2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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App. 22, M.R.E. 315(h) APPENDIX 22 not, however, result in exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, Rule 314(h)(2) provides for the inventory of seized property and provisions of a copy of the inventory to the person from whom the property was seized. Noncompliance with the subdivision does not, however, make the search or seizure unlawful. Under Rule 315(h)(3) compliance with foreign law is required when executing a search authorization outside the United States, but noncompliance does not trigger the exclusionary rule. Rule 316 Seizures (a) General Rule. Rule 316(a) provides that evidence obtained pursuant to the Rule is admissible when relevant and not otherw i s e i n a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r t h e R u l e s . R u l e 3 1 6 r e c o g n i z e s t h a t searches are distinct from seizures. Although rare, a seizure need not be proceeded by a search. Property may, for example, be seized after being located pursuant to plain view, see subdivision (d)(4)(C). Consequently, the propriety of a seizure must be considered independently of any preceding search. (b) Seizures of property. Rule 316(b) defines probable cause in the same fashion as defined by Rule 315 for probable cause searches. See the Analysis of Rule 315(f)(2). The justifications for seizing property are taken from 1969 Manual Para. 152. Their number has, however, been reduced for reasons of brevity. No distinction is made between “evidence of crime” and “instrumentalities or fruits of crime.” Similarly, the proceeds of crime are also “evidence of crime.” 1984 Amendment: The second sentence of subsection (b) was deleted based on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See Analysis, Mil. R. Evid. 315(f)(1), supra. (c) Apprehension. Apprehensions are, of course, seizures of the person and unlawful apprehensions may be challenged as an unlawful seizure. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . T e x i d o r - P e r e z , 7 M . J . 3 5 6 ( C . M . A . 1979). (d) Seizure of property or evidence. (1) Abandoned property. Rule 316(d) restates prior law, not addressed specifically by the 1969 Manual chapter, by providing that abandoned property may be seized by anyone at any time. (2) Consent. Rule 316(d)(2) permits seizure of property with appropriate consent pursuant to Rule 314(e). The prosecution must demonstrate a voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence. (3) Government property. Rule 316(d)(3) permits seizure of government property without probable cause unless the person to whom the property is issued or assigned has a reasonable expectation of privacy therein at the time of seizure. In this regard note Rule 314(d) and its analysis. ( 4 ) O t h e r p r o p e r t y . R u l e 3 1 6 ( d ) ( 4 ) p r o v i d e s f o r s e i z u r e o f property or evidence not otherwise addressed by the Rule. There must be justification to exercise control over the property. Although property may have been lawfully located, it may not be seized for use at trial unless there is a reasonable belief that the property is of a type discussed in Rule 316(b). Because the Rule is inapplicable to seizures unconnected with law enforcement, it does not limit the seizure of property for a valid administrative purpose such as safety. Property or evidence may be seized upon probable cause when seizure is authorized or directed by a search warrant or authoriza- A22-30 tion, Rule 316(d)(4)(A); when exigent circumstances pursuant to Rule 315(g) permit proceeding without such a warrant or authorization; or when the property or evidence is in plain view or smell, Rule 316(d)(4)(C). Although most plain view seizures are inadvertent, there is no necessity that a plain view discovery be inadvertent— notwiths t a n d i n g d i c t a , i n s o m e c o u r t c a s e s ; s e e , C o o l i d g e v . N e w Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Rule allows a seizure pursuant to probable cause when made as a result of plain view. The language used in Rule 316(d)(4)(C) is taken from the ALI M O D E L C O D E O F P R E A R R A I G N M E N T P R O C E D U R E S § 260.6 (1975). The Rule requires that the observation making up the alleged plain view be “reasonable.” Whether intentional observation from outside a window, via flashlight or binocular, for example, is observation in a “reasonable fashion” is a question to be considered on a case by case basis. Whether a person may properly enter upon private property in order to effect a seizure of matter located via plain view is not resolved by the Rule and is left to future case development. 1 9 8 4 A m e n d m e n t : S u b s e c t i o n ( d ) ( 5 ) w a s a d d e d b a s e d o n United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). (e) Power to seize. Rule 316(e) conforms with Rule 315(e) and has its origin in Para. 19, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Rule 317 Interception of wire and oral communication (a) General Rule. The area of interception of wire and oral communications is unusually complex and fluid. At present, the area is governed by the Fourth Amendment, applicable federal statute, DOD directive, and regulations prescribed by the Service Secretaries. In view of this situation, it is preferable to refrain from codification and to vest authority for the area primarily in the Department of Defense or Secretary concerned. Rule 317(c) thus prohibits interception of wire and oral communications for law enforcement purposes by members of the armed forces except as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2516, Rule 317(b), and when applicable, by regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned. Rule 317(a), however, specifically requires exclusion of evidence resulting form noncompliance with Rule 317(c) only when exclusion is required by the Constitution or by an applicable statute. Insofar as a violation of a regulation is concerned, compare United States v. Dillard, 8 M.J. 213 (C.M.A. 1980) with United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). (b) Authorization for Judicial Applications in the United States. Rule 317(b) is intended to clarify the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2516 by expressly recognizing the Attorney General’s authority to authorize applications to a federal court by the Department of Def e n s e , D e p a r t m e n t o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y , o r t h e m i l i t a r y d e p a r t m e n t s f o r a u t h o r i t y t o i n t e r c e p t w i r e o r o r a l communications. (c) Regulations. Rule 317(c) requires interception of wire or oral communications in the United States be first authorized by statute, see Rule 317(b), and interceptions abroad by appropriate regulations. See the Analysis to Rule 317(a), supra. The Committee intends 317(c) to limit only in interceptions that are non consensual under Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Rule 321 Eyewitness identification (a) General Rule (1) Admissibility. The first sentence of Rule 321(a)(1) is the b a s i c r u l e o f a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e y e w i t n e s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d provides that evidence of a relevant out-of-court identification is admissible when otherwise admissible under the Rules. The intent of the provision is to allow any relevant out-of-court identification without any need to comply with the condition precedent such as in-court identification, significant change from the prior rule as found in Para. 153 a, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The language “if such testimony is otherwise admissible under these rules” is primarily intended to ensure compliance with the hearsay rule. Rule 802. It should be noted that Rule 801(d)(1)(C) states that a statement of “identification of a person made after perceiving the person” is not hearsay when “the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.” An eyewitness identification normally will be admissible if the declarant testifies. The Rule’s statement, “the witness making the identification and any person who has observed the previous identification may testify concerning it,” is not an express exception authorizing the witness to testify to an out-of-court identification notwithstanding the hearsay rule, rather it is simply an indication that in appropriate circumstances, see Rules 803 and 804, a witness to an out-of-court identification may testify concerning it. The last sentence of subdivision (a)(1) is intended to clarify procedure by emphasizing that an in-court identification may be bolstered by an out-of-court identification notwithstanding the fact that the in-court identification has not been attacked. (2) Exclusionary rule. Rule 321(a)(2) provides the basic exclusionary rule for eyewitness identification testimony. The substance of the Rule is taken from prior Manual paragraph 153 a as modified by the new procedure for suppression motions. See Rules 304 and 311. Subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides that evidence of an identification will be excluded if it was obtained as a result of an “unlawful identification process conducted by the United States or other domestic authorities” while subdivision (a)(2)(B) excludes evidence of an identification if exclusion would be required by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Under the burden of proof, subdivision (d)(2), an identification is not inadmissible if the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the identification process was not so unnecessarily suggestive, in light of the totality of the circumstances, as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identity. It is the unreliability of the evidence w h i c h i s d e t e r m i n a t i v e . M a n s o n v . B r a t h w a i t e , 4 3 2 U . S . 9 8 (1977). “United States or other domestic authorities” includes military personnel. Although it is clear that an unlawful identification may taint a later identification, it is unclear at present whether an unlawful identification requires suppression of evidence other than identification of the accused. Consequently, the Rule requires exclusion of nonidentification derivative evidence only when the Constitution would so require. (b) Definition of “unlawful.” (1) Lineups and other identification processes. Rule 321(b) defines “unlawful lineup or other identification processes.” When such a procedure is conducted by persons subject to the Uniform ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE App. 22, M.R.E. 321(b)(2) Code of Military Justice or their agents, it will be unlawful if it is “unnecessarily suggestive or otherwise in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as applied to members of the armed forces.” The expression, “unnecessarily suggestive” itself is a technical one and refers to an identification that is in violation of the due process clause because it is unreliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra; Stovall v. Denno, 338 U.S. 292 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). An identification is not unnecessarily suggestive in violation of the due process clause if the identification process was not so unnecessarily suggestive, in light of the totality of the circumstances, as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identity. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, and subdivision (d)(2). Subdivision (1)(A) differs from subdivision (1)(B) only in that it recognizes that the Constitution may apply differently to members of the armed forces than it does to civilians. R u l e 3 2 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) i s a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l f o r m s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n processes including showups and lineups. 1984 Amendment: Subsections (b)(1) and (d)(2) were modified to make clear that the test for admissibility of an out-of-court identification is reliability. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. This was apparently the intent of the drafters of the former rule. See Analysis, Mil. R. Evid. 321. The language actually used in subsection (b)(1) and (d)(2) was subject to a different interpretation, however. See S. Salzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, MILI- TARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 165–167 (1981); Gasperini, Eyewitness Identification Under the Military Rules of Evidence, The Army Lawyer at 42 (May 1980). In determining whether an identification is reliable, the military judge should weigh all the circumstances, including: the opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the offense; the degree of attention paid by the witness; the accuracy of any prior descriptions of the accused by the witness; the level of certainty shown by the witness in the identification; and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors should be weighed the corrupting effect of a suggestive and unnecessary identification. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra; Neil v. Biggers, supra. Note that the modification of subsection (b)(1) eliminates the distinction between identification processes conducted by persons subject to the code and other officials. Because the test is the reliability of the identification, and not a prophylactic standard, there is no basis to distinguish between identification processes conducted by each group. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. (2) Lineups: right to counsel. Rule 321(b)(2) deals only with lineups. The Rule does declare that a lineup is “unlawful” if it is conducted in violation of the right to counsel. Like Rule 305 and 311, Rule 321(b)(2) distinguishes between lineups conducted by persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice or their agents and those conducted by others. Subdivision (b)(2)(A) is the basic right to counsel for personnel participating in military lineups. A lineup participant is entitled to counsel only if that participant is in pretrial restraint (pretrial arrest, restriction, or confinement) under paragraph 20 of the Manual or has had charges preferred against him or her. Mere apprehension or temporary detention does not trigger the right to counsel under the Rule. This portion of the Rule substantially A22-31

App. 22, M.R.E. 315(h) APPENDIX 22<br />

not, however, result in exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, Rule<br />

314(h)(2) provides for the inventory of seized property and provisions<br />

of a copy of the inventory to the person from whom the<br />

property was seized. Noncompliance with the subdivision does<br />

not, however, make the search or seizure unlawful. Under Rule<br />

315(h)(3) compliance with foreign law is required when executing<br />

a search authorization outside the United States, but noncompliance<br />

does not trigger the exclusionary rule.<br />

Rule 316 Seizures<br />

(a) General Rule. Rule 316(a) provides that evidence obtained<br />

pursuant to the Rule is admissible when relevant and not otherw<br />

i s e i n a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r t h e R u l e s . R u l e 3 1 6 r e c o g n i z e s t h a t<br />

searches are distinct from seizures. Although rare, a seizure need<br />

not be proceeded by a search. Property may, for example, be<br />

seized after being located pursuant to plain view, see subdivision<br />

(d)(4)(C). Consequently, the propriety of a seizure must be considered<br />

independently of any preceding search.<br />

(b) Seizures of property. Rule 316(b) defines probable cause in<br />

the same fashion as defined by Rule 315 for probable cause<br />

searches. See the Analysis of Rule 315(f)(2). The justifications for<br />

seizing property are taken from 1969 Manual Para. 152. Their<br />

number has, however, been reduced for reasons of brevity. No<br />

distinction is made between “evidence of crime” and “instrumentalities<br />

or fruits of crime.” Similarly, the proceeds of crime are<br />

also “evidence of crime.”<br />

1984 Amendment: The second sentence of subsection (b) was<br />

deleted based on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See<br />

Analysis, Mil. R. Evid. 315(f)(1), supra.<br />

(c) Apprehension. Apprehensions are, of course, seizures of the<br />

person and unlawful apprehensions may be challenged as an unlawful<br />

seizure. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200<br />

( 1 9 7 9 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . T e x i d o r - P e r e z , 7 M . J . 3 5 6 ( C . M . A .<br />

1979).<br />

(d) Seizure of property or evidence.<br />

(1) Abandoned property. Rule 316(d) restates prior law, not<br />

addressed specifically by the 1969 Manual chapter, by providing<br />

that abandoned property may be seized by anyone at any time.<br />

(2) Consent. Rule 316(d)(2) permits seizure of property with<br />

appropriate consent pursuant to Rule 314(e). The prosecution<br />

must demonstrate a voluntary consent by clear and convincing<br />

evidence.<br />

(3) Government property. Rule 316(d)(3) permits seizure of<br />

government property without probable cause unless the person to<br />

whom the property is issued or assigned has a reasonable expectation<br />

of privacy therein at the time of seizure. In this regard note<br />

Rule 314(d) and its analysis.<br />

( 4 ) O t h e r p r o p e r t y . R u l e 3 1 6 ( d ) ( 4 ) p r o v i d e s f o r s e i z u r e o f<br />

property or evidence not otherwise addressed by the Rule. There<br />

must be justification to exercise control over the property. Although<br />

property may have been lawfully located, it may not be<br />

seized for use at trial unless there is a reasonable belief that the<br />

property is of a type discussed in Rule 316(b). Because the Rule<br />

is inapplicable to seizures unconnected with law enforcement, it<br />

does not limit the seizure of property for a valid administrative<br />

purpose such as safety.<br />

Property or evidence may be seized upon probable cause when<br />

seizure is authorized or directed by a search warrant or authoriza-<br />

A22-30<br />

tion, Rule 316(d)(4)(A); when exigent circumstances pursuant to<br />

Rule 315(g) permit proceeding without such a warrant or authorization;<br />

or when the property or evidence is in plain view or smell,<br />

Rule 316(d)(4)(C).<br />

Although most plain view seizures are inadvertent, there is no<br />

necessity that a plain view discovery be inadvertent— notwiths<br />

t a n d i n g d i c t a , i n s o m e c o u r t c a s e s ; s e e , C o o l i d g e v . N e w<br />

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Rule allows a seizure<br />

pursuant to probable cause when made as a result of plain view.<br />

The language used in Rule 316(d)(4)(C) is taken from the ALI<br />

M O D E L C O D E O F P R E A R R A I G N M E N T P R O C E D U R E S §<br />

260.6 (1975). The Rule requires that the observation making up<br />

the alleged plain view be “reasonable.” Whether intentional observation<br />

from outside a window, via flashlight or binocular, for<br />

example, is observation in a “reasonable fashion” is a question to<br />

be considered on a case by case basis. Whether a person may<br />

properly enter upon private property in order to effect a seizure of<br />

matter located via plain view is not resolved by the Rule and is<br />

left to future case development.<br />

1 9 8 4 A m e n d m e n t : S u b s e c t i o n ( d ) ( 5 ) w a s a d d e d b a s e d o n<br />

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).<br />

(e) Power to seize. Rule 316(e) conforms with Rule 315(e) and<br />

has its origin in Para. 19, MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

Rule 317 Interception of wire and oral<br />

communication<br />

(a) General Rule. The area of interception of wire and oral communications<br />

is unusually complex and fluid. At present, the area<br />

is governed by the Fourth Amendment, applicable federal statute,<br />

DOD directive, and regulations prescribed by the Service Secretaries.<br />

In view of this situation, it is preferable to refrain from<br />

codification and to vest authority for the area primarily in the<br />

Department of Defense or Secretary concerned. Rule 317(c) thus<br />

prohibits interception of wire and oral communications for law<br />

enforcement purposes by members of the armed forces except as<br />

authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2516, Rule 317(b), and when applicable,<br />

by regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense or the<br />

Secretary concerned. Rule 317(a), however, specifically requires<br />

exclusion of evidence resulting form noncompliance with Rule<br />

317(c) only when exclusion is required by the Constitution or by<br />

an applicable statute. Insofar as a violation of a regulation is<br />

concerned, compare United States v. Dillard, 8 M.J. 213 (C.M.A.<br />

1980) with United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).<br />

(b) Authorization for Judicial Applications in the United States.<br />

Rule 317(b) is intended to clarify the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2516<br />

by expressly recognizing the Attorney General’s authority to authorize<br />

applications to a federal court by the Department of Def<br />

e n s e , D e p a r t m e n t o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y , o r t h e m i l i t a r y<br />

d e p a r t m e n t s f o r a u t h o r i t y t o i n t e r c e p t w i r e o r o r a l<br />

communications.<br />

(c) Regulations. Rule 317(c) requires interception of wire or oral<br />

communications in the United States be first authorized by statute,<br />

see Rule 317(b), and interceptions abroad by appropriate<br />

regulations. See the Analysis to Rule 317(a), supra. The Committee<br />

intends 317(c) to limit only in interceptions that are non<br />

consensual under Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States<br />

Code.

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