones. 

History and Discussion of the Problem 

The South China Sea Conflict 

the South China Sea is an area that includes the 

Paracels and Spratlys islands. interest in the two 

archipelagoes began when the French came to the 

region and claimed both the Paracels and the Spratlys 


8

The Paracel and Spratly Islands. 

in the 1930s. Following France’s defeat in World War 

II, France handed over ownership to the Japanese. 

After World War II ended, Japan gave up its claims to 

the island. 5 

The Paracel Islands are currently claimed by 

China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Their claims are based 


9

entirely on historical records. For example, Chinese 

archaeologists have found 2,000-years old objects on 

the islands and have argued that these are evidence 

of China’s ownership of the islands since ancient 

times. China also asserted its claims to the Paracels 

much earlier than the other disputants. the claims 

began in the 19th century and were made throughout 

the 20th century. A map produced by the Republic of 

China in 1947 also showed the islands as part of China. 

Chinese legislation and proclamations such as the 

1992 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones Law have 

restated China’s claims to the region. 

Words have not been China’s only medium of 

asserting its claims. In 1974, Chinese forces attacked 

Vietnamese forces on the island and ended Vietnam’s 

30-year presence on the island. the Vietnamese, 

however, have also used historical evidence to 

support their claims. During the French colonization 

of Vietnam in the 19th century, France also occupied 

the Paracel Islands. Japan took over possession of 

the islands during WWII, and possession fell back to 

the French after WWII. When the French left Vietnam 

before the Vietnam War, Vietnam briefly took control 

of the islands before ceding it to the Chinese after the 

1974 Sino-Vietnamese clash. Currently, China controls 

the islands although Vietnam still maintains its 

territorial claims. China has strengthened its military 

presence over the Paracel Islands, and its control 

has given it significant advantage and proximity in its 

dealings with the Spratlys. 6 

The Spratly Islands, an archipelago that is 700 

nautical miles away from China’s Hainan Island in the 

southern part of the South China Sea, is mostly made 

up of reefs and tiny islands. While the Paracels mainly 

involve just two actors, the Spratly dispute is more 

complex due to its multinational nature. 7 Countries 

that claim the entire Spratlys archipelago include 

China and Vietnam, while Malaysia, the Philippines, 

and Brunei all claim parts of the chain of islands. While 

China and Vietnam based their claims on historical 

evidence, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines 

argued that international laws such as the 1982 

United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (1982 

UNCLOS). 8 Armed confrontations and conflicts have 

erupted periodically throughout the last 30 years, 

culminating in recent heightened tensions between 

the countries. In March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese 

troops and ships exchanged fire on Sinh Cow Island. In 

response to the situation, the Philippines reinforced 

its holdings on eight islands. A month later, the 

Malaysian navy seized several Filipino fishing vessels 

and detained their crewmembers on the grounds that 

they were fishing in Filipino waters without a permit. 

After a high level appeal from President Corazon 

Aquino of the Philippines to Malaysian Prime Minster 

Mahathir Mohamad, the crew was released. 9 

in the past decades, to strengthen their claims on 

the islands, the disputants have put military forces 

on various islets and rocks of the archipelago. In 

the Spratly archipelago, China occupies 9 islands; 

Vietnam, 25; Philippines, 8; and Malaysia, 3. 10 

An international workshop aimed at furthering dialogue on the 

South China Sea conflict. 

Conflict Resolution: Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism 

Since 1990, a paradigm shift in international politics 

changed the politics of the South China Sea region. the 

end of the Cold War saw Russia’s shrinking influence 

and a decrease in American strategic interest in the 

10 


ASEAN is a possible multilateral forum through which the conflict could be resolved. 

region. A rising China stepped in to fill the subsequent 

power vacuum. Southeast Asian countries became 

increasingly worried about China’s influence within 

the region. they needed a way to engage China and 

prevent it from becoming a destabilizing force in the 

region. they soon found a way: multilateralism. 11 

Robert Keohane, a professor of political science 

at Princeton University, defines multilateralism 

as “the practice of coordinating national policies 

in groups of three or more states.” 12 John Gerard 

Ruggie, a professor at Harvard Law School and 

Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, states 

that multilateralism is “an institutional form which 

coordinates behavior among three or more states on 

the basis of generalized principles of conduct – that 

is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a 

class of actions, without regard to the particularistic 

interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies 

that may exist in any specific occurrence.” 13 

view, the nature of the Southeast China Sea issue 

demands a multilateral approach. Firstly, the Spratly 

Islands are claimed by multiple countries, so conflict 

resolution cannot be done bilaterally. Furthermore, 

because of China’s size, economic might, and political 

sway, it would be disadvantageous for any Southeast 

Asia country to deal with China bilaterally. Lastly, 

Southeast Asian countries believe that China could 

commit itself to being a responsible power by joining 

a multilateral mechanism. A more responsible world 

power would be less of a destabilizing force in the 

region. 

Southeast Asian countries have embraced 

multilateralism as the way to resolve the regional 

disputes and have encouraged China to join the 

multilateral mechanism. According to these countries’ 

14 

China’s policy toward conflict resolution has 

walked a fine line between unilateral action and 

multilateral cooperation. In August 1990, Chinese 

Premier Li Peng visited Singapore to indicate China’s 

willingness to set aside territorial disputes in the 

South China Sea and pursue cooperation with the 

other claimants to explore the region together. 

Afterward, Chinese diplomats began talking to their 

Southeast Asian counterparts about the issue at 

multilateral conferences and workshops. One such 

meeting was the informal multilateral cooperative 

11 


workshop entitled “Managing Potential Conflicts in 

the South China Sea” (MPCSCS) hosted by Indonesia. 

Only ASEAN members attended the first meeting. 

However, China began attending the workshop 

actively starting in 1991. 

The South China Sea issue involves both claimants 

and non-claimants. Claimants include the countries 

that border the area: China, Vietnam, and Philippines. 15 

For these countries, the South China Sea conflict is as 

much an issue of national sovereignty as it is an energy 

issue. For China, it considers its control over the two 

archipelagoes as indisputable, and bolstering its 

sovereign claims is its main priority. For Vietnam, the 

Philippines, and other countries involved, sovereignty 

is also an important issue. 16 Given that most of the 

countries in the surrounding area have only been 

founded within the past 50 years, any loss of territory, 

however small, would symbolize the governments’ 

inability to defend their newly established countries. 

Aside from the sovereignty issue, energy resources 

that lie under the seabed and large amounts of fish 

resources are key flashpoints in this dispute. As the 

economies of the claimants continue to grow at a 

rapid rate, their hunger for natural resources will 

grow as well. the Chinese department of Geology 

and Mineral Resources estimated that the area might 

contain as much as 17.7 billion tons of oil. Although 

western experts think the true amount is smaller than 

the Chinese figure, the sheer amount of oil available 

for exploitation still make oil a key issue. Each of the 

claimants wants to ensure that it is able to undertake 

oil exploration in the region without external 

intervention. 17 

Fishery is another dispute amongst the claimants. 

Historically, the South China Sea was known to 

be productive for its fishery resources. Recently 

however, overfishing by the states in the area has led 

to warnings of future shortages. 18 due to population 

growth in the surrounding countries, fishing stocks in 

the littoral zones have fallen to dangerously low levels. 

Consequently, fishing boats of all nationalities have 

ventured increasingly further out to sea. However, 

due to overlapping claims in the open sea, fleets of 

boats from multiple countries often aggressively fish 

in the same areas, leading to severe depletion in fish 

stocks in the greater South China Sea area. 19 

Non-claimants also have a strong interest in 

outcome of the South China Sea issue. Many 

countries, including Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and 

even the United States have an economic interest 

in preserving open navigation through the region. 

Almost one-fourth of the world’s trade passes 

through this region. 20 

The Diaoyu Conflict 

The Diaoyu Islands. 

The Diaoyu Islands (in Chinese) or Senkaku Islands 

(in Japanese) are a tiny group of eight islands in the 

East China Sea. The eight islands total 6.4 square 

kilometers in total, of which only two are over one 

square kilometer. None are currently inhabited or 

have had any kind of reported human activity. 21 the 

islands are located 120 nautical miles northeast of 

Taiwan, 200 nautical miles southwest of Okinawa, 

and 230 nautical miles east of the Chinese mainland. 

Given this unique location, the islands are of strategic 

interest for both China and Japan’s defense. Securing 

sovereignty over the islands would grant the owner 

an advantage in military security. 22 

The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are also lucrative 

12 


economically. Sovereignty over the islands could 

decide who controls around 40,000 square kilometers 

of the surrounding continental shelf or exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ) area. This control would confer 

ownership of natural resources in the area, such as 

fisheries and potential oil and gas reserves. 23 

One of the main reasons the diaoyu islands 

have attracted so much political attention was the 

discovery of oil and gas. Before the discovery of oil 

and gas deposits in the area of the islands, China and 

Japan had an indifferent attitude toward the Diaoyu/ 

Senkaku Islands. 24 However, in 1968, the United 

Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 

East suggested the possibility of large hydrocarbon 

deposits in the waters surrounding the diaoyu/ 

Senkaku Islands. 25 

In addition to the economic and security benefits 

of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the dispute is difficult 

to resolve because of its political implications. China 

and Japan’s domestic politics and international status 

are directly related to the dispute over the islets. How 

each government handles the dispute reflects on 

the legitimacy of the Chinese and Japanese central 

governments in domestic politics and on their foreign 

relations on the international stage. 26 Furthermore, 

how the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute is resolved 

will also serve as the blueprint for the resolution 

of other Chinese and Japanese maritime territorial 

disputes. 27 

Experts generally break the complicated Diaoyu/ 

Senkaku Islands issue into three specific aspects: 

ownership of the islands, the return of the islands, and 

the demarcation of maritime boundary. Regarding 

ownership, China and japan disagree on whether 

the islands were terra nullius (land unclaimed) when 

Japan claimed sovereignty over the islands in 1895. 28 

Second, China and Japan dispute whether Japan 

returned the islands to China after the Japanese 

defeated in World War II. Lastly, China and Japan 

debate how their maritime boundaries are drawn in 

accordance to the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 29 

Historical Developments 

Although the Sino-Japanese dispute over the 

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands began when Japan annexed 

the islands in 1895, it was not until the late 1960’s that 

the dispute became a major issue in Sino-Japanese 

relations. 30 In 1969, the U.S. and Japan issued a 

Joint Statement that led to the Ryukyu Reversion 

Agreement signed in 1971. One of the provisions 

of the agreement stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku 

Islands was a part of Okinawa and was to be returned 

to Japanese rule. 31 thousands of Chinese students in 

the United States protested for several months and 

expressed their concerns in an open letter to the u.S. 

President and Congress. 32 At the same time, both the 

People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland 

and the Republic of China (ROC) government in 

Taiwan disputed the claims. When, in 1970, Japan 

notified the ROC government that Taiwan’s claims to 

the islands were invalid, the Taiwanese government 

planted the ROC flag on the islands, and three 

members of Taiwan’s National Assembly visited the 

islands to signify their control over the islands. In 

June 1971, the Agreement Between Japan and the 

United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu 

islands and the daito islands was signed. All of the 

disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were included in 

the areas returned to Japan. 33 Although initially with 

this signing the U.S. supported Japan’s claims, the 

U.S. shortly afterward took a neutral stance over the 

dispute, which at the time, was between the ROC and 

Japan, because it wanted to improve relations with 

the People’s Republic of China. 34 

The period from the reversion of Okinawa and 

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to Japanese rule in 1972 

to today is characterized by a series of encounters 

followed by periods of inactivity. One of the first 

13 


major crises occurred in 1978. During this time, China 

and Japan were negotiating the terms of the Treaty 

of Peace and Friendship. The Diaoyu/Senkaku issue 

became a major sticking point in the negotiations. 

A group of politicians from the Liberal Democratic 

Party in Japan sought to block all other provisions 

of the treaty until the Diaoyu/Senkaku provision was 

resolved first. The Chinese insisted that the Diaoyu/ 

Senkaku dispute be left out of negotiations. Under the 

implicit encouragement of Japanese nationalists, the 

Japanese right-wing political group Nihon Seinensha 

(Japanese Youth Federation) erected a lighthouse 

on the Diaoyu Island in order to legitimize Japanese 

claims over the area. In response, the Chinese 

government sent a flotilla of fishing ships to surround 

the island and insisted. The Japanese government has 

regularly sent its Maritime Security Forces, namely its 

naval forces, to remove Chinese fishermen from the 

area. After a week of standoff, Japan agreed to table 

discussion of the dispute. the Chinese withdrew the 

vessels. In October 1878, the treaty was signed in 

Beijing. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments 

decided to shelve the issue for the future. 35 

More unilateral declarations and corresponding 

protests from the opposing side took place during the 

1990s. In 1992, China re-asserted its claim by passing 

the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 

which explicitly specified that the Diaoyu Islands was 

China’s territory. In 1996, Japan declared an Exclusive 

Economic Zone around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 

Case Study: The Arctic Circle 

in recent decades, the Arctic climate has changed 

more dramatically than that of any other area of the 

world. 36 For example, Alaska’s average temperature 

increased by 4.9 degrees Fahrenheit since 1950 

compared to a 1.8 degrees increase in the rest of the 

U.S. More frozen areas of the Arctic sea melted in 2007 

than in any other year on record. In 2007, Arctic sea 

ice during the melting season dropped to the lowest 

levels since satellite measurements began keeping 

track of melting patterns in 1979. In September, 

the average sea ice extent was 4.28 million square 

kilometers, which was the lowest September on 

record. This broke the previous record for the month 

set in 2005 by 23 percent, suggesting the acceleration 

of the rate of sea ice melting. 37 

the melting of the ice has strategic implications 

as well as a significant impact on the ecosystem. 

The shrinking ice sheets have reduced the home 

and feeding areas of polar bears, resulting in their 

designation as a threatened species. The lives of the 

indigenous Arctic people are also negatively affected. 

The melting has had significant economic impacts 

as well. Shrinking ice caps allow easier extraction of 

oil, gas, and minerals under the ocean floor. Warmer 

weather also allows for more agriculture. 

in the past, sea ice was deep across the pole. 

Countries could not access much of the Arctic Sea and 

thus claims to regions had no real economic value. 

thus, countries in the latter half of the 20th century 

did not seek to find a framework to replace the sector 

principle. 38 Consequently, countries worked through 

the 1990s to establish a formal legal framework for 

making sovereign claims over the Arctic Seabed. The 

result was the united Nations Conference on the Law 

of the Sea treaty. 

Under the UN Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (UNCLOS), the United States, Russia, Canada, 

Norway, and Denmark are the only countries 

permitted to submit bids for Arctic territory. The 

process began in spring of 2012 and is expected to 

end in 2014. the successful applicants will then gain 

resource exploration rights. 39 

Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 

countries can acquire rights to seafloor territory if the 

areas are linked to their continental shelves. However, 

like the Kyoto and other treaties, different nations 

have various levels of commitment to the Law of the 

14 


Sea. Russia submitted its claim for the Arctic seabed in 

2001 and needs to resubmit its claims. Canada ratified 

the treaty in 2003 and thus has until 2013 to file its 

claim. the united States, on the other hand, has not 

ratified the Law of Sea Convention and thus cannot 

file a claim. 40 If such a claim were filed and accepted, 

the u.S. would gain as much territory as it did when it 

purchased Alaska from Russia. 

A large part of the Arctic controversy centers on the 

underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which is an undersea 

mountain chain that rises 2,500 meters above the 

Arctic Ocean floor. The Ridge is considered to be of 

continental origin as it measures 1,700 kilometers in 

length. Many countries have the potential to claim 

that the Ridge is a natural prolongation of their 

land territory. In order to substantiate their claims, 

countries must provide bathymetric, seismic, and 

gravity data. 41 

Competing claims have been issued as countries 

vie for the opportunity to exercise sovereign rights 

over the Arctic seabed. In August 2008, Canadian 

researchers working in conjunction with Danish 

scientists provided proof that Lomonosov Ridge is a 

natural extension of the North American continent. 

Russia has sent out expeditions to strengthen its 

claims in the Arctic Circle. Russia’s Oceanology 

Research Institute undertook an expedition to the 

Mendeleyev underwater mountain chain in 2005 

and to the Lomonosov Ridge in August 2007. In 

September 2007, The Natural Resources Ministry 

stated that Russian scientists’ preliminary research 

results show that the country can claim 1.2 million 

square kilometers of potentially energy rich Arctic 

territory. In October 2007, Russia’s natural resources 

minister said that “reaching the Lomonosov Ridge 

means for Russia potentially up to 5 billion tons of 

equivalent fuel. 42 In addition, Denmark is currently 

working to collect evidence to claim that Greenland’s 

continental shelf extends all the way to the North 

Pole. Because Greenland is a province of Denmark, 

this would give rights over a significant area of the 

Arctic Ocean seabed. 43 

The Arctic ice sheet is melting at an unprecedented rate. 

UNCLOS determines sovereign rights over bodies of water. 

Oil and Gas Reserves 

The question of oil and gas exploitation is one 

of the main issues in the Arctic Circle disputes. the 

U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of 

15 


The Arctic Circle contains trillions of cubic feet of undiscovered gas. 

the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its 

untapped natural gas lie under the Artic seabed. 44 

This amount represents around 90 billion barrels of 

undiscovered oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural 

gas. 45 By comparison, the united States produces 

1.85 billion barrels of oil each year and 19.3 trillion 

cubic feet of natural gas. 46 According to the National 

Research Council, shipping lanes could be opened 

year-around by 2030 as rising temperatures melt the 

sea ice. 47 

Commercial oil activity in the Arctic began in 1920 

in Canada’s Northwest Territories. The U.S. followed 

suit by issuing its first oil exploration lease on Alaska’s 

North Slope in 1958 and brought in big producers 

like ConocoPhillips. 48 Oil companies began drilling off 

Alaskan, Canadian, Norwegian, and Russian coasts 

in the 1980s. Interest in Greenland has intensified in 

recent years, especially after a 2007 U.S. Geological 

Survey assessment of reserves ranked an area of 

northeastern Greenland as 19th among the world’s 

500 biggest oil and gas regions. 49 

Originally, oil and gas drilling was limited to the 

shorelines due to the harsh climate. However, 

companies pushed further north in search of more 

resources. In August 2007, the Snohvit natural 

gas field went online in the Barents Sea, 90 miles 

from the Norwegian coast. 50 This field, along with 

other oil and gas developments, has maintained 

Norway’s standing as one of the globe’s richest 

nations. Revenues from Snohvit alone are expected 

to top US$39 billion, or US$8,200 per citizen, over 

its estimated 25-year life cycle. Similarly, Russia has 

16 


egun developing the Shtokman gas field in the 

Barents Sea (373 miles offshore) with the help of two 

energy firms: Norway’s Statoil-Hydro and France’s 

total. 51 Russia has responded to environmental 

concerns about resource extraction by committing to 

help set up a public-private partnership, Emercon, to 

monitor and respond quickly to risks arising from oil 

and gas production. 52 

Environmentalists are naturally worried about 

Arctic drilling and resource exploitation. Greenpeace 

International spokesman Mike Townsley said that 

extracting oil and gas will only lead to more fossil 

fuels being burned, which will trigger further global 

warming and melting of ice caps. 53 Furthermore, 

resource extraction inevitably leads to accidents 

and spills. Examples abound—from the 1989 Exxon 

Valdez to the 2006 Deepwater Horizon oil spills. Chris 

Krenz, an Arctic Project Manager for the Oceana 

environmental group says that “placing wells, 

pipelines and vessels in the remote Arctic creates a 

substantial risk of a catastrophic oil spill, and there is 

no proven method to clean up an oil spill in the icy 

conditions often found in the Arctic. 54 

New Energy Leases 

As of 2011, more than 400 oil and gas fields have 

been discovered north of the Arctic Circle. 55 in 

February 2008, the U.S. government’s Minerals 

Management Service approved the extraction of 

oil and gas from a portion of the Chukchi Sea off 

Alaska’s northern coast. Between 2008 and 2012, the 

government opened up four more sections of the 

Chuckhi and Beaufort seas to extraction. Former U.S. 

President George W. Bush stated “Congress should 

permit exploration in currently restricted areas of 

northern Alaska, which could produce roughly the 

equivalent of two decades of imported oil from Saudi 

Arabia. 56 

In June 2008, Canada awarded a US$1.2 billion 

lease to Britain’s British Petroleum (BP) to develop 

oil and gas fields in the Beaufort Sea. 57 Greenland 

has also awarded numerous exploration licenses this 

year to u.S., Canadian, British, danish, and Swedish 

companies, and in July 2008 StatoilHydro began 

mapping the seabed of northeast Greenland. 

Over-fishing 

The development of huge factory fishing ships that 

can stay at sea for months on end has led to severe 

depletions of fish stocks. 58 Governments around the 

Arctic region have responded by setting catch quotas 

and limiting fishing rights of foreign vessels within a 

country’s 200-mile boundaries. Norway has clamped 

down on Russian vessels fishing in Norwegian waters. 

At the same time, ships are moving further north as 

the ice melts. 59 

Shipping Lanes 

Emerging shipping lanes that are a result of the melting ice caps. 

In 2007, the Northwest Passage became completely 

open for the first time due to the recession of Arctic 

sea ice. This path could serve as a shortcut from the 

Pacific to the Atlantic, possibly making it a more 

convenient shortcut than the Strait of Magellan and 

17 


the Panama Canal. In 2007, Senior Scientist Mark 

Serreze at the National Snow and Ice Data Center 

(NSIDC) said, “The sea ice cover is in a downward 

spiral and may have passed the point of no return. As 

the years go by, we are losing more and more ice in 

summer, and growing back less and less ice in winter. 

We may well see an ice-free Arctic Ocean in summer 

within our lifetimes.” Scientists agree that this could 

occur as early as 2030. 60 

If Arctic routes were to be usable for longer 

periods, the savings on shipping costs would be huge. 

For example, a ship’s journey from New York to Tokyo 

would be 2,600 miles shorter if it went through the 

Northwest Passage rather than Panama Canal. Ships 

from London to Tokyo could reduce journeys by 5,000 

miles by going through the Northeast Passage rather 

than the Suez Canal. 

Three basic routes cross the Arctic Ocean: the 

Northwest Passage in North America, the Northern 

Sea Route through Russia’s northern waters, and the 

Transpolar Route over the North Pole. According to 

Mea treadwell, chairman of the u.S. Arctic Research 

Commission, “The greatest potential saving is 

probably over the Northern Sea Route because it’s 

the most ice-free.” 61 Many studies have been done to 

find out the economics of the savings. A 2006 study 

funded by the Alaska-based Institute of the North 

found that shipping containers from the Aleutian 

Islands in western Alaska to Iceland using the 

Northern Sea Route would cost US$354 to US$526 

per container compared to the current cost of 

US$1,500 per container from Japan to Europe using 

the Southern route. 62 

Military Presence 

Arctic coastal states have historically maintained 

strong military presence in the region. In October 

2007, the Canadian government announced, “As 

part of asserting sovereignty in the Arctic, new 

Arctic patrol ships and expanded aerial surveillance 

will guard Canada’s Far North and the Northwest 

Passage.” 63 the military has also launched a space 

satellite named Polar Epsilon to provide land and sea 

surveillance for Canadian forces beginning in the 

summer of 2009. 64 

Recent Developments: 

In May 2008, Arctic coast countries adopted a joint 

declaration asserting the primacy of uNCLOS for 

resolving territorial disputes. 65 The five states have 

agreed that they would abide by the legal framework 

set out by UNCLOS. 66 

Past uN Action 

Background to UNCLOS 

In November 1994, the United Nations Convention 

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered into force. 

This convention establishes a treaty regime to govern 

activities on, over, and under the world’s oceans. 67 in 

builds on the four 1958 Law of the Sea conventions 

and sets forth a framework for future activities in parts 

of the oceans that are beyond national jurisdiction. 68 

Part VI of the convention, which deals with the 

Continental Shelf, and Annex II, which established a 

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 

are two of the most important clauses in uNCLOS. 

The convention gives the coastal state sovereign 

jurisdiction over the resources (e.g. oil and gas) of its 

continental shelf. the continental shelf is the undersea 

extension of a coastal state’s land territory. 69 

Article 76 of the Convention defines the continental 

shelf as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 

areas that extend beyond the coastal state’s 

territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of 

its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 

margin.” 70 under this article, a coastal state with a 

broad continental margin may establish a shelf limit 

beyond 200 nautical miles. 71 This jurisdiction is subject 

to the submission of the particulars of the intended 

limit and supporting scientific and technical data by 

the coastal state to the commission for review and 

18 


ecommendation. 72 The commission reviews the 

documentation and approves its recommendations 

to the submitting state by a two-thirds majority. In 

instances of disagreement with the commission’s 

recommendations, the coastal state may make a 

revised or new submission. 73 The “limits established by 

a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations 

shall be final and binding.” 74 

Proposed Solutions 

The Antarctica Model 

To resolve the Arctic Ocean disputes, it is helpful 

to look at the Antarctica model. In 1959, countries 

around the world signed the Antarctica treaty. the 

treaty stated that “in the interest of all mankind that 

Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively 

for peaceful purposes and shall not become the 

scene or object of international discord.” 75 the treat 

provided for banned mineral exploitation, military 

presence, and sovereign land claims. The Antarctic 

Treaty System (ATS) now governs activities in the 

Antarctic. the AtS is made up of the original Antarctic 

treaty and three other international agreements: 

Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 

(1972), Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 

Marine Living Resources (1980), and the Protocol 

on Environmental Protection tot eh Antarctic Treaty 

(1991). Consequently, the world has committed the 

Antarctic area exclusively for peaceful and scientific 

purposes. 76 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

(QARMA) 

1. How can the UNCLOS be amended to reduce 

overlaps in territorial claims? 

2. How should countries deal with the issue of 

resource sharing? Should they share them 

equally? Or proportionally according to certain 

pre-determined metrics? 

3. What should a conflict resolution framework 

that eschews military action and favors peace 

dialogues look like? 

4. How should legacy sovereignty issues be 

resolved? 

5. What international body has the best 

jurisdiction over territorial disputes? 

6. Should there be a specific timeline with 

deadlines for resolution of competing 

7. 

territorial claims? 

How can the successes of the Antarctica model 

be adopted for current territorial issues? 

Key Actors and Positions 

Russia 

Russia is currently the biggest player in the Arctic. 

It controls 75 percent of the known Arctic oil and 90 

percent of the gas. 77 

In 2007, Russia was fed up with the slow pace of 

international negotiations on the Arctic Ocean issue. 

She sent a pair of submersible vessels more than two 

miles under the Arctic Ocean to plant a titanium Russia 

flag on the ocean floor in the Lomonosov Ridge. 

Claiming rights to the Lomonosov Ridge is more a 

symbolic gesture rather than an action with economic 

consequences. The vast majority of recoverable 

Arctic oil lies in offshore Alaska. The vast majority of 

gas lies in the West Siberian Basin in Russia. According 

to uSGS geologist don Gautier, while the Ridge does 

contain sedimentary rock, a critical component for 

oil reserves to be present, there is no evidence of 

a previous tectonic event that would have sealed 

reserves under the seabed. “Even if oil and gas are 

found, countries will drill closer to their coastlines 

first,” Gautier says, “because they have undisputed 

sovereignty over these areas and because it’s easier 

to operate there than in the Lomonosov, which is 

hundreds of miles offshore.” 78 

European Union 

The European Union (EU) is likely to end up as the 

loser in the race for the Arctic. it has no territory in the 

19 


Arctic region except for Denmark. Although Denmark 

is a member, Greenland left the EU in 1985, and the 

EU is therefore not entitled to share Greenland’s 

claim to the Arctic. 

Denmark 

Denmark has claimed various areas of the Arctic 

Ocean due to its control over Greenland. Greenland 

has quintupled the number of exploitation licenses it 

grants and expanded the area earmarked for oil and 

gas exploration from 2,657 square miles to nearly 

39,000 square miles. 79 

United States 

The United States is a non-party to the convention. 

Consequently, it cannot participate as a member of 

the commission nor can it submit a claim under Article 

76. Over the past two decades, the U.S. has submitted 

its own observations and reports on submissions 

made by other states. 80 It has provided these reports 

to the commission. in addition, since 2001, the u.S. 

has gathered and analyzed data to determine the 

outer limits of its extended continental shelf. In 2007, 

this effort became an official government sponsored 

program called the extended Continental Shelf 

Project under the lead of the Department of State. 81 

Some American observers have suggested 

that coastal countries negotiate and adopt a new 

framework to address the changing circumstances 

in the Arctic. they maintain that the unprecedented 

melting of the ice caps leading to potential disputes 

over underwater resources was not envisioned at the 

time the Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated. 

Other observers have suggested that the Arctic region 

above a certain latitude be designated a wilderness 

area. they cite Article 4 of the Antarctic treaty as a 

precedent. Article 4 states that any current claims 

to sovereign territory are frozen, and “no acts or 

activities taking place while the present Treat is in force 

shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or 

denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 

or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No 

new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to 

territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted 

while the present treaty is in force.” Still supporters 

of the Law of Sea Convention argue that the 

changing circumstances in the Arctic strengthen their 

argument that the U.S. should become a party to the 

convention. 

Norway 

The Norwegians have operated offshore fields 

in the North Sea for decades. As these wells dry up, 

the Norwegians are looking north for new supplies. 

Being able to secure Arctic territory that could supply 

potential oil and gas is of paramount importance for 

Norway. After all, petroleum represented 31 percent 

of Norway’s revenues in 2007 and 48 percent of its 

exports. 82 

China 

Although historically China’s policy toward conflict 

resolution has walked a fine line between unilateral 

action and multilateral cooperation, recent actions 

suggest a move toward bilateral cooperation. 

China prefers the resolution of the South China Sea 

conflict through bilateral agreements because of the 

economic and political leverage it has over smaller 

Southeast Asia countries. 

Suggestions for Further Research 

the sources i found most helpful were policy papers 

written by academics and national organizations like 

the European Commission. Furthermore, the research 

reports compiled by international organizations were 

very informative. 

These are just suggestions. Feel free to explore 

topics mentioned in more detail if you are interested 

and to explore other topics mentioned only briefly. 

The issue of sovereign debt has numerous aspects, 

only a small part of which has been mentioned in this 

guide. 

20 


Topic Area B: Foreign Military 

Bases 


Over the last century, certain countries have built 

a mass network of foreign military bases. These 

countries justify their actions by claiming that foreign 

military bases help maintain the peace and protect 

the people of nations whose rulers are ruthless 

and dangerous. the former claim originates from 

the principle of military deterrence while the latter 

stems from the assumed need for a foreign power 

to intervene when a country’s ruler decide to harm 

his own people. However, these facilities have been 

used to proliferate weapons, perpetuate conflicts, 

and undermine international stability, as these bases 

are integral to numerous wars that have been fought 

in recent decades. Furthermore, these bases have 

caused social and environmental problems on the 

local level. The testing of weapons, high levels of 

rape and violent crimes, and loss of land near the 

bases have created serious social problems. Another 

social and political consequence of the creation of 

the bases has been the economic support of corrupt 

governments. Superpowers that want to project 

their powers afar will often negotiate aid packages 

to developing countries in return for the rights to 

operate military bases in those countries. These 

lucrative aid packages not only help win business for 

the superpower’s companies but also often financially 

support corrupt governments and ruthless regimes. 

As delegates of DISEC, you will seek to address 

the economic, political, and social aspects of this 

issue and develop a framework under which world 

peace is maintained while mitigating the negative 

consequences of foreign military bases. 

History and Discussion of the Problem 

The history of foreign military presence dates back 

to antiquity when Greek city-states expanded and 

waged wars in the 4th century B.C. in modern times, 

expansionist powers such as the Venetian republic, 

colonial Iberian monarchies, and the British Empire 

have set up trading posts and military bases overseas 

to secure vital interests and consolidate power. In the 

late 1940s, the building of military bases expanded 

dramatically. The Soviet Union and the United States 

became the two major superpowers that vied for 

global supremacy. Both states built up a global 

network of military facilities in allied and satellite 

countries in order to confront, encircle, or intimidate 

the opposing power. 83 

Each superpower’s strategies for building military 

bases varied. The West, led by the U.S., adopted 

a policy of containment of the Soviet Union and its 

satellite states. Through a system of alliances, bilateral 

agreements, and other arrangements, the U.S. began 

setting up strategic bases in host countries through 

europe, the Middle east, and Asia. Often relations 

that were purely political and security in character 

quickly developed into economic relations as well. 

The U.S. would often give substantial financial aid, 

provide security assistance in the form of arms 

transfers, and use economic aid such as debt relief to 

build relationships. 84 

For the first 30 years after World War II, the Soviet 

union had only a few allies outside the eurasian 

heartland and limited the building of military bases 

to the lands of those allies. In the 1970s, the Soviets 

aggressively expanded its influence by acquiring 

military facilities in various countries throughout 

Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle east. 

However, in the 1980s, the maintenance of these 

foreign bases proved to be too economically and 

politically demanding for the Soviet Union. 85 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the number of 

troops and bases decreased. Russia lost or withdrew 

from almost all its bases outside the former Soviet 

space but kept a presence in its neighboring 

21 


countries. 86 

Before the 2000s, the traditional roles of military 

bases included the defense of an ally or allies, 

deterrence and counterbalancing functions, defense 

of the home country, and intelligence gathering. With 

the rise of terrorism in the 2000s, counterterrorism 

and expeditionary missions have gained greater 

importance in the rationale of foreign military bases. 87 

The dynamics of foreign bases have experienced a 

dramatic shift after the terrorist attacks of September 

2001 on u.S. soil. the u.S. redirected its attention and 

military assets from europe to Central and South-West 

Asia. The anti-terrorist front that the U.S. built up 

over the subsequent years have seen the deployment 

of u.S. military forces in and close to certain parts of 

Asia that was once considered Russia’s traditional 

sphere of influence. The new countries where the 

U.S. is involved are in close proximity to the borders 

of Russia and China, creating potential for new 

tensions. 88 

Balancing the Positives and Negatives 

One can analyze the utility of Foreign Military 

Presence in terms of a matrix involving military/ 

security benefits to either or both the foreign power 

and the host state, and the liabilities or disadvantages 

to both parties. Military/security benefits to the 

foreign power might include the possibility of 

coercive diplomacy and the maintenance or extension 

of colonial or quasi-colonial presence, influence, 

or control. One such obvious benefit would be the 

enhancement of global security and defense and 

power projection capabilities. An analogous benefit 

would be better response to or control of local and 

regional security problems. 89 the foreign power 

may use its presence to incorporate the local state 

into larger or global security concerns or networks. 

Similarly, a foreign power can freeze competitors 

out of a country or region. Furthermore, a foreign 

military presence facilitates coordination between 

foreign and local forces. 90 

The host nation also receives military and security 

benefits in the form of a security umbrella for the 

local state. Joint exercises between the local state 

and foreign power demonstrate the commitment 

of the foreign power to the local state and provided 

training and experience for local troops. 91 

There are also a multitude of potential liabilities 

or disadvantages of foreign military power. For the 

foreign power, its presence in the host country may 

increase the vulnerability of its agents and citizens 

to civil and violent attacks. Furthermore, basing 

agreements with authoritarian regimes may yield 

short-term benefits but do little for political and or 

economic liberalization. As an extension, basing 

agreements with such regimes may be volatile 

and subject to host-nation demands or ousters. 

Overwhelming military might does not always 

translate well to regional conflicts where adversaries 

enjoy the advantages of greater willingness to suffer, 

more young males of fighting age, and deeper 

knowledge of local terrain, weather, and other 

factors. 92 

For the local host, there are political liabilities 

as well. Permitting a foreign power to establish 

bases on local land creates an association with the 

foreign power’s foreign policy, which may create or 

increase domestic and regional opposition to the 

local host. Furthermore, a foreign military presence 

involves a loss of sovereignty. It may hamper the 

formation of or participation in regional cooperation 

accords, particularly when other local states that are 

not friendly with the foreign power are involved. 

the institution of foreign military installations and 

privileges involves some degree of surrender of 

territoriality. 93 

Legal Immunity 

international agreements such as the Visiting 

Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Status of Forces 

22 


Agreement (SOFA) include clauses that exempt 

troops from local laws. 94 in 2011, a Russian soldier 

stationed in the republic shot a Moldovan citizen. 

The soldier received immunity from prosecution by 

Moldovan courts. Instead, the soldier went through 

the Russian military’s own court martial proceedings, 

which are understood to be biased toward soldiers. 

Similarly, the Status of Forces Agreement between 

South Korea and the United States stipulates that 

U.S. servicemen cannot be held accountable for their 

crimes under Korean law. This agreement affects 

over 100 bases and facilities the U.S. has built in South 

Korea. In 2002, a U.S. tank ran over two teenage girls 

on their way to a birthday party. The U.S. refused to 

hand the driver over the Korean courts to be tried. 

instead, u.S. courts tried the soldiers and found that 

they were not guilty. In 2006 alone, over 2,600 car 

accidents were reported involving U.S. servicemen, 

but there is no avenue for redress as Korean insurance 

companies refuse to cover damages. 95 

Communities around U.S. bases have also 

recorded high levels of rapes and other violent 

crimes committed by foreign soldiers. In 1995, three 

U.S. Marines gang-raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan 

girl. The highly publicized incident galvanized political 

activism and brought wider attention to militaryrelated 

violence against women. 96 the situation was 

further exacerbated when the then-commander of 

U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Richard Macke, 

angered many Japanese citizens when he suggested 

that the servicemen were “stupid” because they 

could have bought a prostitute for less money than 

they spent on renting the car used in the abduction. 97 

President Clinton and then U.S. ambassador Walter 

Mondale issued formal apologies to the Japanese 

government. 98 

Environmental Impact 

Communities around military bases have often 

sustained environmental contamination from 

activities on the bases. Dangerous pollutants such as 

nerve gas, depleted uranium, unexploded mines and 

shells are sometimes improperly stored at military 

bases. These dangerous chemicals can leak onto land 

and into the ground water, causing sickness in the 

surrounding communities. 99 

in 2000, u.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine 

Albright conceded the legacy of “serious public and 

environmental problems” caused by U.S. military 

bases in the Philippines. However, she reiterated 

that the U.S. had no legal obligation to clean up the 

deadly residue. 100 Tests at the former bases in Clarke 

and Subic Bay have revealed dangerous levels of 

poisonous chemicals, lead and fuel in the ground 

water. It had severely damaged the biodiversity and 

fish stocks in the area. 

Regional Instability 

Critics of military bases argue that bases provoke 

conflict and instability. For example, Iran is surrounded 

by 44 U.S. bases. As Robert Johnson observed in 

Business Insider, “This could be reason Iran is so darn 

defensive.” 101 Iran is aware that Iraq and Afghanistan, 

both bordering neighbors, are now occupied and that 

eight more neighboring countries host U.S. or NATO 

military bases. The bases in the region provide Iran 

with the pretext to counter the real and imagined 

threat to its national integrity and sovereignty by 

creating a credible deterrent, nuclear, or otherwise. 102 

Aid in Natural Disasters 

As more foreign military assets are deployed to aid 

in natural disasters, the relationship between military 

assets and humanitarian efforts are becoming more 

complex and tension-filled. Since the 1990s, the 

number of NGOs that have joined the established 

humanitarian agencies has increased significantly. 

Consequently, there has been greater competition 

among different humanitarian actors. At the same 

time, there is a trend for armed forces around the 

world to go beyond their traditional war-fighting 

23 


Military bases facilitate the delivery of aid in the event of natural disasters. 

roles and take on humanitarian and developmentrelated 

tasks. 103 Many in the humanitarian community 

are concerned about being too closely associated 

with a military force especially during peacetime. 104 

They see the increased involvement of the military 

as potentially jeopardizing the humanitarian space. 

this “space” includes the freedom and access for 

humanitarian organizations to assess and meet 

humanitarian needs according to key principles of 

humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. 105 Furthermore, 

the humanitarian space relies on the consent of the 

governing body of the affected region. Consequently, 

the importance and difficulty of maintaining 

humanitarian efforts is particularly significant 

in countries that are experiencing conflict and 

political instability. 106 emergencies in peacetime. the Guidelines stipulate 

that all humanitarian assistance must be provided 

in accordance with core principles of humanity, 

neutrality, and impartiality and with full respect for 

the sovereignty of states. 

Despite the tensions between 

humanitarian workers/principles and military forces, 

those in the humanitarian community have gradually 

accepted the role military assets can play in supporting 

natural disaster responses. 

The Oslo Guidelines, created in 1994, were 

intended to address the need for principles and 

standards and to provide improved coordination in 

the use of military and civil defense assets in response 

to natural, technological, and environmental 

107 ensuring that assistance 

is based on actual needs and delivered by actors that 

have no political interest or stake in the situation on 

the ground not only helps to ensure access to people 

in need of assistance but also contributes to the safety 

and long-term perception of humanitarian workers as 

neutral agents in the field. 108 these guidelines were 

designed to be applied during peacetime. However, 

many of the significant natural disasters that 

provoked an international humanitarian response 

in recent years occurred in areas with pre-existing 

conflicts, such as Indonesia, Haiti, Kashmir, and Sri 

Lanka. 109 

Assets Provided 

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs has conducted international surveys on 

the types of military assets nations contribute to 

disaster relief. According to the data, the asset that 

is most deployed was air transport. the second and 

third were medical support and expert personnel, 

respectively. 110 each category of relief has multiple 

24 


types of interactions between the asset and the 

affected population. The more direct interaction there 

is between the asset and the affected population, 

the more politically sensitive the aid is. The nations 

that deploy the military assets and the countries that 

receive the aid have to arrive at an understanding 

about the level of contact in order for the asset to be 

fully utilized. 

the predominance of aircraft in military assets 

provided is expected given that getting personnel 

and humanitarian relief supplies to a disaster site 

requires air transport. 111 Moving relief goods and 

personnel between countries or within countries, but 

not directly to the affected population, is the least 

politically sensitive and controversial use of foreign 

military assets. However, the use of military aircraft 

to transport goods and personnel to or around 

affected areas or to carry out missions such as search 

and rescue is more politically sensitive. 112 

Many countries often send military medical 

support assets to disaster relief operations in the 

form of medical supplies, field hospitals, doctors, and 

medical professionals. This type of provision is more 

controversial than air transport because it involves a 

higher degree of direct contact between the affected 

populations and foreign military personnel. 113 despite 

this fact, countries have continued to dispatch 

medical support for several reasons. These include: 

1) the visibility and media exposure from having 

one’s armed forces saving lives in a foreign disaster 

situations; and 2) overwhelming humanitarian need 

that cannot be met by local health infrastructure 

or by the humanitarian agencies responding to the 

disaster. 114 

Recent Developments 

On August 30, 2012, Uzbekistan lawmakers 

approved a foreign policy bill that banned the 

creation of foreign military bases in the country and its 

participation in military blocs. 115 to many experts, the 

bill is seen as a symbolic gesture toward both Russia 

and the United States as the country’s geopolitical 

importance grows ahead of the pull of troops from 

Afghanistan. 116 This bill was passed shortly after 

Uzbekistan’s exit from a Russia-led military alliance. 

The exit had sparked debate about Uzbekistan’s 

changing allegiances and willingness to establish 

U.S. bases on its territory. Some observers view the 

bill as a demonstration of goodwill to Moscow after 

Uzbekistan quit the Russian-led Collective Security 

Treaty Organization (ODKB). 117 

In 2005, Uzbekistan closed a U.S. airbase following 

Western criticisms of Uzbekistan’s handling of 

unrest in the city of Andijan. Currently, Germany uses 

Uzbekistan’s Termez airport near Afghanistan and 

has troops stationed there. 

The Role and Utility of Overseas Military Bases 

Overseas military bases serve important purposes 

for a sovereign’s strategic interests abroad. 

According to Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Work, 

“The ultimate aim of any global military posture is 

to achieve advantages in global strategic reaction 

time, geographic positioning of forces, and force 

concentration and support, and thereby contribute 

to a favorable strategic balance in both peace and 

war. 118 

Case Study: U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa 

The issue of U.S. bases in Okinawa is complex 

because of the various conflicting economic, social, 

and political forces both within Japan and between 

Japan the U.S. 

Okinawa is the largest island of the Japanese 

Ryukyu archipelago. Although Okinawa’s surface 

area represents less than one percent of Japan’s 

landmass, it hosts more than three-quarters of U.S. 

bases located on Japanese territory. 119 the island hosts 

23,000 U.S. soldiers and 21,000 of their relatives. This 

represents one in three American soldiers stationed 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 120 

25 


U.S. military presence in Okinawa, Japan. 

The American presence in Okinawa originates from 

the end of World War II. After Japan’s surrender on 

August 15, 1945, U.S. forces took up quarters in the 

military bases of the Japanese Imperial Army during 

the occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. During 

this occupation, then Prime Minister Shigeru yoshida 

proposed that the u.S. permanently host military 

bases on Japanese territories in exchange for three 

guarantees: 1) the recovery of national sovereignty 

as quickly as possible and under good conditions; 

2) the guaranteed access to the U.S. market to sell 

goods, and the possibility for Japan to concentrate 

on economic development without paying the 

cost of maintaining an army and an independent 

defense force; and 3) security against communism, 

whose influence was growing in Asia at the time. 121 

This proposal fit well with U.S. strategic goals. It 

allowed the U.S. to contain communist advances in 

Asia and control a possible resurgence of Japanese 

militarism. 122 

Okinawa’s strategic location explains why the 

island is crucial to the United States’ Asia military 

strategy. Taipei, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Manila 

and Tokyo are all within a radius of 1,500 kilometers. 123 

Consequently, in the 1970s as part of a doctrine of 

disengagement, the U.S. closed many bases around 

Tokyo and relocated many troops to Okinawa. 

Territorial Impact 

The acquisition of land on Okinawa by the U.S. 

military has had a controversial past. The military 

bases on Okinawa are concentrated in the south 

and center of the island and occupy a large share of 

arable land. In 1953, the U.S. occupation authorities 

confiscated the land from more than 50,000 owners 

in order to expand military bases. Despite widespread 

protests (shimagurumi-toso, or fight of the entire 

island) in 1956, the U.S. maintained control over the 

land. 124 

The large size of the bases has caused problems 

in the local communities. The bases cover 20% of the 

main island of Okinawa and thus have a significant 

negative impact on traffic. As the surrounding 

communities urbanized in the last forty years, 

the bases have increasingly impinged on local 

communities in terms of noise and pollution. For many 

local municipalities, the presence of the bases has 

hindered the implementation of economic policies 

and urban planning. 125 

One such example is the Futenma Air Base. The base 

covers 500 hectares and is located in the heart of a 

densely populated urban area with 88,000 inhabitants. 

Over the years, the city of Ginowan has built-up 

around the base and with increasing urbanization the 

risks associated with military activities of the base 

have increased. In August 2004, a helicopter crashed 

on the campus of Okinawa International University. 

Luckily there were no casualties. The air base is also a 

source of noise pollution for the residents. On June 27, 

2008, the Naha court ordered the government to pay 

140 million yen in compensation to 400 neighboring 

residents of the base. 126 

26 


Economics Impact 

The presence of the bases in Okinawa has hindered 

the economic development of the prefecture and has 

contributed to the emergence of a distorted economy. 

it is a common saying that the economy is dependent 

on the 3Ks: “Kichi, Kankou, Kkyo-koji” (the bases, 

tourism, and public money). As a result, Okinawa 

has failed to develop a self-sustaining economy. 

Furthermore, public investment has increased 

significantly. After the handover of Okinawa back to 

the Japanese, the Japanese government enacted the 

hondo-nami policy that sought to improve the living 

standards of Okinawa residents to that of central 

Japan. Consequently, the last 30 years have seen the 

development of the island funded mainly by state 

funds and the increase in the number and scale of 

major public works programs. As a result, the island 

and its municipalities are more dependent on the 

government subsidies. 

Social Impact 

The presence of military bases has had both positive 

and negative social impacts on the population. 

Community programs and associative activities 

have fostered positive interactions between local 

communities and American soldiers and their families. 

American culture is very popular in the surrounding 

communities and has influence urban development 

projects that integrate American culture with the 

local identity. For example, in the two of Chatan, 

developers have constructed an American-style 

shopping district called the “American Village” with 

hints of Japanese culture. 127 

Among the negative developments are prostitution 

and crime. At the height of the Vietnam War when 

the bases were used intensively, the local police 

estimated there to be more than 7,300 prostitutes 

on the island. U.S. soldiers have also been a source 

of crime, including violence against women. The 

Prefecture of Okinawa has identified more than 5,400 

crimes attributed to American troops since 1972. 128 

On September 4, 1995, three U.S. soldiers inflamed 

the local population over the rape of a 12-year old 

Okinawan girl. Major demonstrations were held 

around the island and brought together over 85,000 

people. 129 demonstrators protested the insecurity due 

to the U.S. presence; the legal privileges accorded to 

arrested American military prisoners, and demanded a 

reduction or even complete departure of the bases. 130 

At the core of the issue was the Status of Force 

Agreement (SOFA). Legally, the presence of foreign 

military forces is governed by SOFA, which grants 

privileges to military personnel who are not subject 

to the laws of host countries (diplomats receive the 

same treatment). In the case of Japan and the U.S., 

the criminals covered by U.S. law are only handed 

into custody to the Japanese authorities once their 

guilt has been established. 131 The Japanese municipal 

authorities hosting the bases view SOFA as unfair, a 

symbol of extraterritoriality, and an impingement on 

Japanese sovereignty. Furthermore, the U.S. military 

controls the bases and thus Japanese authorities 

are not allowed to enter them freely or have right of 

inspection over activates in the bases. 132 

A few weeks after the rape, Masahide Ota, the 

Governor of Okinawa, expressed his anger by refusing 

to sign the lases of land rented to the U.S. bases. The 

Japanese government sued Ota because his official 

functions required him to sign the documents. During 

the Supreme Court hearing, Ota explained that the 

American military presence impinges on fundamental 

rights of citizens of Okinawa to live in peace and 

security and challenged the constitutionality of the 

U.S. presence on Japanese soil. 133 Although Ota ended 

up losing the lawsuit, the hearings attracted more 

attention and support from the local population. 

In September 1996, the Governor organized a 

referendum in which 89% of votes were cast in favor 

of reducing the bases and reviewing the legal status of 

27 


u.S. troops. 134 The turn in public sentiment convinced 

Tokyo and Washington to set up a special committee 

to study ways of reducing the negative impacts of 

troops and bases by reorganizing and reducing their 

surface area. In December 1996, the Special Action 

Committee on Okinawa (SACO) reported its findings. 

it recommended retrocession of 11 tracts of military 

land in the south of the island and efforts to reduce 

noise disturbance. It also proposed the relocation of 

the dangerous Futenma base in Okinawa135 After the rape and subsequent uproar in 1995, 

both Japan and the U.S. agreed to apply SOFA in 

an “optimal manner” for Japanese parties. In cases 

of heinous crimes such as rape, the defendants 

are directly placed into custody with the Japanese 

authorities. 136 In 2000, the Okinawa Prefecture filed 

a petition with the Japanese and U.S. governments 

requesting the review of the 11 Articles of the SOFA. 

Following another rape in 2003 in Okinawa, 14 

Prefectures have requested the revision of SOFA. 137 

Case Study: The K2 Problem 

In October 2001, the U.S. set up the Karshi- 

Khanabad air base (K2) in southern Uzbekistan to 

launch operations into Afghanistan. in March 2002, 

President Bush and Uzbek President Islam Karimov 

The former U.S. K2 airbase in Uzbekistan. 

signed a broader strategic cooperation agreement, 

calling for a partnership in the war on terrorism and 

establishing ties between U.S. and Uzbek military 

and security services. The U.S. paid US$15 million for 

use of the airfield. As a tacit quid pro quo, the u.S. 

also provided US$120 million in military hardware 

and surveillance equipment to the Uzbek army, 

US$82 million to the country’s security services, and 

US$55 million in credits from the U.S Export-Import 

Bank. In return, the Uzbek government would allow 

the U.S. to use the airfield and pledged to speed up 

democratization, improve its human rights record, 

and promote greater press freedoms. Few in the 

West criticized the agreement because it was widely 

hailed as a necessary step in the United States’ Afghan 

campaign efforts. 138 

While the u.S. continued its operations in 

Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003, U.S. officials turned 

a blind eye the Uzbek government’s failure to full 

its commitments regarding democratization, human 

rights, and press freedom. In January 2002, Karimov 

unilaterally extended his term until 2007, hurting the 

progress of democracy in the country. Furthermore, 

there was a steady increase in political jailing that 

the Uzbek security services were conducting in the 

28 


name of counterterrorism. At the same time, the u.S. 

practiced “extraordinary rendition,” where it shipped 

dozens of terrorist suspects to Uzbekistan knowing 

that law enforcement officials there routinely employ 

torture. 139 

The U.S. policy community began to show signs 

of discomfort with the arrangement staring in the 

summer of 2004. In July, the State Department 

rescinded US$18 million in aid to Uzbekistan because 

of human rights violations. However, a month later, 

the Department of Defense awarded Uzbekistan 

uS$21 million in weapons transfers and military 

assistance. 140 

The tension erupted in 2005. In May, Uzbek security 

forces attacked thousands of demonstrators, led by 

armed militants, who were protesting the conviction 

of 23 Uzbek businessmen accused of being Muslim 

extremists. Uzbek government officials claimed that 

the militants led a prison break, captured a local 

police station and military barracks, and took several 

hostages. However, human rights organizations 

reported that the demonstration comprised mostly 

of unarmed citizens protesting local police and 

economic policies. International nongovernmental 

organizations such as the International Crisis Group 

and Human Rights Watch have estimated the death 

toll at 700 to 800. 141 

Because the u.S. was afraid of losing access 

to Uzbek air bases, some U.S. officials including 

President Bush’s advisers were reluctant to criticize 

the Uzbek government. Soon after, however, 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly backed 

an international inquiry. In addition, a bipartisan 

group of U.S. senators launched an investigation to 

determine whether any of the Uzbek security troops 

involved in the crackdown had received U.S. training 

or equipment. In response to the scrutiny, Uzbek 

officials began limiting nighttime and cargo flights to 

and from K2 and complaining about payment issues 

and environmental damage relating to use of the 

base. 142 

In July 2006, the arrangement broke down. After 

the United States backed a UN effort to airlift Uzbek 

refugees from neighboring Kyrgyzstan to Romania 

against the wishes of the Uzbek government. Uzbek 

officials activated a termination clause in the K2 base 

agreement that required the U.S. military to close the 

facility within 180 days and dispelled any lingering 

illusion that the Uzbek regime was a reliable security 

partner. For Karimov, expelling the United States 

ingratiated him with Moscow and Beijing and gave 

him a chance to consolidate public support in the face 

of U.S. meddling in local affairs. 143 

Case Study: Kyrgyzstan 

The United States’ decision to establish a military 

base in Kyrgyzstan has also been a complicated 

matter. U.S. officials have faced tricky political 

tradeoffs related to the operation of Ganci Air Base, 

established in 2001 with the consent of then president 

Askar Akayev. The purpose of the base is to support 

Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. and NATO 

war in Afghanistan. 144 Prior to the basing agreement, 

Akayev had increasingly entrenched his rule and 

let democratization efforts backslide. 145 The basing 

agreement gave Akayev’s regime new international 

credibility by distracting Western attention from his 

abuses and anointing him as a partner in the U.S.-led 

war on terrorism. The small Kyrgyz economy also 

benefited from the fees and business generated by 

the air base, which account for five to ten percent of 

Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. At the same time, Kyrgyz security 

services, who obtained military hardware and 

surveillance equipment as a result of the deal, began 

emphasizing and exaggerating the threat of Islamic 

extremism to secure continued u.S. assistance. in 

November 2003, they claimed to have uncovered 

a plot to bomb Ganci Air Base and allegedly caught 

three members of a radical Islamic organization 

29 


A U.S. military base in Kyrgystan. 

with explosives and blueprints of the base. But U.S. 

officials and Kyrgyz political observers are skeptical 

about the details of the plot and the circumstances 

of the arrests. 146 

With the overthrow of Akayev in 2005, the 

U.S. faced difficulty with his successors. In a joint 

statement issued on 5 July 2005, the Shanghai 

Cooperative Organization, which consists of China, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan, declared that the U.S. military bases in 

Central Asia had outlived their purpose of supporting 

the Afghan campaign and should be closed. During his 

first press conference, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev 

announced that the Kyrgyz government would press 

Washington about the necessity of keeping the 

base. 147 

In addition to possibly relocating some activities 

from K2 to Kyrgyzstan, U.S. officials are exploring other 

options in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, 

where the united States has occasionally used 

airfields for refueling stop. A visit by Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Azerbaijan in August 

2005 increased speculation that Washington may be 

considering establishing a military presence there, 

too. 148 

Key Actors: 

United States 

in the aftermath of the Second World War, the 

United States embraced a worldwide military presence 

through its use of overseas bases and installations. 

Despite predictions of a global drawdown in its 

overseas military presence, the United States has, 

particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on 

the Pentagon and World trade Center expanded the 

scope of its global overseas military presence. At the 

same time, it has reduced its deployments in major 

Cold War hubs such as Germany, Japan, and Korea. 149 

Most base and access agreements take the form 

of a bilateral contract signed with the government or 

regime of a base host. Overseas host governments 

usually must provide legal consent to a foreign 

military presence. the united States usually has 

acquired its bases through direct negotiations and 

the creation of contracts with host countries or 

by imposing legal obligations in the aftermath of a 

30 


The global military presence of the United States. 

conflict or occupation of the host name. But even 

where the U.S. obtained basing rights as a result of 

military occupation, and therefore imposed a highly 

asymmetric accord, U.S. officials found them forced 

to renegotiate the basing contract on terms more 

favorable to the base hosts. 150 

Bilateral base access agreements vary between 

the United States and different host countries. These 

agreements can take the form of formal bilateral 

treaties, tacit agreements, executive agreements, 

military-to-military protocols, and/or exchanges of 

diplomatic notes. In some cases, basing agreements 

comprise aspects of broader security agreements 

or mutual defense pacts. For example, the United 

States-Japan Mutual Security Treat has governed 

both U.S. basing rights and its security relations with 

Japan since 1960. 151 

The U.S. and host countries also bundle basing rights 

into broader bilateral accords that set a framework 

for security cooperation, economic assistance, and 

military aid. the “defense and economic cooperation 

agreements” (DECAs) signed between the U.S., 

Greece, Spain, and Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s 

are an example. A few arrangements take a more 

informal form, such as that associated with the longstanding 

American military installations in the united 

Kingdom. Others are governed by non-security 

accords such as the U.S.-U.K. Treaty on intelligence 

sharing which legally underpins the stationing of u.S. 

joint-use installations in Australia. 152 

The length of the agreements also varies. Some 

contracts grant the united States access for a 

specified period of time before becoming subject to 

renewal and renegotiation. Others persist indefinitely 

until the parties agree to terminate the arrangement. 

Agreements may remain secret or classified at the 

behest of the host government while others are 

ratified by a host country’s legislature. 153 

Basing agreements differ with respect to the types 

of issues that they govern. Basing agreements may 

detail or set ceilings on the number of troops that 

can be stationed or rotated in the host. It may also 

impose restrictions on the types of military hardware 

or weapons. In addition, they may specifically 

31 


The U.S. global military presence in 2007. 

address issues of sovereignty, such as which country 

legally controls or polices the basing territory, the 

permissions and consultation procedures necessary 

for base operations, the types of activities that the 

bases can be used for and the criminal jurisdiction and 

other legal procedures that apply to foreign troops 

stationed on the base. 154 

Basing agreements also differ in the type of quid 

pro quo offered by the parties to the arrangement. 

Although U.S. officials consistently refuse to label 

economic packages as “rent” hosts often grant base 

rights in exchange for substantial compensation 

packages. On the other hand, certain countries, most 

notably Japan and Korea, now defray the costs of the 

stationing of U.S. troops by providing sizable bundles 

of host country support. 155 

Host countries often demand ostensibly unrelated 

political concessions in exchange for granting access. 

For example, the government of Portugal threatened 

during the 1960s to evict the U.S. from base facilities 

in the mid-Atlantic Azores if the U.S. government 

did not stop supporting liberation movements in 

Portugal’s African colonies. Thus, the exact terms and 

conditions that govern the deployment of personnel 

and assets, sovereignty rights, and side-payments 

vary considerably across space and time. 156 

Legal provisions of base contracts vary. The 

most important of these are the Status of Forces 

Agreements (SOFAs), which detail the legal status, 

rights, and obligations of U.S. personnel while 

stationed in the host country. SOFAs cover such 

issues as the freedom of movement of American 

troops, their tax status in host country, import and 

export rights and duties, drivers’ licenses, registration 

fees, entitlements, and any other areas in which the 

presence of U.S. forces must be reconciled with the 

laws of a host country. 157 

The U.S. classifies its military facilities according 

to size, location, and geostrategic purpose. 158 the 

largest military bases are called Main Operating Bases. 

These installations have permanently stationed U.S. 

troops, extensive command and control facilities, 

fortified defenses, logistical support infrastructure, 

and supplementary facilities that accommodate 

the families of garrisoned U.S. military service 

personnel. These bases symbolize the United States’ 

ongoing political commitments to key allies and the 

main geostrategic hubs of U.S. power around the 

world. 159 examples of Main Operating Bases include 

Ramstein Air Base in Germany, Kadena Air Base 

in Japan, and Camp Humphreys in South Korea. 160 

The next category of bases, Forward Operating 

32 


A U.S. forward operating base in Afghanistan. 

Sites, includes smaller facilities that do not have 

permanently garrisoned u.S. troops. in times of crisis, 

these installations can be rapidly reinforced and 

serve as a base of operations. The purpose of these 

installations includes the development of bilateral 

relations between the U.S. military and the military 

forces of the host nation. 161 examples of Forward 

Operating Sites include the Sembawang dockyards in 

Singapore and the Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. 

the third category, Cooperative Security Locations, 

have little or no permanent U.S. military presence. 

These installations serve as a platform through which 

the u.S. can conduct peace support operations and 

security cooperation activities. 162 

Establishing bases has huge strategic costs for 

the united States. u.S. support for authoritarian 

governments can breed just the kind of opposition or 

radicalism that American bases are indirectly designed 

to stem. Basing agreements offer propaganda 

opportunities for both legitimate opposition groups 

and extremists. The presence of a U.S. base in a 

nondemocratic state can generate more extremists 

than it stops. For example, the 1996 terrorist attack 

on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia where U.S. 

troops were housed emboldened Islamic extremists 

to call for the complete withdrawal of u.S. forces 

from the Arabian Peninsula. The attack raised security 

concerns for Washington but also suggested to the 

Saudi government that U.S. military presence was 

a domestic political threat. Consequently, in 2003, 

Washington was compelled to withdraw 5,000 troops 

from Saudi Arabia. 163 

Furthermore, dealing with nondemocratic regimes 

is inherently problematic. It is commonly believed 

that entering into agreements with dictators 

guarantees the arrangements’ longevity because 

such regimes are less vulnerable than democracies 

to shifts in public opinion. However, experts now 

believe that operating without the restrictions of a 

constitution, an independent judiciary, and an elected 

legislature makes it easier for authoritarian regimes 

to violate treaties such as military basing agreements. 

Agreements with authoritarian states only last as long 

as the ruling regime does because the status of such 

33 


treaties is subject to the regime’s fortunes rather than 

to a lasting institutional framework. For example, in 

the past, the United States has been expelled when 

its autocratic allies have been toppled. In 1969, the 

U.S. lost access to Wheelus Air Base in Libya when 

Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi took power. In 1979, 

when Mohammad Rez Pahlavi’s regime collapsed, 

the u.S. lost access to its electronic listening posts in 

northern iran. 164 

When democratic governments take over in 

authoritarian countries, U.S. bases are vulnerable to 

backlash. In post-authoritarian elections in Thailand 

(1975), Greece (1981), and South Korea (1997 and 

2002), opposition leaders won office by campaign 

against the U.S. military presence, explicitly linking 

U.S. bases to Washington’s support for previous 

nondemocratic regimes. in some cases, new 

democratic governments challenge the validity of 

preexisting basing agreements that result in the 

curtailment of U.S. rights and eventual expulsion. For 

example, in the late 1980s, the Spanish Socialist Party 

refused to extend a basing agreement with the U.S. 

for access to the Torrejon air base near Madrid. 165 

In consolidated democracies, governments honor 

their commitments to basing agreements because 

those deals are guaranteed by an established legal 

order. For example, even though the government 

of Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 

withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq shortly after he 

was elected in March 2004, it continued to honor a 

preexisting agreement, allowing the u.S. unhindered 

use of its naval station at Rota and its air base in 

Moron in support of the Iraq campaign. 166 

Recently, experts have debated how the United 

States can best use military bases abroad to ensure 

its security. The attacks of September 11, 2001 also 

convinced the Defense Department to rethink the 

overseas deployment of U.S. troops. To support 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the 

United States established air bases in Kyrgyzstan, 

Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. It also signed agreements 

for re-fueling rights and airspace access throughout 

Central Asia. In 2003, the U.S. used airfields and 

ports in Bulgaria and Romania to support its military 

campaign in Iraq. The latest major development 

of the U.S. in regards to military bases is the Global 

Defense Posture Review (GDPR). 167 

The GDPR calls for increasing the number 

of overseas U.S. facilities by replacing and 

supplementing large Cold War-era bases in Germany, 

Japan, and South Korea with smaller facilities known 

as forward operating sites and cooperative security 

locations. These FOBs and COPs will be used against 

sources of regional instability, covering areas where 

the United States has traditionally been absent. Likely 

areas where the bases will be established include 

Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania) 

and Africa (Algeria, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 

Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Uganda). 

The U.S. expansion in Africa is noteworthy because 

it is accompanied by increased military-to-military 

cooperation such as the Pan Sahel Initiative, under 

which the u.S. military is assisting Chad, Niger, Mali, 

and Mauritania in efforts to stem local terrorism. 

These FOBs and COPs are designed to have maximal 

operational flexibility with minimal political downsides 

and few limitations on U.S. access. The hope is that by 

maintaining a lighter footprint Washington will avoid 

some of the problems that have arisen in connection 

with larger U.S. deployments in South Korean and 

Okinawa, Japan. 168 

The U.S. is currently expanding and reconfiguring 

its overseas base network to cope with a new 

strategic posture this realignment is taking place 

during a period of increasing globalization in 

international politics. The rise of globalization is likely 

to place increasing cross-pressures on u.S. relations 

with these new base hosts in areas such as Africa, 

34 


Central Asia and the Black Sea. At the same time, U.S. 

planners believe that the relatively small size, flexible 

structure, and temporary nature of these bases will 

reduce opposition to their presence among host 

countries. 

The GDPR and the Rise of the More Flexible Base 

The Pentagon’s current Global Defense Posture 

Review (GDPR) marks the first fundamental 

transformation of U.S. basing posture since WWII 

as U.S. defense planners adjust to new strategy 

imperatives such as the global war on terror. The 

GDPR will reduce U.S. forces in several major Cold 

War base hosts (especially in Germany, Korea, and 

Japan) and will establish a global network of smaller, 

more flexible facilities such as Forward Operating 

Sites (FOSs) and Cooperative Security Locations 

(CSLs). These new-style bases will be located in 

several regions where the U.S. has not traditionally 

maintained a presence, including Africa (Djibouti and 

Kenya), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) 

and the Black Sea (Bulgaria and Romania). 169 through 

this new initiative, the U.S. wants to abandon its 

traditional role as an “offshore balancer” and more 

directly engage regional threats such as terrorists, 

armed gangs, and insurgents. These lighter FOSs and 

CSLs lack the extensive hub of housing complexes, 

social, and recreational facilities that have traditionally 

characterized U.S. bases and instead contain 

barebones facilities that can be expanded in a time 

of crisis. U.S. negotiators are also seeking guarantees 

of “strategic flexibility” from new base hosts, or 

the right to use the bases for various operational 

purposes without having to secure prior approval 

from the host country. 170 

Impact of Globalization 

Globalizing forces increase the autonomy and exit 

option of weak states. Increasing Chinese financial 

and “soft power” influence, Russian assertiveness, 

and even the activities of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, 

complicate American influence by providing 

alternative sources of economic and military support. 

On the other hand, growing forms of complex 

interdependence grant militarily weak states new 

pathways of leverage over the U.S. 171 

The GDPR, with its emphasis on more flexible and 

temporary bases and access arrangements of FOSs 

and CSLs, is likely to further bolster the autonomy 

and exit options of base hosts. First, the very fact that 

U.S. policymakers emphasize the non-permanent 

nature of these facilities make it more difficult for 

U.S. officials to convince potentially welcoming base 

hosts that u.S. forces will commit to a long-term 

stay. Furthermore, the move away from heavy bases 

affords U.S. officials fewer instruments – such as aid 

guarantees, promises of economic development 

in base hosting locales – to offer as concessions to 

host countries. Faced with the prospect having to 

provide quid pro quo to new base hosts, U.S. officials 

face the politically problematic choice of having to 

provide tacit or private goods, which risks future 

criticism and contractual renegotiation in the event 

of a regime change, or offer no quid pro quo at all, 

which diminishes the benefits that any given base 

host derives from a U.S. presence. 

Increased Hypocrisy Costs 

In recent years, there has been significant evidence 

of rising hypocrisy costs across the America’s basing 

network. The use of the American global basing 

network for activities is often seemingly at odds with 

American justifications of promoting human rights 

and democratization and this has proven damaging 

to U.S. legitimacy and credibility. 172 

Two globally damaging stories of inconsistent U.S. 

behavior involve its use of overseas bases for activities 

that contravene international norms and law. The 

first example is the use of Guantanamo Bay Naval 

Base as an extra-territorial facility for the detention 

of terrorist suspects and enemy combatants. The 

35 


second example concerns allegations that the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) took advantage of the 

U.S. network of global bases to transport prisoners 

to third-party countries where they were tortured 

during interrogation. In 2006, Swiss rapporteur and 

Senator Dick Marty presented a report to the Council 

of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly that alleged that 

14 European countries had collaborated to facilitate a 

spider’s web of illegal flights. The report also alleged 

that the u.S. operated on-site prisons and detention 

facilities on military bases in Kosovo, Romania, and 

Poland. 173 

Public opinion polls provide evidence that these 

hypocrisy costs have inflicted considerable damage 

on America’s international prestige and legitimacy. 

In January 2007 an international poll of over 26,000 

respondents from 25 countries conducted by the 

Program on international Policy Attitudes indicated 

that 67% of participants disapproved of the U.S. 

government’s treatment of Guantanamo detainees, 

while the overall view of the U.S. role in world 

affairs as “mainly negative” had risen from 46% in 

2005 to 52% in 2007. The same poll found that 67% of 

respondents believed that U.S. forces in the Middle 

East “provokes more conflict than it prevents,” 

compared with 17% that view it as a stabilizing force. 

While the costs of anti-Americanism are often difficult 

to assess, increasing public hostility to the U.S. has 

complicated its ability to negotiate favorable basing 

agreements. 174 

Mobilization of Transnational Anti-Base Movement 

Globalization affords more opportunities to 

non-state actors to network and mobilize across 

peripheries. The rise of transnational networks 

of NGOs has been facilitated by the rise of cheap 

information technologies like the Internet, cell 

phones, and new media. these technologies allow 

even small NGOs to project their claims on a global 

level. 

Consistent with the rise of other transitional NGOs 

in other domains, anti-base NGOs and coalitions have 

proliferated throughout the 1990s and 2000s, first 

networking disparate movements within countries 

into anti-base coalitions and then extending 

across borders. These groups now stage anti-base 

campaigns and highlight base-related issues such 

as the environmental impact of bases, crimes and 

accidents involving U.S. troops, the terms of the 

SOFA, and the sex trade surrounding U.S. troops 

presence. 175 Anti-base movements from around 

the world have begun to hold joint conferences, 

including a 2003 conference in Jakarta in which NGOs 

from 26 countries participated and produced the 

joint declaration “Jakarta Peace Consensus” that 

demanded the removal of U.S. overseas bases. In 

March 2007, the new International Coalition for the 

Abolition of Foreign Military Bases held the largest 

anti-base conference to date in Ecuador, with the 

participation of 400 activists from over 40 individual 

countries. 176 

The demonstration effects of global anti-base 

campaigns have even prompted new anti-base 

protests to emerge in countries such as Turkey and 

Italy, hosts that historically have witnessed very little 

anti-base protests by domestic civil society groups. 

For example, in Turkey during the 2003 run-up to 

the vote in the Turkish parliament to authorize the 

use of Turkish territory to the U.S. military, anti-base 

groups organized unprecedented anti-war rallies and 

protests. Similarly, in February 2007, tens of thousands 

of demonstrators took to the street of Vicenza to 

protest the Italian government’s plan to expand 

the base at Vicenza to accommodate additional 

u.S. troops from Germany. the demonstrations in 

Italy actually precipitated a “no confidence” vote 

that briefly brought down Romano Prodi’s left-wing 

political coalition and were remarkable for a host 

country that traditionally has been one of the most 

36 


supportive of U.S. presence. 177 

Re-Emergent Russia 

After World War II, the Soviet Union used military 

bases as a way to counter the United States’ 

containment policy. The Soviets tightened control 

over its satellite states and built military bases on 

their territories. Furthermore, they built bases to 

station troops in countries close to the u.S. and 

its allies. The success of the Cuban Revolution in 

1959 brought a new ally into the Soviet’s sphere of 

influence. Soon afterward, the Soviets built a vast 

military infrastructure on the island. elsewhere 

in the developing world, the Soviets stationed 

military personnel in Angola, Egypt, Finland, Guinea, 

Libya, Mongolia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Yugoslavia, 

and Vietnam. 178 After the break-up of the Soviet 

Union, Russian troops withdrew from bases in East 

Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the 

Baltic states. By 1994, the Russian Federation had 

only 28 foreign bases in the former territory of the 

Soviet Union. By 2002, Russia had closed its military 

installations in Cuba and Vietnam. Domestic factors, 

budgetary constraints, and external politico-military 

reasons were behind this shift. 179 

Rising China 

In 2010, the Chinese government announced 

intentions of establishing military bases beyond its 

own borders, including in neighboring Pakistan. This 

was a significant move due to the implications for 

the balance of power within the region. A base in 

Pakistan would allow China to further counter India’s 

rising influence. At the same time, it could increase 

ties with Pakistan by offering military protection in 

the form of military bases. 180 Furthermore, the base 

would give the Chinese military another springboard 

from which it could quell separatist unrest in the 

Uighur-populated Xinjiang region. 181 

Until this century, China has no military bases 

outside its territory and has often criticized the United 

States for operating overseas bases. However, since 

the early 21st century, China has started building a 

number of commercial harbors, naval stations, and 

listening posts that link the Sanya naval dockyard on 

Hainan Island to the Middle East. Beijing describes 

these facilities as the “String of Pearls” that dovetail 

Chinese energy supply routes to the Middle east and 

east Africa. 182 

Europe 

From the mid-fifteenth to the mid-twentieth 

centuries, European nations have operated overseas 

military installations and trading posts. 183 Portugal 

and Spain were the first nations to do so. They 

built harbors and forts around the littorals of South 

America and West Africa during the 15th and 16th centuries to protect the burgeoning colonies of 

the time. The Netherlands followed suit in the 17th centuries and erect military structures along its trade 

routes leading to Southeast Asia. From the 18th to the 

mid-20th century, France and the U.K. built military 

installations that linked their homelands to the rest 

of their empires. 184 Currently, France and the United 

Kingdom still maintain a large number of overseas 

military installations in geopolitically sensitive 

regions such as the Middle east and northern Africa. 

Taken together, the number of European military 

installations is second only that of the u.S. 185 

The size and scope of these military installations vary 

greatly. in some locations, military facilities comprise 

of a few small buildings that are used as storage 

depots. At the other end of the spectrum, facilities 

could include barracks for hundreds of troops, large 

naval stations, or full-scale aerodromes. 186 

Past uN Actions 

Past United Nations Actions on the subject 

of foreign military bases has been limited. In 19 

December 1967, the 22nd Session of the uN General 

Assembly passed resolution 2344 regarding the 

elimination of foreign military bases in the countries 

37 


of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 187 the resolution 

merely requested that “the Conference of the 

eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament resume 

consideration of the question of the elimination 

of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, 

Africa and Latin America, in accordance with General 

Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI).” 

In 1994, the UN published the Oslo Guidelines 

with the aim of establishing the basic framework 

for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and 

efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defense 

assets in international disaster relief operations. 188 

the intended audience of the guidelines included uN 

humanitarian agencies and their implementing and 

operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian 

Coordinators, uN MCdA commanders and 

commanders of other deployed forces performing 

missions in support of the uN humanitarian agencies, 

and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian 

activities with foreign military forces. In November 

2007, the UN Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published and update 

of the “Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and 

Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief.” 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

(QARMA) 

1. Should there be legal repercussions for 

countries offering explicit or implicit economic 

incentives in return for the establishment of 

military bases in host countries? 

2. What kind of military bases should countries be 

allowed to deploy abroad? 

3. Should soldiers stationed abroad receive legal 

immunity? 

4. What is the optimal amount of legal jurisdiction 

the host nation should have over a foreign 

military base? 

5. How should the foreign country compensate 

the host nation for environmental, economic, 

and other damages? 

6. Should there be an international body that 

resolves disputes involving foreign military 

bases and host countries? 

Suggestions for Further Research 

the sources i found most helpful were policy papers 

written by academics and national organizations like 

the European Commission. Furthermore, the research 

reports compiled by international organizations were 

very informative. 

These are just suggestions. Feel free to explore 

topics mentioned in more detail if you are interested 

and to explore other topics mentioned only in briefing. 

The issue of sovereign debt has numerous aspects, 

only a small part of which has been mentioned in this 

guide. Don’t hesitate to reach out to me if necessary! 

Position Papers 

Two position papers will be submitted, one for each 

topic. the position papers will follow the common 

WorldMUN format of approximately 2 double spaced 

pages per topic, 12 point times New Roman font. 

Position papers must present information in a clear, 

succinct manner, and shall not exceed 4 double 

spaced (12 point font) pages. Position papers are 

essential to organizing one’s thoughts, conducting 

research, and developing creative solutions to the 

problems posed in the study guide. 

Closing Remarks 

Model United Nations was developed to provide 

young individuals with knowledge about international 

relations and global issues, while at the same time 

offering experience with diplomacy. Your passion 

and interest about the topics that are discussed in 

committee are what stimulate the dynamic debate, 

promote the instructive atmosphere, and produce 

the thoughtful resolutions that will come out of this 

experience. The dedication and knowledge that you 

38 


ing to the conference and the time that you invest 

for its preparation will determine its success, for you 

and for other delegates. i understand that this may 

not be an easy task, but I am confident that will rise 

to the challenge. In return, the dais staff promises to 

bring professionalism, enthusiasm, and dedication 

to the conference. Together, we hope to make 

WorldMuN 2013 a truly rewarding experience. 

Please feel free to contact me if you have any 

questions or concerns, whether about your research, 

or any other aspect of the conference. i am always 

happy to help. I wish you the best of luck with all 

of your endeavors throughout the year, and I look 

forward to meeting you at the conference. 

Bibliography 

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N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“Arctic Ocean.” Arctic Ocean. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

“Base Politics.” , Democratic Change and the U.S. 

Military Overseas. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Bracking, Sarah. “Why Is Establishing the Arctic 

as Common Heritage so Important?.” 

Theafricareport.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Jan. 

2012. 

“China Mulls Setting up Military Base in Pakistan.” 

The Times Of India. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“China Plans Foreign Military Bases, How the US 

Should Respond.” National Security Law Brief 

RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Cooley, Alexander, and daniel Nexon. “Bases of 

Empire: Globalization and the Politics of U.S. 

Overseas Basing.” (2007): n. pag. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

Cooley, Alexander. Base Politics: Democratic Change 

and the U.S. Military Overseas. ithaca: Cornell uP, 

2008. Print. 

Dasgupta, Saibal. “China Mulls Setting up Military 

Base in Pakistan.” The Times Of India. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural 

disaster Response.” Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute. N.p., 2008. Web. 26 

dec. 2012. 

“Fact Sheet: The Impact of Military Bases.” Greens 

MPs. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

France-Presse, Agence. “Uzbekistan Lawmakers Ban 

Foreign Military Bases.” Defense News. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Gerken, James. “Arctic Climate Change Opening 

Region To New Military Activity.” The Huffington 

Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 

26 Dec. 2012. 

“Information on the 1995 Rape Incident and the 

Protests That Followed.” Information on the 1995 

Rape Incident and the Protests That Followed. 

N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Johnson, Robert. “This Could Be Part Of The Reason 

Iran Is So Darn Defensive.” Business Insider. N.p., 

n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Lachowski, Zdzislaw. “Foreign Military Bases in 

eurasia.” SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute, June 2007. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

“Legal Status of the Arctic.” Encyclopedia.com. N.p., 

2005. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Lim, Teck Ghee., and Mark J. Valencia. Conflict over 

Natural Resources in South-east Asia and the 

Pacific. Singapore: United Nations UP, 1990. 

Print. 

“Operation Enduring Freedom - Operations.” 

Operation Enduring Freedom. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 

dec. 2012. 

Pajon, Celine. “Understanding the Issue of U.S. 

Military Bases in Okinawa.” Center for Asian 

Studies, June 2010. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Pan, Zhongqi. “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/ 

Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from 

the Chinese Perspective.” Arctic Ocean. N.p., 

n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

Peterson, J.E. “Foreign Military Presence and Its Role 

in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged 

Sword.” (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 26 Dec. 2012.

sitebuilderfiles/Foreign_Military_Presence_in_ 

the_Gulf.pdf>. 

“Race for the Arctic: Who Owns the Region’s 

Undiscovered Oil and Gas?” CQ Global Research. 

N.p., Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage.” department of defense, 

May 2011. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“Save the Arctic.” Greenpeace. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

“the Africa Report.” Theafricareport.com. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“the Status and Location of the Military installations 

of the Member States of the European Union 

and their Potential Role for the european 

Security and defense Policy.” Directorate 

General External Policies of the Union. european 

Parliament, Feb. 2009. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

“UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI - Preamble and 

Frame Index.” UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 26 

dec. 2012. 

“The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To 

Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities 

in Complex Emergencies.” N.p., Mar. 2003. Web. 

26 Dec. 2012. 

UN General Assembly, Elimination of foreign military 

bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 

America, 19 December 1967, A/RES/2344. 

Endnotes 

1 http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm 

2 http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml 

3 http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml 

4 http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ 

5 Lim, Teck Ghee., and Mark J. Valencia. Conflict over 

Natural Resources in South-east Asia and the Pacific. 

Singapore: United Nations UP, 1990. Print. 

6 Ibid 

7 Ibid 

8 Ibid 

9 Ibid 

10 Dzurek, Daniel. “China Occupies Mischief Reef IN 

Latest Spratly Gambit.” N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

11 Ibid 

12 Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for 

Research,” International Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4 

(Autumn 1990), 73. 

13 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy 

of an Institution,” International Organization, Vol. 

46, No. 3 (Summer 1992), 566. 

14 Lim, Teck Ghee., and Mark J. Valencia. Conflict over 

Natural Resources in South-east Asia and the Pacific. 

Singapore: United Nations UP, 1990. Print. 

15 Ibid 

16 Ibid 

17 Ibid 

18 Ibid 

19 Ibid 

20 Ross Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly 

islands,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 23, 

No. 4 (Winter 1997), 196. 

21 Pan, Zhongqi. “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the 

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy 

from the Chinese Perspective.” Arctic Ocean. N.p., 

n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

22 Ibid 

23 Ibid 

24 Ibid 

25 Ibid 

26 Ibid 

27 Ibid 

28 Ibid 

29 Ibid 

30 Ibid 

31 Ibid 

32 Ibid 

33 Ibid 

34 Ibid 

35 Ibid 

36 “Race for the Arctic: Who Owns the Region’s 

Undiscovered Oil and Gas?” CQ Global Research. N.p., 

Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

37 Ibid 

38 “the Africa Report.” Theafricareport.com. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

39 Ibid 

40 “Arctic Ocean.” Arctic Ocean. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

41 Ibid 

42 Ibid 

43 Ibid 

44 “Save the Arctic.” Greenpeace. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 

dec. 2012. 

45 Race for the Arctic: Who Owns the Region’s 


Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

46 Ibid 

40 


47 Gerken, James. “Arctic Climate Change Opening 

Region To New Military Activity.” The Huffington 

Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 26 

dec. 2012. 



Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

49 Ibid 

50 Ibid 

51 Ibid 

52 Ibid 

53 Ibid 

54 Ibid 

55 Ibid 

56 Ibid 

57 Ibid 

58 Ibid 

59 Ibid 

60 “Arctic Ocean.” Arctic Ocean. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 



Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

62 Ibid 

63 Ibid 

64 Ibid 

65 Ibid 

66 Ibid 

67 “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the 

Northwest Passage.” department of defense, May 

2011. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

68 Ibid 

69 Ibid 

70 “UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI - Preamble and 

Frame Index.” UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

71 Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the 


2011. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

72 Ibid 

73 Ibid 

74 “UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI - Preamble and 

Frame Index.” UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

75 “Antarctic Treaty, 1959.” The Antarctic Treaty (1959). 

N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

76 Bracking, Sarah. “Why Is Establishing the Arctic as 

Common Heritage so Important? “ Theafricareport. 

com. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Jan. 2012. 



Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

78 Ibid 

79 The Race to the arctic, 14, “Swedish oil company joins 

hunt for oil and gas in greenland) 

80 Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the 


2011. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

81 Ibid 



Aug. 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

83 Lachowski, Zdzislaw. “Foreign Military Bases in 


Research Institute, June 2007. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

84 Ibid 

85 Ibid 

86 Ibid 

87 Ibid 

88 Ibid 

89 Peterson, J.E. “Foreign Military Presence and Its Role 

in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged 

Sword.” Web. 26 Dec. 2012. . 

90 Ibid 

91 Ibid 

92 Ibid 

93 Ibid 

94 “Fact Sheet: The Impact of Military Bases.” Greens 


95 Ibid 

96 Ibid 

97 Ibid 

98 Ibid 

99 Ibid 

100 Ibid 

101 Johnson, Robert. “This Could Be Part Of The Reason 

Iran Is So Darn Defensive.” Business Insider. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

102 Fact Sheet: The Impact of Military Bases.” Greens 


103 “The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in 

Natural disaster Response.” Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute. N.p., 2008. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

104 Ibid 

105 Ibid 

106 Ibid 

107 Ibid 

108 Ibid 

109 Ibid 

110 Ibid 

111 Ibid 

41 


112 Ibid 

113 Ibid 

114 Ibid 

115 France-Presse, Agence. “Uzbekistan Lawmakers 

Ban Foreign Military Bases.” Defense News. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

116 Ibid 

117 France-Presse, Agence. “Uzbekistan Lawmakers 

Ban Foreign Military Bases.” Defense News. N.p., n.d. 

Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

118 Ibid 

119 Pajon, Celine. “Understanding the Issue of U.S. 

Military Bases in Okinawa.” Center for Asian Studies, 

June 2010. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

120 Ibid 

121 Ibid 

122 Ibid 

123 Ibid 

124 Ibid 

125 Ibid 

126 Ibid 

127 Ibid 

128 Ibid 

129 “Information on the 1995 Rape Incident and the 

Protests That Followed.” Information on the 1995 

Rape Incident and the Protests That Followed. N.p., 

n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

130 Ibid 

131 Ibid 

132 Ibid 

133 Ibid 

134 Ibid 

135 Ibid 

136 Ibid 

137 Ibid 

138 “Base Politics.” , Democratic Change and the U.S. 

Military Overseas. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

139 Ibid 

140 Ibid 

141 Ibid 

142 Ibid 

143 Ibid 

144 Ibid 

145 “Operation Enduring Freedom - Operations.” 

Operation Enduring Freedom. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 

2012. 

146 Ibid 

147 Ibid 

148 Ibid 

149 Cooley, Alexander, and daniel Nexon. “Bases 

of Empire: Globalization and the Politics of U.S. 

Overseas Basing.” (2007): n. pag. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

150 Ibid 

151 Ibid 

152 Ibid 

153 Ibid 

154 Ibid 

155 Ibid 

156 Ibid 

157 Ibid 




159 “the Status and Location of the Military installations 

of the Member States of the European Union and 

their Potential Role for the european Security and 

defense Policy.” Directorate General External Policies 

of the Union. European Parliament, Feb. 2009. Web. 

26 Dec. 2012. 

160 Ibid 

161 Ibid 






26 Dec. 2012. 

163 Cooley, Alexander. Base Politics: Democratic Change 

and the U.S. Military Overseas. ithaca: Cornell uP, 

2008. Print. 

164 Ibid 

165 Ibid 

166 Ibid 

167 Ibid 

168 Ibid 

169 Ibid 

170 Ibid 

171 Ibid 

172 Cooley, Alexander, and daniel Nexon. “Bases 

of Empire: Globalization and the Politics of U.S. 

Overseas Basing.” (2007): n. pag. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

173 Ibid 

174 Ibid 

175 Ibid 

176 Ibid 

177 Ibid 




179 Ibid 

180 “China Mulls Setting up Military Base in Pakistan.” 

The Times Of India. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 

181 “China Plans Foreign Military Bases, How the US 

Should Respond.” National Security Law Brief RSS. 

42 


N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 






26 Dec. 2012. 

183 Ibid 

184 Ibid 

185 Ibid 

186 Ibid 

187 UN General Assembly, Elimination of foreign military 

bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 

19 December 1967, A/RES/2344. 

188 “The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To 

Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in 

Complex Emergencies.” N.p., Mar. 2003. Web. 26 

dec. 2012. 

43 


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