2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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App. 22, M.R.E. 321(b)(2) APPENDIX 22 changes military law and adapts the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding that the right t o c o u n s e l a t t a c h e d o n l y w h e n “ a d v e r s a r y j u d i c i a l c r i m i n a l proceedings” have been initiated or “the government has committed itself to prosecute”) to unique military criminal procedure. See also Rule 305(d)(1)(B). Note that interrogation of a suspect will require rights warnings, perhaps including a warning of a right to counsel, even if counsel is unnecessary under Rule 321. See Rule 305. As previously noted, the Rule does not define “lineup” and recourse to case law is necessary. Intentional exposure of the suspect to one or more individuals for purpose of identification is likely to be a lineup. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), although in rare cases of emergency (e.g., a dying victim) such an identification may be considered a permissible “showup” rather than a “lineup.” Truly accidental confrontations between victims and suspects leading to an identification by the victim are not generally considered “lineups”; cf. United State ex rel Ragazzin v. Brierley, 321 F.Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Photolineart identifications are not “lineups” for purposes of the right to counsel. U n i t e d S t a t e s v . A s h , 4 1 3 U . S . 3 0 0 , 3 0 1 n . 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . I f a photolineart identification is used, however, the photographs employed should be preserved for use at trial in the event that the defense should claim that the identification was “unnecessarily suggestive.” See subdivision (b)(1) supra. A lineup participant who is entitled to counsel is entitled to only one lawyer under the Rule and is specifically entitled to free military counsel without regard to the indigency or lack thereof of the participant. No right to civilian counsel or military counsel of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ’ s o w n s e l e c t i o n e x i s t s u n d e r t h e R u l e , U n i t e d States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, n.27 (1967). A lineup participant may waive any applicable right to counsel so long as the participant is aware of the right to counsel and the waiver is made “freely, knowingly, and intelligently.” Normally a warning of the right to counsel will be necessary for the prosecution to prove an a d e q u a t e w a i v e r s h o u l d t h e d e f e n s e a d e q u a t e l y c h a l l e n g e t h e waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Avers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Model Rules for Law Enforcement, Eye Witness Identification, Rule 404 (1974) cited in E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan, & F. Lederer, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 366 (1979). 1984 Amendment: In subsection (b)(2)(A), the words “or law specialist within the meaning of Article 1” were deleted as unnecessary. See R.C.M. 103(26). Subdivision (b)(2)(B) grants a right to counsel at non-military lineups within the United States only when such a right to counsel is recognized by “the principles of law generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts involving similar lineups.” The Rule presumes that an individual participating in a foreign lineup conducted by officials of a foreign nation without American participation has no right to counsel at such a lineup. (c) Motions to suppress and objections. Rule 321(c) is identical in application to Rule 311(d). See the Analysis to Rules 304 and 311. (d) Burden of proof. Rule 321(d) makes it clear that when an eyewitness identification is challenged by the defense, the prosecution need reply only to the specific cognizable defense complaint. See also Rules 304 and 311. The subdivision distinguishes A22-32 between defense challenges involving alleged violation of the right to counsel and those involving the alleged unnecessarily suggestive identifications. (1) Right to counsel. Subdivision (d)(1) requires that when an alleged violation of the right to counsel has been raised the prosecution must either demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence that counsel was present or that the right to counsel was waived voluntarily and intelligently. The Rule also declares that if the right to counsel is violated at a lineup that results in an identification of the accused any later identification is considered a result of the prior lineup as a matter of law unless the military judge determines by clear and convincing evidence that the latter identification is not the result of the first lineup. Subdivision (d)(1) is taken in substance from 1969 Manual Para. 153 a. ( 2 ) U n n e c e s s a r i l y s u g g e s t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . R u l e 3 2 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) deals with an alleged unnecessarily suggestive identification or with any other alleged violation of due process. The subdivision makes it clear that the prosecution must show, when the defense has raised the issue, that the identification in question was not based upon a preponderance of the evidence, “so unnecessarily suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances, as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identity.” This rule is taken from the Supreme Court’s decisions of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and unlike subdivision (d)(1), applies to all identification processes whether lineups or not. The Rule recognizes that the nature of the identification process itself may well be critical to the reliability of the identification and provides for exclusion of unreliable evidence regardless of its source. If the prosecution meets its burden, the mere fact that the identification process was unnecessary or suggestive does not require exclusion of the evidence, Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. If the identification in question is subsequent to an earlier, unnecessarily suggestive identification, the later identification is admissible if the prosecution can show by clear and convincing evidence that the later identification is not the result of the earlier improper examination. This portion of the Rule is consistent both with 1969 Manual Para. 153 a and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). (e) Defense evidence. Rule 321(e) is identical with the analogous provisions in Rules 304 and 311 and generally restates prior law. (f) Rulings. Rule 321(f) is identical with the analogous provisions in Rules 304 and 321 and substantially changes prior law. See the Analysis to Rule 304(d)(4). (g) Effect of guilty plea. Rule 321(g) is identical with the analogous provisions in Rules 304 and 311 and restates prior law. SECTION IV Relevancy and its Limits Rule 401 Definition of “relevant evidence” The definition of “relevant evidence” found within Rule 401 is taken without change from the Federal Rule and is substantially similar in effect to that used by Para. 137, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The Rule’s definition may be somewhat broader than the 1969 Manual’s, as the Rule defines as relevant any evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” while the

1969 Manual defines as “not relevant” evidence “too remote to have any appreciable probative value ...” To the extent that the 1969 Manual’s definition includes considerations of “legal relevance,” those considerations are adequately addressed by such other Rules as Rules 403 and 609. See, E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL EVI- DENCE 62–65 (1979) (which, after defining “logical relevance” as involving only probative value, states at 63 that “under the rubric of [legal relevance,] the courts have imposed an additional requirement that the item’s probative value outweighs any attendant probative dangers.”) The Rule is similar to the 1969 Manual in that it abandons any reference to “materiality” in favor of a single standard of “relevance.” Notwithstanding the specific terminology used, however, the concept of materiality survives in the Rule’s condition that to be relevant evidence must involve a fact “which is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Rule 402 Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. Rule 402 is taken without significant change from the Federal Rule. The Federal Rule’s language relating to limitations imposed by “the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority” has been replaced by material tailored to the unique nature of the Military Rules of Evidence. Rule 402 recognizes that the Constitution may apply somewhat differently to members of the armed forces than to civilians, and the Rule deletes the Federal Rule’s reference to “other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court” because such Rules do not apply directly in courts-martial. See Rule 101(b)(2). Rule 402 provides a general standard by which irrelevant evidence is always inadmissible and by which relevant evidence is generally admissible. Qualified admissibility of relevant evidence is required by the limitations in Sections III and V and by such other Rules as 403 and 609 which intentionally utilize matters such as degree of probative value and judicial efficiency in determining whether relevant evidence should be admitted. Rule 402 is not significantly different in its effect from Para. 137 of the 1969 Manual which it replaces, and procedures used under the 1969 Manual in determining relevance generally remain valid. Offers of proof are encouraged when items of doubtful relevance are proffered, and it remains possible, subject to the discretion of the military judge, to offer evidence “subject to later connection.” Use of the latter technique, however, must be made with great care to avoid the possibility of bringing inadmissible evidence before the members of the court. It should be noted that Rule 402 is potentially the most important of the new rules. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Military Rules of Evidence resolve all evidentiary matters; see Rule 101(b). When specific authority to resolve an evidentiary issue is absent, Rule 402’s clear result is to make relevant evidence admissible. Rule 403 Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time Rule 403 is taken without change from the Federal Rule of Evidence. The Rule incorporates the concept often known as “legal relevance”, see the Analysis to Rule 401, and provides that evidence may be excluded for the reasons stated notwithstanding ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE App. 22, M.R.E. 404(a) its character as relevant evidence. The Rule vests the military judge with wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence that comes within the Rule. If a party views specific evidence as being highly prejudicial, it may be possible to stipulate to the evidence and thus avoid its presentation to the court members. United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1979), a prosecution for interstate transportation of obscene materials, illustrates this point. The defense offered to stipulate that certain films were obscene in order to prevent the jury from viewing the films, but the prosecution declined to join in the stipulation. The trial judge sustained the prosecution’s rejection of the stipulation and the Fifth Circuit upheld the judge’s decision. In its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals adopted a case by case balancing approach recognizing both the importance of allowing probative evidence to be presented and the use of stipulations as a tool to implement the policies inherent in Rule 403. Insofar as the latter is concerned, the court expressly recognized the power of a Federal district judge to compel the prosecution to accept a defense tendered stipulation. Rule 404 Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes ( a ) C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e g e n e r a l l y . R u l e 4 0 4 ( a ) r e p l a c e s 1 9 6 9 Manual Para. 138 f and is taken without substantial change from the Federal Rule. Rule 404(a) provides, subject to three exceptions, that character evidence is not admissible to show that a person acted in conformity therewith. Rule 404(a)(1) allows only evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the accused to be offered in evidence by the defense. This is a significant change from Para. 138 f of the 1969 Manual which also allows evidence of “general good character” of the accused to be received in order to demonstrate that the accused is less likely to have committed a criminal act. Under the new rule, evidence of general good character is inadmissible because only evidence of a specific trait is acceptable. It is the intention of the Committee, however, to allow the defense to introduce evidence of good military character when that specific trait is pertinent. Evidence of good military character would be admissible, for example, in a prosecution for disobedience of orders. The prosecution may present evidence of a character trait only in rebuttal to receipt in evidence of defense character evidence. This is consistent with prior military law. Rule 404(a)(2) is taken from the Federal Rule with minor changes. The Federal Rule allows the prosecution to present evidence of the character trait of peacefulness of the victim “in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.” Thus, the Federal Rule allows prosecutorial use of character evidence in a homicide case in which self-defense has been raised. The limitation to homicide cases appeared to be inappropriate and impracticable in the military environment. All too often, assaults involving claims of self-defense take place in the densely populated living quarters common to military life. Whether aboard ship or within barracks, it is considered essential to allow evidence of the character trait of peacefulness of the victim. Otherwise, a substantial risk would exist of allowing unlawful assaults to go undeterred. The Federal Rule’s use of the expression “first aggressor” was modified to read “an aggressor,” as substantive military law recognizes that even an individual A22-33

App. 22, M.R.E. 321(b)(2) APPENDIX 22<br />

changes military law and adapts the Supreme Court’s decision in<br />

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding that the right<br />

t o c o u n s e l a t t a c h e d o n l y w h e n “ a d v e r s a r y j u d i c i a l c r i m i n a l<br />

proceedings” have been initiated or “the government has committed<br />

itself to prosecute”) to unique military criminal procedure. See<br />

also Rule 305(d)(1)(B).<br />

Note that interrogation of a suspect will require rights warnings,<br />

perhaps including a warning of a right to counsel, even if<br />

counsel is unnecessary under Rule 321. See Rule 305.<br />

As previously noted, the Rule does not define “lineup” and<br />

recourse to case law is necessary. Intentional exposure of the<br />

suspect to one or more individuals for purpose of identification is<br />

likely to be a lineup. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967),<br />

although in rare cases of emergency (e.g., a dying victim) such an<br />

identification may be considered a permissible “showup” rather<br />

than a “lineup.” Truly accidental confrontations between victims<br />

and suspects leading to an identification by the victim are not<br />

generally considered “lineups”; cf. United State ex rel Ragazzin v.<br />

Brierley, 321 F.Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Photolineart identifications<br />

are not “lineups” for purposes of the right to counsel.<br />

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . A s h , 4 1 3 U . S . 3 0 0 , 3 0 1 n . 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . I f a<br />

photolineart identification is used, however, the photographs employed<br />

should be preserved for use at trial in the event that the<br />

defense should claim that the identification was “unnecessarily<br />

suggestive.” See subdivision (b)(1) supra.<br />

A lineup participant who is entitled to counsel is entitled to<br />

only one lawyer under the Rule and is specifically entitled to free<br />

military counsel without regard to the indigency or lack thereof of<br />

the participant. No right to civilian counsel or military counsel of<br />

t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ’ s o w n s e l e c t i o n e x i s t s u n d e r t h e R u l e , U n i t e d<br />

States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, n.27 (1967). A lineup participant<br />

may waive any applicable right to counsel so long as the participant<br />

is aware of the right to counsel and the waiver is made<br />

“freely, knowingly, and intelligently.” Normally a warning of the<br />

right to counsel will be necessary for the prosecution to prove an<br />

a d e q u a t e w a i v e r s h o u l d t h e d e f e n s e a d e q u a t e l y c h a l l e n g e t h e<br />

waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Avers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.<br />

1970). See also Model Rules for Law Enforcement, Eye Witness<br />

Identification, Rule 404 (1974) cited in E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli,<br />

F. Gilligan, & F. Lederer, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 366<br />

(1979).<br />

1984 Amendment: In subsection (b)(2)(A), the words “or law<br />

specialist within the meaning of Article 1” were deleted as unnecessary.<br />

See R.C.M. 103(26).<br />

Subdivision (b)(2)(B) grants a right to counsel at non-military<br />

lineups within the United States only when such a right to counsel<br />

is recognized by “the principles of law generally recognized in<br />

the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts<br />

involving similar lineups.” The Rule presumes that an individual<br />

participating in a foreign lineup conducted by officials of a foreign<br />

nation without American participation has no right to counsel<br />

at such a lineup.<br />

(c) Motions to suppress and objections. Rule 321(c) is identical<br />

in application to Rule 311(d). See the Analysis to Rules 304 and<br />

311.<br />

(d) Burden of proof. Rule 321(d) makes it clear that when an<br />

eyewitness identification is challenged by the defense, the prosecution<br />

need reply only to the specific cognizable defense complaint.<br />

See also Rules 304 and 311. The subdivision distinguishes<br />

A22-32<br />

between defense challenges involving alleged violation of the<br />

right to counsel and those involving the alleged unnecessarily<br />

suggestive identifications.<br />

(1) Right to counsel. Subdivision (d)(1) requires that when an<br />

alleged violation of the right to counsel has been raised the<br />

prosecution must either demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence<br />

that counsel was present or that the right to counsel was<br />

waived voluntarily and intelligently. The Rule also declares that if<br />

the right to counsel is violated at a lineup that results in an<br />

identification of the accused any later identification is considered<br />

a result of the prior lineup as a matter of law unless the military<br />

judge determines by clear and convincing evidence that the latter<br />

identification is not the result of the first lineup. Subdivision<br />

(d)(1) is taken in substance from 1969 Manual Para. 153 a.<br />

( 2 ) U n n e c e s s a r i l y s u g g e s t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . R u l e 3 2 1 ( d ) ( 2 )<br />

deals with an alleged unnecessarily suggestive identification or<br />

with any other alleged violation of due process. The subdivision<br />

makes it clear that the prosecution must show, when the defense<br />

has raised the issue, that the identification in question was not<br />

based upon a preponderance of the evidence, “so unnecessarily<br />

suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances, as to create<br />

a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identity.”<br />

This rule is taken from the Supreme Court’s decisions of Neil v.<br />

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293<br />

(1967), and unlike subdivision (d)(1), applies to all identification<br />

processes whether lineups or not. The Rule recognizes that the<br />

nature of the identification process itself may well be critical to<br />

the reliability of the identification and provides for exclusion of<br />

unreliable evidence regardless of its source. If the prosecution<br />

meets its burden, the mere fact that the identification process was<br />

unnecessary or suggestive does not require exclusion of the evidence,<br />

Manson v. Brathwaite, supra.<br />

If the identification in question is subsequent to an earlier,<br />

unnecessarily suggestive identification, the later identification is<br />

admissible if the prosecution can show by clear and convincing<br />

evidence that the later identification is not the result of the earlier<br />

improper examination. This portion of the Rule is consistent both<br />

with 1969 Manual Para. 153 a and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682<br />

(1972).<br />

(e) Defense evidence. Rule 321(e) is identical with the analogous<br />

provisions in Rules 304 and 311 and generally restates prior law.<br />

(f) Rulings. Rule 321(f) is identical with the analogous provisions<br />

in Rules 304 and 321 and substantially changes prior law. See the<br />

Analysis to Rule 304(d)(4).<br />

(g) Effect of guilty plea. Rule 321(g) is identical with the analogous<br />

provisions in Rules 304 and 311 and restates prior law.<br />

SECTION IV<br />

Relevancy and its Limits<br />

Rule 401 Definition of “relevant evidence”<br />

The definition of “relevant evidence” found within Rule 401 is<br />

taken without change from the Federal Rule and is substantially<br />

similar in effect to that used by Para. 137, MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

The Rule’s definition may be somewhat broader than the 1969<br />

Manual’s, as the Rule defines as relevant any evidence that has<br />

“any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more probable<br />

or less probable than it would be without the evidence” while the

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