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2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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must be either “a reasonable suspicion that such property is present<br />

in the command” or the inspection must be “a previously<br />

scheduled examination of the command.” The former requirement<br />

requires that an inspection not previously scheduled be justified<br />

by “reasonable suspicion that such property is present in the<br />

command.” This standard is intentionally minimal and requires<br />

only that the person ordering the inspection have a suspicion that<br />

is, under the circumstances, reasonable in nature. Probable cause<br />

is not required. Under the latter requirement, an inspection shall<br />

be scheduled sufficiently far enough in advance as to eliminate<br />

any reasonable probability that the inspection is being used as a<br />

subterfuge, i.e., that it is being used to search a given individual<br />

for evidence of crime when probable cause is lacking. Such<br />

scheduling may be made as a matter of date or event. In other<br />

words, inspections may be scheduled to take place on any specific<br />

date, e.g., a commander may decide on the first of a month to<br />

inspect on the 7th, 9th, and 21st, or on the occurrence of a<br />

specific event beyond the usual control of the commander, e.g.,<br />

whenever an alert is ordered, forces are deployed, a ship sails, the<br />

stock market reaches a certain level of activity, etc. It should be<br />

noted that “previously scheduled” inspections that vest discretion<br />

in the inspector are permissible when otherwise lawful. So long<br />

as the examination, e.g., an entrance gate inspection, has been<br />

previously scheduled, the fact that reasonable exercise of discretion<br />

is involved in singling out individuals to be inspected is not<br />

improper; such inspection must not be in violation of the Equal<br />

Protection clause of the 5th Amendment or be used as a subterfuge<br />

intended to allow search of certain specific individuals.<br />

The Rule applies special restrictions to contraband inspections<br />

because of the inherent possibility that such inspection may be<br />

used as subterfuge searches. Although a lawful inspection may be<br />

conducted with a secondary motive to prosecute those found in<br />

possession of contraband, the primary motive must be administrative<br />

in nature. The Rule recognizes the fact that commanders are<br />

o r d i n a r i l y m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e m o v a l o f c o n t r a b a n d f r o m<br />

u n i t s — t h e r e b y e l i m i n a t i n g i t s n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s o n u n i t<br />

readiness— than with prosecution of those found in possession of<br />

it. The fact that possession of contraband is itself unlawful renders<br />

the probability that an inspection may be a subterfuge somewhat<br />

higher than that for an inspection not intended to locate such<br />

material.<br />

An inspection which has as its intent, or one of its intents, in<br />

whole or in part, the discovery of contraband, however slight,<br />

must comply with the specific requirements set out in the Rule<br />

for inspections for contraband. An inspection which does not<br />

have such an intent need not so comply and will yield admissible<br />

evidence if contraband is found incidentally by the inspection.<br />

Contraband is defined as material the possession of which is by<br />

its very nature unlawful. Material may be declared to be unlawful<br />

by appropriate statute, regulation, or order. For example, if liquor<br />

is prohibited aboard ship, a shipboard inspection for liquor must<br />

comply with the rules for inspections for contraband.<br />

Before unlawful weapons or other contraband may be the subject<br />

of an inspection under Rule 313(b), there must be a determination<br />

that “such property would affect adversely the security,<br />

military fitness, or good order and discipline of the command.” In<br />

the event of an adequate defense challenge under Rule 311 to an<br />

inspection for contraband, the prosecution must establish by a<br />

preponderance that such property would in fact so adversely af-<br />

ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE<br />

App. 22, M.R.E. 313(b)<br />

fect the command. Although the question is an objective one, its<br />

resolution depends heavily on factors unique to the personnel or<br />

location inspected. If such contraband would adversely affect the<br />

ability of the command to complete its assigned mission in any<br />

significant way, the burden is met. The nature of the assigned<br />

mission is unimportant, for that is a matter within the prerogative<br />

of the chain of command only. The expert testimony of those<br />

within the chain of command of a given unit is worthy of great<br />

weight as the only purpose for permitting such an inspection is to<br />

ensure military readiness. The physiological or psychological effects<br />

of a given drug on an individual are normally irrelevant<br />

except insofar as such evidence is relevant to the question of the<br />

user’s ability to perform duties without impaired efficiency. As<br />

inspections are generally quantitative examinations, the nature<br />

and amount of contraband sought is relevant to the question of<br />

the government’s burden. The existence of five unlawful drug<br />

users in an <strong>Army</strong> division, for example, is unlikely to meet the<br />

Rule’s test involving adverse effect, but five users in an <strong>Army</strong><br />

platoon may well do so.<br />

The Rule does not require that personnel to be inspected be<br />

given preliminary notice of the inspection although such advance<br />

notice may well be desirable as a matter of policy or in the<br />

interests, as perhaps in gate inspections, of establishing an alternative<br />

basis, such as consent, for the examination.<br />

R u l e 3 1 3 ( b ) r e q u i r e s t h a t i n s p e c t i o n s b e c o n d u c t e d i n a<br />

“reasonable fashion.” The timing of an inspection and its nature<br />

may be of importance. Inspections conducted at a highly unusual<br />

time are not inherently unreasonable— especially when a legitimate<br />

reason of such timing is present. However, a 0200 inspect<br />

i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , m a y b e u n r e a s o n a b l e d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e<br />

surrounding circumstances.<br />

The Rule expressly permits the use of “any reasonable or<br />

natural technological aid.” Thus, dogs may be used to detect<br />

contraband in an otherwise valid inspection for contraband. This<br />

conclusion follows directly from the fact that inspections for<br />

contraband conducted in compliance with Rule 313 are lawful.<br />

Consequently, the technique of inspection is generally unimportant<br />

under the new rules. The Committee did, however, as a<br />

matter of policy require that the natural or technological aid be<br />

“reasonable.”<br />

Rule 313(b) recognizes and affirms the commander’s power to<br />

conduct administrative examinations which are primarily nonprosecutorial<br />

in purpose. Personnel directing inspections for contraband<br />

must take special care to ensure that such inspections<br />

comply with Rule 313(b) and thus do not constitute improper<br />

general searches or subterfuges.<br />

1984 Amendment: Much of the foregoing Analysis was rendered<br />

obsolete by amendments made in 1984. The third sentence<br />

of Rule 313(b) was modified and the fourth and sixth sentences<br />

are new.<br />

The fourth sentence is new. The Military Rule of Evidence did<br />

not previously expressly address production of body fluids, perhaps<br />

because of United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 48<br />

C . M . R . 7 9 7 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . R u i z w a s i m p l i c i t l y o v e r r u l e d i n U n i t e d<br />

States v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980). Uncertainty concerning<br />

the course of the law of inspections may also have contributed<br />

to the drafter’s silence on the matter. See United States v.<br />

Roberts, 2 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Thomas, 1<br />

M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 1976). Much of the uncertainty in this area was<br />

A22-23

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