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2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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App. 22, M.R.E. 804(b)(3) APPENDIX 22<br />

vexing problem— that of the declaration against penal interest<br />

which implicates the accused as well as the declarant. On the face<br />

of the Rule, such a statement should be admissible, subject to the<br />

effects, if any, of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)<br />

and Rule 306. Notwithstanding this, there is considerable doubt as<br />

to the applicability of the Rule to such a situation. See generally,<br />

4 J . W e i n s t e i n & M . B e r g e r , W E I N S T E I N ’ S E V I D E N C E<br />

804–93, 804–16 (1978). Although the legislative history reflects<br />

an early desire on the part of the Federal Rules of Evidence<br />

A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e t o p r o h i b i t s u c h t e s t i m o n y , a p r o v i s i o n<br />

doing so was not included in the material reviewed by Congress.<br />

Although the House included such a provision, it did so apparently<br />

in large part based upon a view that Bruton, supra,<br />

p r o h i b i t e d s u c h s t a t e m e n t s — a r g u a b l y a n e r r o n e o u s v i e w o f<br />

Bruton, supra, see, Bruton, supra n.3 at 128, Dutton v. Evans,<br />

4 0 0 U . S . 7 4 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . T h e C o n f e r e n c e C o m m i t t e e d e l e t e d t h e<br />

House provision, following the Senate’s desires, because it believed<br />

it inappropriate to “codify constitutional evidentiary princip<br />

l e s . ” W E I N S T E I N ’ S E V I D E N C E a t 8 0 4 – 1 6 ( 1 9 7 8 ) c i t i n g<br />

CONG.REC.H 11931–32 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1974). Thus, applicability<br />

of the hearsay exception to individuals implicating the<br />

accused may well rest only on the extent to which Bruton, supra ,<br />

governs such statement. The Committee intends that the Rule<br />

extend to such statements to the same extent that subdivision<br />

8 0 4 ( b ) ( 4 ) i s h e l d b y t h e A r t i c l e I I I c o u r t s t o a p p l y t o s u c h<br />

statements.<br />

(4) Statement of personal or family history. Rule 804(b)(4) of<br />

the Federal Rule is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule, and had<br />

no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. The primary feature of<br />

Rule 803(b)(4)(A) is its application even though the “declarant<br />

had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter<br />

stated.”<br />

(5) Other exceptions. Rule 804(b)(5) is taken without change<br />

from the Federal Rule and is identical to Rule 803(24). As Rule<br />

803 applies to hearsay statements regardless of the declarant’s<br />

availability or lack thereof, this subdivision is actually superfluous.<br />

As to its effect,see the Analysis to Rule 803(24).<br />

Rule 805 Hearsay within hearsay<br />

Rule 805 is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule. Although<br />

the 1969 Manual did not exactly address the issue, the military<br />

rule is identical with the new rule.<br />

Rule 806 Attacking and supporting credibility of<br />

declarant<br />

Rule 806 is taken from the Federal Rule without change. It<br />

restates the prior military rule that a hearsay declarant or statement<br />

may always be contradicted or impeached. The Rule eliminates<br />

any requirement that the declarant be given “an opportunity<br />

to deny or explain” an inconsistent statement or inconsistent conduct<br />

when such statement or conduct is offered to attack the<br />

hearsay statement. As a result, Rule 806 supersedes Rule 613(b)<br />

which would require such an opportunity for a statement inconsistent<br />

with in-court testimony.<br />

A22-58<br />

SECTION IX<br />

AUTHENTICATION AND INDENTIFICATION<br />

Rule 901 Requirement of authentication or<br />

identification<br />

(a) General provision. Rule 901(a) is taken verbatim from the<br />

Federal Rule, and is similar to Para. 143 b of the 1969 Manual,<br />

which stated in pertinent part that: “A writing may be authenticated<br />

by any competent proof that it is genuine— is in fact what<br />

it purports or is claimed to be.” Unlike the 1969 Manual provision,<br />

however, Rule 901(a) is not limited to writings and consequently<br />

is broader in scope. The Rule supports the requirement<br />

for logical relevance. See Rule 401.<br />

There is substantial question as to the proper interpretation of<br />

the Federal Rule equivalent of Rule 901(a). The Rule requires<br />

only “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in<br />

question is what its proponent claims.” It is possible that this<br />

phrasing supersedes any formulaic approach to authentication and<br />

that rigid rules such as those that have been devised to authenticate<br />

taped recordings, for example, are no longer valid. On the<br />

other hand, it appears fully appropriate for a trial judge to require<br />

such evidence as is needed “to support a finding that the matter in<br />

question is what its proponent claims,” which evidence may echo<br />

in some cases the common law formulations. There appears to be<br />

no reason to believe that the Rule will change the present law as<br />

it affects chains of custody for real evidence— especially if fungible.<br />

Present case law would appear to be consistent with the<br />

new Rule because the chain of custody requirement has not been<br />

applied in a rigid fashion. A chain of custody will still be required<br />

when it is necessary to show that the evidence is what it is<br />

claimed to be and, when appropriate, that its condition is unchanged.<br />

Rule 901(a) may make authentication somewhat easier, but<br />

is unlikely to make a substantial change in most areas of military<br />

practice.<br />

As is generally the case, failure to object to evidence on the<br />

grounds of lack of authentication will waive the objection. See<br />

Rule 103(a).<br />

(b) Illustration. Rule 901(b) is taken verbatim from the Federal<br />

Rule with the exception of a modification to Rule 901(b)(10).<br />

Rule 901(b)(10) has been modified by the addition of “or by<br />

applicable regulations prescribed pursuant to statutory authority.”<br />

The new language was added because it was viewed as impracticable<br />

in military practice to require statutory or Supreme Court<br />

action to add authentication methods. The world wide disposition<br />

of the armed forces with their frequent redeployments may require<br />

rapid adjustments in authentication procedures to preclude<br />

substantial interference with personnel practices needed to ensure<br />

operational efficiency. The new language does not require new<br />

statutory authority. Rather, the present authority that exists for the<br />

various Service and Departmental Secretaries to issue those regulations<br />

necessary for the day to day operations of their department<br />

is sufficient.<br />

Rule 901(b) is a non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of<br />

authentication techniques. None of the examples are inconsistent<br />

with prior military law and many are found within the 1969<br />

Manual, see, Para. 143 b. Self-authentication is governed by Rule<br />

902.

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