cases, namely EU computer price reductions equal to the US and (ii) the case of only a 50% price reduction, which might reflect various impediments to low prices in Europe, including government regulations in Germany forbidding high rebates on products (this law is being abolished in late 2001). At the bottom line the contribution of ICT to potential output growth in the US has been about twice as high as in the EU-15. Among EU countries only Ireland, itself strongly shaped by US multinational investment in ICT, showed a growth contribution of ICT exceeding that in the US in the 1990s. Disregarding Ireland only Sweden, Finland, the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium came within a range of about two-thirds of US figures in 1995-99. With a direct ICT investment effect of almost 1 percentage point in the late 1990s, the US clearly benefited from high nominal investment growth in ICT when prices were falling in relative terms. ICT dynamics are certainly not the full story behind the different growth performance of various OECD countries. However, ICT is one crucial element. Moreover, rapid accumulation of ICT capital might facilitate the exploitation of new knowledge and stimulate innovation as well as diffusion. This is particularly interesting when we take a closer look at the development of R&D-GDP ratios in general and at the development of high technology labor productivity. As regards the latter RÖGER (2001) shows that the US has established a clear lead vis-à-vis the EU since 1993; with a lag of about two years the US world market share of high technology exports has increased strongly while that of Germany and Japan has fallen since 1993. Both Germany and Japan no longer benefit from the exceptional position they had in the Cold War era, namely that they were special among the largest five OECD countries in devoting almost their entire R&D resources to civilian projects. As the following graph shows, there is a general tendency of R&D-GDP ratios to rise in the late 1990s. Sweden is the leader in the OECD with an increase of slightly more than 1 percentage point in the 1990s, bringing the country to a top figure of roughly 4%. Finland also shows a strong increase and reached 3.2% in 1999. Germany’s R&D ratio decreased for more than a decade after 1987, and it has increased only modestly from a bottom figure of about 2% in 1996. The US had a slight reduction of the R&D ratio in the early 1990s but increased in the second half of the decade and was close to 2.3% in 2000. The temporary reduction of the US R&D ratio is, however, mainly due to the falling expenditures on military R&D. This also holds for France and the UK which, however, stabilized R&D ratios in the late 1990s. While Canada and Italy were close together in 1989 with slightly less than 1%, Canada has increased its R&D-GDP ratio, while that of Italy has fallen to a very low level of roughly 0.6% in the mid-1990s. Interestingly, both Japan and Korea reached R&D- GDP ratios slightly above that of Germany in the 1990s. 20
Fig. 3: R&D-GDP Ratios in Selected OECD Countries, 1981-2000 4,4 SWE FIN JPN SUI USA COR GER a) FRA GBR NED CAN ITA 4,2 4,0 3,8 3,6 3,4 3,2 3,0 2,8 2,6 2,4 0,6 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Given the fact that most EU countries are high wage economies, it is obvious that these countries must achieve high labor productivity if full employment is to be reestablished or maintained. High capital intensity (referring here to non-ICT-capital), high ICT intensity, and high knowledge intensity are the three pillars upon which a high wage 2,2 2,0 1,8 1,6 1,4 1,2 1,0 0,8 21
- Page 1: UNIVERSITÄT POTSDAM EUROPÄISCHE W
- Page 5 and 6: Summary We analyze the role of info
- Page 7: Prof. Dr. Paul J.J. Welfens, Jean M
- Page 10 and 11: AT&T has entered the local market v
- Page 12 and 13: While telecommunications has been a
- Page 14 and 15: There is no doubt that the Maastric
- Page 16 and 17: study, based on ICT dynamics with r
- Page 18 and 19: 2. Theoretical Analysis 2.1 ICT Dyn
- Page 20 and 21: (ICT-using sector) and negative lab
- Page 22 and 23: is also included which means that t
- Page 24 and 25: 1.08; however, by 1999 the ratio in
- Page 26 and 27: In the digital economy the inventor
- Page 30 and 31: economy can be built. Facing EU eas
- Page 32 and 33: If purchasing power parity holds fo
- Page 34 and 35: output growth continuing, finally t
- Page 36 and 37: y increasing returns in production
- Page 38 and 39: works through better adaptation to
- Page 40 and 41: investigations offers a wide field
- Page 42 and 43: efficient, indicating that the prem
- Page 44 and 45: 4. The Role of Telecommunications a
- Page 46 and 47: 38 2 R adj. 0.9970 0.9967 0.9969 0.
- Page 48 and 49: number of employees in the second h
- Page 50 and 51: good one-half percentage point emer
- Page 52 and 53: So flat rate pricing will lead to a
- Page 54 and 55: international telecommunications. F
- Page 56 and 57: spective Germany seems to be rather
- Page 58 and 59: References ACS, Z., AUDRETSCH, D.,
- Page 60 and 61: DOSI, G. (1982), Technological Para
- Page 62 and 63: JONES, C.I. and WILLIAMS, J.C. (199
- Page 64 and 65: ROMER, P.M. (1990), Endogenous Tech
- Page 67 and 68: Appendix: Methodological Issues in
- Page 69 and 70: Tab A3: ICT Sectors in Europe and t
- Page 71: Tab A6: Sectoral Developments in th
Change language