2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army
2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army
App. 21, R.C.M. 1101(B) APPENDIX 21 ient means for the command to exercise its prerogative whether to confine an accused when the sentence of the court-martial authorizes it. The commander may decide that, despite the sentence of the court-martial, the accused should not be immediately confined because of operational requirements or other reasons. A decision not to confine is for the convenience of the command and does not constitute deferment of confinement. See Article 57(d). An accused dissatisfied with the decision of the commander may request deferment in accordance with subsection (c) of this rule. The first sentence of the second paragraph of paragraph 20 d(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been deleted. That sentence provided for post-trial “arrest, restriction, or confinement to insure the presence of an accused for impending execution of a punitive discharge.” The authority for such restraint was based on Article 13 which authorized arrest or confinement for persons awaiting the result of trial. See Reed v. Ohman, supra; United States v. Teague, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 317, 12 C.M.R. 73 (1953). The Military Justice Amendments of 1981 Pub. L. No. 97–81, § 3, 95 Stat. 1 0 8 7 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , d e l e t e d t h e l a n g u a g e c o n c e r n i n g s u c h d e t e n t i o n pending the result of trial. (C) Deferment of confinement. Subsection (1) is based on the first sentence of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is based on the second and third sentences of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (2) is based on the first sentence in Article 57(d) and the third sentence of paragraph 88f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The requirement that the request be written is based on the third paragraph of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (3) is based on Article 57(d) and United States v. Brownd, 6 M.J. 338 (C.M.A. 1978). See also ABA Standards, Criminal Appeals, § 21–2.5 (1978); Trotman v. Haebel, 12 M.J. 2 7 ( C . M . A . 1 9 8 1 ) ; P e a r s o n v . C o x , s u p r a ; S t o k e s v . U n i t e d States, 8 M.J. 819 (A.F.C.M.R. 1979), pet. denied, 9 M.J. 33 (1980). See also the first paragraph of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The penultimate sentence recognized the standard of review exercised by the Courts of Criminal Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and other reviewing authorities. See United States v. Brownd, supra. Because the decision to deny a request for deferment is subject to judicial review, the basis for denial should be included in the record. Subsection (4) is based on the fourth paragraph of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (5) is based on the fifth paragraph of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on Pearson v. Cox, supra. Subsection (6) modifies the last two paragraphs of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to conform to the amendment of Article 71(c), see Pub. L. No. 98–209, § 5(e), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The amendment of Article 71(c) permits confinement to be ordered executed in the convening authority’s initial action in all cases. Article 57(d) is intended to permit deferment after this point, however. See S. Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13–14 (1968). Therefore subsection (6) specifically describes four ways in which deferment may be terminated. The result is consistent with paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and with Collier v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 511, 42 C.M.R. 113 (1970). Under subsection (A) the convening authority must specify in the initial action whether approved confinement is ordered executed, suspended, or deferred. See R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(B), (E). Under subs e c t i o n ( B ) , d e f e r m e n t m a y b e t e r m i n a t e d a t a n y t i m e b y A21-80 suspending the confinement. This is because suspension is more favorable to the accused than deferment. Subsections (C) and (D) provide other specific points at which deferment may be terminated. Deferment may be granted for a specified period (e.g., to permit the accused to take care of personal matters), or for an indefinite period (e.g., completion of appellate review). Even if confinement is deferred for an indefinite period, it may be rescinded under subsection (D). When deferment is terminated after the initial action, it will be either suspended or executed. See subsection (7). The first sentence in the discussion is based on Article 57(d). The second, third, and fourth sentences are based on the last two paragraphs of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (7) is based on the last sentence of Article 57(d) and on Collier v. United States, supra. Note that the information on which the rescission is based need not be new information, but only information which was not earlier presented to the authority granting deferment. Cf. Collier v. United States, supra. Note also that the deferment may be rescinded and the accused confined before the accused has an opportunity to submit matters to the rescinding authority. See United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 518, 42 C.M.R. 120 (1970). Subsection (7)(C) is added based on the amendment of Article 71(c). Confinement after the initial action is not “served.” It is deferred, suspended, or executed. Therefore, after deferment is rescinded, it is ordered executed (if not suspended). Subsection ( 7 ) ( C ) p e r m i t s t h e a c c u s e d a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o s u b m i t m a t t e r s before the order of execution, which precludes deferment under Article 57(d), is issued. 1991 Amendment: The Discussion accompanying this subsection was amended to provide for the inclusion of the written basis for any denial of deferment in the record of trial. Although written reasons for denials are not mandatory, and their absence from the record of trial will not per se invalidate a denial decision, their use is strongly encouraged. See Longhofer v. Hilbert, 23 M.J. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1986). 1998 Amendment: In enacting section 1121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 106, 110 Stat. 186, 462, 464 (1996), Congress amended Article 57(a) to make forfeitures of pay and allowances and reductions in grade effective either 14 days after being adjudged by a courtmartial, or when the convening authority takes action in the case, whichever was earlier in time. Until this change, any forfeiture or reduction in grade adjudged by the court did not take effect until convening authority action, which meant the accused often retained the privileges of his or her rank and pay for up to several months. The intent of the amendment of Article 57(a) was to change this situation so that the desired punitive and rehabilitative impact on the accused occurred more quickly. Congress, however, desired that a deserving accused be permitted to request a deferment of any adjudged forfeitures or reduct i o n i n g r a d e , s o t h a t a c o n v e n i n g a u t h o r i t y , i n a p p r o p r i a t e situations, might mitigate the effect of Article 57(a). This change to R.C.M. 1101 is in addition to the change to R.C.M. 1203. The latter implements Congress’ creation of Article 57(a), giving the Service Secretary concerned the authority to defer a sentence to confinement pending review under Article 67(a)(2). (d) Waiving forfeitures resulting from a sentence to confinement to provide for dependent support. 1998 Amendment: This new
subsection implements Article 58b, UCMJ, created by section 1122, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186, 463 (1996). This article permits the convening authority (or other person acting under Article 60) to waive any or all of the forfeiture of pay and allowances forfeited by operation of Article 58b(a) for a period not to exceed six months. The purpose of such waiver is to provide support to some or all of the accused’s dependent(s) when circumstances warrant. The convening authority directs the waiver and identifies those dependent(s) who shall receive the payment(s). Rule 1102 Introduction. This rule is based on Article 60(e) and on paragraphs 80 c and 86 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), all of which concern proceedings in revision. This rule also expressly authorizes post-trial Article 39(a) sessions to address matters not subject to proceedings in revision which may affect legality of findings of guilty or the sentence. See United States v. Mead, 16 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Brickey, 16 M.J. 258 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Witherspoon, 16 M.J. 252 (C.M.A. 1983). Cf. United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967). (a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 60(e), on the first sentence of paragraph 80 c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which indicated that a court-martial could conduct proceedings in revision on its own motion, and on paragraph 86 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). (b) Purpose. Subsection (1) is based on the second sentence of paragraph 86 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion of subsection (1) is based on the last paragraph of paragraph 80 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on United States v. Steck, 10 M.J. 412 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Barnes, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 169, 44 C.M.R. 223 (1972); United States v. Hollis, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 29 C.M.R. 51 (1960). As to subsection (2), see the Introduction, Analysis, this rule. The discussion of subsection 21 is based on United States v. Anderson, supra. 1994 Amendment: The amendment to subsection (b)(2) of this rule clarifies that Article 39(a), UCMJ, authorizes the military judge to take such action after trial and before authenticating the record of trial as may be required in the interest of justice. See United States v. Griffith, 27 M.J. 42, 47 (C.M.A. 1988). The amendment to the Discussion clarifies that the military judge may take remedial action on behalf of an accused without waiting for an order from an appellate court. Under this subsection, the military judge may consider, among other things, misleading instructions, legal sufficiency of the evidence, or errors involving the misconduct of members, witnesses, or counsel. Id.; See United States v. Scaff, 29 M.J. 60, 65 (C.M.A. 1989). (c) Matters not subject to post-trial sessions. This subsection is taken from Article 60(e)(2). (d) When directed. This subsection is based on paragraph 86 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Article 60(e); United States v. Williamson, 4 M.J. 708 (N.C.M.R. 1977), pet. denied, 5 M.J. 219 (1978). Paragraph 86 d indicated that a proceeding in revision could be used to “make the record show the true proceedings.” A certificate of correction is the appropriate mechanism for this, so the former provision is deleted. Note that a trial session may be ANALYSIS App. 21, R.C.M. 1103(b) directed, when authorized by an appropriate reviewing authority ( e.g., the supervisory authority, or the Judge Advocate General), even if some or all of the sentence has been executed. 2007 Amendment: For purposes of this rule, the list of appropriate reviewing authorities included in the 1994 amendment includes any court authorized to review cases on appeal under the UCMJ. (e) Procedure. Subsection (1) is based on paragraph 80 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also R.C.M. 505 and 805 and Analysis. Good cause for detailing a different military judge includes unavailability due to physical disability or transfer, and circumstances in which inquiry into misconduct by a military judge is necessary. Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 80 c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (2) is more concise than its predecessor; it leaves to the military judge responsibility to determine what specific action to take. Subsection (3) is based on paragraph 80 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Rule 1102A Post-trial hearing for person found not guilty only be reason of lack of mental responsibility. 1998 Amendment: This new Rule implements Article 76b(b), UCMJ. Created in section 1133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186, 464-66 (1996), it provides for a post-trial hearing within forty days of the finding that the accused is not guilty only by reason of a lack of mental responsibility. Depending on the offense concerned, the accused has the burden of proving either by a preponderance of the evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence, that his or her release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another due to a present mental disease or defect. The intent of the drafters is for R.C.M. 1102A to mirror the provisions of sections 4243 and 4247 of title 18, United States Code. Rule 1103 Preparation of record of trial (a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 54(c) and on the first sentence of paragraph 82 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). (b) General courts-martial. Subsection (1)(A) is based on Article 38(a). In Federal civilian courts the reporter is responsible for preparing the record of trial. 28 U.S.C. § 753; Fed. R. App.P. 11 (b). The responsibility of the trial counsel for preparation of the record is established by Article 38(a), however. Subsection (1)(B) is based on the second paragraph of paragraph 82 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Anderson, 12 M.J. 195 (C.M.A. 1982). Subsection (2)(A) is based on Article 54(a) and the first sentence of paragraph 82 b(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Cf. Article 19. Subsection (2)(B) is based on Article 54(c) and on the third sentence of paragraph 82 b(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1983); H.R. Rep. No.491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949); S. Rep. No.486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23–24 (1949). See also Articles 19 and 66; United States v. W h i t m a n , 2 3 U . S . C . M . A . 4 8 , 4 8 C . M . R . 5 1 9 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; U n i t e d States v. Thompson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 448, 47 C.M.R. 489 (1973); United States v. Whitman, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 11 C.M.R. 179 A21-81
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App. 21, R.C.M. 1101(B) APPENDIX 21<br />
ient means for the command to exercise its prerogative whether to<br />
confine an accused when the sentence of the court-martial authorizes<br />
it. The commander may decide that, despite the sentence of<br />
the court-martial, the accused should not be immediately confined<br />
because of operational requirements or other reasons. A decision<br />
not to confine is for the convenience of the command and does<br />
not constitute deferment of confinement. See Article 57(d). An<br />
accused dissatisfied with the decision of the commander may<br />
request deferment in accordance with subsection (c) of this rule.<br />
The first sentence of the second paragraph of paragraph 20 d(1)<br />
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been deleted. That sentence provided<br />
for post-trial “arrest, restriction, or confinement to insure the<br />
presence of an accused for impending execution of a punitive<br />
discharge.” The authority for such restraint was based on Article<br />
13 which authorized arrest or confinement for persons awaiting<br />
the result of trial. See Reed v. Ohman, supra; United States v.<br />
Teague, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 317, 12 C.M.R. 73 (1953). The Military<br />
Justice Amendments of 1981 Pub. L. No. 97–81, § 3, 95 Stat.<br />
1 0 8 7 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , d e l e t e d t h e l a n g u a g e c o n c e r n i n g s u c h d e t e n t i o n<br />
pending the result of trial.<br />
(C) Deferment of confinement. Subsection (1) is based on the<br />
first sentence of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The<br />
discussion is based on the second and third sentences of paragraph<br />
88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />
Subsection (2) is based on the first sentence in Article 57(d)<br />
and the third sentence of paragraph 88f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />
The requirement that the request be written is based on the third<br />
paragraph of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />
Subsection (3) is based on Article 57(d) and United States v.<br />
Brownd, 6 M.J. 338 (C.M.A. 1978). See also ABA Standards,<br />
Criminal Appeals, § 21–2.5 (1978); Trotman v. Haebel, 12 M.J.<br />
2 7 ( C . M . A . 1 9 8 1 ) ; P e a r s o n v . C o x , s u p r a ; S t o k e s v . U n i t e d<br />
States, 8 M.J. 819 (A.F.C.M.R. 1979), pet. denied, 9 M.J. 33<br />
(1980). See also the first paragraph of paragraph 88 f of MCM,<br />
1969 (Rev.). The penultimate sentence recognized the standard of<br />
review exercised by the Courts of Criminal Appeals, the Court of<br />
Appeals for the Armed Forces, and other reviewing authorities.<br />
See United States v. Brownd, supra. Because the decision to deny<br />
a request for deferment is subject to judicial review, the basis for<br />
denial should be included in the record.<br />
Subsection (4) is based on the fourth paragraph of paragraph 88<br />
f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />
Subsection (5) is based on the fifth paragraph of paragraph 88 f<br />
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on Pearson v. Cox, supra.<br />
Subsection (6) modifies the last two paragraphs of paragraph<br />
88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to conform to the amendment of<br />
Article 71(c), see Pub. L. No. 98–209, § 5(e), 97 Stat. 1393<br />
(1983). The amendment of Article 71(c) permits confinement to<br />
be ordered executed in the convening authority’s initial action in<br />
all cases. Article 57(d) is intended to permit deferment after this<br />
point, however. See S. Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.<br />
13–14 (1968). Therefore subsection (6) specifically describes four<br />
ways in which deferment may be terminated. The result is consistent<br />
with paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and with Collier v.<br />
United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 511, 42 C.M.R. 113 (1970). Under<br />
subsection (A) the convening authority must specify in the initial<br />
action whether approved confinement is ordered executed, suspended,<br />
or deferred. See R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(B), (E). Under subs<br />
e c t i o n ( B ) , d e f e r m e n t m a y b e t e r m i n a t e d a t a n y t i m e b y<br />
A21-80<br />
suspending the confinement. This is because suspension is more<br />
favorable to the accused than deferment. Subsections (C) and (D)<br />
provide other specific points at which deferment may be terminated.<br />
Deferment may be granted for a specified period (e.g., to<br />
permit the accused to take care of personal matters), or for an<br />
indefinite period (e.g., completion of appellate review). Even if<br />
confinement is deferred for an indefinite period, it may be rescinded<br />
under subsection (D). When deferment is terminated after<br />
the initial action, it will be either suspended or executed. See<br />
subsection (7). The first sentence in the discussion is based on<br />
Article 57(d). The second, third, and fourth sentences are based<br />
on the last two paragraphs of paragraph 88 f of MCM, 1969<br />
(Rev.).<br />
Subsection (7) is based on the last sentence of Article 57(d)<br />
and on Collier v. United States, supra. Note that the information<br />
on which the rescission is based need not be new information, but<br />
only information which was not earlier presented to the authority<br />
granting deferment. Cf. Collier v. United States, supra. Note also<br />
that the deferment may be rescinded and the accused confined<br />
before the accused has an opportunity to submit matters to the<br />
rescinding authority. See United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A.<br />
518, 42 C.M.R. 120 (1970).<br />
Subsection (7)(C) is added based on the amendment of Article<br />
71(c). Confinement after the initial action is not “served.” It is<br />
deferred, suspended, or executed. Therefore, after deferment is<br />
rescinded, it is ordered executed (if not suspended). Subsection<br />
( 7 ) ( C ) p e r m i t s t h e a c c u s e d a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o s u b m i t m a t t e r s<br />
before the order of execution, which precludes deferment under<br />
Article 57(d), is issued.<br />
1991 Amendment: The Discussion accompanying this subsection<br />
was amended to provide for the inclusion of the written basis<br />
for any denial of deferment in the record of trial. Although written<br />
reasons for denials are not mandatory, and their absence from<br />
the record of trial will not per se invalidate a denial decision,<br />
their use is strongly encouraged. See Longhofer v. Hilbert, 23<br />
M.J. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1986).<br />
1998 Amendment: In enacting section 1121 of the National<br />
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-<br />
106, 110 Stat. 186, 462, 464 (1996), Congress amended Article<br />
57(a) to make forfeitures of pay and allowances and reductions in<br />
grade effective either 14 days after being adjudged by a courtmartial,<br />
or when the convening authority takes action in the case,<br />
whichever was earlier in time. Until this change, any forfeiture or<br />
reduction in grade adjudged by the court did not take effect until<br />
convening authority action, which meant the accused often retained<br />
the privileges of his or her rank and pay for up to several<br />
months. The intent of the amendment of Article 57(a) was to<br />
change this situation so that the desired punitive and rehabilitative<br />
impact on the accused occurred more quickly.<br />
Congress, however, desired that a deserving accused be permitted<br />
to request a deferment of any adjudged forfeitures or reduct<br />
i o n i n g r a d e , s o t h a t a c o n v e n i n g a u t h o r i t y , i n a p p r o p r i a t e<br />
situations, might mitigate the effect of Article 57(a).<br />
This change to R.C.M. 1101 is in addition to the change to<br />
R.C.M. 1203. The latter implements Congress’ creation of Article<br />
57(a), giving the Service Secretary concerned the authority to<br />
defer a sentence to confinement pending review under Article<br />
67(a)(2).<br />
(d) Waiving forfeitures resulting from a sentence to confinement<br />
to provide for dependent support. 1998 Amendment: This new