2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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App. 22, M.R.E. 304(a) APPENDIX 22 Rule 304, however, makes all derivative evidence inadmissible. Although some support for the 1969 Manual limitations can be found in the literal phrasing of Article 31(d), the intent of the A r t i c l e a s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e c o m m e n t a r y p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e House hearings, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearing on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed S e r v i c e s , 8 1 s t C o n g . , 1 s t S e s s . 9 8 4 ( 1 9 4 9 ) , w a s t o e x c l u d e “evidence” rather than just “statements.” Attempting to allow admission of evidence obtained from statements which were the product of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement would appear to be both against public policy and unnecessarily complicated. Similarly, the 1969 Manual’s attempt to limit the exclusion of derivative evidence to that obtained through compulsion caused by “Government agents” has been deleted in favor of the simpler exclusion of all derivative evidence. This change, however, does not affect the limitation, as expressed in current case law, that the warning requirements apply only when the interrogating individual is either a civilian law enforcement officer or an individual subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice acting in an official disciplinary capacity or in a position of authority over a suspect or accused. The House hearings indicate that all evidence obtained in violation of Article 31 was to be excluded and all persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice may violate Article 31(a). Consequently, the attempted 1969 Manual restriction could affect at most only derivative evidence obtained from involuntary statements compelled by private citizens. Public policy demands that private citizens not be encouraged to take the law into their own hands and that law enforcement agents not be encouraged to attempt to circumvent an accused’s rights via proxy interrogation. It is clear that truly spontaneous statements are admissible as they are not “obtained” from an accused or suspect. An apparently volunteered statement which is actually the result of coercive circumstances intentionally created or used by interrogators will be involuntary. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), Rule 305(b)(2). Manual language dealing with this area has been deleted as being unnecessary. (b) Exceptions. Rule 304(b)(1) adopts Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) insofar as it would allow use for impeachment or at a later trial for perjury, false swearing, or the making of a false official statement, or statements taken in violation of the counsel warnings required under Rule 305(d)-(e). Under Paras. 140 a(2) and 153b, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), use of such statements was not permissible. United States v. Girard, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R. 438 (1975); United States v. Jordan, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971). The Court of Military Appeals has recognized expressly the authority of the President to adopt the holding in Harris on impeachment. Jordan, supra, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 617, 44 C.M.R. 44, 47, and Rule 304(b) adopts Harris to military law. A statement obtained in violation of Article 31(b), however, remains inadmissible for all purposes, as is a statement that is otherwise involuntary under Rules 302, 304(b)(3), or 305(a). It was the intent of the Committee to permit use of a statement which is involuntary because thewaiver of counsel rights under Rule 305(g) was absent or improper which is implicit in Rule 304(b)’s reference to Rule 305(d). 1986 Amendment: Rule 304(b)(2) was added to incorporate the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule based on Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984); see also A22-10 United States v. Kozak, 12 M.J. 389 (C.M.A. 1982); Analysis of Rule 311(b)(2). 1990 Amendment: Subsection (b)(1) was amended by adding “the requirements of Mil. R. Evid. 305(c) and 305(f), or.” This language expands the scope of the exception and thereby permits statements obtained in violation of Article 31(b), UCMJ, and Mil. R. Evid. 305(c) and (f) to be used for impeachment purposes or at a later trial for perjury, false swearing, or the making of a false official statement. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); cf. United States v. Williams, 23 M.J. 362 (C.M.A. 1987). An accused cannot pervert the procedural safeguards of Article 31(b) into a license to testify perjuriously in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge credibility utilizing the traditional t r u t h - t e s t i n g d e v i c e s o f t h e a d v e r s a r y p r o c e s s . S e e W a l d e r v . United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969). Similarly, when the procedural protections of Mil. R. Evid. 305(f) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), are violated, the deterrent effect of excluding the unlawfully obtained evidence is fully vindicated by preventing its use in the Government’s case-in-chief, but permitting its collateral use to impeach an accused who testifies inconsistently or perjuriously. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Statements which are not the product of free and rational choice, Greenwald v. Wisconsin , 390 U.S. 519 (1968), or are the result of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducements are involuntary and thus inadmissible, because of their untrustworthiness, even as impeachment evidence. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 1994 Amendment: Rule 304(b)(1) adopts Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), insofar as it would allow use for impeachment or at a later trial for perjury, false swearing, or the making of a false official statement, statements taken in violation of the counsel warnings required under Mil R. Evid. 305(d)-(e). Under paragraphs 140a(2) and 153b, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), use of such s t a t e m e n t s w a s n o t p e r m i s s i b l e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . G i r a r d , 2 3 U.S.C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R. 438 (1975); United States v. Jordan, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971). The Court of Military Appeals has recognized expressly the authority of the President to a d o p t t h e h o l d i n g i n H a r r i s o n i m p e a c h m e n t . J o r d a n , 2 0 U.S.C.M.A. at 617, 44 C.M.R. at 47, and Mil R. Evid. 304(b) adopts Harris in military law. Subsequently, in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990), the Supreme Court held that statements taken in violation of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), could also be used to impeach a defendant’s false and inconsistent testimony. In so doing, the Court extended the Fifth Amendment rationale of Harris to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to counsel. (c) Definitions. (1) Confession and admission. Rules 304(c)(1) and (2) express without change the definitions found in Para. 140 a(1), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Silence may constitute an admission when it does not involve a reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination or related rights. Rule 301(f)(3). For example, if an imputation against a person comes to his or her attention under circumstances that would reasonably call for a denial of its accuracy if the imputation were not true, a failure to utter such a denial could possibly constitute an admission by silence. Note, however, in this regard, Rule 304(h)(3), and Rule 801(a)(2). ( 2 ) I n v o l u n t a r y . T h e d e f i n i t i o n o f “ i n v o l u n t a r y ” i n R u l e 304(c)(3) summarizes the prior definition of “not voluntary” as

found in Para. 140 a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The examples in Para. 140 a(2) are set forth in this paragraph. A statement obtained in violation of the warning and waiver requirements of Rule 305 is “involuntary.” Rule 305(a). The language governing statements obtained through the use of “coercion, unlawful influence, and unlawful inducement,” found in Article 31(d) makes it clear that a statement obtained by any person, regardless of status, that is the product of such conduct is involuntary. Although it is unlikely that a private citizen may run afoul of the prohibition of unlawful influence or inducement, such a person clearly may coerce a statement and such coercion will yield an involuntary statement. A statement made by the accused during a mental examination ordered under Para. 121, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (now R.C.M. 706, MCM, 1984) is treated as an involuntary statement under Rule 304. See Rule 302(a). The basis for this rule is that Para. 121 and Rule 302 compel the accused to participate in the Government examination or face a judicial order prohibiting the accused from presenting any expert testimony on the issue of mental responsibility. Insofar as Rule 304(c)(3) is concerned, some examples which may by themselves or in conjunction with others constitute coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement in obtaining a confession or admission are: Infliction of bodily harm including questioning accompanied by deprivation of the necessities of life such as food, sleep, or adequate clothing; Threats of bodily harm; Imposition of confinement or deprivation of privileges or necessities because a statement was not made by the accused, or threats thereof if a statement is not made; Promises of immunity or clemency as to any offense allegedly committed by the accused; Promises of reward or benefit, or threats of disadvantage likely to induce the accused to make the confession or admission. There is no change in the principle, set forth in the fifth paragraph of Para. 140 a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), that a statement obtained “in an interrogation conducted in accordance with all applicable rules is not involuntary because the interrogation was preceded by one that was not so conducted, if it clearly appears that all improper influences of the preceding interrogations had ceased to operate on the mind of the accused or suspect at the time that he or she made the statement.” In such a case, the effect of the involuntary statement is sufficiently attenuated to permit a determination that the latter statement was not “ obtained in violation of” the rights and privileges found in Rule 304(c)(3) and 305(a) (emphasis added). (d) Procedure. Rule 304(d) makes a significant change in prior procedure. Under Para. 140 a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), the prosecution was required to prove a statement to be voluntary before it could be admitted in evidence absent explicit defense waiver. Rule 304(d) is intended to reduce the number of unnecessary objections to evidence on voluntariness grounds and to narrow what litigation remains by requiring the defense to move to suppress or to object to evidence covered by this Rule. Failure to so move or object constitutes a waiver of the motion or objection. This follows civilian procedure in which the accused is provided an opportunity to assert privilege against self-incrimination and ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE App. 22, M.R.E. 304(d)(3) related rights but may waive any objection to evidence obtained in violation of the privilege through failure to object. ( 1 ) D i s c l o s u r e . P r i o r p r o c e d u r e ( P a r a . 1 2 1 , M C M , 1 9 6 9 (Rev.)) is changed to assist the defense in formulating its challenges. The prosecution is required to disclose prior to arraignment all statements by the accused known to the prosecution which are relevant to the case (including matters likely to be relevant in rebuttal and sentencing) and within military control. Disclosure should be made in writing in order to prove compliance with the Rule and to prevent misunderstandings. As a general matter, the trial counsel is not authorized to obtain statements made by the accused at a sanity board, with limited exceptions. If the trial counsel has knowledge of such statements, they must be disclosed. Regardless of trial counsel’s knowledge, the defense is entitled to receive the full report of the sanity board. (2) Motions and objections. The defense is required under Rule 304(d)(2) to challenge evidence disclosed prior to arraignment under Rule 304(d)(1) prior to submission of plea. In the absence of a motion or objection prior to plea, the defense may not raise the issue at a later time except as permitted by the military judge for good cause shown. Failure to challenge disclosed evidence waives the objection. This is a change from prior law under which objection traditionally has been made after plea but may be made, at the discretion of the military judge, prior to plea. This change brings military law into line with civilian federal procedure and resolves what is presently a variable and uncertain procedure. Litigation of a defense motion to suppress or an objection to a statement made by the accused or to any derivative evidence should take place at a hearing held outside the presence of the court members. See, e.g., Rule 104(c). (3) Specificity. Rule 304(d)(3) permits the military judge to require the defense to specify the grounds for an objection under Rule 304, but if the defense has not had adequate opportunity to interview those persons present at the taking of a statement, the military judge may issue an appropriate order including granting a continuance for purposes of interview or permitting a general objection. In view of the waiver that results in the event of failure to object, defense counsel must have sufficient information in order to decide whether to object to the admissibility of a statement by the accused. Although telephone or other long distance communications may be sufficient to allow a counsel to make an informed decision, counsel may consider a personal interview to be essential in this area and in such a case counsel is entitled to personally interview the witnesses to the taking of a statement before specificity can be required. When such an interview is desired but despite due diligence counsel has been unable to interview adequately those persons included in the taking of a statement, the military judge has authority to resolve the situation. Normally this would include the granting of a continuance for interviews, or other appropriate relief. If an adequate opportunity to interview is absent, even if this results solely from the witness’ unwillingness to speak to the defense, then the specificity requirement does not apply. Lacking adequate opportunity to interview, the defense may be authorized to enter a general objection to the evidence. If a general objection has been authorized, the prosecution must present evidence to show affirmatively that the statement was voluntary in the same manner as it would be required to do under prior law. Defense counsel is not required to meet the A22-11

found in Para. 140 a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The examples in<br />

Para. 140 a(2) are set forth in this paragraph. A statement obtained<br />

in violation of the warning and waiver requirements of<br />

Rule 305 is “involuntary.” Rule 305(a).<br />

The language governing statements obtained through the use of<br />

“coercion, unlawful influence, and unlawful inducement,” found<br />

in Article 31(d) makes it clear that a statement obtained by any<br />

person, regardless of status, that is the product of such conduct is<br />

involuntary. Although it is unlikely that a private citizen may run<br />

afoul of the prohibition of unlawful influence or inducement, such<br />

a person clearly may coerce a statement and such coercion will<br />

yield an involuntary statement.<br />

A statement made by the accused during a mental examination<br />

ordered under Para. 121, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (now R.C.M. 706,<br />

MCM, 1984) is treated as an involuntary statement under Rule<br />

304. See Rule 302(a). The basis for this rule is that Para. 121 and<br />

Rule 302 compel the accused to participate in the Government<br />

examination or face a judicial order prohibiting the accused from<br />

presenting any expert testimony on the issue of mental responsibility.<br />

Insofar as Rule 304(c)(3) is concerned, some examples which<br />

may by themselves or in conjunction with others constitute coercion,<br />

unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement in obtaining a<br />

confession or admission are:<br />

Infliction of bodily harm including questioning accompanied by<br />

deprivation of the necessities of life such as food, sleep, or adequate<br />

clothing;<br />

Threats of bodily harm;<br />

Imposition of confinement or deprivation of privileges or necessities<br />

because a statement was not made by the accused, or<br />

threats thereof if a statement is not made;<br />

Promises of immunity or clemency as to any offense allegedly<br />

committed by the accused;<br />

Promises of reward or benefit, or threats of disadvantage likely<br />

to induce the accused to make the confession or admission.<br />

There is no change in the principle, set forth in the fifth<br />

paragraph of Para. 140 a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), that a statement<br />

obtained “in an interrogation conducted in accordance with all<br />

applicable rules is not involuntary because the interrogation was<br />

preceded by one that was not so conducted, if it clearly appears<br />

that all improper influences of the preceding interrogations had<br />

ceased to operate on the mind of the accused or suspect at the<br />

time that he or she made the statement.” In such a case, the effect<br />

of the involuntary statement is sufficiently attenuated to permit a<br />

determination that the latter statement was not “ obtained in<br />

violation of” the rights and privileges found in Rule 304(c)(3) and<br />

305(a) (emphasis added).<br />

(d) Procedure. Rule 304(d) makes a significant change in prior<br />

procedure. Under Para. 140 a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), the prosecution<br />

was required to prove a statement to be voluntary before it<br />

could be admitted in evidence absent explicit defense waiver.<br />

Rule 304(d) is intended to reduce the number of unnecessary<br />

objections to evidence on voluntariness grounds and to narrow<br />

what litigation remains by requiring the defense to move to suppress<br />

or to object to evidence covered by this Rule. Failure to so<br />

move or object constitutes a waiver of the motion or objection.<br />

This follows civilian procedure in which the accused is provided<br />

an opportunity to assert privilege against self-incrimination and<br />

ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE<br />

App. 22, M.R.E. 304(d)(3)<br />

related rights but may waive any objection to evidence obtained<br />

in violation of the privilege through failure to object.<br />

( 1 ) D i s c l o s u r e . P r i o r p r o c e d u r e ( P a r a . 1 2 1 , M C M , 1 9 6 9<br />

(Rev.)) is changed to assist the defense in formulating its challenges.<br />

The prosecution is required to disclose prior to arraignment<br />

all statements by the accused known to the prosecution<br />

which are relevant to the case (including matters likely to be<br />

relevant in rebuttal and sentencing) and within military control.<br />

Disclosure should be made in writing in order to prove compliance<br />

with the Rule and to prevent misunderstandings. As a general<br />

matter, the trial counsel is not authorized to obtain statements<br />

made by the accused at a sanity board, with limited exceptions. If<br />

the trial counsel has knowledge of such statements, they must be<br />

disclosed. Regardless of trial counsel’s knowledge, the defense is<br />

entitled to receive the full report of the sanity board.<br />

(2) Motions and objections. The defense is required under Rule<br />

304(d)(2) to challenge evidence disclosed prior to arraignment<br />

under Rule 304(d)(1) prior to submission of plea. In the absence<br />

of a motion or objection prior to plea, the defense may not raise<br />

the issue at a later time except as permitted by the military judge<br />

for good cause shown. Failure to challenge disclosed evidence<br />

waives the objection. This is a change from prior law under<br />

which objection traditionally has been made after plea but may be<br />

made, at the discretion of the military judge, prior to plea. This<br />

change brings military law into line with civilian federal procedure<br />

and resolves what is presently a variable and uncertain<br />

procedure.<br />

Litigation of a defense motion to suppress or an objection to a<br />

statement made by the accused or to any derivative evidence<br />

should take place at a hearing held outside the presence of the<br />

court members. See, e.g., Rule 104(c).<br />

(3) Specificity. Rule 304(d)(3) permits the military judge to<br />

require the defense to specify the grounds for an objection under<br />

Rule 304, but if the defense has not had adequate opportunity to<br />

interview those persons present at the taking of a statement, the<br />

military judge may issue an appropriate order including granting a<br />

continuance for purposes of interview or permitting a general<br />

objection. In view of the waiver that results in the event of failure<br />

to object, defense counsel must have sufficient information in<br />

order to decide whether to object to the admissibility of a statement<br />

by the accused. Although telephone or other long distance<br />

communications may be sufficient to allow a counsel to make an<br />

informed decision, counsel may consider a personal interview to<br />

be essential in this area and in such a case counsel is entitled to<br />

personally interview the witnesses to the taking of a statement<br />

before specificity can be required. When such an interview is<br />

desired but despite due diligence counsel has been unable to<br />

interview adequately those persons included in the taking of a<br />

statement, the military judge has authority to resolve the situation.<br />

Normally this would include the granting of a continuance for<br />

interviews, or other appropriate relief. If an adequate opportunity<br />

to interview is absent, even if this results solely from the witness’<br />

unwillingness to speak to the defense, then the specificity requirement<br />

does not apply. Lacking adequate opportunity to interview,<br />

the defense may be authorized to enter a general objection to the<br />

evidence. If a general objection has been authorized, the prosecution<br />

must present evidence to show affirmatively that the statement<br />

was voluntary in the same manner as it would be required to<br />

do under prior law. Defense counsel is not required to meet the<br />

A22-11

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