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2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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( c ) N a t u r e o f t h e r e s i s t a n c e . T h i s s u b p a r a g r a p h i s t a k e n<br />

from paragraph 174 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

(d) Mistake. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph 174<br />

a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Nelson, 17<br />

U.S.C.M.A. 620, 38 C.M.R. 418 (1968).<br />

( e ) I l l e g a l a p p r e h e n s i o n . T h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e o f t h i s s u b -<br />

paragraph is taken from paragraph 174a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

Although such a rule is not without criticism, see United States v.<br />

Lewis, 7 M.J. 348 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Moore, 483<br />

F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir.1973), it has long been recognized in<br />

military and civilian courts. John Bad Elk v. United States, 177<br />

U.S. 529 (1900); paragraph 174 a of MCM, 1951. Cf. paragraph<br />

157 of MCM (<strong>Army</strong>), 1949; MCM (AF), 1949; paragraph 139 of<br />

MCM, 1928; W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 122 (2d<br />

ed. 1920 reprint). (Before 1951 resisting apprehension was not<br />

specifically prohibited by the Articles of War. Earlier references<br />

are to breaking arrest or escape from confinement.)<br />

The second sentence has been added to make clear that the<br />

issue of legality of an apprehension (e.g., whether based on probable<br />

cause or otherwise in accordance with requirements for legal<br />

sufficiency; see R.C.M. 302(e)) is not in issue until raised by the<br />

defense. United States v. Wilson, and United States v. Clansey,<br />

both supra. Cf. United States v. Smith, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 231, 45<br />

C.M.R. 5 (1972). See also Analysis, paragraph 19 b. The presumption<br />

is a burden assigning device; it has no evidentiary<br />

weight once the issue is raised. Because the issue of legality is<br />

not an element, and because the prosecution bears the burden of<br />

establishing legality when the issue is raised, the problems of<br />

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Turner v. United<br />

States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) are not encountered. Cf. Patterson v.<br />

New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).<br />

The third sentence is based on United States v. Carson, supra.<br />

(2) Breaking arrest.<br />

(a) Arrest. This subparagraph has been added for clarity.<br />

(b) Authority to order arrest. See Analysis, R.C.M. 304(b);<br />

R.C.M. 1101; and paragraph 2, Part V.<br />

(c) Nature of restraint imposed by arrest. This subparagraph<br />

is based on paragraph 174 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also<br />

Analysis, paragraph 19 b.<br />

(d) Breaking. This subparagraph is based on paragraph 174<br />

b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

(e) Illegal arrest. The first sentence in this subparagraph is<br />

based on paragraph 174 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second<br />

sentence has been added to clarify that legality of an arrest (e.g.,<br />

whether based on probable cause or based on legally sufficient<br />

nonjudicial punishment or court-martial sentence) is not in issue<br />

until raised by the defense. See Analysis, paragraphs 19 b and 19<br />

c(1)(e). The third sentence is based onUnited States v. Carson,<br />

supra.<br />

(3) Escape from custody.<br />

( a ) C u s t o d y . T h i s s u b p a r a g r a p h i s t a k e n f r o m p a r a g r a p h<br />

174d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to the distinction between escape<br />

from custody and escape from confinement,see United States v.<br />

Ellsey, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 455, 37 C.M.R. 75 (1966). But see United<br />

States v. Felty, 12 M.J. 438 (C.M.A. 1982).<br />

( b ) A u t h o r i t y t o a p p r e h e n d . S e e A n a l y s i s , p a r a g r a p h 1 9<br />

c(1)(b).<br />

ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE ARTICLES<br />

Pun. Art. 95<br />

(c) Escape. This cross-reference is based on paragraph 174 c<br />

of MCM, 1969 (rev.).<br />

(d) Illegal custody. The first sentence in this subparagraph is<br />

based on paragraph 174 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second<br />

sentence has been added to clarify that legality of custody (e.g.,<br />

whether based on probable cause) is not in issue until raised by<br />

the defense. See Analysis, paragraphs 19 b and 19 c(1)(e ). The<br />

third sentence is based on United States v. Carson, supra.<br />

(4) Escape from confinement.<br />

(a) Confinement. See Article 9(a). See also Analysis, R.C.M.<br />

305; R.C.M. 1101; and paragraph 5c, Part v.<br />

1991 Amendment: Subparagraph c(4)(a) was amended to specify<br />

that escape from post-trial confinement is subject to increased<br />

punishment.<br />

(b) Authority to order confinement. See Analysis, R.C.M.<br />

304(b); R.C.M. 1101; and paragraph 2, Part V.<br />

(c) Escape. This subparagraph is based on paragraph 174 c<br />

of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Maslanich, 13<br />

M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982).<br />

( d ) S t a t u s w h e n t e m p o r a r i l y o u t s i d e c o n f i n e m e n t f a c i l i t y .<br />

This subparagraph is based on United States v. Silk, 37 C.M.R.<br />

523 (A.B.r. 1966); United States v. Sines, 34 C.M.R. 716 (N.B.R.<br />

1964).<br />

(e) Legality of confinement. This subparagraph is based on<br />

174 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second sentence has been added<br />

to clarify that legality of confinement (e.g., whether based on<br />

probable cause or otherwise in accordance with requirements for<br />

legal sufficiency) is not in issue until raised by the defense. See<br />

Analysis, paragraphs 19 b and 19 c(1)(e). The third sentence is<br />

based on United States v. Carson, supra.<br />

1991 Amendment: Subparagraphs e and f were amended to<br />

provide increased punishment for escape from post-trial confinement.<br />

The increased punishment reflects the seriousness of the<br />

offense and is consistent with other federal law. See 18 U.S.C.<br />

751(a).<br />

1998 Amendment: Subparagraphs a, b, c, and f were amended<br />

to implement the amendment to 10 U.S.C. §895 (Article 95,<br />

UCMJ) contained in section 1112 of the National Defense Authorization<br />

Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110<br />

Stat. 186, 461 (1996). The amendment proscribes fleeing from<br />

apprehension without regard to whether the accused otherwise<br />

resisted apprehension. The amendment responds to the U.S. Court<br />

of Appeals for the Armed Forces decisions in United States v.<br />

Harris, 29 M.J. 169 (C.M.A. 1989), and United States v. Burgess,<br />

32 M.J. 446 (C.M.A. 1991). In both cases, the court held that<br />

resisting apprehension does not include fleeing from apprehension,<br />

contrary to the then-existing explanation in Part IV, paragraph<br />

19c.(1)(c), MCM, of the nature of the resistance required<br />

f o r r e s i s t i n g a p p r e h e n s i o n . T h e 1 9 5 1 a n d 1 9 6 9 M a n u a l s f o r<br />

Courts-Martial also explained that flight could constitute resisting<br />

apprehension under Article 95, an interpretation affirmed in the<br />

only early military case on point, United States v. Mercer, 11<br />

C.M.R. 812 (A.F.B.R. 1953). Flight from apprehension should be<br />

expressly deterred and punished under military law. Military personnel<br />

are specially trained and routinely expected to submit to<br />

lawful authority. Rather than being a merely incidental or reflexive<br />

action, flight from apprehension in the context of the armed<br />

A23-7

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