2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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Pun. Art. 112 APPENDIX 23 wide Survey of Nonmedical Drug Use and Alcohol Use Among Military Personnel: 1980. In addition, the controlled substances which are listed in Schedules I through V of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.) as amended are incorporated. The most commonly abused drugs are listed separately so that it will be unnecessary to refer to the controlled substances list, as modified by the Attorney General in the Code of Federal Regulations, in most cases. Most commanders and some legal offices do not have ready access to such authorities. (2) Possess. The definition of possession is based upon United States v. Aloyian, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 36 C.M.R. 489 (1966) and paragraph 4–144, Military Judges’ Benchbook, DA PAM 27–9 ( M a y 1 9 8 2 ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W i l s o n , 7 M . J . 2 9 0 (C.M.A. 1979) and cases cited therein concerning the concept of constructive possession. With respect to the inferences described i n t h i s s u b p a r a g r a p h a n d s u b p a r a g r a p h ( 5 ) W r o n g f u l n e s s , s e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v . A l v a r e z , 1 0 U . S . C . M . A . 2 4 , 2 7 C . M . R . 9 8 (1958); United States v. Nabors, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 27, 27 C.M.R. 101 (1958). It is important to bear in mind that distinction between inferences and presumptions. See United States v. Mahan , 1 M.J. 303 (C.M.R. 1976). See also United States v. Baylor, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 502, 37 C.M.R. 122 (1967). (3) Distribute. This subparagraph is based on 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) and (11). See also E. Devitt and C. Blackmar, 2 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 58.03 (3d ed. 1977). “Distribution” replaces “sale” and “transfer.” This conforms with Federal practice, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and will simplify military practice by reducing pleading, proof, and associated multiplicity problems in drug offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 7 M.J. 342 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Maginley, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 445, 32 C.M.R. 445 (1963). Evidence of sale is not necessary to prove the offense of distributing a controlled substance. See United States v. Snow , 537 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 481 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973). Thus, the defense of “agency” see United States v. Fruscella, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 44 C.M.R. 80 (1971), no longer applies in the military. Cf. United States v. Snow, supra; United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, supra (“procuring agent” defense abolished under 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.). Evidence of sale is admissible, of course, on the merits as “part and parcel” of the criminal transaction (see United States v. Stokes, 12 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 1982); cf. United States v. Johnson, supra; see also Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)), or in aggravation (see paragraph 75 b (4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); see also United States v. Vickers, 13 M.J. 403 (C.M.A. 1982)). ( 4 ) M a n u f a c t u r e . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s t a k e n f r o m 2 1 U . S . C . § 802(14). The exception in 21 U.S.C. § 802(14) is covered in subparagraph (5). (5) Wrongfulness. This subparagraph is based on the last paragraph of paragraph 213 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 822(c). See also United States v. West, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 34 C.M.R. 449 (1964); paragraphs 4–144 and 145, Military Judges’ Benchbook, DA PAM 27–9 (May 1982). It is not intended to perpetuate the holding in United States v. Rowe, 11 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1981). (6) Intent to distribute. This subparagraph parallels Federal law which allows for increased punishment for drug offenses with an A23-12 intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). The discussion of circumstances from which an inference of intent to distribute may be inferred is based on numerous Federal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 625 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979); United States v. Ramirez-Rodriquez, 552 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974). Cf. United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972). Possession of a large amount of drugs may permit an inference but does not create a presumption of intent to distribute. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); United States v. Mahan, 1 M.J. 303 (C.M.A. 1976). (7) Certain amount. This subparagraph is based on United States v. Alvarez, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 24, 27 C.M.R. 98 (1958); United States v. Brown, 45 C.M.R. 416 (A.C.M.R. 1972); United States v . B u r n s , 3 7 C . M . R . 9 4 2 ( A . F . B . R . 1 9 6 7 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Owens, 36 C.M.R. 909 (A.B.R. 1966). 1993 Amendment. Paragraph c was amended by adding new paragraphs (10) and (11). Subparagraph (10) defines the term “use” and delineates knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance as a required component of the offense. See United States v. Mance, 26 M.J. 244 (C.M.A. 1988). The validity of a p e r m i s s i v e i n f e r e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e i s r e c o g n i z e d . S e e U n i t e d States v. Ford, 23 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 1987); United States v. Harper, 22 M.J. 157 (C.M.A. 1986). Subparagraph (11) precludes an accused from relying upon lack of actual knowledge when such accused has purposefully avoided knowledge of the presence or identity of controlled substances. See United States v. Mance, supra, (Cox, J., concurring). When an accused deliberately avoids knowing the truth concerning a crucial fact (i.e. presence or identity) and there is a high probability that the crucial fact does exist, the accused is held accountable to the same extent as one who has actual knowledge. See United States v. Newman, 14 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 1983). Subsection (11) follows federal authority which equates actual knowledge with deliberate ignorance. See United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied , 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). Section 4 (now subparagraph f) amends Appendix 6c. The new s a m p l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a r e b a s e d o n s a m p l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 1 4 4 through 146 found in appendix 6c of the MCM, 1969 (Rev.), as modified to reflect the new comprehensive drug offense provision. Section 5 provides an effective date for the new amendments. Section 6 requires the Secretary of Defense to transmit these amendments to Congress. 38. Article 113— Misbehavior of sentinel or lookout c. Explanation. Subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) are based on paragraph 192 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph (4) is based on United States v. Seeser, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 472, 18 C.M.R. 96 (1955); paragraph 192 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); paragraph 174 of MCM (Army), 1949; paragraph 174 of MCM (AF), 1949. Subp a r a g r a p h ( 6 ) i s b a s e d o n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W i l l i a m s , 4 U.S.C.M.A. 69, 15 C.M.R. 69 (1954); United States v. Cook, 31 C.M.R. 550 (A.F.B.R. 1961). See also United States v. Getman, 2 M.J. 279 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976).

39. Article 114— Duelling c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 193 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The explanation of conniving at fighting a duel was modified to reflect the requirement for actual knowledge and to more correctly reflect the term connive. f. Sample specification. The sample specification for conniving at fighting a duel was redrafted to more accurately reflect the nature of the offense. 40. Article 115— Malingering c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 194 of M C M , 1 9 6 9 ( R e v . ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . K i s n e r , 1 5 U . S . C . M . A . 1 5 3 , 3 5 C . M . R . 1 2 5 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Mamaluy, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 102, 27 C.M.R. 176 (1959); United States v. Kersten, 4 M.J. 657 (A.C.M.R. 1977). d . L e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s . S e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v . T a y l o r , 1 7 U.S.C.M.A. 595, 38 C.M.R. 393 (1968). e . M a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t . T h e m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t s w e r e changed to reflect the greater seriousness of malingering in war or other combat situations and to add a greater measure of deterrence in such cases. 41. Article 116— Riot or breach of peace c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 195 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and United States v. Metcalf, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 153, 36 C.M.R. 309 (1966). The reference to “use of vile or abusive words to another in a public place” contained in paragraph 195 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been replaced by the language contained in the fourth sentence of subparagraph (2) since the former language was subject to an overly broad application. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). f. Sample specifications. Riot— see United States v. Randolf, 49 C.M.R. 336 (N.C.M.R. 1974); United States v. Brice, 48 C.M.R. 368 (N.C.M.R. 1973). 42. Article 117— Provoking speeches or gestures c. Explanation. Subparagraph (1) is based on paragraph 196 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Thompson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 46 C.M.R. 88 (1972). See generally Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U . S . 5 1 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . H u g h e n s , 1 4 C . M . R . 5 0 9 (N.B.R. 1954). Subparagraph (2) is based on the language of A r t i c l e 1 1 7 a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B o w d e n , 2 4 C . M . R . 5 4 0 (A.F.B.R. 1957), pet. denied, 24 C.M.R. 311 (1957). See also United States v. Lacy, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 164, 27 C.M.R. 238 (1959). 1986 Amendment: The listing of “Article 134— indecent language” as a lesser included offense of provoking speeches was d e l e t e d . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . L i n y e a r , 3 M . J . 1 0 2 7 ( N . M . C . M . R . 1977), held that provoking speeches is actually a lesser included offense of indecent language. Also, indecent language carries a greater maximum punishment than provoking speeches, which would be unusual for a lesser offense. e . M a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t . T h e m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t w a s i n - creased from that set forth in paragraph 127c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to more accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense. 43. Article 118— Murder a. Text. ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE ARTICLES b. Elements. Element (b) in (3), Act inherently dangerous to others, has been modified based on United States v. Hartley, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 36 C.M.R. 405 (1966). 2007 Amendment: Paragraph (4) of the text and elements has been amended for consistency with the changes to Article 118 under Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006. See subsection (d) of Section 552. c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 197 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraphs c(2)(b) is based on United States v. Sechler, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 12 C.M.R. 119 (1953). As to subparagraph (c)(4)(A), see United States v. Vandenack, 15 M.J. 428 (C.M.A. 1983). Subparagraph c(4)(b) is based on United States v. Stokes, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 65, 19 C.M.R. 191 (1955). d. Lesser included offenses. As to Article 118(3), see United States v. Roa, 12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982). 1993 Amendment: The listed lesser included offenses of murder under Article 118(3) were changed to conform to the rationale of United States v. Roa, 12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982). Inasmuch as Article 118(3) does not require specific intent, attempted murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of murder under Article 118(3). 1995 Amendment: The word “others” was replaced by the word “another” in Article 118(3) pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102—484, 106 Stat. 2315, 2506 (1992). This change addresses the limited language previously used in Article 118(3) as identified in United States v. Berg, 30 M.J. 195 (C.M.A. 1990). 44. Article 119— Manslaughter Pun. Art. 119 b. Elements. 2 0 0 7 A m e n d m e n t : P a r a g r a p h ( 4 ) o f t h e e l e m e n t s h a s b e e n amended for consistency with the changes to Article 118 under Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006. See subsection (d) of Section 552. c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 198 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Moglia, 3 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Harrison, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 484, 37 C.M.R. 104 (1967); United States v. Redding, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 242, 34 C.M.R. 22 (1963); United States v. Fox, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 9 C.M.R. 95 (1953). e. Maximum punishment. 1 9 9 4 A m e n d m e n t . T h e a m e n d m e n t t o p a r a g r a p h 4 4 e ( 1 ) i n - creased the maximum period of confinement for voluntary manslaughter to 15 years. The 10-year maximum confinement period was unnecessarily restrictive; an egregious case of voluntary manslaughter may warrant confinement in excess of ten years. 1994 Amendment. The amendment to paragraph 44e(2) elimin a t e d t h e a n o m a l y c r e a t e d w h e n t h e m a x i m u m a u t h o r i z e d punishment for a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter was greater than the maximum authorized punishment for the offense of involuntary manslaughter. For example, prior to the amendment, the maximum authorized punishment for the offense of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon was greater than that of involuntary manslaughter. This amendment also facilitates instructions on lesser included offenses of involuntary man- A23-13

39. Article 114— Duelling<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 193 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The explanation of conniving at fighting a<br />

duel was modified to reflect the requirement for actual knowledge<br />

and to more correctly reflect the term connive.<br />

f. <strong>Sam</strong>ple specification. The sample specification for conniving at<br />

fighting a duel was redrafted to more accurately reflect the nature<br />

of the offense.<br />

40. Article 115— Malingering<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 194 of<br />

M C M , 1 9 6 9 ( R e v . ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . K i s n e r , 1 5<br />

U . S . C . M . A . 1 5 3 , 3 5 C . M . R . 1 2 5 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v .<br />

Mamaluy, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 102, 27 C.M.R. 176 (1959); United<br />

States v. Kersten, 4 M.J. 657 (A.C.M.R. 1977).<br />

d . L e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s . S e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v . T a y l o r , 1 7<br />

U.S.C.M.A. 595, 38 C.M.R. 393 (1968).<br />

e . M a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t . T h e m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t s w e r e<br />

changed to reflect the greater seriousness of malingering in war or<br />

other combat situations and to add a greater measure of deterrence<br />

in such cases.<br />

41. Article 116— Riot or breach of peace<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 195 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and United States v. Metcalf, 16 U.S.C.M.A.<br />

153, 36 C.M.R. 309 (1966). The reference to “use of vile or<br />

abusive words to another in a public place” contained in paragraph<br />

195 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been replaced by the<br />

language contained in the fourth sentence of subparagraph (2)<br />

since the former language was subject to an overly broad application.<br />

See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).<br />

f. <strong>Sam</strong>ple specifications. Riot— see United States v. Randolf, 49<br />

C.M.R. 336 (N.C.M.R. 1974); United States v. Brice, 48 C.M.R.<br />

368 (N.C.M.R. 1973).<br />

42. Article 117— Provoking speeches or gestures<br />

c. Explanation. Subparagraph (1) is based on paragraph 196 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Thompson, 22 U.S.C.M.A.<br />

88, 46 C.M.R. 88 (1972). See generally Gooding v. Wilson, 405<br />

U . S . 5 1 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . H u g h e n s , 1 4 C . M . R . 5 0 9<br />

(N.B.R. 1954). Subparagraph (2) is based on the language of<br />

A r t i c l e 1 1 7 a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B o w d e n , 2 4 C . M . R . 5 4 0<br />

(A.F.B.R. 1957), pet. denied, 24 C.M.R. 311 (1957). See also<br />

United States v. Lacy, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 164, 27 C.M.R. 238 (1959).<br />

1986 Amendment: The listing of “Article 134— indecent language”<br />

as a lesser included offense of provoking speeches was<br />

d e l e t e d . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . L i n y e a r , 3 M . J . 1 0 2 7 ( N . M . C . M . R .<br />

1977), held that provoking speeches is actually a lesser included<br />

offense of indecent language. Also, indecent language carries a<br />

greater maximum punishment than provoking speeches, which<br />

would be unusual for a lesser offense.<br />

e . M a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t . T h e m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t w a s i n -<br />

creased from that set forth in paragraph 127c of MCM, 1969<br />

(Rev.) to more accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense.<br />

43. Article 118— Murder<br />

a. Text.<br />

ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE ARTICLES<br />

b. Elements. Element (b) in (3), Act inherently dangerous to<br />

others, has been modified based on United States v. Hartley, 16<br />

U.S.C.M.A. 249, 36 C.M.R. 405 (1966).<br />

2007 Amendment: Paragraph (4) of the text and elements has<br />

been amended for consistency with the changes to Article 118<br />

under Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for<br />

Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006. See subsection<br />

(d) of Section 552.<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 197 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraphs c(2)(b) is based on United<br />

States v. Sechler, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 12 C.M.R. 119 (1953). As to<br />

subparagraph (c)(4)(A), see United States v. Vandenack, 15 M.J.<br />

428 (C.M.A. 1983). Subparagraph c(4)(b) is based on United<br />

States v. Stokes, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 65, 19 C.M.R. 191 (1955).<br />

d. Lesser included offenses. As to Article 118(3), see United<br />

States v. Roa, 12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982).<br />

1993 Amendment: The listed lesser included offenses of murder<br />

under Article 118(3) were changed to conform to the rationale of<br />

United States v. Roa, 12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982). Inasmuch as<br />

Article 118(3) does not require specific intent, attempted murder,<br />

voluntary manslaughter, assault with intent to murder and assault<br />

with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter are not lesser included<br />

offenses of murder under Article 118(3).<br />

1995 Amendment: The word “others” was replaced by the word<br />

“another” in Article 118(3) pursuant to the National Defense<br />

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102—484,<br />

106 Stat. 2315, 2506 (1992). This change addresses the limited<br />

language previously used in Article 118(3) as identified in United<br />

States v. Berg, 30 M.J. 195 (C.M.A. 1990).<br />

44. Article 119— Manslaughter<br />

Pun. Art. 119<br />

b. Elements.<br />

2 0 0 7 A m e n d m e n t : P a r a g r a p h ( 4 ) o f t h e e l e m e n t s h a s b e e n<br />

amended for consistency with the changes to Article 118 under<br />

Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal<br />

Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 2006. See subsection (d) of<br />

Section 552.<br />

c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 198 of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Moglia, 3 M.J. 216<br />

(C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Harrison, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 484, 37<br />

C.M.R. 104 (1967); United States v. Redding, 14 U.S.C.M.A.<br />

242, 34 C.M.R. 22 (1963); United States v. Fox, 2 U.S.C.M.A.<br />

465, 9 C.M.R. 95 (1953).<br />

e. Maximum punishment.<br />

1 9 9 4 A m e n d m e n t . T h e a m e n d m e n t t o p a r a g r a p h 4 4 e ( 1 ) i n -<br />

creased the maximum period of confinement for voluntary manslaughter<br />

to 15 years. The 10-year maximum confinement period<br />

was unnecessarily restrictive; an egregious case of voluntary manslaughter<br />

may warrant confinement in excess of ten years.<br />

1994 Amendment. The amendment to paragraph 44e(2) elimin<br />

a t e d t h e a n o m a l y c r e a t e d w h e n t h e m a x i m u m a u t h o r i z e d<br />

punishment for a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter<br />

was greater than the maximum authorized punishment<br />

for the offense of involuntary manslaughter. For example, prior to<br />

the amendment, the maximum authorized punishment for the offense<br />

of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon was greater<br />

than that of involuntary manslaughter. This amendment also facilitates<br />

instructions on lesser included offenses of involuntary man-<br />

A23-13

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