2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army
2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army
App. 21, R.C.M. 1107(e) APPENDIX 21 was moved to new subsection (1)(B)(iv) to recognize expressly that, in cases where a superior authority has approved some findings of guilty and has authorized a rehearing as to other offenses, the convening authority may, unless otherwise directed, reassess a sentence based on approved findings of guilty under the criteria established by United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986), and dismiss the remaining charges. See United States v. Harris, 53 M.J. 86 (2000). The power of convening authorities to reassess had been expressly authorized in paragraph 92a of MCM, 1969. The authorizing language was moved to the Discussion following R.C.M. 1107(e)(1)(B)(iii) in MCM, 1984. The Discussion was amended to advise practitioners to apply the criteria for sentence reassessment established by United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986). See also United States v. Harris, 53 M.J. 86 (2000); United States v. Eversole, 53 M.J. 132 (2000). The Discussion was further amended to encourage practitioners to seek clarification from superior authority where the directive to the convening authority is unclear. Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 92 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also paragraph 89 c(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). If the accused was acquitted of a specification which is later determined to have failed to state an offense, another trial for the same offense would be barred. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). It is unclear whether an acquittal by a jurisdictionally defective court-martial bars retrial. See United States v. Culver, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 141, 46 C.M.R. 141 (1973). ( f ) C o n t e n t s o f a c t i o n a n d r e l a t e d m a t t e r s . S u b s e c t i o n ( 1 ) i s based on paragraph 89 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 1991 Amendment: The 1984 rules omitted any requirement that the convening authority’s action be included in the record of trial. This amendment corrects that omission. Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 89 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second sentence is new. It is intended to simplify the procedure when a defect in the action is discovered in Article 65(c) review. There is no need for another authority to formally act in such cases if the convening authority can take corrective action. The accused cannot be harmed by such action. A convening authority may still be directed to take corrective action when necessary, under the third sentence. “Erroneous” means clerical error only. See subsection (g) of this rule. This new sentence is not intended to allow a convening authority to change a proper action because of a change of mind. 1995 Amendment: The amendment allows a convening authority to recall and modify any action after it has been published or after an accused has been officially notified, but before a record has been forwarded for review, as long as the new action is not less favorable to the accused than the prior action. A convening authority is not limited to taking only corrective action, but may also modify the approved findings or sentence provided the modification is not less favorable to the accused than the earlier action. Subsection (3) is based on paragraph 89 c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The provision in paragraph 89 c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) that disapproval of the sentence also constitutes disapproval of the findings unless otherwise stated is deleted. The convening authority must expressly indicate which findings, if any, are disapproved in any case. See Article 60(c)(3). The discussion is based on paragraph 89 c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(A) is based on paragraph 89 c(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The first sentence of paragraph 89 c(2)is no longer accurate. Since no A21-88 action on the findings is required, any disapproval of findings must be expressed. Subsection (4)(B) is taken from paragraph 89 c(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(D) is based on paragraph 89 c(6) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). However, because that portion of the sentence which extends to confinement may now be ordered executed when the convening authority takes action ( see Article 71(c)(2); R.C.M. 1113(b)), temporary custody is unnecessary in such cases. Therefore, this subsection applies only when death has been adjudged and approved. Subsection (4)(E) is taken from paragraph 89 c(7) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(F) is new. See Analysis, R.C.M. 305(k). See also United States v. Suzuki, 14 M.J. 491 (C.M.A. 1983). Subsection (4)(G) is taken from paragraph 89 c(9) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(H) is modified based on the amendment of Article 71 which permits a reprimand to be ordered executed from action, regardless of the other components of the sentence. Admonition has been deleted. See R.C.M. 1003(b)(1). Subsection (5) is based on paragraph 89 c(8) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also R.C.M. 810(d) and Analysis. The provision in paragraph 89 c(8) requiring that the accused be credited with time in confinement while awaiting a rehearing is deleted. Given the p r o c e d u r e s f o r i m p o s i t i o n a n d c o n t i n u a t i o n o f r e s t r a i n t w h i l e awaiting trial ( see R.C.M. 304 and 305), there should not be a credit simply because the trial is a rehearing. (g) Incomplete, ambiguous, or erroneous action. This subsection is based on paragraph 95 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See generally United States v. Loft, 10 J M.J. 266 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Lower, 10 M.J. 263 (C.M.A. 1981). (h) Service on accused. This subsection is based on Article 61(a), as amended, see Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98–209, § 5(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). Rule 1108 Suspension of execution of sentence This rule is based on Articles 71(d) and 74, and paragraphs 88 e and 97 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Fed.R.Crim. P. 32(e). The second paragraph of the discussion to subsection (b) is based on United States v. Stonesifer, 2 M.J. 212 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Williams, 2 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Occhi, 2 M.J. 60 (C.M.A. 1976). Subsection (c) is new and based on Article 71; United States v. Lallande, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 170, 46 C.M.R. 170 (1973); United State v. May, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 258, 27 C.M.R. 432 (1959). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (“upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best”). The notice provisions are designed to facilitate vacation when that becomes necessary. See the Analysis, R.C.M. 1109. The language limiting the period of suspension to the accused’s current enlistment has been deleted. See United States v. Thomas, 45 C.M.R. 908 (N.C.M.R. 1972). Cf. United States v. Clardy, 13 M.J. 308 (C.M.A. 1982). See also subsection (e) of this rule. 1990 Amendment: The third sentence was amended to delete the limitation of Secretarial designation to an “officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which the accused is assigned” and to permit such designation to any “commanding officer.” This comports with the language of Article 74(a), UCMJ and paragraphs 97 a of MCM, 1951 and MCM, 1969. The specific designation of inferior courts-martial convening authorities to remit or suspend unexecuted portions was not intended to limit in any other respects the Secretarial designation power. Except for a sentence which has been approved by the
President, remission or suspension authority is otherwise left entirely to departmental regulations. The last sentence was added to clarify the authority of the officials named in section (b) to grant clemency or mitigating action on those parts of the sentence that have been approved and ordered executed but that have not actually been carried out. In the case of forfeiture the “carrying out ” involves the actual collection after pay accrues on a daily basis. Thus, even when a sentence to total forfeiture has been approved and ordered executed, the named officials can still grant clemency or mitigating action. Although a prisoner may be administratively placed in a nonpay status when total forfeiture has been ordered executed, the total forfeiture is collected as it would otherwise accrue during the period that the prisoner is in a nonpay status. If clemency were granted, the prisoner could be returned administratively to a pay status, pay would accrue, and any resulting partial forfeiture would be collected as it accrues. Likewise, that portion of confinement which has not been served is “unexecuted”. 2004 Amendment: Subsection (b) was amended to conform to the limitations on Secretarial authority to grant clemency for military prisoners serving a sentence of confinement for life without eligibility for parole contained in section 553 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub.L.No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654, Oct 30, 2000. Rule 1109 Vacation of suspension of sentence (a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 72 and paragraph 97 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). (b) Timeliness. This subsection is based on the fourth paragraph of paragraph 97 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Pells , 5 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Rozycki, 3 M.J. 127, 129 (C.M.A. 1977). (c) Confinement of probationer pending vacation proceedings. This subsection is new and based onGagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); United States v. Bingham, 3 M.J. 119 (C.M.A. 1977). It is consistent with Fed.R.Crim. P. 32.1(a)(1). Note that if the actual hearing on vacation under subsection (d)(1) or (e)(3) and (4) is completed within the specified time period, a separate probable cause hearing need not be held. (d) Violation of suspended general court-martial sentence or of a suspended court-martial sentence including a bad-conduct discharge. This subsection is based on Article 72(a) and (b); the first two paragraphs of paragraph 97 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Bingham, supra; United States v. Rozycki, supra. See also Fed.R.Crim. P. 32.1(a)(2). (e) Vacation of suspended special court-martial sentence not including a bad-conduct discharge or of a suspended summary court-martial sentence. This subsection is based on Article 72(c); United States v. Bingham, supra; United States v. Rozycki, supra. Fed.R.Crim. P. 32.1(b) is not adopted. That rule requires a hearing before conditions of probation may be modified. Modification is seldom used in the military. Because a probationer may be transferred or change duty assignments as a normal incident of military life, a commander should have the flexibility to make appropriate changes in conditions of probation without having to conduct a hearing. This is not intended to permit conditions of probation to be made substantially more severe without due proc- ANALYSIS App. 21, R.C.M. 1110(b) e s s . A t a m i n i m u m , t h e p r o b a t i o n e r m u s t b e n o t i f i e d o f t h e changes. 1986 Amendment: Several amendments were made to R.C.M. 1109 to specify that the notice to the probationer concerning the vacation proceedings must be in writing, and to specify that the recommendations concerning vacation of the suspension provided by the hearing officer must also be in writing. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 2254 (1985). Several references to “conditions of probation” were changed to “conditions of suspension” for consistency of terminology. 1998 Amendment: The Rule is amended to clarify that “the suspension of a special court-martial sentence which as approved includes a bad-conduct discharge,” permits the officer exercising special court-martial jurisdiction to vacate any suspended punishments other than an approved suspended bad-conduct discharge. 2002 Amendment: Subsection (e) was amended to implement the amendment to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 819 (Article 19, UCMJ) contained in section 577 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999) i n c r e a s i n g t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t a t s p e c i a l courts-martial. (f) Vacation of a suspended special court-martial sentence that includes a bad-conduct discharge or confinement for one year. Subsection (f) was amended to implement the amendment to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 819 (Article 19, UCMJ) contained in section 577 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999) increasing the jurisdictional maximum punishment at special courts-martial. This amendment reflects the decision to treat an approved sentence of confinement for one year, regardless of whether any period of confinement is suspended, as a serious offense, in the same manner as a suspended approved bad-conduct discharge at special courts-martial under Article 72, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1109. Rule 1110 Waiver or withdrawal of appellate review Introduction. This rule is new and is based on Article 61, as amended, see Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98–209, § 5(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The rule provides procedures to ensure that a waiver or withdrawal of appellate review is a voluntary and informed choice. See also Appendices 19 and 20 for forms. See S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1983). (a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 61. The discussion is also based on Articles 64 and 69(b). 2002 Amendment: Subsection (a) was amended to implement the amendment to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 819 (Article 19, UCMJ) contained in section 577 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999) i n c r e a s i n g t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t a t s p e c i a l courts-martial. (b) Right to counsel. This subsection is based on Article 61(a). Although Article 61(b) does not expressly require the signature of defense counsel as does Article 61(a), the same requirements should apply. Preferably counsel who represented the accused at trial will advise the accused concerning waiver, the appellate c o u n s e l ( i f o n e h a s b e e n a p p o i n t e d ) w i l l d o s o c o n c e r n i n g withdrawal. This subsection reflects this preference. It also recognizes, however, that this may not always be practicable; for exam- A21-89
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App. 21, R.C.M. 1107(e) APPENDIX 21<br />
was moved to new subsection (1)(B)(iv) to recognize expressly<br />
that, in cases where a superior authority has approved some findings<br />
of guilty and has authorized a rehearing as to other offenses,<br />
the convening authority may, unless otherwise directed, reassess a<br />
sentence based on approved findings of guilty under the criteria<br />
established by United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986),<br />
and dismiss the remaining charges. See United States v. Harris,<br />
53 M.J. 86 (2000). The power of convening authorities to reassess<br />
had been expressly authorized in paragraph 92a of MCM, 1969.<br />
The authorizing language was moved to the Discussion following<br />
R.C.M. 1107(e)(1)(B)(iii) in MCM, 1984. The Discussion was<br />
amended to advise practitioners to apply the criteria for sentence<br />
reassessment established by United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305<br />
(C.M.A. 1986). See also United States v. Harris, 53 M.J. 86<br />
(2000); United States v. Eversole, 53 M.J. 132 (2000). The Discussion<br />
was further amended to encourage practitioners to seek<br />
clarification from superior authority where the directive to the<br />
convening authority is unclear.<br />
Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 92 b of MCM, 1969<br />
(Rev.). See also paragraph 89 c(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). If the<br />
accused was acquitted of a specification which is later determined<br />
to have failed to state an offense, another trial for the same<br />
offense would be barred. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662<br />
(1896). It is unclear whether an acquittal by a jurisdictionally<br />
defective court-martial bars retrial. See United States v. Culver,<br />
22 U.S.C.M.A. 141, 46 C.M.R. 141 (1973).<br />
( f ) C o n t e n t s o f a c t i o n a n d r e l a t e d m a t t e r s . S u b s e c t i o n ( 1 ) i s<br />
based on paragraph 89 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />
1991 Amendment: The 1984 rules omitted any requirement that<br />
the convening authority’s action be included in the record of trial.<br />
This amendment corrects that omission.<br />
Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 89 b of MCM, 1969<br />
(Rev.). The second sentence is new. It is intended to simplify the<br />
procedure when a defect in the action is discovered in Article<br />
65(c) review. There is no need for another authority to formally<br />
act in such cases if the convening authority can take corrective<br />
action. The accused cannot be harmed by such action. A convening<br />
authority may still be directed to take corrective action when<br />
necessary, under the third sentence. “Erroneous” means clerical<br />
error only. See subsection (g) of this rule. This new sentence is<br />
not intended to allow a convening authority to change a proper<br />
action because of a change of mind.<br />
1995 Amendment: The amendment allows a convening authority<br />
to recall and modify any action after it has been published or<br />
after an accused has been officially notified, but before a record<br />
has been forwarded for review, as long as the new action is not<br />
less favorable to the accused than the prior action. A convening<br />
authority is not limited to taking only corrective action, but may<br />
also modify the approved findings or sentence provided the modification<br />
is not less favorable to the accused than the earlier action.<br />
Subsection (3) is based on paragraph 89 c(2) of MCM, 1969<br />
(Rev.). The provision in paragraph 89 c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.)<br />
that disapproval of the sentence also constitutes disapproval of the<br />
findings unless otherwise stated is deleted. The convening authority<br />
must expressly indicate which findings, if any, are disapproved<br />
in any case. See Article 60(c)(3). The discussion is based<br />
on paragraph 89 c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(A) is<br />
based on paragraph 89 c(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The first<br />
sentence of paragraph 89 c(2)is no longer accurate. Since no<br />
A21-88<br />
action on the findings is required, any disapproval of findings<br />
must be expressed. Subsection (4)(B) is taken from paragraph 89<br />
c(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(D) is based on paragraph<br />
89 c(6) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). However, because that<br />
portion of the sentence which extends to confinement may now<br />
be ordered executed when the convening authority takes action (<br />
see Article 71(c)(2); R.C.M. 1113(b)), temporary custody is unnecessary<br />
in such cases. Therefore, this subsection applies only<br />
when death has been adjudged and approved. Subsection (4)(E) is<br />
taken from paragraph 89 c(7) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection<br />
(4)(F) is new. See Analysis, R.C.M. 305(k). See also United<br />
States v. Suzuki, 14 M.J. 491 (C.M.A. 1983). Subsection (4)(G) is<br />
taken from paragraph 89 c(9) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection<br />
(4)(H) is modified based on the amendment of Article 71 which<br />
permits a reprimand to be ordered executed from action, regardless<br />
of the other components of the sentence. Admonition has<br />
been deleted. See R.C.M. 1003(b)(1).<br />
Subsection (5) is based on paragraph 89 c(8) of MCM, 1969<br />
(Rev.). See also R.C.M. 810(d) and Analysis. The provision in<br />
paragraph 89 c(8) requiring that the accused be credited with time<br />
in confinement while awaiting a rehearing is deleted. Given the<br />
p r o c e d u r e s f o r i m p o s i t i o n a n d c o n t i n u a t i o n o f r e s t r a i n t w h i l e<br />
awaiting trial ( see R.C.M. 304 and 305), there should not be a<br />
credit simply because the trial is a rehearing.<br />
(g) Incomplete, ambiguous, or erroneous action. This subsection<br />
is based on paragraph 95 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See generally<br />
United States v. Loft, 10 J M.J. 266 (C.M.A. 1981); United States<br />
v. Lower, 10 M.J. 263 (C.M.A. 1981).<br />
(h) Service on accused. This subsection is based on Article 61(a),<br />
as amended, see Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98–209,<br />
§ 5(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983).<br />
Rule 1108 Suspension of execution of sentence<br />
This rule is based on Articles 71(d) and 74, and paragraphs 88<br />
e and 97 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Fed.R.Crim. P. 32(e).<br />
The second paragraph of the discussion to subsection (b) is based<br />
on United States v. Stonesifer, 2 M.J. 212 (C.M.A. 1977); United<br />
States v. Williams, 2 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v.<br />
Occhi, 2 M.J. 60 (C.M.A. 1976). Subsection (c) is new and based<br />
on Article 71; United States v. Lallande, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 170, 46<br />
C.M.R. 170 (1973); United State v. May, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 258, 27<br />
C.M.R. 432 (1959). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (“upon such terms and<br />
conditions as the court deems best”). The notice provisions are<br />
designed to facilitate vacation when that becomes necessary. See<br />
the Analysis, R.C.M. 1109. The language limiting the period of<br />
suspension to the accused’s current enlistment has been deleted.<br />
See United States v. Thomas, 45 C.M.R. 908 (N.C.M.R. 1972).<br />
Cf. United States v. Clardy, 13 M.J. 308 (C.M.A. 1982). See also<br />
subsection (e) of this rule.<br />
1990 Amendment: The third sentence was amended to delete<br />
the limitation of Secretarial designation to an “officer exercising<br />
general court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which the<br />
accused is assigned” and to permit such designation to any “commanding<br />
officer.” This comports with the language of Article<br />
74(a), UCMJ and paragraphs 97 a of MCM, 1951 and MCM,<br />
1969. The specific designation of inferior courts-martial convening<br />
authorities to remit or suspend unexecuted portions was not<br />
intended to limit in any other respects the Secretarial designation<br />
power. Except for a sentence which has been approved by the