2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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Pun. Art. 122 APPENDIX 23 d. Lesser included offenses. See United States v. Calhoun, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 18 C.M.R. 52 (1955). e. Maximum punishment. The aggravating factor of use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery, and a higher maximum punishment in such cases, have been added because of the inc r e a s e d d a n g e r w h e n r o b b e r y i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h a f i r e a r m whether or not loaded or operable. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113 and 2114; United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Thomas, 455 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1972); Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969). See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report 29–33 (Aug. 17, 1981). The 15-year maximum is the same as that for robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2111. 48. Article 123— Forgery c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 202 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 49. Article 123a— Making, drawing, or uttering check, draft, or order without sufficient funds c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 202A of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The language in paragraph 202A using an illegal transaction such as an illegal gambling game as an example of “for any other purpose” was eliminated in subparagraph (7), based on United States v. Wallace, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 650, 36 C.M.R. 148 (1966). The statutory inference found in Article 123a and explained in subparagraph (17) was not meant to preempt the usual methods of proof of knowledge and intent. See S.Rep. No. 659, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1961). Subparagraph (18) is based on United States v. Callaghan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 231, 34 C.M.R. 11 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W e b b , 4 6 C . M . R . 1 0 8 3 (A.C.M.R. 1972). As to share drafts see also United States v. Palmer, 14 M.J. 731 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. Grubbs, 13 M.J. 594 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982). e. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for subsection (1) has been revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to $100, and over $100) only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties contingent on value in property offenses in civilian jurisdiction. 2002 Amendment: The monetary amount affecting the maximum punishments has been revised from $100 to $500 to account for inflation. The last change was in 1969 raising the amount to $100. The value has also been readjusted to realign it more closely with the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties in civilian jurisdictions. See generally American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries Sec. 223.1 (1980) (suggesting $500 as the value). f. Sample specification. See also United States v. Palmer and United States v. Grubbs, both supra (pleading share drafts; pleading more than one check or draft). 50. Article 124— Maiming c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 203 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph c(3) is based on United States v. Hicks, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 621, 20 C.M.R. 337 (1956). The discussion of intent has been modified to reflect that some specific intent to injure is necessary. United States v. Hicks, supra. The A23-16 third sentence of the third paragraph of paragraph 203 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which was based on Hicks (see Analysis of Contents, Manual for Courts-martial, United States, 1969 (Revised edition), DA PAM 27–2 at 28–15), was misleading in this regard. Contra United States v. Tua, 4 M.J. 761 (A.C.M.R. 1977), pet. denied, 5 M.J. 91 (1978). e. Maximum punishment. 2007 Amendment: The maximum punishment for the offense of maiming was increased from 7 years confinement to 20 years confinement, consistent with the federal offense of maiming. 18 U.S.C. § 114. 51. Article 125— Sodomy b. Elements. 2004 Amendment: Paragraph 51(b) was amended by adding two factors pertaining to age based upon the 1994 amendment to paragraph 51(e) that created two distinct categories of sodomy involving a child. See also concurrent change to R.C.M. 307(c)(3) and accompanying analysis. c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 204 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Fellatio and cunnilingus are within the scope of Article 125. See United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160 (C.M.A. 1978). For a discussion of the possible constitutional limitations on the application of Article 125 (for example, the sexual activity of a married couple), see United States v. Scoby, supra. d. Paragraph 51e. The Analysis accompanying subparagraph 51e is amended by inserting the following at the end thereof: 1994 Amendment. One of the objectives of the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2245 was to define sexual abuse in gender-neutral terms. Since the scope of Article 125, U.C.M.J., accommodates those forms of sexual abuse other than the rape provided for in Article 120, U.C.M.J., the maximum punishments permitted under Article 125 were amended to bring them more in line with Article 120 and the Act, thus providing sanctions that are generally equivalent regardless of the victim’s gender. Subparagraph e(1) was amended by increasing the maximum period of confinement from 20 years to life. Subparagraph e(2) was amended by creating two distinct categories of sodomy involving a child, one involving children who have attained the age of 12 but are not yet 16, and the other involving children under the age of 12. The latter is now designated as subparagraph e(3). The punishment for the former category remains the same as it was for the original category of children under the age of 16. This amendment, however, increases the maximum punishment to life when the victim is under the age of 12 years. Lesser included offenses. 2007 Amendment. The former Paragraph 87 (1) (b), Article 134 Indecent Acts or Liberties with a Child, has been replaced in its entirety by paragraph 45. The former Paragraph 63 (2) (c), Article 134 Assault - Indecent, has been replaced in its entirety by paragraph 45. The former Paragraph 90 (3) (a), Article 134 Indecent Acts with Another, has been replaced in its entirety by paragraph 45. Lesser included offenses under Article 120 should be considered depending on the factual circumstances in each case. e. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for forcible sodomy was raised in recognition of the severity of the offense which is similar to rape in its violation of personal privacy and dignity. f. Sample specifications. 2004 Amendment: Paragraph 51(f) was amended to aid practitioners in charging the two distinct catego-

ies of sodomy involving a child created in 1994. See also concurrent change to R.C.M. 307(c)(3) and accompanying analysis. 52. Article 126— Arson c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 205 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 (C.M.A.1983); United States v. Duke, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 460, 37 C.M.R. 80 (1966); United States v. Scott, 8 M.J. 853 (N.C.M.R. 1980); United States v. Jones, 2 M.J. 785 (A.C.M.R. 1976). e. Maximum punishment. The maximum period of confinement for simple arson of property of a value of more than $100 has been reduced from 10 to 5 years. This parallels 18 U.S.C. § 81. The separate punishment for simple arson of property of a value of $100 or less has been retained because 18 U.S.C. Sec. 81 does not cover most personal property. 2002 Amendment: The monetary amount affecting the maximum punishments has been revised from $100 to $500 to account for inflation. The last change was in 1969 raising the amount to $100. The value has also been readjusted to realign it more closely with the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties in civilian jurisdictions. See generally American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries Sec. 223.1 (1980) (suggesting $500 as the value). A value of $500 was chosen to maintain deterrence, simplicity, and uniformity for the Manual’s property offenses. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 81, Arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, no longer grades the offense on the basis of value. 53. Article 127— Extortion c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 206 of M C M , 1 9 6 9 ( R e v . ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . S c h m i d t , 1 6 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 36 C.M.R. 213 (1966); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 373–74 (2d ed. 1969). Subparagraph (4) is based on United States v. McCollum, 13 M.J. 127 (C.M.A. 1982). 54. Article 128— Assault c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 207 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Vigil, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 474, 13 C.M.R. 30 (1953) (aggravated assault); United States v. Spearman, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 48 C.M.R. 405 (1974) (grievous bodily harm). e. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for (2) Assault consummated by a battery has been increased because of the range of types of harm which may be caused by a battery. These may include serious injury, even though unintended or not caused by a means or force likely to produce grievous bodily harm. The maximum punishment for (6) Assault upon a sentinel or lookout in the execution of duty, or upon any person who, in the execution of office, is performing security police, military police, shore patrol, master at arms, or other military or civilian law enforcement duties, has been increased based on 18 U.S.C. § 111 and 18 U.S.C. § 1114. The maximum punishment for aggravated assaults committed with firearms has been increased based on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report 29–33 (Aug. 17, 1981). N o t e t h a t t h e h i g h e r m a x i m u m f o r a s s a u l t w i t h a d a n g e r o u s weapon when the weapon is a firearm applies even if the firearm is used as a bludgeon. This is because the danger injected is ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE ARTICLES Pun. Art. 131 significantly greater when a loaded firearm is used, even as a bludgeon. In certain situations, this punishment scheme may have the effect of making intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm a lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. For example, if in the course of an assault with a loaded firearm the accused or a coactor stabs the victim with a knife, the assault with a dangerous weapon (the firearm) would carry an 8 year maximum penalty, as opposed to 5 years for the assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm. In such a case, the specification should be carefully tailored to describe each facet of the assault. 1998 Amendment: A separate maximum punishment for assault with an unloaded firearm was created due to the serious nature of the offense. Threatening a person with an unloaded firearm places the victim of that assault in fear of losing his or her life. Such a traumatic experience is a far greater injury to the victim than that sustained in the course of a typical simple assault. Therefore, it calls for an increased punishment. 2007 Amendment: The maximum punishments for some aggravated assault offenses were established to recognize the increased severity of such offenses when children are the victims. These maximum punishments are consistent with the maximum punishments of the Article 134 offense of Child Endangerment, established in 2007. 55. Article 129— Burglary c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 208 of M C M , 1 9 6 9 ( R e v . ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . K l u t z , 9 U.S.C.M.A. 20, 25 C.M.R. 282 (1958). Subparagraph c(2) and (3) have been revised based on R. Perkins, Criminal Law 192–193 and 199 (2d ed. 1969). As to subparagraph c(2), see also 13 AM.Jur. 2d Burglary § 18 (1964); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 3d 881 (1976). f. Sample specification. See United States v. Knight, 15 M.J. 202 (C.M.A. 1983). 56. Article 130— Housebreaking c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 209 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 25 C.M.R. 173 (1958). See also United States v. Breen, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 658, 36 C.M.R. 156 (1966); United States v. Hall, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 374, 30 C.M.R. 374 (1961); United States v. Taylor, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 3O C.M.R. 44 (1960) (all regarding “structure”); United States v. Weaver, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 173, 39 C.M.R. 173 (1969) (“separate offense”); United States v. Williams, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 241, 15 C.M.R. 241 (1954) (“entry”). 57. Article 131— Perjury c. Explanation. Subparagraph (1) and (2) are based on paragraph 210 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). In the last sentence of subparagraph (2)(a), the phrase “unless the witness was forced to answer over a valid claim of privilege”which appeared at the end of the fourth paragraph of paragraph 210 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been d e l e t e d b a s e d o n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M a n d u j a n o , 4 2 5 U . S . 5 6 4 (1976); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See also United States v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980). Subparagraph (3) i s n e w a n d i s b a s e d o n P u b l i c L a w 9 4 – 5 5 0 o f 1 9 7 6 w h i c h amended Article 131 by adding a second clause based on section A23-17

Pun. Art. 122 APPENDIX 23<br />

d. Lesser included offenses. See United States v. Calhoun, 5<br />

U.S.C.M.A. 428, 18 C.M.R. 52 (1955).<br />

e. Maximum punishment. The aggravating factor of use of a firearm<br />

in the commission of a robbery, and a higher maximum<br />

punishment in such cases, have been added because of the inc<br />

r e a s e d d a n g e r w h e n r o b b e r y i s c o m m i t t e d w i t h a f i r e a r m<br />

whether or not loaded or operable. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113 and<br />

2114; United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972);<br />

United States v. Thomas, 455 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1972); Baker v.<br />

United States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969). See also U.S. Dep’t<br />

of Justice, Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime,<br />

Final Report 29–33 (Aug. 17, 1981). The 15-year maximum is<br />

the same as that for robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2111.<br />

48. Article 123— Forgery<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 202 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

49. Article 123a— Making, drawing, or uttering<br />

check, draft, or order without sufficient funds<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 202A of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The language in paragraph 202A using an<br />

illegal transaction such as an illegal gambling game as an example<br />

of “for any other purpose” was eliminated in subparagraph<br />

(7), based on United States v. Wallace, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 650, 36<br />

C.M.R. 148 (1966). The statutory inference found in Article 123a<br />

and explained in subparagraph (17) was not meant to preempt the<br />

usual methods of proof of knowledge and intent. See S.Rep. No.<br />

659, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1961). Subparagraph (18) is based<br />

on United States v. Callaghan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 231, 34 C.M.R. 11<br />

( 1 9 6 3 ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W e b b , 4 6 C . M . R . 1 0 8 3<br />

(A.C.M.R. 1972). As to share drafts see also United States v.<br />

Palmer, 14 M.J. 731 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. Grubbs,<br />

13 M.J. 594 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982).<br />

e. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for subsection<br />

(1) has been revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50<br />

to $100, and over $100) only two are used. This is simpler and<br />

conforms more closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor<br />

penalties contingent on value in property offenses in<br />

civilian jurisdiction.<br />

2002 Amendment: The monetary amount affecting the maximum<br />

punishments has been revised from $100 to $500 to account<br />

for inflation. The last change was in 1969 raising the amount to<br />

$100. The value has also been readjusted to realign it more<br />

closely with the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties<br />

in civilian jurisdictions. See generally American Law Institute,<br />

Model Penal Code and Commentaries Sec. 223.1 (1980)<br />

(suggesting $500 as the value).<br />

f. <strong>Sam</strong>ple specification. See also United States v. Palmer and<br />

United States v. Grubbs, both supra (pleading share drafts; pleading<br />

more than one check or draft).<br />

50. Article 124— Maiming<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 203 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph c(3) is based on United States<br />

v. Hicks, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 621, 20 C.M.R. 337 (1956). The discussion<br />

of intent has been modified to reflect that some specific<br />

intent to injure is necessary. United States v. Hicks, supra. The<br />

A23-16<br />

third sentence of the third paragraph of paragraph 203 of MCM,<br />

1969 (Rev.), which was based on Hicks (see Analysis of Contents,<br />

Manual for Courts-martial, United States, 1969 (Revised <strong>edition</strong>),<br />

DA PAM 27–2 at 28–15), was misleading in this regard. Contra<br />

United States v. Tua, 4 M.J. 761 (A.C.M.R. 1977), pet. denied, 5<br />

M.J. 91 (1978).<br />

e. Maximum punishment. 2007 Amendment: The maximum punishment<br />

for the offense of maiming was increased from 7 years<br />

confinement to 20 years confinement, consistent with the federal<br />

offense of maiming. 18 U.S.C. § 114.<br />

51. Article 125— Sodomy<br />

b. Elements. 2004 Amendment: Paragraph 51(b) was amended by<br />

adding two factors pertaining to age based upon the 1994 amendment<br />

to paragraph 51(e) that created two distinct categories of<br />

sodomy involving a child. See also concurrent change to R.C.M.<br />

307(c)(3) and accompanying analysis.<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 204 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Fellatio and cunnilingus are within the scope<br />

of Article 125. See United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52 (C.M.A.<br />

1979); United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160 (C.M.A. 1978). For a<br />

discussion of the possible constitutional limitations on the application<br />

of Article 125 (for example, the sexual activity of a married<br />

couple), see United States v. Scoby, supra.<br />

d. Paragraph 51e. The Analysis accompanying subparagraph 51e<br />

is amended by inserting the following at the end thereof:<br />

1994 Amendment. One of the objectives of the Sexual Abuse<br />

Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2245 was to define sexual abuse<br />

in gender-neutral terms. Since the scope of Article 125, U.C.M.J.,<br />

accommodates those forms of sexual abuse other than the rape<br />

provided for in Article 120, U.C.M.J., the maximum punishments<br />

permitted under Article 125 were amended to bring them more in<br />

line with Article 120 and the Act, thus providing sanctions that<br />

are generally equivalent regardless of the victim’s gender. Subparagraph<br />

e(1) was amended by increasing the maximum period<br />

of confinement from 20 years to life. Subparagraph e(2) was<br />

amended by creating two distinct categories of sodomy involving<br />

a child, one involving children who have attained the age of 12<br />

but are not yet 16, and the other involving children under the age<br />

of 12. The latter is now designated as subparagraph e(3). The<br />

punishment for the former category remains the same as it was<br />

for the original category of children under the age of 16. This<br />

amendment, however, increases the maximum punishment to life<br />

when the victim is under the age of 12 years.<br />

Lesser included offenses.<br />

2007 Amendment. The former Paragraph 87 (1) (b), Article 134<br />

Indecent Acts or Liberties with a Child, has been replaced in its<br />

entirety by paragraph 45. The former Paragraph 63 (2) (c), Article<br />

134 Assault - Indecent, has been replaced in its entirety by paragraph<br />

45. The former Paragraph 90 (3) (a), Article 134 Indecent<br />

Acts with Another, has been replaced in its entirety by paragraph<br />

45. Lesser included offenses under Article 120 should be considered<br />

depending on the factual circumstances in each case.<br />

e. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for forcible<br />

sodomy was raised in recognition of the severity of the offense<br />

which is similar to rape in its violation of personal privacy and<br />

dignity.<br />

f. <strong>Sam</strong>ple specifications. 2004 Amendment: Paragraph 51(f) was<br />

amended to aid practitioners in charging the two distinct catego-

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